{ "id": 5387049, "name": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. CHARLES TACKETT, Defendant-Appellant", "name_abbreviation": "People v. Tackett", "decision_date": "1993-07-09", "docket_number": "No. 2-91-0866", "first_page": "622", "last_page": "627", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "246 Ill. App. 3d 622" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "126 Ill. App. 3d 985", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3598460 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "992" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/126/0985-01" ] }, { "cite": "189 Ill. App. 3d 292", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2679302 ], "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "307" }, { "page": "307" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/189/0292-01" ] }, { "cite": "151 Ill. App. 3d 344", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3541632 ], "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "350" }, { "page": "351" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/151/0344-01" ] }, { "cite": "123 Ill. App. 3d 1042", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5676250 ], "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1044" }, { "page": "1045" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/123/1042-01" ] }, { "cite": "149 Ill. App. 3d 1000", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3460701 ], "weight": 4, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1007" }, { "page": "1007" }, { "page": "1007" }, { "page": "1013" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/149/1000-01" ] }, { "cite": "138 Ill. 2d 349", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5576240 ], "weight": 3, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "357" }, { "page": "365" }, { "page": "368" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/138/0349-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 636, "char_count": 13116, "ocr_confidence": 0.765, "pagerank": { "raw": 5.209463879257128e-08, "percentile": 0.3292058726203729 }, "sha256": "244efbd97eb946a79657ab93ae28846cad29742e9914ee289226fd805002d89f", "simhash": "1:292865e23b611964", "word_count": 2118 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T16:15:27.018701+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. CHARLES TACKETT, Defendant-Appellant." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE COLWELL\ndelivered the opinion of the court;\nDefendant, Charles Tackett, was found guilty of aggravated criminal sexual assault (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1991, ch. 38, par. 12\u2014 14(b)(1)) and sentenced to the Department of Corrections (DOC) for a term of six years. Defendant appeals, alleging the trial court erred in denying his pretrial motion to suppress his statements confessing to the crime. We affirm.\nA Lake County information charged that defendant, who was 17 years of age or older, knowingly committed an act of sexual penetration with C.M., who was under 13 years of age when the act was committed, in that defendant placed his finger in the vagina of C.M. Mark Pleasant, an investigator with the Illinois Department of Children and Family Services (DCFS), and Len Brezinski, a detective with the Lake County sheriffs department, first questioned defendant on October 24, 1990, at the Round Lake police station. Defendant, who was 19 years of age at the time of arrest, signed a waiver of his Miranda rights and then signed a statement he provided to the authorities after they had talked for about an hour. Such statement fully admitted his digital penetration of C.M.\u2019s vagina on October 22, 1990. C.M. was a two-year-old child that defendant baby-sat regularly. The statement also said defendant voluntarily agreed to talk with Brezinski and Pleasant and that \u201cDet. Brezinski told me what all of my legal rights are and I understand all of them. I have not been threatened or promised anything.\u201d Defendant\u2019s statement revealed that he was himself molested on more than one occasion as a child. Defendant\u2019s statement indicated that he had read it, understood it, and had been given the chance to make changes and corrections. He was then returned to his sister\u2019s house.\nDefendant was formally arrested the following day and transported to the sheriff\u2019s department in Waukegan, where he made a second statement to the same authorities. Defendant\u2019s second statement added that he had also digitally penetrated C.M.\u2019s vagina on October 19, 1990.\nDefendant filed a motion to suppress such statements on December 19, 1990. Defendant\u2019s motion alleged: (1) that his statement on October 24, 1990, was not made with a knowing and intelligent waiver of his right to remain silent or his right to counsel; (2) that this statement was made as a result of improper inducements by the officials; and (3) that the initial questioning was conducted in violation of the defendant\u2019s right to be advised of his Miranda rights. Defendant further alleged that his second statement from October 25, 1990, should also be suppressed since it violated defendant\u2019s rights and was tainted by defendant\u2019s coerced statements on October 24, 1990.\nLinda Bresolin, a clinical psychologist, testified at the May 30, 1991, hearing on defendant\u2019s motion that she administered a battery of psychological tests to defendant at his counsel\u2019s request. She concluded defendant was in the borderline range of intellectual functioning and scored a full scale IQ of 74. Bresolin explained that an IQ of 80 is in the below average range and an IQ of 69 indicates mental retardation. Bresolin noted that defendant frequently asked her to repeat the instructions given to him during testing.\nPleasant testified he was assigned to investigate the alleged sexual assault on C.M. Pleasant and Brezinski located defendant at his sister\u2019s home on October 24, 1990, where he was baby-sitting his four-year-old nephew. They informed defendant they were investigating the allegations concerning C.M. and wished to speak with him at the Round Lake police department. Defendant was concerned about leaving the home since his sister would be home soon and would wonder where he and his nephew were. Pleasant offered to contact defendant\u2019s sister when they reached the station. Pleasant testified he did not conduct the interview in the home because he did not want the four-year-old to be present and no typewriter would be available at the house to take a statement from defendant if necessary.\nThe officers gave defendant his Miranda warnings at the station before defendant made any statements. Brezinski read defendant his rights one at a time and asked defendant to initial each one on the Miranda form or inform Brezinski if he did not understand. Defendant initialed each statement and signed the form waiving his Miranda rights. After a 40- to 60-minute discussion with the officers, defendant admitted to having committed the offense. Defendant also told the officers he had been abused as a child and indicated he needed help. Pleasant said he then gave defendant the name of a clinic which might aid defendant in counseling. Defendant signed his statement and the officers returned him to his sister\u2019s home. The following day, the officers returned to arrest defendant. The officers readvised defendant of his Miranda rights. Defendant then made an oral statement that was reduced to writing and signed by him. Pleasant testified that no threats or promises were made to induce defendant into making the statement. Brezinski\u2019s testimony substantially corroborated that of Pleasant. Defendant motioned at that time for a directed verdict which was denied.\nDefendant testified he thought the officers were from the \u201cChildren and Families Association\u201d and that they wanted to talk to him at the beach. He said the officers indicated they were there to help defendant. Defendant said he thought the officers were there to help children and he considered himself a child. Pleasant gave him the name of a doctor or clinic on the day of the first interview. Defendant did not read the form waiving his Miranda rights before he signed it. Defendant admitted he knew what was written in his\nstatement of confession before he signed it. Defendant said he also gave the second statement on October 25 because he trusted the officers and thought they would help him. Defendant stated that he had been in special education throughout his schooling. He had finished high school and received mostly A\u2019s and B\u2019s.\nThe court denied defendant\u2019s motion and commented:\n\u201cThere is no doubt in this case that he [defendant] was given his Miranda warnings, and there was no testimony from the defendant that he did not understand those warnings.\nThis case [sic], the police did not attempt to mislead the defendant by indicating that they had evidence, that they did not have, or misstating evidence about the case to the defendant. * * *\n* * *\nI think the defendant may well in fact have misapprehended some of the circumstances surrounding what was going on, however, that\u2019s not really the standard.\nIn all the cases cited by the defense, and all the cases that I was able to find, there was some activity or intent on the\npolice to in some way deceive the defendant.\n* * *\nAlthough I find that the defendant may have perceived the situation, there is no \u2014 there has been no testimony that he did not know and understand what his rights were ***.\nThe defendant may in fact have not completely understood everything that was going on around him, okay, but I find that there was no attempt or there was no action from the police that led him to those conclusions.\u201d\nDefendant was later found guilty after a stipulated bench trial and sentenced to six years of imprisonment.\nDefendant contends on appeal that his age and intellectual level, combined with the officers\u2019 promise to aid him with counseling, induced him to confess to the offense herein, thus rendering his statement to the police involuntary and inadmissible in evidence. A statement of confession must be voluntary in order to be admissible. (People v. Bernasco (1990), 138 Ill. 2d 349, 357.) The test for voluntariness is whether such statement was made freely and without inducement of any sort or whether defendant\u2019s will was overcome at the time he confessed. (People v. Kokoraleis (1986), 149 Ill. App. 3d 1000, 1007.) A court must consider the \u201ctotality of the circumstances\u201d to determine whether a statement has been given voluntarily. (Kokoraleis, 149 Ill. App. 3d at 1007.) Such circumstances include defendant\u2019s mental ability, familiarity with the English language, age, education, and experience. (Bernasco, 138 Ill. 2d at 365; People v. Berry (1984), 123 Ill. App. 3d 1042, 1044.) Courts should also consider the duration of questioning and determine whether defendant received his constitutional rights or was subjected to any physical punishment. (In re T.S. (1986), 151 Ill. App. 3d 344, 350.) The trial court\u2019s decision on whether a defendant\u2019s confession is voluntary will not be overturned on appeal unless it is against the manifest weight of the evidence. Kokoraleis, 149 Ill. App. 3d at 1007.\nDefendant contends his borderline intellectual functioning allowed the officers to induce him to confess to the offense by promising to help defendant find counseling to overcome the sexual abuse he had suffered as a child. Subnormal mentality does not ipso facto make a confession involuntary where the subnormality has not deprived the defendant of the ability to understand the meaning and ramifications of his confession. (People v. Abernathy (1989), 189 Ill. App. 3d 292, 307.) Evidence of limited mental capacity alone does not indicate that a defendant is incapable of waiving his constitutional rights and making a voluntary confession (People v. Ellison (1984), 126 Ill. App. 3d 985, 992; Kokoraleis, 149 Ill. App. 3d at 1013); rather, it is only one of the issues to be considered in reviewing the totality of the circumstances under which a confession is made. The trial court is in a better position than a reviewing court to evaluate a defendant\u2019s ability to understand his rights. Abernathy, 189 Ill. App. 3d at 307.\nHere, the officers informed defendant from the beginning that they wished to speak about the sexual abuse allegations regarding C.M. Defendant read and indicated he understood the waiver form which he signed before any questioning commenced at the police station. The record shows that defendant read over and corrected the contents of his statements before signing them. He admitted at trial that he knew what the statements said. Pleasant testified that he gave defendant the name of a clinic which might be able to assist defendant with counseling but did not do so until defendant indicated he needed help. Neither Pleasant nor Brezinski threatened or promised defendant anything in order to procure his statements. A review of the totality of the circumstances surrounding defendant\u2019s statements demonstrates that defendant voluntarily confessed to the instant offense. We do not find that the officers\u2019 attempt to find counseling for defendant added a deceptive atmosphere to the interview.\nThe record supports the trial court\u2019s finding that defendant\u2019s borderline intellectual functioning did not interfere with his ability to comprehend the meaning of a voluntarily made statement and, therefore, his statements were admissible. We find it significant that the trial court here reached its conclusion after hearing official police and psychological testimony and that the court made its own observations of defendant while he was testifying. (See Bernasco, 138 Ill. 2d at 368.) We conclude that the State has proven by a preponderance of the evidence that defendant voluntarily provided a statement of confession to the instant offense.\nThe cases cited as support by defendant can be distinguished. In Berry, the police conduct toward the defendant bordered on deception. The police interrogated defendant about an unrelated offense and fabricated evidence of defendant\u2019s latent fingerprints found at the scene in order to obtain a confession. (See Berry, 123 Ill. App. 3d at 1045.) In T.S., respondent was falsely informed that witnesses would testify against him and that certain pieces of evidence would link him to the crime. Respondent was also falsely informed that the police had a videotape of respondent entering and exiting the crime scene and that if respondent \u201ccooperated\u201d he would not be arrested. (See T.S., 151 Ill. App. 3d at 351.) Here, there is no indication defendant was deceived into making a confession. The testimony at trial indicated the officers merely responded to defendant\u2019s request for help by giving him the name of a counseling clinic, rather than using the possibility of treatment as an inducement to confess. Therefore, we find that the trial court did not err in denying defendant\u2019s motion to suppress.\nFor the foregoing reasons, we affirm the decision of the circuit court of Lake County.\nAffirmed.\nINGLIS, P.J., and DOYLE, J., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE COLWELL" } ], "attorneys": [ "G. Joseph Weller, of State Appellate Defender\u2019s Office, of Elgin, and Beth Katz, of Evanston, for appellant.", "Michael J. Waller, State\u2019s Attorney, of Waukegan, Brian L. Buzard, of Mt. Morris, and Jay Wiegman, of Springfield (William L. Browers, of State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor\u2019s Office, of counsel), for the People." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. CHARLES TACKETT, Defendant-Appellant.\nSecond District\nNo. 2 \u2014 91\u20140866\nOpinion filed July 9, 1993.\nG. Joseph Weller, of State Appellate Defender\u2019s Office, of Elgin, and Beth Katz, of Evanston, for appellant.\nMichael J. Waller, State\u2019s Attorney, of Waukegan, Brian L. Buzard, of Mt. Morris, and Jay Wiegman, of Springfield (William L. Browers, of State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor\u2019s Office, of counsel), for the People." }, "file_name": "0622-01", "first_page_order": 640, "last_page_order": 645 }