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JOHN L. MARKIEWICZ, Defendant-Appellant." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE McLAREN\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nFollowing a jury trial in January 1991 defendant, John Markiewicz, was found guilty of first degree murder (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 38, par. 9 \u2014 1). Defendant was found to be eligible for the death penalty (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 38, par. 9 \u2014 1(b)(8)), but was sentenced to a term of natural-life imprisonment without parole. Defendant raises the following issues on appeal: (1) whether evidence of other crimes was properly admitted; (2) whether trial counsel was ineffective; (3) whether defendant was entitled to a hearing on his allegations of ineffective assistance of counsel; (4) whether the State\u2019s comments during closing argument deprived defendant of a fair trial; and (5) whether the court abused its discretion in sentencing. For the following reasons, we affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand.\nDefendant was charged with three counts of first degree murder (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 38, pars. 9 \u2014 1(a)(1), (a)(2)) arising from the death of the victim, Debra Shelton. Shelton was last seen alive on March 30, 1988. On April 27, 1989, her decomposed body was discovered buried on the banks of the Fox River in a 55-gallon drum. An autopsy conducted by Dr. Lawrence Blum found the cause of death to be acute cocaine overdose. At trial, the State argued that defendant repeatedly injected the victim with cocaine until she died to prevent her from revealing information about the abduction, kidnapping, aggravated battery, and murder of Frank Mahlendorf.\nRay Katzensky testified for the State in exchange for immunity from prosecution for his involvement in the kidnapping and aggravated battery of Frank Mahlendorf and Shelton\u2019s murder and its concealment. Paul Schmitz testified for the State in exchange for immunity from prosecution for his involvement in Shelton\u2019s murder and its concealment. Schmitz and Katzensky both testified that on March 23, 1988, they accompanied defendant to the home of Frank Mahlendorf to collect money owed for narcotics. When Mahlendorf opened the door, defendant forced him into Katzensky\u2019s automobile. Defendant informed Mahlendorf that he wanted the money owed for drugs and repeatedly struck him. When Mahlendorf responded that he did not have the money, defendant drove to Schmitz\u2019 home in South Elgin, Illinois. Defendant forced Mahlendorf into the garage and repeatedly slapped, beat, and kicked him, eventually breaking his nose. Katzensky and defendant tied Mahlendorf\u2019s hands to his feet and threw him into the trunk of Katzensky\u2019s automobile. Schmitz, Shelton, and defendant drove Katzensky\u2019s automobile to Wisconsin. They dropped Shelton off on a gravel road and proceeded to Devil\u2019s Lake. Defendant took Mahlendorf out of the trunk, dragged him into a culvert, and shot him. Defendant handed the gun to Schmitz and Schmitz shot Mahlendorf. Mahlendorf\u2019s body was left in the ditch. Schmitz, Shelton, and defendant drove to Iowa for a few days, stopping to throw the gun in the Mississippi River. Schmitz was eventually convicted of Mahlendorf\u2019s murder and is presently serving a double life term of imprisonment for that crime. The charges against defendant for Mahlendorf\u2019s murder were dropped.\nSchmitz testified that defendant told him Shelton needed to be killed because she knew about Mahlendorf\u2019s murder. On March 30, 1988, a farewell party was held for Shelton at Katzensky\u2019s apartment. Shelton was planning to leave for Tennessee the next day to live with her father. At the party, Shelton drank some champagne which was dosed with LSD by defendant. Later that evening, Shelton accompanied defendant to Schmitz\u2019 home. Defendant filled three syringes of cocaine. Defendant and Shelton entered the garage at Schmitz\u2019 residence and defendant began to inject cocaine into Shelton\u2019s body. After a time, defendant informed Schmitz that Shelton was having a seizure. Schmitz observed that Shelton was shaking, groaning, and had urinated on herself. Shelton was shaking so severely that Schmitz had to hold her down while defendant sat on Shelton\u2019s chest and attempted to inject her arm with another syringe filled with cocaine. After five or six unsuccessful attempts, defendant injected Shelton\u2019s leg with the syringe. When Schmitz returned to the garage, Shelton was dead. Schmitz wrapped her body in a blanket and locked it in a room in the garage.\nThree days after Shelton\u2019s death, Katzensky, Schmitz and defendant placed her body into a 55-gallon drum. Katzensky and defendant drove to McHenry County and rolled the drum into the Fox River. Approximately one month later, defendant told Katzensky that they were going to have to bury the drum. Defendant and Katzensky rented a boat and bumped into the drum while searching for it on the Fox River. They towed the drum to the bank of the river, rolled the drum into a hole they dug, and covered it. Katzensky returned the next day with concrete and finished burying the drum.\nOn April 27, 1989, Katzensky led the police to the spot where he buried the drum containing Shelton\u2019s body. An autopsy performed by Dr. Lawrence Blum and a toxicological analysis revealed a small amount of cocaine and a larger amount of benzoyl ecogonine, the chemical breakdown product of cocaine, in the gastric contents of Shelton\u2019s body. Blum found no signs of blunt trauma, stabbing, gunshot wound, disease, or heart problems. Blum found the fact that traces of cocaine remained in Shelton\u2019s body significant because the drug breaks down easily in the body. Based on this, Blum opined that Shelton died of an acute cocaine overdose.\nFollowing a jury trial in January 1991, defendant was found guilty of first degree murder. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 38, par. 9 \u2014 1.) Defendant was found to be eligible for the death penalty on the basis that he murdered Shelton to prevent her from testifying or otherwise assisting the State in prosecuting him for the Mahlendorf murder. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 38, par. 9 \u2014 1(b)(8).) However, the jury found the existence of mitigating factors sufficient to preclude a death sentence. Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 38, par. 9 \u2014 1(c).\nAt the sentencing hearing, 10 witnesses testified as to defendant\u2019s childhood and his activities during incarceration. The court stated that it heard all the testimony and considered the presentence report and letters presented. However, the court determined that none of the evidence presented in mitigation could be considered \u201cunder any of the factors in mitigation listed by the statute.\u201d Defendant was sentenced to a term of natural life in prison without parole.\nDefendant\u2019s attorneys filed a post-trial motion for a new trial alleging various errors. Defendant later filed two pro se post-trial motions alleging ineffective assistance of counsel. Defendant\u2019s trial attorneys, John Paul Carroll and M. Lee Witte, were granted leave to withdraw as attorneys for defendant because of a conflict of interest created by defendant\u2019s pro se post-trial motion alleging ineffective assistance of counsel. Defendant\u2019s post-trial motions for a new trial were denied after a hearing, and this appeal followed.\nEVIDENCE OF OTHER CRIMES\nDefendant first contends that he was denied a fair trial by the admission of evidence of other crimes, including drug trafficking, drug abuse, possession of weapons, murder, and solicitation. Evidence of crimes, wrongs, or acts for which a defendant is not on trial is inadmissible for the purpose of establishing his propensity to commit crime. (People v. Lucas (1992), 151 Ill. 2d 461, 485.) This type of evidence is prejudicial because a jury may convict the defendant because it believes he is a bad person and deserves punishment. (People v. Thingvold (1991), 145 Ill. 2d 441, 452.) However, evidence of other crimes may be admitted when relevant to show motive, intent, mistake, absence of mistake, identity, common design, or modus operandi (Lucas, 151 Ill. 2d at 486), if the probative value of the evidence outweighs the risk of unfair prejudice (People v. Maxwell (1992), 148 Ill. 2d 116, 130). Our supreme court has gone so far as to hold that evidence of other offenses is admissible if it is relevant to establish any material issue other than the propensity to commit crime. People v. Stewart (1984), 105 Ill. 2d 22, 62; People v. McKibbins (1983), 96 Ill. 2d 176, 182.\nBefore such evidence is admitted, the State must first show that crime or misconduct occurred and that the defendant committed the offense or participated in its commission. (Lucas, 151 Ill. 2d at 486; Thingvold, 145 Ill. 2d at 455.) The degre\u00e9 of proof necessary to show that the defendant participated in the commission of the crime need not be beyond a reasonable doubt, but must be more than a mere suspicion. (Thingvold, 145 Ill. 2d at 456.) When such evidence is offered, the trial court must establish the purpose for which the evidence is offered and weigh the relevance of the evidence against its prejudicial impact. (Thingvold, 145 Ill. 2d at 452.) The admissibility of such evidence is a matter within the sound discretion of the trial court which will not be reversed on review absent an abuse of that discretion. (People v. Illgen (1991), 145 Ill. 2d 353, 364.) An abuse of discretion will be found \u201conly where the trial court\u2019s decision is \u2018arbitrary, fanciful or unreasonable\u2019 or \u2018where no reasonable man would take the view adopted by the trial court.\u2019 \u201d Illgen, 145 Ill. 2d at 364, quoting People v. M.D. (1984), 101 Ill. 2d 73, 90.\nIn this case, evidence of other crimes was admitted through the testimony of several of the State\u2019s witnesses. Defense counsel failed to raise a timely objection when this testimony was admitted. He also failed to pursue a motion in limine, filed by defendant\u2019s prior attorney, which sought to limit the State from eliciting information concerning defendant\u2019s reputation as a drug dealer, for violence, and that the State\u2019s witnesses feared retaliation from defendant. Further, defense counsel failed to object when a pattern jury instruction was withdrawn which limited the jury\u2019s use of evidence of other crimes. (Illinois Pattern Jury Instructions, Criminal, No. 3.14 (2d ed. 1981) (hereinafter IPI Criminal 2d).) For these reasons, defendant now claims that he was denied the effective assistance of counsel. Although both defense counsel and defendant filed post-trial motions for a new trial, these motions fail to raise the issue of any error which occurred by the admission of evidence of other crimes aside from that relating to the amount of detail admitted concerning Mahlendorf\u2019s murder.\nThe failure to timely object when the evidence of other crimes is introduced and to raise the issue in a post-trial motion operates as a waiver of defendant\u2019s right to raise the issue as a ground for reversal on review. (Lucas, 151 Ill. 2d at 481.) To preserve an issue for review, an objection to the alleged error must be made at trial and included in a post-trial motion. (People v. Turner (1989), 128 Ill. 2d 540, 555; People v. Enoch (1988), 122 Ill. 2d 176, 187.) However, the plain error rule (134 Ill. 2d R. 615(a)) permits a reviewing court to consider issues waived on appeal if (1) the evidence in a criminal case is closely balanced; or (2) the complained-of error \u201cis so fundamental and of such magnitude that the accused was denied a fair trial.\u201d People v. Herrett (1990), 137 Ill. 2d 195, 209-10.\nThe evidence in this case was not closely balanced. Both Schmitz and Katzensky testified that defendant intended to kill Shelton to prevent her from revealing her knowledge of Mahlendorf\u2019s murder. Schmitz related his observations while aiding defendant in repeatedly injecting Shelton with cocaine until she died. Katzensky testified of his involvement while aiding defendant in concealing Shelton\u2019s murder by placing her body in the drum and burying it in the Fox River. Although these witnesses testified in exchange for immunity from prosecution, their testimony was corroborated by other witnesses who testified that defendant admitted he murdered Shelton. Furthermore, no witnesses were called to testify for the defense to give a different explanation of the events related by the State\u2019s witnesses. Thus, we find that the evidence in this case was not closely balanced.\nThe second basis upon which to invoke the plain error rule is where the error is so fundamental that it deprived defendant of a fair trial. Consequently, we must first determine whether it was error to admit the evidence of other crimes of which defendant now complains. If so, we must determine whether the error was of such magnitude that it deprived defendant of a fair trial.\nIn this case, Schmitz and Katzensky related the events occurring prior to Mahlendorf s murder. Defendant concedes that some information concerning the Mahlendorf murder was admissible to prove defendant\u2019s motive in murdering Shelton. However, defendant contends that the facts admitted in support of the State\u2019s motive theory should have been limited to the details of the Mahlendorf murder which Shelton knew. (See People v. Smith (1990), 141 Ill. 2d 40, 56.) He asserts that the detailed account of Mahlendorf\u2019s murder amounted to a trial within a trial and should have been excluded as more prejudicial than probative.\nWe agree that it was not necessary to elicit all of the details concerning Mahlendorf\u2019s murder. Even where some evidence of another crime is competent and relevant, the State may not put on a trial within a trial by means of detailed evidence of the other crime. (People v. Bartall (1983), 98 Ill. 2d 294, 315.) The trial court should carefully limit evidence of the other crime to that which is relevant to the issues on which the other crime evidence is admitted. Bartall, 98 Ill. 2d at 315; People v. Curtis (1986), 141 Ill. App. 3d 827, 831.\nIn this case, the State sought the death penalty on the basis that defendant murdered Shelton to prevent her from revealing information concerning his involvement in Mahlendorf\u2019s murder. Thus, the details of Mahlendorf\u2019s murder that Shelton knew or observed were admissible to prove defendant\u2019s motive in murdering Shelton. According to Katzensky, Shelton observed Mahlendorf tied and beaten at Schmitz\u2019 residence, accompanied defendant and Schmitz to Wisconsin with Mahlendorf in the trunk of the automobile, and drove to Iowa after Mahlendorf\u2019s murder, stopping to dispose of the murder weapon in the Mississippi River. She did not observe what occurred prior to the time defendant brought Mahlendorf to Schmitz\u2019 home. Thus, these details were arguably inadmissible.\nContrary to People v. Olson (1981), 96 Ill. App. 3d 193, which defendant cites, the details of Mahlendorf\u2019s murder to which Schmitz and Katzensky testified and Shelton did not observe were not graphic or inflammatory. (See People v. Kincy (1982), 106 Ill. App. 3d 250, 257.) The witnesses simply related the events leading up to Mahlendorf\u2019s murder, which included his abduction and beating in Katzensky\u2019s automobile en route to Schmitz\u2019 home, where Shelton first observed this victim. Accordingly, we find that the court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the details of the Mahlendorf murder. (See People v. Breton (1992), 237 Ill. App. 3d 355, 363.) Thus, as to this evidence, there was no error, let alone plain error.\nThe next type of evidence to which defendant objects concerns evidence of defendant\u2019s extensive drug trafficking and drug abuse. At trial, the State\u2019s witnesses related defendant\u2019s use of intravenous drugs, his history of drug abuse, his involvement in the drug milieu, and his nickname, \u201cdoctor John,\u201d which described his proficiency in delivering intravenous injections of narcotics.\nContrary to defendant\u2019s contention, this evidence was not relevant merely to show defendant\u2019s propensity to commit drug-related crimes. The State\u2019s theory was that defendant murdered Shelton by repeatedly injecting her body with cocaine. His involvement with drugs and self-proclaimed proficiency at injecting narcotics was directly relevant to the method utilized in Shelton\u2019s murder. Further, defendant\u2019s knowledge of and experience with narcotics were relevant in illustrating that defendant knew the amount of cocaine he injected in Shelton\u2019s body was lethal and that he intended to kill her. This evidence eliminates any speculation that defendant mistakenly injected Shelton with a fatal overdose of cocaine. The cases defendant cites where evidence of defendant\u2019s drug-related activities was held to be prejudicial such that a new trial was warranted are factually inapposite because they do not involve a murder where the victim was killed by a fatal dose of a narcotic. (See People v. Speight (1992), 153 Ill. 2d 365, 372-73; People v. Mitran (1990), 194 Ill. App. 3d 344.) Again, as to this evidence, there was no error, let alone plain error.\nDefendant next objects to Katzensky\u2019s statement that defendant told him he dismembered a woman\u2019s body, burned it, and threw it into a river. The following interchange occurred when Katzensky testified of his involvement in burying the drum containing Shelton\u2019s body:\n\u201cQ. [Mr. Barsanti, for the State]: After you brought the boat back, did [defendant] give you any further instructions?\nA. [Ray Katzensky]: Yeah, on the way home. Well, on the way back to taking the boat back he said tomorrow we\u2019re going to have to come back and finish covering her up and get some concrete to put over the top. We needed a bucket and the concrete was the main thing to fix it up and throw it on there.\nQ. Did he tell you to get those items?\nA. Yes. Then he also said \u2014 after we got into my car and we were headed back, after we took the boat back, then John said, well, the same thing about I\u2019m not supposed to tell nobody nothing, and then he told me what he did to a woman one time. I didn\u2019t know whether he was lying or not, but I believed it. He said he cut off her head and her hands and her feet and burned them and cut the rest of her up and threw her in the river.\nQ. You don\u2019t know if that\u2019s true or not?\nA. No, I don\u2019t.\u201d\nDefendant contends that this evidence should have not been admitted.\nWe agree. Even if this evidence was relevant to prove intent, modus operandi, or defendant\u2019s willingness to commit murder, it was inadmissible. Evidence of other crimes is inadmissible even for a proper purpose until it is shown that a crime actually took place and that defendant committed it-or participated in its commission. (Lucas, 151 Ill. 2d at 486.) Katzensky\u2019s statement should have been excluded because there was no foundation indicating that this murder actually took place. Therefore, the trial court abused its discretion in admitting this statement. However, Katzensky stated that he did not know whether this statement was true. Thus, the jury was on notice that defendant\u2019s statement may have been untrue and was potentially unreliable. Accordingly, we do not find it rises to plain error.\nDefendant also objects to evidence that he possessed an \u201cUzi.\u201d This information was elicited when Schmitz gave the following details of the day Shelton\u2019s body was placed in the drum and buried:\n\u201cQ. [by Mr. Barsanti, for the State]: Did you see [defendant] that morning?\nA. [by Paul Schmitz]: Yes.\nQ. Did you notice if he was carrying anything?\nA. He might have had a gun on him. I think he had his Uzi, I don\u2019t know.\nQ. He had his what?\nA. Uzi.\nQ. Is that an automatic pistol?\nMr. Carroll [for the defense]: Excuse me, Judge.\nThe Witness: I guess.\nMr. Carroll: I think he said he might have had a gun. If he\u2019s not sure, I would object to going into the status of what\u2014\nTHE COURT: You want to rephrase the question.\nBy Mr. Barsanti:\nQ. Did you see anything in his hands that morning when you got out of your room?\nA. He didn\u2019t have nothing in his hands, no. If he had his Uzi on him at that time, it was underneath his coat.\nQ. Did you see it?\nA. I don\u2019t know if it was that morning or not.\u201d\nDefendant contends that the only relevant evidence of the use of a gun was that Mahlendorf was shot with a .22 caliber gun. We agree. While the testimony was improper, we determine that any prejudicial effect did not constitute plain error. (See People v. Prewitt (1987), 160 Ill. App. 3d 942, 950.) The witness stated that he did not actually see defendant\u2019s \u201cUzi.\u201d Thus, the jury was on notice that defendant actually may not have had this type of gun.\nEven if all the evidence of other crimes was admissible, defendant contends that it was plain error to admit the evidence without an instruction limiting the jury\u2019s use of the evidence for a proper purpose. At the instruction conference, the State withdrew the following instruction without objection by the defense:\n\u201cEvidence has been received that the defendant has been involved in offenses other than that charged in the indictment. This evidence has been received solely on the issue of defendant\u2019s identification, presence, intent, motive, design and knowledge. This evidence may be considered by you only for the limited purpose for which it was received.\u201d (Illinois Pattern Jury Instructions, Criminal, No. 3.14 (2d ed. 1981).)\nThus, the jury heard evidence of Mahlendorf\u2019s murder, of defendant\u2019s history and involvement with drugs, that defendant told Katzensky he once murdered a woman, cut up her body, and threw it in the river, and that defendant possessed an Uzi, without an instruction cautioning the limited purpose for which this information was admitted.\nUnder Supreme Court Rule 451(c), \u201csubstantial defects\u201d in jury instructions in criminal cases are not waived by failing to timely object \u201cif the interests of justice require.\u201d (134 Ill. 2d R. 451(c).) This exception to the waiver rule is limited to \u201cgrave errors\u201d or situations where the case is close factually and fundamental fairness requires the jury to be properly instructed. (People v. Ivory (1991), 217 Ill. App. 3d 619, 623.) A limiting instruction on the use of other crimes evidence would have been appropriate in this case. However, our research reveals no case law indicating that plain error always occurs when the court fails to instruct the jury of the limited purpose for which evidence of other crimes is admitted.\nOn the contrary, in People v. Crowder (1987), 161 Ill. App. 3d 1009, 1017, the court found that a defendant waived the issue of the prejudicial admission of other crimes evidence by failing to object when the evidence was admitted during trial and by failing to seek any cautionary instructions. Further, a trial court is not responsible for giving an instruction not offered sua sponte. It is the burden of the party who desires a specific instruction to present it to the court and request that it be given to the jury. (Turner, 128 Ill. 2d at 562.) Generally, the only instructions necessary to ensure a fair trial include the elements of the crime charged, the presumption of innocence, and the question of burden of proof. Turner, 128 Ill. 2d at 562-63.\nIn this case, the instruction was not given because the State withdrew it without objection by the defense. It can be inferred that the jury could have considered the evidence of other crimes committed by defendant for an improper purpose. However, an error in a jury instruction is harmless if the result of the trial would not have been different if a proper instruction was given. (People v. Johnson (1991), 146 Ill. 2d 109, 137.) As we previously determined, the evidence in the case was not closely balanced. One witness testified that defendant informed him that he was planning to murder Shelton because she knew too much about Mahlendorf\u2019s murder. This same witness related his observations while aiding defendant in injecting Shelton with a syringe filled with cocaine and that she died shortly after. Another witness testified of his observations in aiding defendant in concealing Shelton\u2019s murder. This evidence was corroborated by other witnesses who testified that defendant admitted he killed Shelton. On this basis, we find that any error resulting from the failure to instruct the jury i on the limited purpose for which the evidence of other crimes was received would not have affected the outcome of the trial.\nINEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL\nIn this case, defendant\u2019s trial attorneys, John Paul Carroll and M. Lee Witte, filed a post-trial motion for a new trial alleging various errors. Subsequent to that time, defendant wrote a letter to his trial attorneys requesting that the post-trial motion be amended to include claims of ineffective assistance of counsel. Carroll responded by stating that he amended the post-trial motion to include several of defendant\u2019s requests but would not amend it further because he found the additional issues defendant raised were meritless. In Carroll\u2019s opinion, defendant would benefit more by concentrating on the sentencing phase of his trial since the chances of receiving a new trial were bleak. He informed defendant that his right to appeal was already protected and he would not file inappropriate motions. If defendant persisted, Carroll stated that he would be forced to withdraw as defendant\u2019s attorney. Defendant\u2019s post-trial motion was denied.\nIn spite of this, defendant filed two pro se post-trial motions following trial and sentencing which alleged ineffective assistance of counsel by virtue of errors made by the State and the court, including the court\u2019s failure to procure an expert pathologist for the defense. Carroll filed a motion to withdraw as counsel for defendant based on an apparent conflict of interest. Carroll appeared before the court and presented a copy of a notice of the motion to withdraw which was signed by defendant. The court granted the motion believing that defendant consented to the withdrawal. The court subsequently requested that attorney Fred Morelli be appointed to represent defendant. Defendant advised Morelli that he was not confident in his abilities and did not want him as his attorney. Thus, the court informed defendant that he would have to retain private counsel.\nWhen defendant appeared for a hearing on his pro se motions for a new trial, he requested that an attorney be appointed to represent him. Defendant informed the court that he signed the notice of the motion to withdraw only to indicate he was served. Thereafter, the court vacated its order of discharge and reappointed attorneys Carroll and Witte to represent defendant. Defendant expressed concern over the time during which he could file a notice of appeal since 27 days passed from the time he was sentenced. Since the court already denied the post-trial motion filed by his attorneys, the judge informed defendant that he was unsure whether the time during which defendant could file a notice of appeal was stopped while his pro se post-trial motions were pending. Defendant proceeded to argue his motions. The court reserved its ruling on three issues until attorney Carroll was able to appear before the court. Carroll appeared the following day and argued these issues on behalf of defendant. Defendant\u2019s pro se post-trial motions for a new trial were denied in their entirety, including the issue of whether an expert pathologist should have been appointed for the defense.\nDefendant contends that in accordance with People v. Krankel (1984), 102 Ill. 2d 181, this matter should be remanded to determine whether defendant was denied the effective assistance of counsel, as he should have had other counsel appointed to argue his pro se post-trial motions which raised the issue of ineffective assistance of trial counsel. Krankel did not establish a per se rule that all pro se motions for a new trial which allege ineffective assistance of counsel must result in the appointment of new counsel to assist in the motion. (Peo pie v. Crane (1991), 145 Ill. 2d 520, 533.) Rather, the trial court must examine the factual matters underlying the defendant\u2019s claim. If the claim pertains to a matter of trial strategy or is otherwise spurious, new counsel is not necessary. (People v. Nitz (1991), 143 Ill. 2d 82, 134.) Only if the allegations illustrate possible neglect should new counsel be appointed to make an independent evaluation of the defendant\u2019s complaint and present it to the court. People v. Williams (1991), 147 Ill. 2d 173, 251; Nitz, 143 Ill. 2d at 134.\nIt would be improper for the court to require attorney Carroll to argue that his own conduct at trial was ineffective. However, our review of defendant\u2019s pro se post-trial motions reveals that the errors he alleges, including the issue of the appointment of an expert pathologist for the defense, although couched in terms of ineffective assistance of counsel, actually attack procedural and substantive rulings by the court and alleged errors by the State. Thus, defendant\u2019s pro se post-trial motions were redundant of the post-trial motions previously filed by defendant\u2019s trial attorneys and denied by the court. For these reasons, the trial court did not err in refusing to appoint a new attorney to represent defendant at the hearing on his pro se post-trial motions. His contentions either reiterated the previous post-trial motions filed by his attorneys or encompassed issues that might have been raised at that time.\nOn rehearing, defendant contends that he could not have raised the issue of attorney Carroll\u2019s neglect in retaining an expert pathologist in his post-trial motion because the issue \u201cdid not arise until after the trial court informed the defendant [during the hearing on defendant\u2019s pro se post-trial motion] that it never denied the defense expert fees because defense counsel never asked for them.\u201d Our review of the record reveals that Carroll\u2019s predecessor, Larry Wechter, filed a motion for an ex parte hearing regarding defendant\u2019s request to appoint a forensic pathologist. The court denied the request for an ex parte hearing and, in doing so, informed attorney Wechter that no motion to appoint an expert was pending before the court. On the record, Wechter amended his motion and requested the court to provide a forensic pathologist. The court responded that it would not approve fees for an expert from Pennsylvania without a schedule of fees for other experts in the area. Thereafter, Wechter withdrew from the case, and Carroll was appointed to represent defendant. The record reveals that a fee schedule was never presented to the court and no expert was ever appointed.\nWe agree with defendant that the court may not have been aware of Carroll\u2019s possible misrepresentation at the time of its ruling on defendant\u2019s pro se post-trial motions. However, assuming arguendo defendant would be entitled to a Krankel hearing and appointment of new counsel to argue his pro se post-trial motions, defendant still has not demonstrated that he would be entitled to a new trial. Unlike the situations in Krankel, People v. Williams (1992), 224 Ill. App. 3d 517, People v. Finley (1991), 222 Ill. App. 3d 571, and People v. Jameson (1987), 155 Ill. App. 3d 650, where the identity of the uncontacted witness was known and the evidentiary value of the proposed testimony self-evident, there is no identified pathologist in this case or any proposed testimony. Since the record does not disclose the substance of the expert\u2019s proposed testimony, its evidentiary value is entirely speculative. Thus, even if defendant was able to prove Carroll\u2019s misrepresentation, he would be unable to show any prejudice resulting from such action or inaction. The indictment in this case was not confined to the theory that the victim died of a cocaine overdose. Even if a pathologist was retained to dispute Dr. Blum\u2019s findings, this would not preclude a jury\u2019s finding that defendant was responsible for the acts which caused Shelton\u2019s death. Therefore, defendant has not demonstrated that an alternate pathologist\u2019s opinion would have led to a different result. For these reasons, the trial court did not err in refusing to appoint new counsel to represent defendant at the hearing on his pro se post-trial motions.\nTurning to defendant\u2019s allegations of ineffective assistance of counsel which were not raised either in the post-trial motions filed by his attorneys or in his pro se post-trial motions, defendant asserts that his trial attorney, John Carroll, failed to preserve the record for review by (1) failing to object when the above evidence of other crimes was admitted; (2) failing to pursue a motion in limine to preclude the State from eliciting information concerning defendant\u2019s reputation as a drug dealer, for violence, and that the State\u2019s witnesses feared retaliation from defendant; and (3) failing to object when the State withdrew an instruction limiting the jury\u2019s use of evidence of other crimes.\nThere is a strong presumption that counsel\u2019s performance at trial and at sentencing fell within the range of acceptable behavior. (People v. Wright (1992), 149 Ill. 2d 36, 46.) To prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant must establish that (1) counsel\u2019s performance was so seriously deficient that it fell below an objective standard of reasonableness; and (2) the deficient performance was so prejudicial that the defendant was denied a fair trial. (Strickland v. Washington (1984), 466 U.S. 668, 687, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674, 693, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 2064; People v. Albanese (1984), 104 Ill. 2d 504, 525.) To show actual prejudice, defendant must demonstrate that, but for counsel\u2019s deficient performance, there is a reasonable probability that the result of the proceeding would have been different. (Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694, 80 L. Ed. 2d at 698, 104 S. Ct. at 2068; People v. Titone (1992), 151 Ill. 2d 19, 36.) An accused is entitled to competent, not perfect, representation. The fact that a defense tactic was unsuccessful does not retrospectively demonstrate incompetence. Therefore, counsel\u2019s performance at trial will not be deemed ineffective if the claimed error was a matter of discretion, trial tactics, or strategy. People v. Williams (1992), 235 Ill. App. 3d 638, 651.\nWe previously discussed the admissibility of various evidence of other crimes admitted during trial. Although some of this evidence was admissible, defense counsel failed to object when the State withdrew a pattern jury instruction limiting the use of such evidence. Failing to object has been held to constitute a matter of sound trial strategy. (People v. Steidl (1991), 142 Ill. 2d 204, 240-41; People v. Bosek (1991), 210 Ill. App. 3d 573, 600-01.) However, defendant\u2019s trial attorneys should have sought an instruction limiting the jury\u2019s use of evidence of other crimes. It is not a matter of discretion or trial strategy for a defense attorney to fail to seek an instruction when extensive evidence of.another crime is admitted, even for a limited purpose.\nNevertheless, a reviewing court need not determine whether counsel\u2019s performance was deficient prior to examining whether defendant suffered any prejudice as a result of the alleged deficiencies. An ineffectiveness claim may be disposed of on the ground of insufficient prejudice without deciding whether the alleged errors constitute constitutionally ineffective assistance of counsel. (Strickland, 466 U.S. at 697, 80 L. Ed. 2d at 699, 104 S. Ct. at 2069; People v. Odie (1992), 151 Ill. 2d 168, 173.) We previously discussed the admissibility of evidence of the other crimes or wrongdoings committed by defendant. Some of the evidence was admissible for limited purposes of illustrating motive, intent, method, modus operandi, and consciousness of guilt. However, we further determined that allowing the evidence to be admitted, even without the limiting instruction, did not amount to plain error, as the evidence was not closely balanced or the error so fundamental that defendant was deprived of a fair trial. Similarly, any error which may have occurred when defendant\u2019s trial attorneys failed to object when this evidence was admitted and to seek an instruction limiting the jury\u2019s use of other crimes evidence was harmless, as defendant has failed to establish that, but for counsel\u2019s errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.\nCLOSING ARGUMENTS\nDefendant asserts that he was denied a fair trial by improper comments made by the State during closing argument. The State is allowed substantial latitude in closing argument. (Williams, 147 Ill. 2d at 231.) The prosecutor has the right to comment on the evidence and draw all legitimate inferences deducible from the evidence even if unfavorable to defendant. (People v. Johnson (1992), 149 Ill. 2d 118, 145.) Although the State\u2019s comments may exceed the bounds of proper argument, the verdict must not be disturbed unless the remark clearly affected the outcome of the trial. (People v. Leger (1992), 149 Ill. 2d 355, 399.) Absent a clear abuse of discretion, the trial court\u2019s determination of the propriety of the closing argument should be followed. Johnson, 149 Ill. 2d at 145.\nIn closing argument, the prosecuting attorney stated as follows:\n\u201cAnd you hear a lot about this term beyond a reasonable doubt and burden of proof and I\u2019d just like to talk about that for a moment. The burden of proof means that the State has to prove the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. That\u2019s our burden. That\u2019s what we have to do, the State. We have to put on people to tell you.\nI just want to let you know that that\u2019s the same burden of proof in every criminal case in this country. Every criminal verdict that there has ever been entered of a guilty was based on that very same burden. Be it like this, a murder case, or bicycle theft case or some minor theft case or driving under the influence of alcohol case, it\u2019s the same burden. Every time there is a guilty verdict, the State has sustained that burden. It\u2019s nothing new. It\u2019s nothing magical. It\u2019s nothing different because of this particular case. That\u2019s the way it is in every case, in every court, in every type of crime across this country.\u201d\nDefendant contends that the State erroneously minimized its burden of proof by comparing burden of proof in the instant case to that of a bicycle theft case.\nDefendant failed to object to the prosecutor\u2019s remarks during closing argument. Therefore, we would be justified in holding that the issue was waived. (Enoch, 122 Ill. 2d at 187.) Notwithstanding the waiver rule, we do not find plain error.\nThis court has held that proper commentary includes remarks which characterize the State\u2019s burden of proof as one which is not unreasonable or impossible to meet and as one which prosecutors meet daily. (People v. Hicks (1987), 162 Ill. App. 3d 707, 714.) However, each case must be decided on its own facts. (People v. Bryant (1983), 94 Ill. 2d 514, 523.) It is interesting to note that the State discussed its burden of proof in a strikingly similar fashion in People v. Scaggs (1982) , 111 Ill. App. 3d 633, 637 (\u201cEvery defendant that has ever been convicted in this building in this country has been convicted beyond a reasonable doubt whether it is stealing a bicycle or committing a murder. It does not put this man on a pedestal. It is not some impossible thing floating up there in the air. It is a burden that is met every day\u201d). In Scaggs, the court found that this \u201cfrequently used argument\u201d has been repeatedly held to be improper because it may have the effect of lessening the importance of the State\u2019s burden of proof. (Scaggs, 111 Ill. App. 3d at 637.) However, the Scaggs court did not make a finding of whether this error alone was sufficient to require a new trial. Rather, the court found that the cumulative impact of several errors mandated a new trial. See also People v. Starks (1983) , 116 Ill. App. 3d 384, 395-96.\nWe do not find that the prosecutor\u2019s comments in this case constituted plain error. While we do not condone or encourage argument which compares the burden of proof in a murder case to that involving a bicycle theft, we find that the prosecutor\u2019s comments were an honest reflection and statement of the law. Further, our review of the State\u2019s entire closing argument reveals that its burden of proof was not minimized. The prosecutor accurately indicated that the jury was the finder of fact and would be instructed to decide the case based on the evidence it heard. The jury was informed of the State\u2019s burden of proof and also that the defense had no burden and was not required to prove anything. Defendant may not choose one portion of the closing argument and ignore these other statements. For these reasons, we find the State\u2019s closing did not constitute reversible error.\nDuring opening argument, defense counsel suggested that Ray Katzensky and Paul Schmitz were responsible for murdering Mahlendorf and Shelton. During closing argument, the prosecuting attorney stated as follows:\n\u201cWhat I recall the defendant saying to you [during the State\u2019s opening argument] is that Ray Katzensky and Paul Schmitz did this crime. *** In fact, I heard counsel a couple times ask witnesses isn\u2019t it true, Mr. Schmitz, that it was you and Ray Katzensky who went in there and killed Mahlendorf or it was you and Ray Katzensky who went in that barn and gave the cocaine to Debra Shelton. And to those questions that were asked, the answer was no, that\u2019s not true. No. That was the answers that were given to those questions.\n* * *\nNow, no one in this case has ever said that, what counsel suggested to you [during opening argument]. He has asked a question about it. The answer to that question is no. What is evidence is not what he asked, it\u2019s what that person says. He can ask anything. What\u2019s important is what they say. No one in this case ever said Katzensky and Schmitz did that. No one. There is no testimony of that. There is none. And he questioned along those lines and when it was posed it was knocked down and was answered in a negative manner. No, that\u2019s not the case. It was this man, it was Markiewicz, it was not him.\nYou have to remember that and you have to keep that in mind because that\u2019s very important. You can say whatever you want, ladies and gentlemen. I can say whatever I want here. Attorneys can say whatever they want in opening statement. But what it comes down to, what the proof is, what the proof of the pudding is will someone take that witness stand and say that. Is there some evidence in this record, some testimony in this record about what counsel suggested to you. And no, there is not.\u201d\nDefendant failed to object to these statements during trial. Nevertheless, we review defendant\u2019s contentions on the merits under the plain error rule. 134 Ill. 2d R. 615(a).\nOn appeal, defendant contends that the State\u2019s comments improperly emphasized the defense\u2019s failure to present any witnesses to refute the evidence admitted during trial. We disagree. An accused has a constitutional right not to testify as a witness in his own behalf. (Herrett, 137 Ill. 2d at 210.) The prosecution may not directly or indirectly comment on the defendant\u2019s failure to take the stand in his own defense. (People v. Lyles (1985), 106 Ill. 2d 373, 390.) The prosecution may, however, describe the State\u2019s evidence as uncontradicted, even if the defendant is the only person who could have contradicted it (Herrett, 137 Ill. 2d at 211), if the comments are not intended or calculated to direct the jury\u2019s attention to the defendant\u2019s failure to testify. (People v. Moore (1991), 215 Ill. App. 3d 836, 842-43.) Further, prosecutorial comments based on facts in evidence, or reasonable inferences drawn therefrom, fall within the bounds of proper argument, and prosecutorial comments that are invited by the defense and are not prejudicial do not constitute error. People v. Franklin (1990), 135 Ill. 2d 78, 100.\nIn its opening statement, the defense revealed its theory that Katzensky and Schmitz were responsible for Shelton\u2019s murder. Defense counsel attempted to prove this by cross-examining Katzensky and Schmitz and questioning whether they committed the murder. The State accurately stated during closing argument that the witnesses always responded negatively to such questions. We find that the State\u2019s comments during closing argument were not calculated to highlight defendant\u2019s failure to testify. Rather, the State\u2019s closing argument consisted of reasonable comments based on the evidence, invited by the defense, and not prejudicial to defendant. See People v. Terry (1988), 176 Ill. App. 3d 947, 950.\nAlthough the State\u2019s comments may exceed the bounds of proper argument, the verdict must not be disturbed on review unless the remark clearly affected the outcome of the trial. (Leger, 149 Ill. 2d at 399.) We previously determined that the evidence in this case was not closely balanced, as there was substantial and uncontradicted evidence of defendant\u2019s guilt. Even assuming both of the State\u2019s comments were improper, we deem any error was harmless, as the record demonstrates that the comments were not a material factor in defendant\u2019s conviction, nor did they result in substantial prejudice to defendant\u2019s right to a fair trial.\nSENTENCING\nIn this case, the jury found defendant eligible for the death penalty on the basis that he murdered Shelton to prevent her from testifying or giving material assistance to the State in an investigation or prosecution of Mahlendorf\u2019s murder. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 38, par. 9 \u2014 1(b)(8).) However, the jury found the existence of one or more mitigating factors sufficient to preclude the imposition of the death penalty. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 38, par. 9 \u2014 1(c).) Thus, the judge imposed a sentence of natural-life imprisonment without parole as provided by section 5 \u2014 8\u20141 of the Unified Code of Corrections. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 38, par. 1005 \u2014 8\u20141(a)(1)(b).) Defendant\u2019s final contention on appeal is that this case should be remanded for re-sentencing because the court abused its discretion in sentencing.\nA trial judge is given broad discretion in fashioning an appropriate sentence. (People v. Black (1992), 223 Ill. App. 3d 630, 633.) The trial court\u2019s decision is given great weight and deference and will not be disturbed on review absent an abuse of discretion. (People v. Wilson (1991), 143 Ill. 2d 236, 250.) The reviewing court should not substitute its judgment for that of the trial court merely because it might have imposed a different sentence by balancing the aggravating and mitigating factors differently. People v. Carlson (1992), 224 Ill. App. 3d 1034, 1044.\nWe note that defendant\u2019s pro se post-trial motions filed after sentencing did not raise any issues relating to defendant\u2019s sentence. Further, a motion to reduce the sentence was not filed. People v. Pfister (1993), 240 Ill. App. 3d 931, 934-37, holding that some form of post-sentencing motion is required to preserve a sentencing issue for appeal, was not decided at the time defendant was sentenced. Notwithstanding the waiver rule of Pfister, we find the sentencing proceeding in the present case was so flawed that we choose to address the merits of the case on the basis of plain error. 134 Ill. 2d R. 615(a); see Pfister, 240 Ill. App. 3d at 937 (McLaren, J., dissenting); People v. Hess (1993), 241 Ill. App. 3d 276, 283.\nIn sentencing defendant to a term of natural-life imprisonment, the court commented as follows:\n\u201cOne of the things that I have to take into consideration on sentencing anybody is the factors in aggravation and mitigation that are laid out in Chapter 38.\nI\u2019m going to consider three factors in aggravation. One, the defendant\u2019s conduct caused or threatened serious harm; three, the defendant has a history of prior delinquency or criminal activity; and seven, the sentence is necessary to deter others from committing the same crime.\nAs far as the factors listed in mitigation, I don\u2019t see where any of them apply here; therefore I\u2019m not going to consider any of them.\u201d\nThe judge proceeded to reiterate the testimony presented in mitigation, including defendant\u2019s unfortunate upbringing with an abusive father, grammar school grades, testimony from various persons indicating that defendant is \u201ca good guy,\u201d scores in attaining a GED certificate while incarcerated, and goals toward further education. However, he also cited defendant\u2019s criminal history, which includes several violent crimes, including battery, aggravated battery, armed robbery, theft, unlawful use of weapons, and felonious assault with a dangerous weapon. Then the judge stated as follows:\n\u201cIf I were to listen to everything that everybody said today as well as combine that with what I heard in the hearing on aggravation and mitigation, I cannot place them under any of the factors in mitigation listed by the statute. I have to look at the strides you\u2019ve made, but I pointed out the inconsistencies that I\u2019ve seen in the testimony, the letters and the presentence report because for the last ten years or more you\u2019ve been kind of doing the Dr. Jekyll and Mr. Hyde routine as far as I can see.\n* * *\nThe only thing that I can see or the only reason that I could see that Debbie Shelton was killed is exactly what the jury found. She was killed to keep her from possibly testifying against you in Wisconsin in the Mahlendorf death.\n* * *\nI agree that [Shelton] probably didn\u2019t have any pain as far as she knew ***. The testimony was that she was addicted to cocaine. She was being fed cocaine, only in larger amounts than she thought she was receiving. And she was fed that until she kind of shook like a bowl of jelly and then the final injection was administered to her and then she sat in kind of a shed for the next three days and then was buried in the Fox River and right next to it for the next ten months.\nAny sympathy that I think should have been afforded to you was given to you by the jury. I see no reason at all why I should give you any more sympathy. T admire you for what you have done since you\u2019ve been in the jail, but I\u2019m not going to consider that in my sentencing. It has nothing to do with the factors in mitigation. Mr. Markiewicz, I\u2019m going to sentence you to life without parole.\u201d\nDefendant asserts that the cause should be remanded for resentencing before a different judge because the sentencing judge abused his discretion by considering improper factors in aggravation and by failing to consider the mitigating evidence before the court.\nDefendant contends that the court found Shelton felt no pain when she died. Because the death of the victim is inherent in the offense of murder, defendant asserts that the court abused its discretion by considering the degree of harm caused in imposing an aggravated sentence. We agree that the court may not consider the death of the victim in imposing an aggravated sentence for murder because death is implicit in the offense. (People v. Saldivar (1986), 113 Ill. 2d 256.) However, it is proper for the trial court to consider the force employed and the manner in which the death occurred in applying the serious bodily harm factor. (Saldivar, 113 Ill. 2d at 271; People v. Natty (1991), 216 Ill. App. 3d 742, 773-74.) We do not agree that the passage quoted above reveals that the sentencing judge placed improper emphasis on serious harm. The judge mentioned the manner in which Shelton was murdered and agreed that she probably felt no pain. We find this comment proper, as we do not necessarily equate the lack of pain with a lack of serious harm. Furthermore, the sentencing judge also considered the defendant\u2019s history of prior delinquency or criminal activity, the fact that a sentence of imprisonment was necessary to deter others from committing the same crime, and, most significantly, that a sentence of natural life was statutorily authorized because the jury found that defendant murdered Shelton to prevent her from revealing information about Mahlendorf\u2019s murder. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 38, par. 1005-8-1(a)(1)(b).) Therefore, we find that the court did not abuse its discretion in applying aggravating factors, including serious harm.\nSection 5 \u2014 5\u20143.1(a) of the Unified Code of Corrections states that certain enumerated grounds \u201cshall be accorded weight in favor of withholding or minimizing a sentence of imprisonment.\u201d (Emphasis added.) (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 38, par. 1005 \u2014 5\u20143.1(a).) As this language is mandatory rather than directory, the sentencing authority may not refuse to consider relevant evidence presented in mitigation. (See Hitchcock v. Dugger (1987), 481 U.S. 393, 398-99, 95 L. Ed. 2d 347, 353, 107 S. Ct. 1821, 1824; Maxwell, 148 Ill. 2d at 147.) This includes evidence that a defendant has adjusted well to incarceration. (Skipper v. South Carolina (1986), 476 U.S. 1, 90 L. Ed. 2d 1, 106 S. Ct. 1669; People v. Turner (1993), 156 Ill. 2d 354, 359; People v. St. Pierre (1992), 146 Ill. 2d 494, 514-15.) Although the sentencing body may not disregard evidence in mitigation, it may determine the weight attributed to relevant mitigating evidence. (Maxwell, 148 Ill. 2d at 148.) Thus, the existence of mitigating factors does not automatically oblige the trial court to reduce a sentence from the maximum allowed. (People v. Smith (1991), 214 Ill. App. 3d 327, 339.) Where mitigating evidence is before the court, it is presumed the court considered that evidence absent some contrary indication other than the sentence imposed. People v. Willis (1991), 210 Ill. App. 3d 379, 389-90.\n\u2022 12 In this case, the sentencing judge stated on more than one occasion that he was not going to consider the evidence presented in mitigation because it did not fit into any of the categories enumerated in section 5 \u2014 5\u20143.1 of the Unified Code of Corrections. At the sentencing hearing, defendant introduced evidence that he acquired a GED certificate while incarcerated and that he was motivated toward furthering his education. However, the sentencing judge stated that he admired defendant for furthering his education, but was not going to consider that in sentencing. This approach is flawed.\nThe sentencing body should consider all matters reflecting upon the defendant\u2019s personality, propensities, purposes, tendencies, and every aspect of his life relevant to the sentencing proceeding. (People v. Scott (1992), 148 Ill. 2d 479, 560; People v. Barrow (1989), 133 Ill. 2d 226, 281.) Defendant\u2019s educational efforts are relevant as they relate to his rehabilitative potential. As such, this, and other evidence presented in mitigation, should have been considered by the court.\nThe sentencing judge was statutorily entitled to render a sentence of natural-life imprisonment, as the jury found that defendant was eligible for the death penalty. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 38, pars. 1005\u2014 8 \u2014 1(a)(1)(b), 9 \u2014 1(b)(8).) However, contrary to the trial court\u2019s repeated comments, the court should have considered defendant\u2019s evidence presented in mitigation and determined that the aggravating factors outweighed the mitigating factors. (See Scott, 148 Ill. 2d at 559-60; Maxwell, 148 Ill. 2d at 147-48.) Although the sentencing judge reiterated the evidence in mitigation in sentencing, his comments state that he did not consider it. Accordingly, we find that the judge abused his discretion in failing to consider mitigating evidence in sentencing and remand this cause to the trial court for a new sentencing hearing.\nOn rehearing, defendant claims prejudice by the sentencing judge, Judge Thomas E. Hogan, and requests his remand for resentencing to be held before a different judge. Our review of the record indicates that Judge Hogan, who was also the trial judge, may have harbored a commitment to imposing the maximum possible penalty. During voir dire, Judge Hogan advised the jurors that, if they found a mitigating factor sufficient to preclude the death penalty, \u201c[defendant] would be sentenced to life without parole in the penitentiary.\u201d (Emphasis added.) Although Judge Hogan was entitled to render this sentence, it was not mandatory, as the Unified Code of Corrections states that a term of natural-life imprisonment \u201cmay\u201d be imposed for this felony. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 38, par. 1005 \u2014 8\u20141(a)(1)(b).) Accordingly, we remand this cause for resentencing before a judge other than Judge Hogan. See People ex rel. Ward v. Moran (1973), 54 Ill. 2d 552.\nFor the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the circuit court of Kane County is affirmed in part and reversed in part, and the cause is remanded to the trial court for sentencing.\nAffirmed in part; reversed in part and remanded.\nUNVERZAGT and QUETSCH, JJ., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE McLAREN" } ], "attorneys": [ "G. Joseph Weller and Kim M. DeWitt, both of State Appellate Defender\u2019s Office, of Elgin, for appellant.", "David R. Akemann, State\u2019s Attorney, of Geneva (William L. Browers and Lawrence M. Bauer, both of State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor\u2019s Office, of counsel), for the People." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. JOHN L. MARKIEWICZ, Defendant-Appellant.\nSecond District\nNo. 2 \u2014 91\u20140499\nOpinion filed June 22, 1993.\nG. Joseph Weller and Kim M. DeWitt, both of State Appellate Defender\u2019s Office, of Elgin, for appellant.\nDavid R. Akemann, State\u2019s Attorney, of Geneva (William L. Browers and Lawrence M. Bauer, both of State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor\u2019s Office, of counsel), for the People." }, "file_name": "0031-01", "first_page_order": 49, "last_page_order": 74 }