{ "id": 5100995, "name": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. TONY WILLIAMS, Defendant-Appellant", "name_abbreviation": "People v. Williams", "decision_date": "1991-11-08", "docket_number": "No. 1\u201488\u20140597", "first_page": "5", "last_page": "13", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "244 Ill. App. 3d 5" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "244 N.E.2d 136", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "41 Ill. 2d 483", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2852796 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "492" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/41/0483-01" ] }, { "cite": "309 N.E.2d 544", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1969, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "56 Ill. 2d 536", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5405478 ], "year": 1969, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "543" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/56/0536-01" ] }, { "cite": "450 N.E.2d 851", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "115 Ill. App. 3d 276", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3557943 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/115/0276-01" ] }, { "cite": "473 N.E.2d 1246", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1254" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "104 Ill. 2d 504", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3147214 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "524" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/104/0504-01" ] }, { "cite": "144 Ill. 2d 482", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5592622 ], "year": 1968, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "508" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/144/0482-01" ] }, { "cite": "568 N.E.2d 755", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "142 Ill. 2d 410", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3236771 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "437-38" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/142/0410-01" ] }, { "cite": "512 N.E.2d 1183", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "117 Ill. 2d 317", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5545304 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/117/0317-01" ] }, { "cite": "476 U.S. 162", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 12835 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1987, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/476/0162-01" ] }, { "cite": "521 N.E.2d 38", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1987, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "121 Ill. 2d 401", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3201150 ], "year": 1987, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/121/0401-01" ] }, { "cite": "464 N.E.2d 261", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1988, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "102 Ill. 2d 88", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3156187 ], "year": 1988, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/102/0088-01" ] }, { "cite": "467 U.S. 180", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6196731 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1987, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "189-90" }, { "page": "155-56" }, { "page": "2298-99" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/467/0180-01" ] }, { "cite": "406 U.S. 682", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6173132 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "689" }, { "page": "418" }, { "page": "1882" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/406/0682-01" ] }, { "cite": "413 U.S. 300", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 11340271 ], "weight": 6, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "309" }, { "page": "626" }, { "page": "2573" }, { "page": "309" }, { "page": "626" }, { "page": "2573" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/413/0300-01" ] }, { "cite": "506 N.E.2d 571", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 4, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "580" }, { "page": "580" }, { "page": "580" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "116 Ill. 2d 29", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5543054 ], "weight": 4, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "50" }, { "page": "50" }, { "page": "50-51" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/116/0029-01" ] }, { "cite": "564 N.E.2d 803", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1987, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "139 Ill. 2d 89", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5573939 ], "weight": 5, "year": 1987, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "123" }, { "page": "123" }, { "page": "125" }, { "page": "125-26" }, { "page": "126" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/139/0089-01" ] }, { "cite": "391 U.S. 510", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 1767501 ], "weight": 12, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "522" }, { "page": "785" }, { "page": "1777" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/391/0510-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 873, "char_count": 18877, "ocr_confidence": 0.753, "pagerank": { "raw": 4.417441169658951e-08, "percentile": 0.2769761866425417 }, "sha256": "d9b76fc0f9df1c658bcffcd35d15912c9e6f5eff192b7dee0f88b9c71cce0816", "simhash": "1:146a775bcf86cd82", "word_count": 3103 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T19:27:37.423199+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. TONY WILLIAMS, Defendant-Appellant." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE MURRAY\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nDefendant, Tony Williams (Williams), was charged by indictment with the murder of Jennifer Higgenbottom. Following a jury trial, Williams was found guilty of murder. Subsequently, defendant was sentenced to 40 years in the Illinois Department of Corrections. This timely appeal followed.\nOn appeal Williams raises the following issues for review: (1) whether the trial court erred in admitting identification testimony when defendant did not have counsel at a preindictment lineup; (2) whether the trial court erred in allowing the State to question the jury pursuant to Witherspoon v. Illinois (1968), 391 U.S. 510, 20 L. Ed. 2d 776, 88 S. Ct. 1770; and (3) whether the jury was properly instructed on felony murder where defendant was not indicted for armed robbery.\nThe evidence presented at trial indicated that the following events took place.\nOn November 5, 1985, Jennifer Higgenbottom (Jennifer) lived with her mother, brothers and sisters at 11914 South Lafayette. She had been living with Derrick Smith up until two days earlier. At approximately 9 o\u2019clock in the evening on November 5, Derrick Smith (Smith) arrived at the Higgenbottom residence and asked to speak with Jennifer. Jennifer\u2019s brother, Derrick Higgenbottom, told Smith that she was not home since he knew she didn\u2019t want to speak to him. Smith talked to Herman Higgenbottom about getting a television set that he, Smith, claimed belonged to him. Smith maintained the television set had been removed by Jennifer. Herman didn\u2019t know anything about a television set. The two men argued, and Smith told Herman that he would return with \u201csome guys\u201d and take the television.\nSmith left the Higgenbottom residence but returned about a half an hour later. He was accompanied by the defendant, who was carrying a sawed-off shotgun at his side. Both Herman and Derrick Higgenbottom saw defendant get out of Derrick Smith\u2019s car and walk up to their porch. Smith told Herman that he wanted his television set. During the argument Jennifer came to the door. She told Smith to get off her mother\u2019s porch. Jennifer left the door to call the police. Shortly she returned with Michelle Warren. Bonita and Darren Higgenbottom, another sister and brother of Jennifer\u2019s, also saw defendant through the window. Darren also saw the gun in defendant\u2019s hand. The witnesses were able to see defendant\u2019s face since there were lights on inside the house and there was a streetlight on across the street.\nThe argument continued, and Derrick Smith and defendant said something to each other. Herman was unable to hear what was said since there was so much noise. Defendant then raised his gun and shot through the window of the storm door. Defendant\u2019s bullet hit Jennifer in the face and she fell to the floor. Jennifer died as a result of the injuries sustained by the shot fired at her. Both Herman and Darren saw defendant and Smith run off the porch and get into Smith\u2019s car.\nDetective Maslanda arrived at the Higgenbottom home at approximately 10 p.m. to talk with the witnesses. He spoke with them and then began looking for Derrick Smith. The next day the detective went back to the Higgenbottom home and showed an array of pictures to the members of Jennifer\u2019s family. Bonita, Derrick and Herman Higgenbottom viewed the photo array separately. Each person positively identified the defendant as the person he or she saw on the porch with the shotgun. On November 7, 1985, Smith was arrested and a warrant for defendant\u2019s arrest was issued.\nOn December 13, 1986, defendant was arrested. Detective Pedersen conducted a lineup and had Jennifer\u2019s brothers and sisters view it. The Higgenbottoms each viewed the lineup separately. The five members of Jennifer\u2019s family identified defendant in the lineup. The lineup was conducted without benefit of counsel for Williams.\nAt trial the State elected to try this as a capital case. This election was premised upon the murder occurring during the commission of a forcible felony. After the jury returned a guilty verdict on the murder charge, the defendant elected to waive a jury for the death penalty proceedings. The State asserted that the murder was committed during the course of committing or attempting to commit an armed robbery. The State argued that defendant was armed and present with Smith when he demanded the television. Defendant also had stated that he wanted his brother\u2019s property. The State\u2019s position was that since defendant was demanding this property while armed with a shotgun, this murder occurred during an attempted armed robbery. Nevertheless, during the death penalty proceedings, the trial judge found that the crime of attempted armed robbery was not proven beyond a reasonable doubt so that the statutory factor did not exist. Defendant was sentenced to 40 years with the Illinois Department of Corrections.\nWe find no procedural and/or substantive errors in the case, and accordingly, we affirm the conviction and sentence imposed by the trial court.\nI\nFirst Williams argues that although he was advised of his fifth amendment rights there was never advice tendered as to his sixth amendment right to counsel. He maintains that the failure to tender these rights or warnings, and the concomitant failure to secure a waiver, violated Williams\u2019 sixth amendment rights, where a lineup was conducted without benefit of counsel. Williams claims that his sixth amendment right to counsel was violated by not providing him with counsel at the time the lineup was conducted. This contention is totally without merit.\nThe lineup occurred after an arrest on an unrelated charge, 13 months after Jennifer\u2019s murder. Detective Pedersen discovered the outstanding warrant for murder which had been obtained by the police more than one year earlier. Williams was advised of his Miranda rights. He was also informed of the outstanding warrant. Williams agreed to talk to the police officers and participate in a lineup. Williams testified that the police advised him that he had a right to an attorney during questioning but that he had never been informed that he had a right to an attorney during the lineup. Williams never asked for an attorney nor did he state that he did not want to participate in the lineup.\nThe constitutional right to counsel is guaranteed at the time adversary proceedings are initiated, not during the fact-finding process. The right to counsel attaches with the initiation of adversary proceedings against a defendant and that may occur by formal charge, preliminary hearing, indictment, information or arraignment. (People v. Hayes (1990), 139 Ill. 2d 89, 123, 564 N.E.2d 803; People v. Wilson (1987), 116 Ill. 2d 29, 50, 506 N.E.2d 571, 580.) The sixth amendment\u2019s right to counsel guarantee assures that the accused receives the assistance of counsel when confronted with \u201cthe intricacies of the law and the advocacy of the public prosecutor\u201d at trial. (United States v. Ash (1973), 413 U.S. 300, 309, 37 L. Ed. 2d 619, 626, 93 S. Ct. 2568, 2573.) It also insures that the defendant receives the assistance of counsel at certain \u201ccritical\u201d preindictment proceedings, where the accused is confronted by the procedural system, an expert adversary or both, and where the results of the confrontation might determine the defendant\u2019s fate and make the trial itself a mere formality. (United States v. Ash (1973), 413 U.S. 300, 309, 37 L. Ed. 2d 619, 626, 93 S. Ct. 2568, 2573; Kirby v. Illinois (1972), 406 U.S. 682, 689, 32 L. Ed. 2d 411, 418, 92 S. Ct. 1877, 1882; People v. Hayes (1990), 139 Ill. 2d 89, 123, 564 N.E.2d 803.) It has not been held that an arrest by itself triggers the right to counsel. (Wilson, 116 Ill. 2d at 50, 506 N.E.2d at 580, citing United States v. Gouveia (1984), 467 U.S. 180, 189-90, 81 L. Ed. 2d 146, 155-56, 104 S. Ct. 2292, 2298-99.) In People v. Wilson (1987), 116 Ill. 2d 29, 50-51, 506 N.E.2d 571, 580, the Illinois Supreme Court declined to find that adversary proceedings were initiated when a police officer presented a complaint to a judge and an arrest warrant was issued.\nAt the pretrial motion to suppress, Detective Edmund Leracz testified that the arrest warrant for Williams was issued by the police department and that it was not until after a lineup was conducted that the State\u2019s Attorney\u2019s office was contacted. In People v. Hayes, the Illinois Supreme Court stated that People v. Owens (1984), 102 Ill. 2d 88, 464 N.E.2d 261, People v. Thompkins (1988), 121 Ill. 2d 401, 521 N.E.2d 38, and People v. Wilson (1987), 116 Ill. 2d 29, 506 N.E.2d 571, demonstrate that in determining whether an accused\u2019s sixth amendment right to counsel attaches upon the filing of a criminal complaint, the court must consider the degree to which the State\u2019s prosecutorial forces have focused upon the accused. (Hayes, 139 Ill. 2d at 125.) In Hayes the prosecutor reviewed the criminal complaint against the defendant before it was filed in the circuit court. The court stated that \u201c[t]he prosecutor\u2019s involvement in the procurement of the warrant, however, was not significant and did not signal a commitment by the State to prosecute the defendant.\u201d (139 Ill. 2d at 125-26.) The complaint for preliminary examination had been presented by a police officer, not an assistant State\u2019s Attorney. The Hayes court went on to say \u201c[t]he fact that a warrant was obtained prior to the defendant\u2019s arrest was not sufficient to create trial-like confrontation contemplated by the sixth amendment.\u201d Hayes, 139 Ill. 2d at 126.\nThe arrest warrant was obtained by police officers, and the State\u2019s Attorney\u2019s office was only contacted after the defendant\u2019s lineup. Moreover, no formal charge, preliminary hearing, indictment, information or arraignment occurred until after defendant\u2019s identification in the lineup. At the time of the lineup the prosecutorial involvement was minimal; thus, for the reasons set forth above, we find that there was no violation of defendant\u2019s right to counsel.\nFurther, we note that Williams admits that \u201clineups conducted before indictment or some formal judiciary proceeding do not trigger the right to counsel,\u201d but suggests an exception in this case because Williams \u201chad, to all but the disengenuious [sic], become the accused.\u201d We disagree with defendant\u2019s argument, and in this era of senseless killings and rising crime rate, we find no reason to create an exception to the aforecited rule.\nII\nTwelve prospective jurors were excused for cause because they were not acceptable under the rule in Witherspoon v. Illinois (1968), 391 U.S. 510, 20 L. Ed. 2d 776, 88 S. Ct. 1770. \u201cWither-spoon\u201d is a word that cannot as yet be found in Webster\u2019s various dictionaries. It is also a word unknown to the common law. It found its origin in the case of Witherspoon v. Illinois (1968), 391 U.S. 510, 20 L. Ed. 2d 776, 88 S. Ct. 1770. To \u201cWitherspoon\u201d has become known as questioning a jury about its feelings regarding the death penalty.\nWilliams argues that the excusal of the jurors, which the defense found to be acceptable, deprived him of his right to a fair trial. He maintains that failure to grant a mistrial, as requested by the defense, further compounded the error. The defendant argues that Witherspoon-qualified juries are conviction prone and that the dismissal of satisfactory prospective jurors, but for their feelings toward the death penalty, was error. Defense counsel concludes argument on this issue by stating, \u201c[e]ven if the normal qualifying of jurors in a death penalty case, pursuant to Witherspoon, is not violative of a fair trial, certainly the ruse of death eligibility, for the purpose of eliminating otherwise capable (not to mention favorable to the defense) prospective jurors deprived Mr. Williams of a fair trial.\u201d\nBoth the United States Supreme Court and the Illinois Supreme Court have found that a jury questioned regarding the death penalty is presumed to be a fair jury on the question of guilt or innocence. (Lockhart v. McCree (1986), 476 U.S. 162, 90 L. Ed. 2d 137, 106 S. Ct. 1758; People v. Shum (1987), 117 Ill. 2d 317, 512 N.E.2d 1183.) Thus, we find that defendant\u2019s argument that Witherspoon juries are conviction prone lacks merit. A trial court which is qualifying a jury pursuant to Witherspoon is in the best position to determine whether a prospective juror would be fair and, as such, deference must be paid to the trial judge who sees and hears the veniremen. (People v. Morgan (1991), 142 Ill. 2d 410, 437-38, 568 N.E.2d 755.) The defendant does not address this argument in terms of the dismissal of any particular juror. The defendant\u2019s argument consisted only of general conclusory statements. After a careful review of the record, we find no evidence to support defendant\u2019s argument that the jury was conviction prone.\nFinally, the issue of the death penalty, contrary to the argument of the defendant, was properly pursued. The thrust of the State\u2019s case was that Jennifer\u2019s murder had been effected during an armed robbery. Defense counsel was aware prior to the voir dire process that the State was seeking the death penalty in this case. However, it was not until the second day of jury selection that defense counsel objected to the questions concerning the death penalty. Defense counsel requested a mistrial, or in the alternative, a dismissal of the jurors that had already been selected since the felony of armed robbery was not part of the indictment. The trial judge denied the motion for a mistrial and continued the voir dire questioning pursuant to Witherspoon.\n\u201cThe erroneous exclusion of a prospective juror because of the person\u2019s views regarding capital punishment, though it will not vitiate the jury\u2019s determination of guilt, will necessitate a new sentencing hearing.\u201d (People v. Seuffer (1991), 144 Ill. 2d 482, 508, citing Witherspoon v. Illinois (1968), 391 U.S. 510, 522, 20 L. Ed. 2d 776, 785, 88 S. Ct. 1770, 1777.) The Illinois Supreme Court in People v. Albanese (1984), 104 Ill. 2d 504, 524, 473 N.E.2d 1246, 1254, reaffirmed the Witherspoon questioning but found that the defendant\u2019s argument concerning the jury\u2019s impartiality to be irrelevant since the trial judge, rather than the jury, made the sentencing decision.\nSince Williams waived a jury for the death penalty proceedings in this case, the jury was never asked to determine Williams\u2019 sentence. We do not believe that the trial judge erred in disqualifying any jurors pursuant to Witherspoon questioning; however, even if any error existed, the argument is irrelevant due to the fact that the trial judge rather than the jury made the sentencing decision.\nWe find nothing in the record or the defendant\u2019s argument to support his allegations that the jury was conviction prone nor do we find any support for the allegation that Williams was denied his right to a fair trial. Furthermore, we do not believe the trial judge erred in refusing to grant a mistrial.\nIll\nWilliams argues that instruction on attempted armed robbery, as the basis for felony-murder accountability in this case, was unwarranted, confusing and error, especially when considering the later finding of ineligibility.\nThe jury was given Illinois Pattern Jury Instructions, Criminal, No. 7.01 (2d ed. 1981), which states:\n\u201cA person commits *** murder when he kills an individual without lawful justification if, in performing the acts which cause death, he is attempting to commit the offense of armed robbery.\u201d\nWilliams was not indicted for armed robbery nor was he convicted of the same. Defense counsel objected to the instruction on the basis that defendant was not charged with the offense of armed robbery. After arguments for the State, the trial judge ruled that the instruction would be given over defendant\u2019s objection.\nAs a general proposition of law, both the State and the defendant are entitled to instructions which present their respective theories, even though they are supported by slight evidence. (People v. Williams (1983), 115 Ill. App. 3d 276, 450 N.E.2d 851.) The State\u2019s theory of the case was based on its original contention that Williams killed Jennifer while attempting to commit the armed robbery of a television set.\nSupporting the State\u2019s theory were four witnesses who saw the defendant on the porch with a sawed-off shotgun. At the time, defendant was with Smith and Smith was demanding a television set. Williams told Herman Higgenbottom \u201che wanted his brother\u2019s s \u2014 .\u201d When the victim came back from calling the police, Williams shot her. This evidence justified the instruction, despite the fact that at the death penalty portion of the trial the trial judge determined that armed robbery was not proven beyond a reasonable doubt. Had the defendant been misled in his defense or exposed to double jeopardy, giving the instruction would have been error.\nIn People v. Allen (1974), 56 Ill. 2d 536, 543, 309 N.E.2d 544, the jury was given an instruction on felony murder even though the defendant was indicted for murder and not felony murder. The Allen court quoted the following from People v. Rosochacki (1969), 41 Ill. 2d 483, 492, 244 N.E.2d 136:\n\u201cWe find that the defendant here was charged with murder and convicted of that crime, and even if a variance did exist between the type of murder charged in the indictment and the types described in the instructions, it would not vitiate the conviction unless it was of such a character as to mislead the defendant in his defense or expose him to double jeopardy. [Citations.] There is no evidence in this case whatsoever that the defendant was misled in his defense, nor did counsel at any time during the proceedings request additional time, allege surprise, or claim that it was impossible for him to prepare a defense to the proof being offered against him.\u201d\nWilliams was notified prior to trial that the State would be proceeding under the felony-murder theory. Defense counsel did not allege surprise nor did he ask for a continuance for the purpose of preparing a defense to this charge. Nothing in the record indicates either that Williams was misled or that he was exposed to double jeopardy. Accordingly, we do not believe that the trial court erred in giving the instruction.\nFor all of the above reasons, we affirm the conviction and sentence imposed by the trial court.\nJudgment affirmed.\nLORENZ, P.J., and McNULTY, J., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE MURRAY" } ], "attorneys": [ "Randolph N. Stone, Public Defender, of Chicago (Edwin A. Burnette, Assistant Public Defender, of counsel), for appellant.", "Jack O\u2019Malley, State\u2019s Attorney, of Chicago (Christine Perille and Kathleen Hewlett, Special Assistant State\u2019s Attorneys, and Renee Goldfarb, Assistant State\u2019s Attorney, of counsel), for the People." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. TONY WILLIAMS, Defendant-Appellant.\nFirst District (5th Division)\nNo. 1\u201488\u20140597\nOpinion filed November 8,1991.\nRandolph N. Stone, Public Defender, of Chicago (Edwin A. Burnette, Assistant Public Defender, of counsel), for appellant.\nJack O\u2019Malley, State\u2019s Attorney, of Chicago (Christine Perille and Kathleen Hewlett, Special Assistant State\u2019s Attorneys, and Renee Goldfarb, Assistant State\u2019s Attorney, of counsel), for the People." }, "file_name": "0005-01", "first_page_order": 25, "last_page_order": 33 }