{ "id": 5384021, "name": "GREENLEE TOOL, a Division of Excello Corporation, Appellant, v. THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION et al. (Raymond Allen, Appellee)", "name_abbreviation": "Greenlee Tool v. Industrial Commission", "decision_date": "1993-06-03", "docket_number": "No. 2-92-1088WC", "first_page": "500", "last_page": "506", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "245 Ill. App. 3d 500" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "574 N.E.2d 1231", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "215 Ill. App. 3d 242", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5294547 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/215/0242-01" ] }, { "cite": "546 N.E.2d 651", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "190 Ill. App. 3d 338", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2521469 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/190/0338-01" ] }, { "cite": "410 N.E.2d 837", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "81 Ill. 2d 434", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5479904 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/81/0434-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 556, "char_count": 14037, "ocr_confidence": 0.767, "pagerank": { "raw": 2.1715869913252583e-07, "percentile": 0.7712876310549379 }, "sha256": "d44153618eca3f8e818156abb1d4b1a052413bbb7a95773256fb7a5572283a42", "simhash": "1:e976c5f4a513a810", "word_count": 2220 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T18:35:03.225726+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "GREENLEE TOOL, a Division of Excello Corporation, Appellant, v. THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION et al. (Raymond Allen, Appellee)." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE McCUSKEY\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nThe petitioner, Raymond Allen, filed two workers\u2019 compensation claims against the respondent, Greenlee Tool (Greenlee). He sought to recover damages for neck and arm injuries he allegedly suffered in two separate work-related accidents. Allen claimed the first accident occurred on April 1, 1985, and that the second accident occurred on April 9, 1986. This opinion will resolve the issues on appeal arising from the 1985 accident.\nGreenlee had different insurance carriers providing coverage for the two accidents. Greenlee\u2019s insurer at the time of the first accident was Firemen\u2019s Fund Insurance Company (Firemen\u2019s Fund). Coverage for the second accident was held by Cigna.\nOn September 15, 1988, the claims were consolidated on the petitioner\u2019s request and both proceeded to arbitration. No attorney was present at the arbitration hearing to represent Greenlee on the 1985 claim. The arbitrator determined that the 1985 claim should proceed ex parte.\nFollowing a hearing, the arbitrator ruled that the petitioner had sustained a compensable injury on April 1, 1985, and awarded the petitioner a permanency award of 10% of a man as a whole. Additionally, the petitioner was awarded temporary total disability benefits from April 2,1985, through May 7,1985.\nOn review, the Illinois Industrial Commission (Commission) denied Greenlee\u2019s motion to set aside the arbitrator\u2019s ex parte decision. The Commission reduced the injury award from 10% to 5% of a man as a whole. The Commission affirmed the arbitrator\u2019s decision in all other respects. The circuit court confirmed the Commission\u2019s decision. Greenlee appeals. For the reasons which follow, we reverse and remand the cause to the Commission.\nAt the September 15, 1988, arbitration hearing, Gregory Sujack was the attorney representing Greenlee on the 1986 accident. Sujack told the arbitrator that he was only there to represent Greenlee on the 1986 claim.\nCounsel for the petitioner told the arbitrator that there had been service upon Greenlee for the 1985 claim. Petitioner\u2019s counsel then explained to the arbitrator that he had telephoned Firemen\u2019s Fund the morning of the hearing and gave it notice that he intended to proceed on the 1985 claim. According to petitioner\u2019s counsel, Fireman\u2019s Fund did not react in any way or ask for a continuance. The arbitrator then directed petitioner\u2019s counsel to proceed on both claims.\nFollowing the presentation of evidence, the arbitrator found the petitioner had suffered a compensable injury on April 1, 1985, and awarded the benefits previously indicated. Greenlee subsequently filed a petition for review with the Commission as well as a motion to set aside the arbitrator\u2019s ex parte decision.\nAt the hearing before the Commission, Greenlee sought to set aside the arbitrator\u2019s ex parte decision. Greenlee\u2019s attorney at the hearing before the Commission was assigned by its insurance carrier, Fireman\u2019s Fund. Greenlee presented the affidavit of Sandra Molitor. She managed Greenlee\u2019s workers\u2019 compensation cases during the period of time in question. Her affidavit stated that Greenlee had never received an application for adjustment of claim relating to the April 1, 1985, injury. Molitor further asserted that Greenlee had never received either a request for hearing form or a stipulation sheet setting the case for hearing on September 15, 1988. Therefore, Greenlee argued that it had not received notice of the arbitration hearing.\nFrom his own file, the petitioner produced his copy of the application for adjustment of claim for the April 1, 1985, accident. Attached to the application was a proof of service form which indicated that Mary Louise McElree had mailed a copy of the document to Greenlee. The petitioner also produced a copy of a notice of hearing which allegedly was from the Commission\u2019s file. The notice of hearing was for an initial status hearing concerning the April 1, 1985, accident. The notice indicated that the status hearing was to be held on August 14, 1986. The petitioner argued that the Commission through its \u201csystem\u201d would have sent Greenlee a copy of the notice of hearing.\nThe petitioner also presented the testimony of attorney John Shepherd. He stated that he previously represented Greenlee in other workers\u2019 compensation cases. Shepherd said that on the date of the arbitration hearing counsel for the petitioner approached him to discuss the situation. Thereafter, Shepherd telephoned Sandra Molitor, who managed Greenlee\u2019s workers\u2019 compensation cases. Shepherd informed Molitor that there was a case pending against Greenlee which was set before the arbitrator that day. Shepherd said he was totally unfamiliar with the case. He stated that he did not tell Molitor the name of the petitioner since he did not know it. Shepherd said that he did not file an entry of appearance in the 1985 case or request a continuance on behalf of Greenlee. After hearing this evidence, the Commission noted that an arbitrator has the burden to keep cases moving and reserved any ruling until the remainder of the evidence was presented.\nFollowing the presentation of additional evidence, the Commission denied Greenlee\u2019s motion to set aside the arbitrator\u2019s ex parte decision. The Commission then reduced the petitioner\u2019s injury award. It affirmed the arbitrator\u2019s decision in all other respects. Thereafter, the circuit court of De Kalb County confirmed the Commission\u2019s decision.\nOn appeal, Greenlee argues that the Commission erred in denying its motion to set aside the ex parte decision of the arbitrator. Green-lee first contends that it did not receive notice of the arbitration hearing as required by section 7030.20(b)(2)(B) of the Illinois Administrative Code (Code) (50 Ill. Adm. Code \u00a77030.20(b)(2)(B) (1985)).\nIn pertinent part, section 7030.20(b)(2)(B) of the Code provides that if there is no agreement between the parties on setting a trial date, the petitioner may file a motion requesting a hearing. The petitioner\u2019s motion should be accompanied by a request for hearing form which is provided by the Commission and sets forth the petitioner\u2019s claims. If the arbitrator determines that the matter should proceed to trial, he shall set the matter for trial on a date 15 days or more after the opposing party has received a completed request for hearing form. If the lawyer for any party fails without good cause to appear at the motion hearing, the arbitrator will hear the motion ex parte. Also, if the matter is ready for trial, the arbitrator will set a trial date convenient to the arbitrator and the party that appeared at the motion hearing. However, the Code provides that in no event shall the trial date be less than 15 days from the receipt by the opposing party of the request for hearing form.\nHere, Greenlee contends that the above-noted section of the Code was clearly applicable and prohibited the arbitrator from proceeding to an ex parte hearing. We agree. Greenlee points out that it presented as evidence the affidavit of Sandra Molitor which attested that Greenlee never received the required request for hearing form or the petitioner\u2019s application for adjustment of claim. As a result, Greenlee asserts that it did not receive the statutorily required notice of the arbitration hearing.\nGreenlee further argues that the Illinois Supreme Court\u2019s decision in Interstate Contractors v. Industrial Comm\u2019n (1980), 81 Ill. 2d 434, 410 N.E.2d 837, supports its position that the arbitrator lacked jurisdiction over the parties in the case at hand because Greenlee did not receive notice of the arbitration hearing. Again, we agree.\nIn Interstate Contractors, the arbitration hearing was held ex parte because the employer did not receive notice of the hearing. There, the claimant failed to specify correctly the address of the employer in his application for adjustment of claim and therefore failed to effect service upon the employer. Our supreme court held that since the employer did not appear and had received no notice of the hearing, the arbitrator\u2019s award would be set aside for lack of jurisdiction over the parties.\nFinally, Greenlee contends that the arbitrator\u2019s decision to proceed ex parte may have been based on the so-called \u201cChicago Arbitration Rules.\u201d Greenlee notes that under these rules cases which are \u201cabove the red line\u201d must be heard at the call or be dismissed for want of prosecution. Greenlee contends that the decision in Berrios v. Rybacki (1989), 190 Ill. App. 3d 338, 546 N.E.2d 651, is dispositive of this issue. We also agree. In Berrios, the court held that the \u201cChicago Arbitration Rules\u201d were invalid. The court reasoned that the so-called \u201cChicago Arbitration Rules\u201d had not been properly promulgated pursuant to the Illinois Administrative Procedure Act. Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 127, par. 1001 et seq.\nInitially, we hold that the Code\u2019s provisions concerning notice are applicable in the instant appeal. In this regard, the affidavit of Sandra Molitor indicated that Greenlee never received proper notice pursuant to the Code. In response, the petitioner\u2019s evidence consisted of a copy of an application for adjustment of claim retrieved from his own files. While the petitioner\u2019s application apparently indicated that a copy had been sent to the respondent, the record does not indicate whether a copy of this document was on file with the Commission at the time of their review.\nThe other document which the petitioner proffered as proof of service upon Greenlee was a copy of a notice of hearing form allegedly taken from the Commission\u2019s file. The notice was for an initial status hearing to be held on August 14, 1986. We note that this notice was for a date approximately two years prior to the September 15, 1988, arbitration hearing. The petitioner argues that a copy of the initial status hearing notice would have been sent to Greenlee through the Commission\u2019s \u201csystem.\u201d Again, we point out that the record is barren of any proof that service was made upon Greenlee.\nThe petitioner additionally argues that the testimony of attorney John Shepherd, who represented Greenlee in other workers\u2019 compensation cases, established that Greenlee received notice of the hearing on the day of the arbitrator\u2019s ex parte decision. Shepherd also stated he did not represent Greenlee with respect to the 1985 accident. However, we find Shepherd\u2019s testimony did not establish that Greenlee received notice of the arbitration hearing. Shepherd clearly testified that he did not tell Greenlee\u2019s representative the petitioner\u2019s name because he did not know it. Moreover, the petitioner cites no case law, nor can this court find any cases, which support the petitioner\u2019s proposition that the Code\u2019s due process requirements are satisfied when a respondent receives notice of an arbitration hearing on the day the hearing is held. Consequently, we find no merit in petitioner\u2019s argument.\nBased upon our review of the record, we find the Commission did not have sufficient evidence to support its determination that Greenlee received the required notice pursuant to the Code. Therefore, we reverse. Additionally, based upon our supreme court\u2019s holding in Interstate Contractors, we find that the arbitrator did not have jurisdiction over the parties because Greenlee did not receive the statutorily required notice of the arbitration hearing. Accordingly, we conclude that the arbitrator\u2019s award was void.\nFurthermore, even if the arbitrator was relying on some provision of the so-called \u201cChicago Arbitration Rules\u201d as authority to proceed with the ex parte hearing, we find that such reliance was misplaced. The \u201cChicago Arbitration Rules\u201d were determined by Berrios to be invalid. We find unpersuasive the petitioner\u2019s argument that Berrios is inapplicable because it was rendered following the arbitration hearing. The Berrios decision holds that the \u201cChicago Arbitration Rules\u201d were never properly promulgated. As a result, the \u201cChicago Arbitration Rules\u201d have always been invalid.\nFinally, we note that the petitioner has cited no authority, nor can this court find any, for the following contentions: (1) because an attorney was present to represent Greenlee on the 1986 accident claim, Greenlee had actual notice of the hearing involving the 1985 claim; (2) that when the attorney handling Greenlee\u2019s 1986 claim objected to a question relating to the 1985 claim, he then became Green-lee\u2019s attorney for the 1985 claim; or (3) Greenlee\u2019s attorney for the 1986 claim automatically became Greenlee\u2019s attorney for the 1985 claim when he raised the attorney-client privilege relating to records of any correspondence between his law firm and Greenlee involving the 1985 claim.\nIt is well established that bare contentions without argument or citation to any authority do not merit consideration on appeal. (State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v. Haskins (1991), 215 Ill. App. 3d 242, 574 N.E.2d 1231.) We find the petitioner has failed to cite any authority in support of the above-noted propositions. As a result, we will not review these bare contentions.\nFor the reasons indicated, we have determined that the record does not support a finding that Greenlee received the statutorily required notice of the arbitration hearing. Thus, the arbitrator\u2019s decision was void for lack of jurisdiction over the parties. Accordingly, we reverse the decision of the circuit court and remand the cause to the Commission for further proceedings consistent with our opinion.\nReversed and remanded.\nMcCULLOUGH, P.J., and RAKOWSKI, WOODWARD, and RARICK, JJ., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE McCUSKEY" } ], "attorneys": [ "Karen L. Kendall, of Heyl, Royster, Voelker & Allen, of Peoria, and Gregory P. Sujack, of Garofalo, Hanson, Schreiber & Vandlik, of Chicago, for appellant.", "Richard 0. Greenfield, of Chicago, for appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "GREENLEE TOOL, a Division of Excello Corporation, Appellant, v. THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION et al. (Raymond Allen, Appellee).\nSecond District (Industrial Commission Division)\nNo. 2 \u2014 92\u20141088WC\nOpinion filed June 3, 1993.\nKaren L. Kendall, of Heyl, Royster, Voelker & Allen, of Peoria, and Gregory P. Sujack, of Garofalo, Hanson, Schreiber & Vandlik, of Chicago, for appellant.\nRichard 0. Greenfield, of Chicago, for appellee." }, "file_name": "0500-01", "first_page_order": 520, "last_page_order": 526 }