{
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  "name": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. BRADLEY PHILLIPS, Defendant-Appellant",
  "name_abbreviation": "People v. Phillips",
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    "judges": [],
    "parties": [
      "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. BRADLEY PHILLIPS, Defendant-Appellant."
    ],
    "opinions": [
      {
        "text": "JUSTICE RIZZI\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nDefendant, Bradley Phillips, was convicted of first degree murder (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 38, par. 9 \u2014 1) and attempted armed robbery (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 38, pars. 8 \u2014 4, 18 \u2014 2) in a jury trial and sentenced to an extended term of 60 years\u2019 imprisonment to run consecutively with a term of 15 years\u2019 imprisonment. On appeal, defendant contends that (1) the prosecutor committed reversible error when he misstated the law during closing arguments; (2) he received ineffective assistance of counsel; (3) the trial court erred when it failed to appoint counsel to argue his pro se post-trial motion alleging ineffective assistance of counsel; and (4) his sentence is excessive and should be vacated or reduced. We affirm the judgments of conviction of first degree murder and attempted armed robbery, and remand for re-sentencing.\nThe victim, Kenneth Hardy, was approached by defendant and Andre Collins near his home in Chicago, Illinois. Defendant demanded money from Hardy. Hardy resisted. Defendant then shot Hardy once in the chest at close range. Hardy died shortly thereafter. Defendant and Collins were subsequently arrested and charged with murder and armed robbery. Collins pled guilty to attempted armed robbery and agreed to testify against defendant at trial.\nDefendant first contends that the prosecutor committed reversible error when he misstated the law during closing arguments. In his closing remarks to the jury, the prosecutor stated:\n\u201cAs you sit there now, do you have any doubt whatsoever that one of those three individuals killed Kenneth Hardy? And second, this is the second thing we need to prove, that when [defendant] did so, *** he was attempting to commit the offense of armed robbery. Do you have any doubt? Forget this reasonable doubt stuff. Do you have any doubt?\u201d\nWe find that the prosecutor\u2019s closing statements here do not lessen the State\u2019s burden of proving defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt or otherwise interfere with defendant\u2019s right to a fair and impartial trial. See People v. Smith, (1991), 220 Ill. App. 3d 39, 47, 580 N.E.2d 891, 896.\nDefendant next contends that he received ineffective assistance of counsel because defense counsel failed to object to certain prejudicial hearsay statements allegedly made by defendant to Andre Collins. At trial, Collins testified that while he and defendant were in jail, defendant stated to him that \u201c[Collins\u2019] mother was going to rot in hell\u201d for testifying against him and \u201cthat if he can\u2019t get me in the penitentiary, he was going to get my mama.\u201d Defendant argues that defense counsel\u2019s failure to object to Collins\u2019 irrelevant and highly prejudicial testimony renders his assistance of counsel ineffective. Contrary to defendant\u2019s assertions, however, the record here indicates that defense counsel strenuously objected to Collins\u2019 testimony, but that his objections were overruled by the trial court. Our further review of the record in its entirety reveals that defense counsel\u2019s representation of defendant here did not fall below the objective standard of competence enunciated in Strickland v. Washington (1984), 466 U.S. 668, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674, 104 S. Ct. 2052.\nDefendant next contends that the trial court erred when it failed to appoint counsel to argue his pro se post-trial motion alleging ineffective assistance of counsel. The trial court may summarily dismiss a pro se post-trial motion alleging ineffective assistance of counsel without appointing counsel if, after conducting a preliminary investigation of the factual matters underlying the motion, it determines that the allegations are spurious. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 38, par. 116-1; People v. Nitz (1991), 143 Ill. 2d 82, 134-35, 572 N.E.2d 895, 919.) After reviewing the circumstances surrounding defendant\u2019s allegations of ineffective assistance of counsel, we cannot say that the trial court erred when it failed to appoint counsel to argue defendant\u2019s pro se post-trial motion.\nDefendant finally contends that his sentence should be vacated or reduced because the factors justifying an extended-term sentence are not present here. The trial court may sentence a defendant to an extended term of up to 80 years\u2019 imprisonment where a murder is accompanied by, inter alia, exceptionally brutal or heinous behavior indicative of wanton cruelty. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 38, pars. 1005\u20148\u20142, 1005\u20145\u20143.2(b)(2).) Additionally, the trial court may impose consecutive sentences if the nature and circumstances of the offense and the history and character of a defendant require the imposition of consecutive sentences in order to protect the public from further criminal conduct. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 38, par. 1005\u20148\u20144.) At the sentencing hearing, the trial court stated:\n\u201cThe Court is familiar with the facts giving rise to the jury\u2019s guilty verdict, the circumstances of the case and the matters which have been ably presented here both in aggravation and mitigation, the materials contained in the pre-sentence invest\u00edgation report, and the statutory factors both in aggravation and mitigation in regards to the general sentencing provisions of the Unified Code of Corrections. ***\nMr. Hardy lost his life because he made [defendant] angry or mad, that he was gunned down with what the Court could well interpret as a willful and wanton act indicative of wanton cruelty, an execution. * * *\nThere was no evidence that [defendant] acted under any provocation, justification or that his conduct was induced or facilitated by someone other than himself. *** To deter [defendant], which the Court believes has willfully and wantonly taken the life of another human being under such circumstances indicative of wanton cruelty, it will be the judgment of this Court that insofar as the charge of murder is concerned, defendant shall be sentenced to the Illinois Department of Corrections for a determinant sentence of 60 years; and insofar as the charge of attempt armed robbery, the Court will impose a sentence of 15 years. It will further be the order of the Court *** that the sentences that are imposed this day shall run consecutively.\u201d\nWhile we may agree with the trial court that defendant\u2019s action was accompanied by exceptionally brutal or heinous behavior indicative of wanton cruelty warranting justification of an extended-term sentence, we are compelled by the supreme court\u2019s holding in People v. Andrews (1989), 132 Ill. 2d 451, 466-67, 548 N.E.2d 1025, 1031-32, to find that the trial court abused its discretion in sentencing defendant to an extended term.\nAccordingly, the judgments of conviction of first degree murder and attempted armed robbery are affirmed and the case remanded for resentencing.\nAffirmed in part; vacated in part and remanded.\nTULLY, P.J., and CERDA, J., concur.",
        "type": "majority",
        "author": "JUSTICE RIZZI"
      }
    ],
    "attorneys": [
      "Rita A. Fry, Public Defender, of Chicago (Henry L. Hams, Assistant Public Defender, of counsel), for appellant.",
      "Jack O\u2019Malley, State\u2019s Attorney, of Chicago (Renee Goldfarb, Barbara Jones, and Brian Holmes, Assistant State\u2019s Attorneys, of counsel), for the People."
    ],
    "corrections": "",
    "head_matter": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. BRADLEY PHILLIPS, Defendant-Appellant.\nFirst District (3rd Division)\nNo. 1\u201489\u20141513\nOpinion filed March 26, 1993.\nRita A. Fry, Public Defender, of Chicago (Henry L. Hams, Assistant Public Defender, of counsel), for appellant.\nJack O\u2019Malley, State\u2019s Attorney, of Chicago (Renee Goldfarb, Barbara Jones, and Brian Holmes, Assistant State\u2019s Attorneys, of counsel), for the People."
  },
  "file_name": "0237-01",
  "first_page_order": 257,
  "last_page_order": 260
}