{ "id": 5385822, "name": "DALLAS RUNION, Appellee, v. THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION et al. (Owens-Illinois, Inc., Appellant)", "name_abbreviation": "Runion v. Industrial Commission", "decision_date": "1993-05-26", "docket_number": "No. 5-92-0019WC", "first_page": "470", "last_page": "474", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "245 Ill. App. 3d 470" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "418 N.E.2d 722", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "724" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "84 Ill. 2d 262", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3045373 ], "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "267" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/84/0262-01" ] }, { "cite": "573 N.E.2d 836", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "842" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "214 Ill. App. 3d 301", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5299134 ], "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "309" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/214/0301-01" ] }, { "cite": "538 N.E.2d 830", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "182 Ill. App. 3d 983", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2619064 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/182/0983-01" ] }, { "cite": "523 N.E.2d 912", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 4, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "917" }, { "page": "917" }, { "page": "918" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "169 Ill. App. 3d 459", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3549892 ], "weight": 5, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "466" }, { "page": "466" }, { "page": "468" }, { "page": "468" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/169/0459-01" ] }, { "cite": "522 N.E.2d 1260", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 4, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1265" }, { "page": "1266" }, { "page": "1266" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "168 Ill. App. 3d 678", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3512211 ], "weight": 4, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "685" }, { "page": "687" }, { "page": "688" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/168/0678-01" ] }, { "cite": "343 N.E.2d 913", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "919" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "62 Ill. 2d 556", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2970395 ], "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "567" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/62/0556-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 599, "char_count": 10026, "ocr_confidence": 0.785, "pagerank": { "raw": 7.351004668085049e-08, "percentile": 0.4411456034695459 }, "sha256": "22d5c1dca4b472a886e9333b4db58209bb4fe608e04f03fc9f148e56adc9647d", "simhash": "1:32d5b30415fdee84", "word_count": 1598 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T18:35:03.225726+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "DALLAS RUNION, Appellee, v. THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION et al. (Owens-Illinois, Inc., Appellant)." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE RAKOWSKI\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nThe employee, Dallas Runion (claimant), filed his claim pursuant to the Illinois Workers\u2019 Occupational Diseases Act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 48, par. 172.36 et seq.) against Owens-Illinois, Inc. (employer). Following a hearing, the arbitrator denied the claim, finding that claimant failed to prove that his illness was caused or aggravated by his employment. The Industrial Commission (Commission) affirmed, but on judicial review, the circuit court reversed and entered judgment in favor of the claimant. The sole issue on appeal is whether the Commission\u2019s decision was against the manifest weight of the evidence. We reverse.\nThe relevant facts follow. For the 28 years prior to April 30, 1985, his last day of work, claimant had worked as a lathe operator for employer. On March 31, 1982, claimant was admitted to St. Anthony\u2019s Hospital by his wife. Claimant was agitated and very suspicious. He complained of hearing voices and that his room, phone, and car were bugged. Claimant was discharged on April 6, 1982, but he was treated on an outpatient basis by Dr. Chand for about six months. He was released to work on October 11,1982.\nClaimant worked without incident for over two years, during which time no psychiatric treatment was sought by claimant. On April 30, 1985, claimant was allegedly accused by his supervisor of causing a lathe to break down. Claimant went on permanent sick leave on that date and began treatment with Dr. Dennis two days later. Dr. Dennis continued treating the claimant for approximately one year.\nDuring this period, on June 28, 1985, claimant was taken to the Alton Mental Health Center by the Madison County sheriff\u2019s department after threatening family members with a gun. He was discharged on July 19, 1985. The final diagnosis was schizophrenia, paranoid type.\nDr. Dennis, claimant\u2019s psychologist, testified that work did not cause his condition. He testified that he relied solely on claimant\u2019s statements to determine what the triggering event to the 1985 psychosis was, but that he would not trust a patient to know what triggered a psychosis. Dr. Dennis concluded that claimant\u2019s perception at work may not have been real.\nDr. Stillings testified on behalf of the employer. Dr. Stillings, as Dr. Dennis, stated that the claimant\u2019s disorder was genetic in origin. As such, this condition was not aggravated by the environment but existed on its own through a biochemical imbalance in the neurotransmitters. That is, claimant\u2019s depressed condition was not aggravated by any alleged events at work, but because of his depressed condition, anything that he perceived at work would invoke the abnormal response.\nOn August 8, 1990, claimant died of a self-inflicted gunshot wound.\nIn Pathfinder Co. v. Industrial Comm\u2019n (1976), 62 Ill. 2d 556, 343 N.E.2d 913, the claimant pulled a co-worker\u2019s severed hand from a machine, fainted, and subsequently suffered psychological problems. In upholding the Commission\u2019s award, the supreme court stated that the claimant experienced a sudden, severe emotional shock, which would be the reaction of a person of normal sensibilities who, attempting to aid an injured co-worker, reached in and drew a severed hand from the press. Pathfinder, 62 Ill. 2d at 567, 343 N.E.2d at 919.\nThe requirement that the psychological problems must be the result of a sudden, severe shock was emphasized in General Motors Parts Division v. Industrial Comm\u2019n (1988), 168 Ill. App. 3d 678, 522 N.E.2d 1260. In General Motors, the claimant sought compensation for psychic injury suffered after his supervisor verbally assaulted him with profane, racial slurs. While the court noted that recovery for mental incapacity resulting from a work-related injury is a compensable injury in Illinois (General Motors, 168 Ill. App. 3d at 685, 522 N.E.2d at 1265), the opinion went on to say:\n\u201c[T]he supreme court\u2019s decision in Pathfinder is limited to the narrow group of cases in which an employee suffers a sudden, severe emotional shock which results in immediately apparent psychic injury and is precipitated by an uncommon event of significantly greater proportion or dimension than that to which the employee would otherwise be subjected in the normal course of employment.\u201d General Motors, 168 Ill. App. 3d at 687, 522 N.E.2d at 1266.\nThe court concluded that the claimant \u201cfailed to establish the verbal abuse he suffered, albeit unpleasant, was anything other than an ordinary incident of employment which is not uncommon to and might well be encountered in a great many occupations.\u201d General Motors, 168 Ill. App. 3d at 688, 522 N.E.2d at 1266.\nIn Chicago Board of Education v. Industrial Comm\u2019n (1988), 169 Ill. App. 3d 459, 523 N.E.2d 912, a teacher sought compensation for a mental disorder resulting from verbal and physical assaults by students. In reversing the Commission\u2019s award, the court held that on-the-job stress, of itself, is not a disease. (Chicago Board of Education, 169 Ill. App. 3d at 466, 523 N.E.2d at 917.) \u201cTo *** allow compensation for any mental diseases and disorders caused by on-the-job stressful events or conditions would *** open a floodgate for workers who succumb to the everyday pressures of life.\u201d (Chicago Board of Education, 169 Ill. App. 3d at 466, 523 N.E.2d at 917.) Besides being extraordinary, the conditions producing the disability must exist in reality from an objective standpoint, and the conditions must be the major contributory cause of the the mental disorder. Chicago Board of Education, 169 Ill. App. 3d at 468, 523 N.E.2d at 918; see also Board of Education v. Industrial Comm\u2019n (1989), 182 Ill. App. 3d 983, 538 N.E.2d 830.\nThe most recent case dealing with this issue is City of Springfield v. Industrial Comm\u2019n (1991), 214 Ill. App. 3d 301, 573 N.E.2d 836. In Springfield, the claimant, a fire inspector, testified that his workload, politics, interpretation of rules, and discrimination by supervisors over a four-year period led to stress-related mental disease. In reversing the Commission\u2019s award, we held that because the conditions that the claimant referred to were not unique to the claimant\u2019s employment or to the claimant himself, the claimant did not satisfy the test that would allow the court to find that he suffered an occupational disease. Springfield, 214 Ill. App. 3d at 309, 573 N.E.2d at 842.\nIn the case sub judice, the claimant seeks compensation under the Workers\u2019 Occupational Diseases Act for the aggravation of his preexisting condition that resulted in his 1985 breakdown. The claimant alleges that the stress of work slowly built up over an 18-month period. He argues that even if the illness was genetic, the issue is whether the conditions in his work environment aggravated his mental illness or accelerated the processes which led to his breakdown in April 1985. Claimant relies on Azzarelli Construction Co. v. Industrial Comm\u2019n (1981), 84 Ill. 2d 262, 418 N.E.2d 722.\nAzzarelli is clearly distinguishable from the the case sub judice. In Azzarelli, the claimant sought benefits because he suffered a heart attack while at work. The supreme court\u2019s support for the statement that a claimant\u2019s injury need not be the sole factor that aggravated a preexisting condition, so long as it is \u201ca factor\u201d that contributed to the disability, comes from cases that all dealt with physical injuries at the workplace that resulted in disabilities. (See Azzarelli, 84 Ill. 2d at 267, 418 N.E.2d at 724.) In the case sub judice, we are dealing with a mental disability and therefore a different standard applies.\nRecovery for nontraumatically induced mental disease is limited to those who can establish that: (1) the mental disorder arose in a situation of greater dimensions than the day-to-day emotional strain and tension which all employees must experience; (2) the conditions exist in reality, from an objective standpoint; and (3) the employment conditions, when compared with the nonemployment conditions, were the \u201cmajor contributory cause\u201d of the mental disorder. Chicago Board of Education, 169 Ill. App. 3d at 468.\nIn the case sub judice, the factors allegedly contributing to claimant\u2019s schizophrenia (the dual operation, the timed production schedule, and the \u201cscrap\u201d policy) were the same for every employee. The employer notes that there was no disciplinary action taken regarding the machine that broke down. In fact, a supervisor, Dewey, and the Industrial Relations Director, Bailey, both testified that they heard nothing of the incident, and the claimant\u2019s foreman, Moseby, never acted in the manner consistent with claimant\u2019s statement. (Moseby passed away before the hearing.)\nIn essence, the claimant has not shown that the pressure to not produce scrap, a closely timed production schedule, or a change to a new machine were conditions that were extraordinary to his employment. Furthermore, according to both doctors, claimant\u2019s perception of events may not have existed in reality. Finally, there were family conditions in evidence which could have caused the Commission to view the events at work, if they happened at all, as not a major contributory cause of the mental disorder.\nIn conclusion, the Commission\u2019s finding that claimant\u2019s psychosis was not a compensable illness under the Workers\u2019 Occupational Diseases Act was not against the weight of the evidence. In addition, the contention that the claimant\u2019s psychosis was aggravated by stress in the work place is not proper as a matter of law.\nAccordingly, the order of the circuit court is reversed.\nReversed.\nMcCULLOUGH, Ed., and WOODWARD, STOUDER, and RARICK, JJ., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE RAKOWSKI" } ], "attorneys": [ "Don W. Ward and Joanne Turner Stevenson, both of Pessin, Baird, Belsheim & Wells, of Belleville, for appellant.", "Marsha D. Bronson, of Talbert & Mallon, P.C., of Alton, for appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "DALLAS RUNION, Appellee, v. THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION et al. (Owens-Illinois, Inc., Appellant).\nFifth District (Industrial Commission Division)\nNo. 5 \u2014 92\u20140019WC\nOpinion filed May 26, 1993.\nDon W. Ward and Joanne Turner Stevenson, both of Pessin, Baird, Belsheim & Wells, of Belleville, for appellant.\nMarsha D. Bronson, of Talbert & Mallon, P.C., of Alton, for appellee." }, "file_name": "0470-01", "first_page_order": 490, "last_page_order": 494 }