{ "id": 5385538, "name": "In re PAT BRAZELTON, Asserted to be a Person Subject to Administration of Psychotropic Medication (The People of the State of Illinois, Petitioner-Appellee, v. Pat Brazelton, Respondent-Appellant)", "name_abbreviation": "People v. Brazelton", "decision_date": "1993-06-10", "docket_number": "No. 4-92-0659", "first_page": "1028", "last_page": "1037", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "245 Ill. App. 3d 1028" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "382 N.E.2d 1201", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1203" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "73 Ill. 2d 90", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5441312 ], "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "95" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/73/0090-01" ] }, { "cite": "139 N.E.2d 255", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1978, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "10 Ill. 2d 87", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2725346 ], "year": 1978, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/10/0087-01" ] }, { "cite": "292 N.E.2d 382", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "53 Ill. 2d 399", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2925683 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/53/0399-01" ] }, { "cite": "356 N.E.2d 42", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "49" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "64 Ill. 2d 286", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5430025 ], "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "300" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/64/0286-01" ] }, { "cite": "1991 Ill. Laws 992", "category": "laws:leg_session", "reporter": "Ill. Laws", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "1978 Ill. Laws 1462", "category": "laws:leg_session", "reporter": "Ill. Laws", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "495 N.E.2d 485", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "113 Ill. 2d 1", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3173556 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/113/0001-01" ] }, { "cite": "478 N.E.2d 267", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "pin_cites": [ { "page": "278" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "106 Ill. 2d 237", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3138930 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "263" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/106/0237-01" ] }, { "cite": "606 N.E.2d 727", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "pin_cites": [ { "page": "731" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "239 Ill. App. 3d 29", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5147859 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "35" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/239/0029-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 935, "char_count": 20891, "ocr_confidence": 0.807, "pagerank": { "raw": 2.298458236619558e-07, "percentile": 0.7870993637080772 }, "sha256": "81beb88ba13343f34c1337a2a51f3cb0f285a00e687be9ede0d7dcfcc76365be", "simhash": "1:fe96b643799da406", "word_count": 3516 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T18:35:03.225726+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "In re PAT BRAZELTON, Asserted to be a Person Subject to Administration of Psychotropic Medication (The People of the State of Illinois, Petitioner-Appellee, v. Pat Brazelton, Respondent-Appellant)." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE GREEN\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nThis case concerns the operation of section 2 \u2014 107.1 of the Mental Health and Developmental Disabilities Code (Code) (111. Rev. Stat. 1991, ch. 911/2, par. 2 \u2014 107.1), which provides for procedures whereby a court order may be obtained for the administration of psychotropic medication to a person for that person\u2019s benefit but against his or her will. The circuit court here entered such an order. One of the issues raised, whether the legislation meets constitutional muster, is now before the Illinois Supreme Court {In re C.E. (Cir. Ct. Cook Co., Mar. 30, 1992), No. 91 \u2014 COT\u201406, appeal allowed (1992), No. 73605). We need not pass on that question here because we conclude that even if the legislation is valid, reversal is required for other reasons.\nOn July 10, 1992, Dr. Barry M. Rebeck, a psychiatrist, filed a petition in the circuit court of Macon County, pursuant to section 2 \u2014 107.1 of the Code, seeking authority for the clinical staff of Adolf Meyer Mental Health and Developmental Center of Decatur (Meyer Center) to administer psychotropic medicine to respondent Pat Brazelton against her will. The court set the matter for hearing on July 21, 1992, and an assistant public defender was appointed to represent respondent. Respondent was personally served with notice of that hearing on July 13, 1992. Appointed counsel was present in court on July 20, 1992, when a request by the petitioner to continue the proceedings was allowed without objection by respondent\u2019s counsel. The cause was continued until August 4,1992.\nOn August 4, 1992, respondent appeared with counsel and made an oral motion for a jury trial. The court denied the motion for the stated reason that the Code makes no provision for a jury trial in regard to a section 2 \u2014 107.1 petition. The court then conducted a bench hearing on the petition and found for the petitioner. On August 6, 1992, the court entered an order authorizing the Meyer Center clinical staff to administer psychotropic medication to respondent for a period not to exceed 90 days. On August 12, 1992, on respondent\u2019s motion, the court stayed the foregoing order until further order of the court.\nRespondent has appealed, contending (1) the court\u2019s order violated constitutional and statutory guarantees; (2) the proof did not support the order entered; and (3) the court erred in denying respondent a jury trial. As we have indicated, no useful purpose would be served by our attempting to decide the constitutional issue here. The question of statutory violation is so intertwined with the first question that our attempts to decide that would also be useless. Moreover, we need not decide either of the foregoing questions because error in the handling of the jury trial issue requires reversal. We do pass upon the sufficiency of the evidence to support the verdict because, if insufficient, we must reverse outright. If the evidence was strong enough to uphold the order, we can merely reverse and remand for a new trial if the supreme court upholds the validity of section 2 \u2014 107.1 of the Code. Accordingly, we consider the sufficiency of the evidence first.\nThe State\u2019s only witness was Dr. Rebeck, who testified as follows: (1) he most recently observed respondent on the day of the hearing and the day before; (2) respondent had been diagnosed with a serious mental illness; (3) respondent\u2019s behavior had deteriorated, i.e., according to family reports she used to be gainfully employed and due to her illness she had been unable to work for the last few years; (4) prior to her being admitted to the Meyer Center she was so preoccupied with her delusions and her fixations she could no longer function independently; (5) respondent\u2019s illness existed for both \u201ca period marked by the continuing presence of those symptoms\u201d and by the \u201crepeated episodic occurrence of symptoms\u201d; and (6) a course of treatment including the administration of psychotropic medication had been developed for respondent which was \u201cconsistent within a reasonable degree of psychiatric certainty as to appropriateness and likelihood of benefit.\u201d\nDr. Rebeck described the proposed treatment of psychotropic medications as including \u201ceither a long[-]acting form that could be injected or an oral form, if the patient would comply with taking that and depending upon her response. The dosage and the amount would be demonstrated by her response.\u201d Specifically, Dr. Rebeck testified he would prescribe Haldol or Prolixin Enanthate or similar antipsychotic medications based on how respondent responds to the medications.\nDr. Rebeck further testified (1) he believed the benefits of psychotropic medication would outweigh the harm of the medication; (2) at that time respondent lacked the capacity to make a reasonable decision about taking the medication; (3) the staff members at the Meyer Center had repeatedly attempted to talk with respondent; however, she was preoccupied with her delusional thoughts; (4) the staff had attempted to obtain respondent\u2019s voluntary agreement to take the medication; and (5) he considers the involuntary administration of psychotropic medication essential to respondent\u2019s proper treatment.\nOn cross-examination, Dr. Rebeck testified as follows: (1) he had not observed respondent ever behave in a threatening manner to herself or others aside from being verbally aggressive when her delusions were challenged; (2) respondent\u2019s mother told him that \u201cprior to her being admitted to [the] hospital [respondent] was driving in a car and because of her response to a perceived disturbance she almost accidentally drove her car off a bridge\u201d; (3) he based his opinion.that respondent\u2019s behavior was deteriorating on the fact she could not independently function or work because of her preoccupation with delusional thoughts; (4) less restrictive services such as psycho-education and psychotherapy would be futile for respondent because she neither believed she had a mental illness nor was she willing to hear about having a mental illness; and (5) without the administration of medication, respondent would be subject to either long-term hospitalization or isolation at home while totally dysfunctional.\nRespondent testified on her own behalf as follows: (1) she was 46 years old; (2) she worked outside the home for 12 years and had lived independently; (3) she had no prior hospitalizations and she was involuntarily admitted to the Meyer Center because of a \u201charassment situation because they would not open up to a hypnosis that was being done[;] I didn\u2019t want to go in and they put me in anyway\u201d; (4) she had never harmed herself or others; (5) she had the mental capacity to decide whether to take psychotropic medication; (6) she refused the medication because she felt \u201cpsychotropics, as explained to [her], [was] the same as \u2018moban\u2019 medicine which was given to [her] by a doctor in Louisville. Did no good. Didn\u2019t get rid of the harassment going on. Not only that it made [her] extremely miserable\u201d; and (7) when she took the other medication she \u201cshook constantly.\u201d\nOn cross-examination, respondent testified that she was never hospitalized in Louisville, Kentucky, but medication had been prescribed for her. The following colloquy took place regarding her experience in Kentucky:\n\u201cQ. [State\u2019s Attorney]: Were you in a hospital there?\nA. [Respondent]: No, I wasn\u2019t in a hospital. I was working at Citizen\u2019s Fidelity as a program analyst there. I was in the process, being harassed. I had complained about a bugging where I worked at which turned into sound waves and hypnosis through an investigation.\nQ. Who do you think is responsible for this?\nA. It has been said Pinkerton Security.\nQ. I\u2019m sorry?\nA. It has been said Pinkerton Security. It has also been brought out my husband and his father who were in the security business was also involved in hypnotizing me by sound waves or methods of sound waves.\nQ. Do you think that is still going on?\nA. I know it is still going on right here in your hospital.\u201d\nThe proof required for the court to grant a section 2 \u2014 107.1 order is set forth in section 2 \u2014 107.1(d) of the Code, which states:\n\u201cPsychotropic medication shall not be administered to the recipient unless it has been determined by clear and convincing evidence that all of the following factors are present:\n(1) That the recipient has a serious mental illness or developmental disability.\n(2) That because of said mental illness or developmental disability, the recipient exhibits deterioration of his ability to function, suffering, or threatening or disruptive behavior.\n(3) That the illness or disability has existed for a period marked by the continuing presence of the symptoms set forth in paragraph (2) of subsection (d) of this Section or the repeated episodic occurrence of these symptoms.\n(4) That the benefits of the psychotropic medication will outweigh the harm.\n(5) That the recipient lacks the capacity to make a reasoned decision about the medication.\n(6) That other less restrictive services have been explored and found inappropriate.\u201d\n111. Rev. Stat. 1991, ch. 91V2, par. 2 \u2014 107.1(d).\nSection 2 \u2014 107.1(d) of the Code requires proof \u201cby clear and convincing evidence.\u201d (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1991, ch. 911/2, par. 2\u2014 107.1(d).) However, as this court stated in the case of In re Jeffers (1992), 239 Ill. App. 3d 29, 35, 606 N.E.2d 727, 731, that requirement is one for the trial court under section 2 \u2014 107.1(d) of the Code and we will give great deference to the determination of the trier of fact and should \u201creverse only if the trial court\u2019s decision is manifestly erroneous.\u201d That was not the case here. Dr. Rebeck\u2019s testimony covered every aspect of the required proof.\nRespondent objected to Dr. Rebeck\u2019s reliance on hearsay reports from respondent\u2019s family in regard to her deterioration in her ability to function. Where, as here, hearsay evidence is received without objection, it should be considered for whatever probative value it has. (People v. Collins (1985), 106 Ill. 2d 237, 263, 478 N.E.2d 267, 278.) The use of hearsay information, if reasonably relied upon, is one of the usual ways for a psychiatrist to make a diagnosis. (See People v. Anderson (1986), 113 Ill. 2d 1, 495 N.E.2d 485.) The information Rebeck related was sufficient for him to conclude that respondent had a serious illness and was exhibiting a deteriorating ability to function. The evidence concerning the bridge episode helped in making that determination. The indications of paranoia apparent in respondent\u2019s testimony also supported the court\u2019s decision on this issue.\nIn giving his opinion that the benefits of the proposed medication exceeded the harm which could be caused, Dr. Rebeck stated in cautious terms that the proposed medication was reasonably likely to be appropriate, and the result of not using the medication would likely be long-term hospitalization or isolation in a dysfunctional state at home. The refusal of the respondent to take the medication was readily apparent from all of the testimony.\nThe respondent was not entitled to have the petition dismissed in bar of action for lack of proof and we will not reverse without remandment.\nRespondent\u2019s claim to a right to trial by jury on the section 2 \u2014 107.1 petition arises from subsection (c) thereof, which states:\n\u201cUnless otherwise provided herein, the procedures set forth in Article VIII of Chapter 3 of this Act, including the provisions regarding appointment of counsel, shall govern hearings under this Section.\u201d 111. Rev. Stat. 1991, ch. 91^2, par. 2\u2014 107.1(c).\nSection 3 \u2014 802 of the Code, which is part of chapter 3, article VIII, of the Code states:\n\u201cThe respondent is entitled to a jury on the question of whether he is subject to involuntary admission. The jury shall consist of 6 persons to be chosen in the same manner as are jurors in other civil proceedings.\u201d 111. Rev. Stat. 1991, ch. 91V2, par. 3 \u2014 802.\nThe statement in section 3 \u2014 802 of the Code that a respondent is entitled to a jury trial on the question of involuntary admission does not \u201cprovide otherwise\u201d in regard to a right of a section 2\u2014 107.1 respondent to a jury trial arising from the incorporation of section 3 \u2014 802 procedures. Section 3 \u2014 802 was part of the Code when it became effective January 1, 1979. (See Pub. Act 80 \u2014 1414, eff. January 1,1979 (1978 Ill. Laws 1462, 1484).) Section 2 \u2014 107.1 became effective August 13, 1991 (see Pub. Act 87 \u2014 124, \u00a71, eff. August 13, 1991 (1991 Ill. Laws 992)) and made procedures and rights previously limited to certain proceedings also applicable to actions under section 2 \u2014 107.1. Nothing else in the Code provides that a respondent\u2019s right to jury trial is not applicable to section 2 \u2014 107.1. The State admits the foregoing interpretation is correct and that respondent had a right to a jury trial but maintains respondent waived that right.\nThe State\u2019s theory of waiver begins with section 6 \u2014 100 of the Code, which states that \u201c[\u00a1judicial proceedings conducted pursuant to this Act shall be conducted in accordance with the Civil Practice Law, except to the extent the provisions of this Act indicate to the contrary or are inconsistent, in which case this Act governs.\u201d (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1991, ch. 91^2, par. 6 \u2014 100.) Section 2 \u2014 1105 of the Civil Practice Law states that \u201c[a] defendant desirous of a trial by jury must file a demand therefor not later than the filing of his or her answer\u201d or the right to a jury is waived (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1991, ch. 110, par. 2 \u2014 1105). In civil cases, Supreme Court Rule 101(d) requires an answer or appearance to be filed within 30 days of service upon that defendant. 134 Ill. 2d R. 101(d).\nOn the other hand, neither section 2 \u2014 107.1 of the Code nor article VIII of chapter 3 of the Code imposes any duty upon a respondent to file a responsive pleading. The practice is not to file a responsive pleading and an implied requirement to do so would be inconsistent with the intent that section 2 \u2014 107.1 creates a \u201cspeedy and efficient\u201d manner of treating mentally ill patients who lack the capacity to make reasoned decisions in regard to medication. Report of the Governor\u2019s Commission to Revise the Mental Health Code of Illinois 45 (1989).\nThe State emphasizes the decision of the supreme court in Village of Park Forest v. Walker (1976), 64 Ill. 2d 286, 356 N.E.2d 42, where that court upheld a circuit court decision to deny a 12-person jury to a defendant in an ordinance violation case where he made his request the day the case was called for trial. The plaintiff had previously demanded a six-member jury, and the case had been tried before such a jury. The court pointed out that in City of Danville v. Hartshorn (1973), 53 Ill. 2d 399, 292 N.E.2d 382, it had held that in such a case the right to a jury trial was governed by section 64 of the then Civil Practice Act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1971, ch. 110, par. 64), which was the same as the present section 2 \u2014 1105 of the Civil Practice Law. The Walker court pointed out that the difficulty with that analogy was that section 64 of the Civil Practice Act referred to filing a demand at the time of answer and defendants to ordinance violation charges were not required to file answers. However, the court concluded that since the defendant had 10 months after the filing of the charges before the case went to trial, defendant was unduly tardy in not requesting a jury until day of trial.\nThe Walker court analogized the situation in an ordinance violation case to that in a small claims case where Supreme Court Rule 285 required a defendant\u2019s demand for a jury was required to be filed at the time of appearance. (See 43 Ill. 2d R. 285.) The State maintains that would be an appropriate rule to apply to section 2\u2014 107.1 proceedings. However, as we have indicated, the Code makes no provision for any appearance by or on behalf of a respondent prior to hearing.\nThe Walker court also pointed out that a motion for leave to file a late jury demand could have been filed under then section 59 of the Civil Practice Act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1971, ch. 110, par. 59), which provided for, upon good cause shown, a discretionary granting by a trial court of additional time to take any step prior to judgment. (Walker, 64 Ill. 2d at 300, 356 N.E.2d at 49.) The Walker court noted that in Hudson v. Leverenz (1956), 10 Ill. 2d 87, 139 N.E.2d 255, the supreme court had upheld a discretionary decision of a trial court to allow the filing of a late jury demand. Similarly, in Hernandez v. Power Construction Co. (1978), 73 Ill. 2d 90, 382 N.E.2d 1201, the supreme court upheld an appellate court\u2019s judgment reversing a circuit court order denying a late request for a jury trial.\nThe foregoing cases have several implications which would seem to be applicable to the time for making jury demands in section 2\u2014 107.1 proceedings. One is that no exact time limit is imposed. Another is that the demand must be made in a reasonable time. The third is that the court must exercise a discretion before denying a late request for a jury trial.\nHere, the case had originally been set for hearing on July 21, 1992, but was continued on the motion of petitioner until August 4, 1992. Respondent\u2019s counsel could have made a jury request at that time. The requirement of section 2 \u2014 107.1 of the Code that a hearing be held within 30 days of the filing of the petition placed a further restriction on the court unless a request by a respondent for a jury trial which would require a delay beyond the 30-day deadline would constitute a waiver by a respondent of the 30-day rule. Here, the 30-day period would have expired in less than a week from the time respondent made a jury request. Most importantly, the difficulties that arise when a party waits until the day of trial to make a jury demand are readily apparent. Clearly, if the court here had considered respondent\u2019s demand, recited difficulties that would arise in obtaining jurors or other disruptions to court proceedings, no error would result in the denial of the request for a jury.\nHere, the court did not exercise the discretion it possessed. No effort was made to determine whether a jury could easily be obtained. The legislature obviously deemed the right of trial by jury an important aspect of the sensitive decision which must be made in determining whether mind-altering substances can be imposed upon an individual who does not want the medicine. Under the circumstances, we deem highly significant the statement of the supreme court in regard to a trial court\u2019s ruling on a request to make a tardy request for a jury trial. That court stated that the issue on review is not whether the reviewing court \u201cwould have allowed the [request], but whether the action was a reasonable exercise of sound discretion.\u201d (Emphasis added.) (Hernandez, 73 Ill. 2d at 95, 382 N.E.2d at 1203.) Respondent did not have that benefit here.\nThe State maintains that the circuit court\u2019s failure to exercise discretion in determining whether respondent\u2019s jury demand was too late is harmless error at worst because the proof of the petitioner\u2019s case was so strong that a jury would have been sure to approve it. Just as we gave deference to the determination of the court in finding in favor of the petitioner, we do not assume another trier of fact would have decided the same way. A jury viewing the witnesses could have concluded that Dr. Rebeck\u2019s opinions were based on too skimpy actual knowledge of the respondent. We do not agree that any error was harmless.\nBecause of the importance of the right to trial by jury, the uncertainty as to when the demand for such a trial should be made here, and the lack of exercise of discretion by the court before denying a jury trial, we hold that the order appealed must be reversed and the cause remanded to the circuit court of Macon County. That court should await the final decision by the supreme court in the case of C.E. and if the validity of section 2 \u2014 107.1 of the Code is upheld, grant respondent\u2019s jury request and proceed to try the issues before a jury. If the supreme court should determine that section 2 \u2014 107.1 is invalid, the court should then dismiss the petition.\nReversed and remanded with directions.\nKNECHT and COOK, JJ., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE GREEN" } ], "attorneys": [ "John B. Lower and Jeff M. Plesko (argued), both of Guardianship & Advocacy Commission, of Anna, for appellant.", "Lawrence R. Fichter, State\u2019s Attorney, of Decatur (Norbert J. Goetten, Robert J. Biderman, and Denise M. Ambrose (argued), all of State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor\u2019s Office, of counsel), for the People." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "In re PAT BRAZELTON, Asserted to be a Person Subject to Administration of Psychotropic Medication (The People of the State of Illinois, Petitioner-Appellee, v. Pat Brazelton, Respondent-Appellant).\nFourth District\nNo. 4 \u2014 92\u20140659\nArgued March 23, 1993.\nOpinion filed June 10, 1993.\nJohn B. Lower and Jeff M. Plesko (argued), both of Guardianship & Advocacy Commission, of Anna, for appellant.\nLawrence R. Fichter, State\u2019s Attorney, of Decatur (Norbert J. Goetten, Robert J. Biderman, and Denise M. Ambrose (argued), all of State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor\u2019s Office, of counsel), for the People." }, "file_name": "1028-01", "first_page_order": 1048, "last_page_order": 1057 }