{ "id": 5384294, "name": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. DEAN JONES, Defendant-Appellee", "name_abbreviation": "People v. Jones", "decision_date": "1993-06-10", "docket_number": "No. 4-92-0930", "first_page": "810", "last_page": "815", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "245 Ill. App. 3d 810" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "493 N.E.2d 410", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "143 Ill. App. 3d 567", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5665230 ], "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "570" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/143/0567-01" ] }, { "cite": "493 N.E.2d 89", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 3, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "92" }, { "page": "92" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "143 Ill. App. 3d 735", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5665161 ], "weight": 3, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "739" }, { "page": "739" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/143/0735-01" ] }, { "cite": "449 N.E.2d 172", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "173" }, { "page": "173" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "114 Ill. App. 3d 655", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3590403 ], "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "657" }, { "page": "657" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/114/0655-01" ] }, { "cite": "284 N.E.2d 39", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 5, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "40" }, { "page": "41" }, { "page": "41" }, { "page": "41" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "5 Ill. App. 3d 683", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2524381 ], "weight": 5, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "684" }, { "page": "685" }, { "page": "686" }, { "page": "685" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/5/0683-01" ] }, { "cite": "504 N.E.2d 539", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 4, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "540-41" }, { "page": "541" }, { "page": "541" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "152 Ill. App. 3d 374", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3576588 ], "weight": 4, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "376-77" }, { "page": "377" }, { "page": "377" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/152/0374-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 577, "char_count": 12726, "ocr_confidence": 0.779, "pagerank": { "raw": 6.840974422730465e-08, "percentile": 0.4172256760915405 }, "sha256": "99205e10548e2ec1aee0e7a84dc3aba17194e5276e35992f8d1dd8bba41876e1", "simhash": "1:3b2e7b5e4d41fec3", "word_count": 2122 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T18:35:03.225726+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. DEAN JONES, Defendant-Appellee." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "PRESIDING JUSTICE STEIGMANN\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nThis case raises the issue of whether the offense of soliciting for a juvenile prostitute (111. Rev. Stat. 1991, ch. 38, par. 11 \u2014 15.1) applies to a prospective customer who solicits sexual acts for money from a juvenile. The trial court held that the statute applies only to \u201cmiddlemen\u201d who find customers for a juvenile prostitute. Accordingly, the court dismissed a charge against defendant, Dean Jones, of soliciting for a juvenile prostitute because the State had only alleged that he acted as a prospective customer.\nWe affirm.\nI. Background\nIn August 1992, the State filed a two-count information charging defendant with distribution of harmful materials (111. Rev. Stat. 1991, ch. 38, par. 11 \u2014 21(a)) and soliciting for a juvenile prostitute (111. Rev. Stat. 1991, ch. 38, par. 11 \u2014 15.1(a)). The first count alleged that defendant knowingly exhibited \u201cx-rated videotapes depicting male on male sexual acts\u201d to D.W.M., a child under 18 years of age. The second count alleged that defendant \u201cknowingly solicit[ed] D.W.M., a child under 16 years of age, to perform an act of sexual penetration for money.\u201d Both of these offenses allegedly occurred between January 1 and February 19,1992.\nIn October 1992, defendant filed a motion to dismiss the count charging him with soliciting a juvenile prostitute. Citing People v. Thoma (1987), 152 Ill. App. 3d 374, 504 N.E.2d 539, defendant argued that section 11 \u2014 15 of the Criminal Code of 1961 (Code) (111. Rev. Stat. 1991, ch. 38, par. 11 \u2014 15), defining the offense of soliciting for a prostitute, applies only to \u201cmiddlemen\u201d who arrange prostitution by soliciting customers for prostitutes. Section 11 \u2014 15.1 of the Code (soliciting for a juvenile prostitute) incorporates by reference the provisions of section 11 \u2014 15 of the Code. Thus, defendant argued, section 11 \u2014 15.1 of the Code similarly applied only to \u201cmiddlemen.\u201d After conducting a hearing on defendant\u2019s motion, the trial court granted it. The State appeals.\nII. Analysis\nIn pertinent part, section 11 \u2014 15(a) of the Code provides the following:\n\u201cSoliciting for a prostitute, (a) Any person who performs any of the following acts commits soliciting for a prostitute:\n(1) Solicits another for the purpose of prostitution; or\n(2) Arranges or offers to arrange a meeting of persons for the purpose of prostitution; or\n(3) Directs another to a place knowing such direction is for the purpose of prostitution.\u201d (111. Rev. Stat. 1991, ch. 38, par. 11 \u2014 15(a).)\nA first or second violation of section 11 \u2014 15 is a Class A misdemeanor. (111. Rev. Stat. 1991, ch. 38, par. 11 \u2014 15(b).) A violation of section 11 \u2014 15.1(a) of the Code (soliciting for a juvenile prostitute) enhances the above crime to a Class 1 felony (111. Rev. Stat. 1991, ch. 38, par. 11 \u2014 15.1(c)) when \u201cthe prostitute for whom such person is soliciting is under 16 years of age or is an institutionalized severely or profoundly mentally retarded person.\u201d (Emphasis added.) 111. Rev. Stat. 1991, ch. 38, par. ll-15.1(a).\nIn this appeal, the State argues that section 11 \u2014 15 of the Code applies to anyone involved in the solicitation of a prostitute, not just to \u201cmiddlemen\u201d who arrange prostitution by soliciting prospective customers on behalf of prostitutes. The First District Appellate Court first interpreted this section in Daley v. Resnick (1972), 5 Ill. App. 3d 683, 284 N.E.2d 39. In Daley, a liquor license was revoked because the license holder\u2019s barmaid had offered to perform sexual favors herself for money to an undercover officer. (Daley, 5 Ill. App. 3d at 684, 284 N.E.2d at 40.) Regarding section 11 \u2014 15 of the Code, the court wrote the following:\n\u201cIt seems perfectly clear to us that the soliciting prohibited by [section 11 \u2014 15 of the Code] necessarily excludes solicitation by the prostitute herself, and covers only the \u2018runner\u2019 or \u2018middle-man.\u2019 We can conceive of no other construction of the words, \u2018soliciting for a prostitute\u2019 ***.\u201d (Daley, 5 Ill. App. 3d at 685, 284 N.E.2d at 41.)\n(We note that section 11 \u2014 15 of the Code, construed by the court in Daley, is essentially the same statute we construe in the present case.) The court in Daley then reversed the revocation because it held that the underlying offense of soliciting for a prostitute that provided the grounds for the revocation had not occurred. Daley, 5 Ill. App. 3d at 686, 284 N.E.2d at 41.\nHowever, in People v. Blair (1983), 114 Ill. App. 3d 655, 657, 449 N.E.2d 172, 173, a different panel of the First District Appellate Court held that section 11 \u2014 15 of the Code applied to a prospective customer who asked an undercover policewoman to perform oral sex for money. Without mentioning or citing Daley, the court wrote that \u201c[t]he phrase \u2018solicits another for the purpose of prostitution\u2019 has a broader meaning than to solicit another on behalf of a prostitute as the defendant contends. It also means to appeal to or entice another for an act of prostitution.\u201d (Emphasis added.) Blair, 114 Ill. App. 3d at 657, 449 N.E.2d at 173.\nIn People v. Holloway (1986), 143 Ill. App. 3d 735, 493 N.E.2d 89, a divided panel of the First District Appellate Court addressed the conflict between Daley and Blair and sided with Daley. The court reasoned that Blair inappropriately focused on only the language of section 11 \u2014 15(aXl) of the Code (111. Rev. Stat. 1983, ch. 38, par. 11\u2014 15(aXl)), whereas Daley considered the language in section 11 \u2014 15 of the Code as a whole, as well as the title of the offense. In Holloway, the court wrote that \u201c[t]he statute should be read as a whole and all its relevant parts should be considered to determine the intent of the legislature.\u201d (Holloway, 143 Ill. App. 3d at 739, 493 N.E.2d at 92.) After so considering the statute, the court held that \u201c[t]he clear import of section 11 \u2014 15 [of the Code] is that the scope of the offense is restricted to those persons who establish the contact between the prostitute and a prospective customer.\u201d Holloway, 143 Ill. App. 3d at 739, 493 N.E.2d at 92.\nIn People v. Anderson (1986), 143 Ill. App. 3d 567, 493 N.E.2d 410, the Fifth District Appellate Court interpreted section 11 \u2014 15(aX3) of the Code (111. Rev. Stat. 1983, ch. 38, par. 11 \u2014 15(aX3)) and held that the person whom the defendant directs to a place of prostitution must be the prospective customer, not the prostitute. In so holding, the court rejected the Blair interpretation of the statute and wrote the following:\n\u201cWe believe that the *** language [of section 11 \u2014 15.1 of the Code] clearly indicates that the person to be charged under the soliciting for a juvenile prostitute statute is one who acts on behalf of the juvenile prostitute in procuring customers.\u201d Anderson, 143 Ill. App. 3d at 570, 493 N.E.2d at 412.\nIn Thoma (152 Ill. App. 3d at 376-77, 504 N.E.2d at 540-41), the Third District Appellate Court agreed with Daley and Holloway that section 11 \u2014 15 of the Code only applies to \u201cmiddlemen\u201d and not to prostitutes or the prospective customers of a prostitute. In so holding, the court noted in dicta that section 11 \u2014 15.1(a) of the Code \u2014 the section directly involved in this case \u2014 stated that \u201c[a]ny person who violates any of the provisions of Section 11 \u2014 15(a) of this Act commits soliciting for a juvenile prostitute where the prostitute for whom such person is soliciting is under 16 years of age\u201d (emphasis added) (HI. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 38, par. 11 \u2014 15.1(a)), instead of stating \u201cwhere the prostitute whom such person is soliciting is under 16 years of age.\u201d (Thoma, 152 Ill. App. 3d at 377, 504 N.E.2d at 541.) The court noted that this language indicated that both these statutes apply only to middlemen who solicit prospective customers on behalf of the prostitute.\nWe agree with Daley, Holloway, and Thoma that the language in section 11 \u2014 15 of the Code, when taken as a whole and not in parsed bits, indicates that the statute covers only \u201cmiddlemen\u201d who solicit customers for the prostitute and not the prospective customers or the prostitute. In support of our conclusion, we note that the statutory scheme regarding prostitution indicates that the offense of \u201c[patronizing a juvenile prostitute\u201d (111. Rev. Stat. 1991, ch. 38, par. 11\u2014 18.1) is merely a Class 4 felony (111. Rev. Stat. 1991, ch. 38, par. 11 \u2014 18.1(c)), while the offense of soliciting for a juvenile prostitute is a Class 1 felony. Thus, under the State\u2019s theory, a potential customer merely asking a juvenile to perform an act of sexual penetration for money would commit a more serious offense than if he actually consummated the deal.\nFinally, as recognized in Daley (5 Ill. App. 3d at 685, 284 N.E.2d at 41), Holloway (143 Ill. App. 3d at 739-40, 493 N.E.2d at 92-93), Anderson (143 Ill. App. 3d at 570, 493 N.E.2d at 412-13), and Thoma (152 Ill. App. 3d at 377, 504 N.E.2d at 541), the official committee comments state the following regarding sections 11 \u2014 15 and 11 \u2014 15.1 of the Code:\n\u201cThe section [11 \u2014 15 of the Code] is broadly drafted to insure coverage of all acts by the \u2018runner\u2019 or the \u2018middle-man\u2019 in arranging business for a working prostitute. Subsection (aXl) proscribes simply \u2018soliciting\u2019. This subsection envisions one who actively seeks out customers for the prostitute, those who initiate the suggestion to the prospective patron. The word \u2018solicit\u2019 is employed here *** to require only an invitation \u2014 the response of the prospective customer, and the locale of the solicitation, being wholly immaterial so far as the scope of the section is concerned. The following two subsections then expand the concept of solicitation to include the essential activities of a middle-man who might not initiate the suggestion \u2014 but whose participation in arranging the activity is such as to be vital to the engagement. Thus, in subsection (aX2) the person who arranges or offers to arrange a meeting of persons for purposes of prostitution is covered. This would cover the situation of an elevator operator or bellhop in a hotel who establishes contact between a patron and a prostitute who is living in the hotel or who will visit the patron\u2019s room if summoned. The third subsection deals with directing the prospective patron to a prostitute or a place of prostitution. *** [I]f a man entered a taxicab and asked the driver to take him to a place of prostitution, and the driver takes the person to a prostitute, the section would be violated by the cab driver. ***\nSubsections (aX2) and (aX3) do not impose an active duty upon cabdrivers, bellhops, elevator operators, hotel clerks and the like to suppress the practice of prostitution \u2014 but it does impose upon them a duty not to cooperate either actively or passively in the practice of the trade beyond the lawfiil duties imposed by their employment. * * *\nThe modern day practice of prostitution relies heavily upon mobility and an informal intelligence service to establish contacts between prostitute and patron. The middleman who has only a casual connection with the trade is nevertheless essential to its successful operation in many quarters. Thus, effective control of prostitution requires concern beyond the traditional public nuisance concept of the common law to deter passive cooperation by persons who have, perhapsf,] only an indirect connection with the trade.\u201d (Emphasis added.) (111. Ann. Stat., ch. 38, par. 11 \u2014 15, Committee Comments \u2014 1961, at 341-42 (SmithHurd 1979).)\nAlthough, as noted in Blair, these committee comments are not part of the statute, they nonetheless provide support for our holding that the offense of \u201csoliciting for a prostitute\u201d and \u201csoliciting for a juvenile prostitute\u201d apply only to a \u201cmiddleman\u201d who arranges prostitution by finding customers for prostitutes, not to the prostitute or the prospective patron.\nAlthough the alleged acts underlying count II of the State\u2019s information in this case might constitute an inchoate attempt or solicitation offense of a different statutory section, they do not constitute the offense of soliciting for a juvenile prostitute under section 11\u2014 15.1 of the Code. Thus, the trial court appropriately granted defendant\u2019s motion to dismiss that charge.\nIII. Conclusion\nFor the reasons stated, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.\nAffirmed.\nLUND and GREEN, JJ., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "PRESIDING JUSTICE STEIGMANN" } ], "attorneys": [ "Michael D. Clary, State\u2019s Attorney, of Danville (Norbert J. Goetten, Robert J. Biderman, and Elliott Turpin, all of State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor\u2019s Office, of counsel), for the People.", "Terry Miles, of Acton & Snyder, of Danville, for appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. DEAN JONES, Defendant-Appellee.\nFourth District\nNo. 4 \u2014 92\u20140930\nOpinion filed June 10, 1993.\nMichael D. Clary, State\u2019s Attorney, of Danville (Norbert J. Goetten, Robert J. Biderman, and Elliott Turpin, all of State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor\u2019s Office, of counsel), for the People.\nTerry Miles, of Acton & Snyder, of Danville, for appellee." }, "file_name": "0810-01", "first_page_order": 830, "last_page_order": 835 }