{ "id": 5099530, "name": "MICHAEL E. MARTIN, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. STATE JOURNAL-REGISTER, a Division of the Copley Press, Inc., Defendants-Appellees", "name_abbreviation": "Martin v. State Journal-Register", "decision_date": "1993-04-29", "docket_number": "No. 4\u201492\u20140915", "first_page": "955", "last_page": "965", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "244 Ill. App. 3d 955" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "477 U.S. 242", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6206897 ], "weight": 6, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "244" }, { "page": "209" }, { "page": "2508" }, { "page": "254" }, { "page": "215" }, { "page": "2513" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/477/0242-01" ] }, { "cite": "532 N.E.2d 790", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "pin_cites": [ { "page": "797" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "125 Ill. 2d 402", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5554718 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "418-19" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/125/0402-01" ] }, { "cite": "585 N.E.2d 1164", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1167" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "223 Ill. App. 3d 819", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5256165 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "823-24" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/223/0819-01" ] }, { "cite": "569 N.E.2d 1160", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 3, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1163" }, { "page": "1163" }, { "page": "1166" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "211 Ill. App. 3d 145", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2526953 ], "weight": 3, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "151" }, { "page": "151" }, { "page": "154-55" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/211/0145-01" ] }, { "cite": "376 U.S. 254", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 379234 ], "weight": 6, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "279-80" }, { "page": "706" }, { "page": "726" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/376/0254-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 1050, "char_count": 25963, "ocr_confidence": 0.76, "pagerank": { "raw": 6.655012148852098e-08, "percentile": 0.40550723227493185 }, "sha256": "dd44aefcc73eb91f9023b9dd6d945347f34d74c8bc67125ffca96141177d08ac", "simhash": "1:ee66020d0d543af1", "word_count": 4235 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T19:27:37.423199+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "MICHAEL E. MARTIN, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. STATE JOURNAL-REGISTER, a Division of the Copley Press, Inc., Defendants-Appellees." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "PRESIDING JUSTICE STEIGMANN\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nIn July 1986, plaintiff, Michael E. Martin (an. officer with the Illinois Department of Conservation (DOC)), sued defendants, the State Journal-Register (a Springfield newspaper) and Pam Portado Gibson (a free-lance writer for the State Journal-Register), for libel. Plaintiff\u2019s suit arose out of an article Gibson wrote that accused Martin of abusing his position as a conservation officer. In June 1992, defendants moved for summary judgment under section 2 \u2014 1005 of the Code of Civil Procedure (Code) (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1991, ch. 110, par. 2\u20141005), claiming in essence that no genuine issue of material fact existed regarding whether Gibson wrote the article with actual malice as required by New York Times Co. v. Sullivan (1964), 376 U.S. 254, 11 L. Ed. 2d 686, 84 S. Ct. 710. In August 1992, the trial court conducted a hearing on this motion and granted it. Plaintiff appeals from the order granting summary judgment for defendants.\nWe affirm.\nI. Background\nDuring 1986, Gibson wrote a weekly free-lance column on environmental issues for the State Journal-Register, entitled \u201cWildlife window.\u201d During this time, plaintiff worked as a DOC officer. In January and February 1986, Commonwealth Edison used fenthion to kill an estimated 270,000 starlings at its plant near Lake Sangchris State Park. However, several other wild and domestic animals, including some great horned owls and a mink, died from secondary poisoning when they preyed on the starlings.\nGibson wrote a series of articles about this incident. The fifth article, entitled \u201cLegislation needed to avert another wildlife tragedy,\u201d accused Martin of taking two of the owls that died from fenthion poisoning to a taxidermist for stuffing to add to \u201chis decor.\u201d In pertinent part, the article stated the following:\n\u201cBut now sources report Conservation Police Officer Mike Martin sent \u2018his own owl,\u2019 found dead on New Year\u2019s Eve, to a taxidermist for stuffing for \u2018his decor.\u2019 Martin is reported to have sent a second owl to the same taxidermist. A dead mink, found with the first owl, was reportedly \u2018trashed.\u2019 Apparently it didn\u2019t fit in with the Martin\u2019s [sic] decor.\nThe DOC then sent Martin to take statements from the taxidermist and the veterinarians. Now that\u2019s covering your bases or something. The matter takes on more weight when it was left up to me to tell Temple Reynolds [the Director of the DOC Law Enforcement Division, who was on vacation during the fenthion crisis], after five weeks of \u2018investigation,\u2019 how long the DOC had really known a secondary wildlife kill was occurring.\u201d (State Journal-Register, Feb. 28, 1986, at 29.)\nAlthough the article did not so state, Martin\u2019s conduct as described in the article arguably constituted the crimes of official misconduct (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 38, par. 33 \u2014 3) and possession of a protected bird of prey without a permit (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 61, pars. 2.4, 3.5). His conduct also would have violated several DOC regulations.\nIn July 1986, plaintiff sued the State Journal-Register and Gibson, claiming that the following four statements from Gibson\u2019s article libelled him: (1) that plaintiff took the first owl to a taxidermist; (2) that plaintiff sent a second owl to a taxidermist; (3) that plaintiff threw a dead mink in the garbage; and (4) that plaintiff did not faithfully and correctly fulfill his duties as an officer when he interviewed the taxidermist. Plaintiff further alleged that (1) he did not take the owls to a taxidermist, someone else did; (2) he did not throw a mink away; and (3) he \u201cdid take statements from the taxidermist and from all persons having contact with the owls in question.\u201d He also alleged that the only time he possessed the owls was when he confiscated them from the taxidermist (pursuant to orders from his supervisor) and brought them to the Springfield DOC office.\nIn addition, plaintiff claimed that Gibson failed to verify her sources by checking her story with the taxidermist, the people who found the dead owls, the University of Illinois (which tested the dead owls for fenthion poisoning), or plaintiff. Plaintiff alleged that as a result of Gibson\u2019s failure to verify her sources, she knowingly, intentionally, willfully, and maliciously published \u201cfalse, scandalous and malicious libels concerning Plaintiff *** with the intent to injure Plaintiff\u2019s good name and *** reputation.\u201d In addition to general damages, plaintiff sought $750,000 in punitive damages from Gibson and the State Journal-Register.\nIn June 1992, defendants moved for summary judgment under section 2 \u2014 1005 of the Code. In support of their motion, defendants attached five affidavits. The first came from James Moak, who served as the Chief of the Wildlife Resources Division of the DOC at the time of the article. His affidavit confirmed the facts regarding the fenthion poisoning and Martin\u2019s connection to the owls. In pertinent part, it stated the following:\n\u201cAs reported by Pam Portado Gibson in The State Journal-Register, in early 1986 many species of wildlife, and some domestic animals, died in the area of the Commonwealth Edison Plant and the Lake Sangchris State Park. Great horned owls and other protected species of wildlife were killed. *** Pam Portado Gibson investigated and reported this story. I spoke frequently with her in connection with this story. We discussed the importance of recovering sick and dead wildlife to test them as quickly as possible for poisoning ***. We discussed the fact that two great horned owls and a mink had been located at the Norris Hill Taxidermy Shop in Taylorville, that the Department had not been notified of the deaths of these predators, and that these carcasses had not been tested for fenthion poisoning.\n*** Prior to publication of the February 28, 1986[,] article[,] Ms. Gibson requested that I explain to her the procedure for handling carcasses of protected species. I explained that there was a formal procedure, even in the absence of the fenthion crises [sic], and that collection permits and tags were required for the collection or transportation of protected species. *** Prior to the publication of the *** article, Ms. Gibson asked me whether the Division of Wildlife Resources had received a request for a permit relating to the two owls which were located at Norris Hill\u2019s Taxidermy Shop ***, and I informed her of my findings that no permits had been applied for or issued which would have allowed for the transportation of the owls. I then subsequently checked almost daily and found that no permit was ever applied for.\n*** I investigated this matter at Ms. Gibson\u2019s request. My investigation revealed that Conservation Police Officer Mike Martin had improperly authorized the collection and transfer of the owls to the Norris Hill Taxidermy Shop in Taylorville, to be prepared for decor, at the height of the fenthion crisis. I informed Ms. Gibson prior to the publication of the *** article that a conservation police officer does not have the authority to permit citizens to take possession and transport the carcass of a protected species, even in the absence of the fenthion crises [sic]. The Department immediately ordered the owls retrieved from the taxidermist and sent them for testing upon learning of their existence.\n*** Prior to the publication of the *** article, Ms. Gibson contacted me concerning the accuracy of her article. In a telephone conversation, she read to me the article in its entirety, prior to its publication. The article was truthful, and I verified and confirmed it. Mike Martin [had] referred to the owls as his own owls, I referred to the owls as \u2018Martin\u2019s own owls, \u2019 and I informed Ms. Gibson of these facts. \u201d (Emphasis added.)\nThe second affidavit came from Dan Troemper, the Chief of Public Lands for the DOC. He swore that on February 19, 1986 (over a week before the State Journal-Register published the article in question), Gibson asked him to investigate whether the taxidermist possessed the owls. Troemper stated that he phoned Norris Hill, the taxidermist, who told Troemper that he did have the owls, which Hill called \u201cMartin\u2019s own owls.\u201d Troemper also stated that \u201cTaxidermist Hill [also] said to me *** that a dead mink found with the first owl was \u2018trashed\u2019.\u201d He added that he had referred to the owls as \u201cMartin\u2019s owls\u201d in several separate conversations, including one with Gibson. Troemper did not mention anything in his affidavit about Martin\u2019s alleged desire to use the owls for \u201chis decor.\u201d\nThe third affidavit came from Charles Tamminga, who worked as the head of the DOC Public Information Division and was in charge of press releases and communications with the press. Tamminga swore that Gibson customarily contacted him regarding the factual accuracy of her articles before she published them, and that she did so regarding the February 28 article. She had read to him the entire article, and he \u201cinvestigated its truth.\u201d He contacted Larry Closson (one of plaintiff\u2019s supervisors at the time) and Troemper, who told him that \u201ctwo owls had been delivered to a taxidermist on Mike Martin\u2019s instructions.\u201d Tamminga therefore \u201c[contacted] Pam Fortado Gibson and informed her that I had checked every part of her story and my investigation on behalf of the Department of Conservation could not refute or disprove her story.\u201d\nThe fourth affidavit came from Phil Chiles, a DOC employee who worked under Tamminga. He also swore that Gibson customarily checked the accuracy of her articles with him, and that she did so regarding the February 28 article. He added that he told her that people within DOC had referred to the owls as \u201c \u2018Martin\u2019s owls,\u2019 in that he had authority over the owls in questions.\u201d\nThe fifth affidavit came from Rick Wenneborg, a minister of a church in Chatham. He swore that he spoke to an employee of the Chatham Veterinary Clinic from whom plaintiff had taken statements about the owls. The employee told Wenneborg that as plaintiff asked questions of the employee and others at the clinic, plaintiff had referred to the owls as \u201c \u2018his owls.\u2019 \u201d Wenneborg added that \u201c[a] reference was also made to the effect that at least one owl was to be used in his \u2018decor\u2019 \u201d and that he \u201crelayed [all] the above information to Pam Fortado Gibson by phone later that same day.\u201d\nDefendants also attached a transcript of Gibson\u2019s discovery deposition to their motion. In that deposition, Gibson testified that she had continued writing her column for the State Journal-Register until January 1991, when the managing editor cut her column. She testified that she had submitted the column weekly, and Ed Armstrong would edit it for grammar, syntax, and coherence. Although Armstrong would sometimes discuss with her the tact involved in writing about sensitive topics, he did not do so regarding the February 28 article because they did not consider it a sensitive topic. She added that Armstrong trusted her generally and thus did not often request her to verify her sources.\nRegarding the February 28 article, Gibson stated in her deposition that she spoke to all of the people who provided the above affidavits and used them and others as sources for her article. In particular, Moak had told her that no one had obtained a permit to transfer the owls to the taxidermist (as required by law), and that plaintiff and others had referred to the owls as if they were plaintiff\u2019s own owls. She testified that Orville Gosnell and Dan Troemper told her that plaintiff planned to use the owls for \u201chis decor.\u201d (The record does not reveal who Orville Gosnell was other than that he passed away prior to the litigation in this case.)\nShe also said that she spoke to Jim Helfrich, whom Gibson identified as \u201cthe second top man in [DOC],\u201d about the article because she respected Helfrich\u2019s desire to not make \u201claw enforcement look bad.\u201d She claimed that, despite these concerns, Helfrich suggested that she \u201cgo forward with the article,\u201d and that Helfrich told her that \u201che [had] checked it all out.\u201d She later added that Troemper, Chiles, and Tamminga \u2014 whom she identified as the three people responsible for DOC relations with the media \u2014 had all informed her that plaintiff had sent \u201chis own owl\u201d to the taxidermist. She also noted that she had seen notes written by Mike Connalin \u2014 whom she identified as the acting head of the DOC Law Enforcement Division in Temple Reynolds\u2019 absence \u2014 that identified the owls as \u201cMartin\u2019s own owls.\u201d\nIn response to defendants\u2019 motion for summary judgment, plaintiff submitted two affidavits. The first came from Larry Closson, the Chief of the DOC Law Enforcement Division, who swore that Gibson contacted him the week after she published the article, saying that she wanted to present plaintiff\u2019s side of the story in the next week\u2019s column because \u201cshe had printed her people\u2019s side\u201d of the story. (The record does not reveal whether Gibson ever did publish \u201cplaintiff\u2019s side\u201d of the story.) Closson added that \u201cGibson said she felt that [plaintiff] had misused the word \u2018my\u2019 when referring to the owls and that her people interpreted that as meaning the owls were Martin\u2019s personally. She stated that she knew for sure that one was mounted for a schoolf,] but that she writes what her people told her.\u201d (Emphasis added.)\nThe second affidavit from plaintiff came from A1 Mickelson, an employee who worked at the DOC during the time at issue. Mickelson swore that Gibson spoke to him at least three times before the article appeared in the State Journal-Register, speaking in terms that indicated that she thought the owls would be stuffed for a school, not for Martin\u2019s decor. Mickelson also swore that other information he received from her indicated that \u2014 independent of the fenthion crisis and the owl stuffings \u2014 Gibson did not like Martin and considered him a bad and dishonest conservation officer, thereby revealing a suggested bias Gibson held against plaintiff.\nAt the August 1992 hearing on their motion for summary judgment, defendants argued that the trial court should grant their motions because no genuine issue of material fact existed regarding New York Times malice, a required element of plaintiff\u2019s case. After considering the above affidavits and deposition, the trial court granted summary judgment for defendants, and plaintiff appeals that order.\nII. Analysis\nA court appropriately grants summary judgment when the pleadings, depositions, affidavits, and admissions on file reveal that no genuine issue of material fact exists and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. (Miller v. Danville Elks Lodge 332 (1991), 211 Ill. App. 3d 145, 151, 569 N.E.2d 1160, 1163.) When considering a motion for summary judgment, a court should interpret the record in favor of the party opposing the motion. (Miller, 211 Ill. App. 3d at 151, 569 N.E.2d at 1163.) Because a motion for summary judgment involves only legal issues and does not require the trial court to use its discretion regarding fact-finding or assessing the credibility of witnesses, an appellate court reviews a trial court\u2019s grant of summary judgment de novo and affords the trial court\u2019s decision no deference. Shull v. Harristown Township (1992), 223 Ill. App. 3d 819, 823-24, 585 N.E.2d 1164, 1167.\nIn libel cases involving a reporter\u2019s comments about a public figure, the United States Supreme Court held in New York Times (376 U.S. at 279-80, 11 L. Ed. 2d at 706, 84 S. Ct. at 726) that the plaintiff must prove that the reporter published the material at issue with \u201cactual malice.\u201d (See Costello v. Capital Cities Communications, Inc. (1988), 125 Ill. 2d 402, 418-19, 532 N.E.2d 790, 797.) New York Times \u201cactual malice\u201d exists if (1) the defendant knew that the statement was false, or (2) the defendant made the statement with reckless disregard as to its truth. (Miller, 211 Ill. App. 3d at 154-55, 569 N.E.2d at 1166.) If the plaintiff fails to prove New York Times \u201cactual malice,\u201d then a qualified privilege protects reporters from libel lawsuits. Further, although the plaintiff need only prove the common law elements of libel by a preponderance of the evidence, the plaintiff must prove New York Times \u201cactual malice\u201d by clear and convincing evidence in order to overcome the reporter\u2019s qualified privilege. (Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc. (1986), 477 U.S. 242, 244, 91 L. Ed. 2d 202, 209, 106 S. Ct. 2505, 2508.)\n\u201cWhen determining if a genuine factual issue as to actual malice exists [at the summary judgment stage of a] libel suit brought by a public figure, a trial judge must bear in mind *** [that] there is no genuine issue [of material fact] if the evidence presented in the opposing affidavits is of insufficient caliber or quantity to allow a rational finder of fact to find actual malice by clear and convincing evidence.\u201d Anderson, 477 U.S. at 254, 91 L. Ed. 2d at 215, 106 S. Ct. at 2513.\nEven though almost 30 years have passed since the Supreme Court decided New York Times, confusion still exists over the \u201cactual malice\u201d standard, mostly because the Supreme Court unfortunately chose the term \u201cmalice\u201d to describe the mental state a reporter must possess to lose his qualified privilege. The \u201cdictionary\u201d meaning of the term \u201cmalice\u201d \u2014 \u201c[t]he desire to harm others, or to see others suffer; ill will; spite\u201d (American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language 790 (1975))\u2014 differs completely from the meaning given to it by the Supreme Court as a term of art in libel cases involving a reporter\u2019s comments about public figures. As commentators have noted, although \u201cthe Court used the word \u2018malice,\u2019 it was not referring to the old, common law libel meaning of \u2018malice\u2019 as hatefulness or ill will; [instead], from its defin\u00edtion, the Court meant \u2018scienter.\u2019 \u201d (4 R. Rotunda & J. Nowak, Treatise on Constitutional Law \u00a720.33, at 202 (2d ed. 1992).) To avoid confusion, we will refer to \u201cactual malice\u201d under New York Times as \u201cNew York Times malice.\u201d\nThe confusion engendered by the Supreme Court\u2019s unfortunate choice of \u201cmalice\u201d as a term of art appears in this very case. Plaintiff argues several irrelevant matters regarding Gibson\u2019s alleged bias, deficient reporting methods, and general lack of integrity. Regarding her bias, most of the facts in the affidavits submitted by plaintiff, as well as most of the arguments in plaintiff\u2019s brief, focus on proving that Gibson did not like plaintiff or, at a minimum, did not want him to be a conservation officer because she considered him dishonest and uncommitted. Plaintiff also focuses on portions of Gibson\u2019s deposition in which this ill will again manifests itself. However, none of these allegations pertains to whether Gibson made the statements at issue with New York Times malice. Gibson might very well have hated plaintiff \u2014 even though nothing in the record suggests she did \u2014 and thus wanted him removed from the DOC when she published the article in question, but such animosity would provide nothing more than a suggested motive behind her New York Times malice. More specifically, her ill will could not prove (or even suggest) that she published the statements in question either knowing they were false or with a reckless disregard for their truth.\nAs mentioned earlier, defendants attached to their motion for summary judgment several affidavits from people who all held positions of authority and knowledge regarding the incident at issue and who all swore in their affidavits that they served as sources for the article. The existence of these sources completely ends this matter. Indeed, Moak\u2019s affidavit provided perhaps the strongest defense possible to claims of New York Times malice wherein it stated the following: \u201cIn a telephone conversation, she read *** the article [to me] in its entirety, prior to its publication. The article was truthful, and I verified and confirmed it.\u201d (Emphasis added.)\nWe consider the existence of these affidavits, which reveal Gibson\u2019s sources, wholly dispositive. Even assuming that everything Gibson wrote in the article regarding plaintiff was completely false, plaintiff\u2019s complaint would rest with Gibson\u2019s sources, not Gibson or the newspaper.\nPlaintiff suggests that Gibson actually suspected or should have known that her sources did not provide her with accurate information. However, New York Times malice does not incorporate mere suspicions or what a reporter should have known. Instead, it requires that the reporter actually knew that the information was false or acted with such disregard for the truth as to rise to the level of recklessness. The record indicates that Gibson either believed her sources or \u2014 at the worst\u2014 merely suspected that they might not have provided her with the whole truth. This state of mind does not come close to New York Times malice.\nUpon reviewing the record, we see only two items that relate to establishing New York Times malice. First, Closson swore in his affidavit that Gibson told him that she \u201cknew for sure that one [of the owls] was mounted for a school [and not for plaintiff\u2019s decor,] but that she writes what her people tell her.\u201d Mickelson similarly swore that Gibson vaguely spoke in terms that indicated she knew the owls would be for \u201cschool usage.\u201d If Gibson had printed that plaintiff intended to use both owls for \u201chis decor\u201d while she knew that one would instead go to a school, then she would have published a statement while knowing it to be false, and thereby published it with New York Times malice.\nHowever, Gibson wrote in the article only that plaintiff intended to use the first owl for \u201chis decor,\u201d and then she added in a separate sentence that plaintiff sent another owl to the taxidermist without specifying why. Further, in her deposition, Gibson did not state that she knew which owl plaintiff intended to use for his decor, just that he intended to use \u201ceither one of the two\u201d for his decor. The article is consistent with this interpretation, and therefore no New York Times malice exists with regard to her statement that plaintiff intended to use one of the owls for \u201chis decor.\u201d\nSecond, Gibson testified in her deposition that she spoke to Bob Rose, in the \u201cDivision Headquarters of Lands,\u201d because she had heard that he held one of the owls. Apparently, she learned from him that Rose\u2019s grandson wanted to keep the bird. Gibson testified that Rose informed her that he thus planned, pursuant to plaintiffs instructions, to bring the owl to a taxidermist \u201cto have this protected federal species stuffed *** to keep [Rose\u2019s] grandson from crying\u201d about losing the bird. Combined with the above information that she allegedly knew that one owl would go to a school, this information provided some reason to believe that Gibson might have published the story knowing that someone other than plaintiff intended to use the second owl for \u201chis decor.\u201d\nHowever, when plaintiff\u2019s counsel confronted her on this matter, Gibson clarified that Orville Gosnell and Troemper had told her differently \u2014 namely, that Martin intended to use the owls for his own decor\u2014 and that Reverend Wenneborg had told her that he overheard some people talk about Martin using the owls for his decor. The question thus turns to whether these sources existed.\nPlaintiff also argues that Gibson should bear responsibility for her deficient reporting methods in that she did not thoroughly check the accuracy of the information her sources provided. Plaintiff suggests that Gibson owed a duty to contact the taxidermist, the University of Hlinois (which conducted the fenthion poisoning tests), or plaintiff, himself, before publishing the article. We emphatically disagree.\nAssessing New York Times malice in terms of how thoroughly a reporter checks the information a source provides to the degree plaintiff suggests would turn courts into editors, defining and describing the standards by which reporters perform their jobs. In the extreme, doing so could also effectively cut the public off from developing news stories that must \u2014 by their very nature \u2014 be reported on less than perfect information. If, as plaintiff suggests, courts require reporters to thoroughly check their facts so as to eliminate all doubt about their truth before going to print, such developing news stories would end up swallowed by the delay of this exhaustive investigation. We are confident that this reason is one which underlies the Supreme Court\u2019s holding that a reporter libels a public figure only when that reporter prints a story knowing it to be false or with a reckless disregard for its truth. These exacting terms are meant to guarantee that a reporter will not bear liability merely because that reporter\u2019s story turns out to be inaccurate.\nPut bluntly, reporters do not and cannot guarantee the truth of their stories; instead, they serve as conduits through which information flows from the reporters\u2019 sources to the public. The first amendment protects the right of the press to so serve without fear of punishment from the government or from lawsuits brought by public figures who dislike the information a reporter\u2019s sources provided. Although good reporters exercise discretion and care in checking their facts, the first amendment sometimes requires us to suffer the consequences of irresponsible journalism. The alternative \u2014 that the courts become \u201csuper editors\u201d \u2014 is both too heavy a price to pay and one which our Nation\u2019s Founders rejected.\nIII. Conclusion\nFor the reasons stated above, we affirm the trial court\u2019s order granting judgment.\nAffirmed.\nMcCULLOUGH and COOK, JJ., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "PRESIDING JUSTICE STEIGMANN" } ], "attorneys": [ "Frank B. Schweitzer (argued), of Taylorville, for appellant.", "Barry 0. Hines (argued) and R. Kurt Wilke, both of Barber, Segatto, Hoffee & Hines, of Springfield, for appellees." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "MICHAEL E. MARTIN, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. STATE JOURNAL-REGISTER, a Division of the Copley Press, Inc., Defendants-Appellees.\nFourth District\nNo. 4 \u2014 92\u20140915\nOpinion filed April 29, 1993.\nFrank B. Schweitzer (argued), of Taylorville, for appellant.\nBarry 0. Hines (argued) and R. Kurt Wilke, both of Barber, Segatto, Hoffee & Hines, of Springfield, for appellees." }, "file_name": "0955-01", "first_page_order": 975, "last_page_order": 985 }