{ "id": 2929774, "name": "SUSAN M. TOPPEL, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. LUIS REDONDO, DefendantAppellee", "name_abbreviation": "Toppel v. Redondo", "decision_date": "1993-05-28", "docket_number": "No. 1\u201492\u20140999", "first_page": "211", "last_page": "215", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "247 Ill. App. 3d 211" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "576 N.E.2d 28", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "215 Ill. App. 3d 735", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5294943 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/215/0735-01" ] }, { "cite": "504 N.E.2d 772", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "152 Ill. App. 3d 524", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3575904 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/152/0524-01" ] }, { "cite": "211 N.E.2d 253", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "33 Ill. 2d 326", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2886822 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/33/0326-01" ] }, { "cite": "484 N.E.2d 1237", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1965, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "137 Ill. App. 3d 773", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3638963 ], "year": 1965, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/137/0773-01" ] }, { "cite": "555 N.E.2d 1012", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "198 Ill. App. 3d 209", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2474190 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/198/0209-01" ] }, { "cite": "463 N.E.2d 216", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1990, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "124 Ill. App. 3d 42", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3427450 ], "year": 1990, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/124/0042-01" ] }, { "cite": "506 N.E.2d 658", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "666" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "153 Ill. App. 3d 918", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3609197 ], "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "930" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/153/0918-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 466, "char_count": 8182, "ocr_confidence": 0.771, "pagerank": { "raw": 4.565170110192638e-08, "percentile": 0.2860400355387515 }, "sha256": "51188663b6b899a906a3cac5c7381adb75b2de5f6670f324392156272cd451e6", "simhash": "1:c1789032da878d56", "word_count": 1282 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T17:38:22.874712+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "SUSAN M. TOPPEL, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. LUIS REDONDO, DefendantAppellee." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE McNULTY\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nPlaintiff Susan M. Toppel appeals from a jury verdict in favor of defendant Dr. Luis Redondo in this medical malpractice action. Plaintiff injured her left knee in a softball game. She was treated by Dr. Redondo, an orthopedic surgeon, who performed arthroscopic surgery on her knee. When plaintiff continued to experience pain in her knee, she saw another orthopedic surgeon, Dr. Dossier, who performed an arthroscopic examination and then reconstructive surgery of plaintiff\u2019s knee. Plaintiff still continued to experience pain in her knee.\nPlaintiff\u2019s first contention is that defendant should not have been permitted to read part of Dr. Fossier\u2019s evidence deposition at trial. Because Dr. Fossier was unable to testify at trial, his evidence deposition was taken two months before trial. During his cross-examination, Dr. Fossier identified defendant\u2019s exhibit No. 1 as the letter that he wrote declining to testify as an expert on plaintiff\u2019s behalf. In his letter, Dr. Fossier stated:\n\u201cWhile I do not necessarily agree with the way Dr. Redondo proceeded with the treatment of Ms. Toppel\u2019s torn anterior cruciate ligament, I do not think that based on the review of the records which you have provided that his care necessarily constitutes a claim of malpractice.\u201d\nPlaintiff objected at both the evidence deposition and at trial, stating that Dr. Fossier should not be allowed to testify on cross-examination as to the contents of his letter since this went beyond the scope of direct examination. Plaintiff maintains that on direct examination Dr. Fossier testified only as to his care and treatment of the plaintiff and no questions or responses were given regarding the appropriateness of defendant\u2019s care. Plaintiff contends that the error was compounded by the fact that defense counsel also used the letter in cross-examination of plaintiff\u2019s expert, Dr. Kane, and the trial court then allowed Dr. Fossier\u2019s letter to be given to the jury during deliberations.\nA similar situation occurred in Gust K. Newberg, Inc. v. Illinois State Toll Highway Authority (1987), 153 Ill. App. 3d 918, 506 N.E.2d 658, wherein the defendant objected that the plaintiff\u2019s cross-examination during an evidence deposition went beyond the scope of the direct. The court concluded:\n\u201cWe agree with [plaintiff] that a separate notice of deposition need not have been given by [plaintiff], but we disagree that it was appropriate for [plaintiff] to cross-examine [the witness] beyond the bounds of the direct examination without first concluding the [defendant\u2019s] examination. *** [I]n an evidence deposition the examination and cross-examination shall be the same as though the deponent were testifying at trial. (103 Ill. 2d R. 206(c)(2).) Cross-examination is limited to subjects covered in direct examination, because other subjects would not be relevant. [Citation.] The proper procedure for [plaintiff\u2019s] counsel to have followed would have been to limit his scope of cross-examination and, after concluding his cross-examination, proceed to examine the witness directly.\u201d (Newberg, 153 Ill. App. 3d at 930, 506 N.E.2d at 666.)\nThe court in Newberg did not, however, reverse on this basis since it found the witness\u2019 testimony to be irrelevant.\nHere, Dr. Fossier\u2019s letter was indeed relevant. It bore directly on whether defendant\u2019s treatment of plaintiff constituted malpractice. Although defendant concedes that his cross-examination of Dr. Dossier went beyond the scope of the direct, we decline to reverse on this basis. Plaintiff does not dispute that Dr. Fossier\u2019s testimony regarding the contents of his letter was admissible evidence. Instead, plaintiff contends that he was prejudiced by the introduction of this evidence at the improper time. We, however, do not believe that the jury verdict would have been any different if the evidence had been introduced at the proper time.\nPlaintiff next contends that the trial court erred in allowing into evidence an article entitled, \u201cThe Incomplete Tears of the Anterior Cruciate Ligament and Knee Locking,\u201d written in part by defendant\u2019s expert, Dr. Noble. In support of her assertion, plaintiff relies on Mielke v. Condell Memorial Hospital (1984), 124 Ill. App. 3d 42, 463 N.E.2d 216, and Schuchman v. Stackable (1990), 198 Ill. App. 3d 209, 555 N.E.2d 1012, wherein it was held that an expert witness on direct examination may not read into evidence excerpts from articles and treatises which support his testimony. Those cases are not applicable here, however, since Dr. Noble simply identified the article as one that he authored and at no point discussed or relied on the article during his testimony.\nIt was during the cross-examination of plaintiff\u2019s expert, Dr. Kane, that the contents of Dr. Noble\u2019s article were brought before the jury. During the cross-examination Dr. Kane admitted that if plaintiff\u2019s injury was an incomplete tear, that type of injury was discussed in Dr. Noble\u2019s article and according to the article, defendant\u2019s treatment of the injury was within the standard of care. Plaintiff does not dispute that defendant\u2019s cross-examination was proper since the law clearly states that an expert witness may be cross-examined as to the views of recognized authorities expressed in treatises or professional periodicals. (Hollembaek v. Dominick\u2019s Finer Foods, Inc. (1985), 137 Ill. App. 3d 773, 484 N.E.2d 1237; see Darling v. Charleston Community Memorial Hospital (1965), 33 Ill. 2d 326, 211 N.E.2d 253.) Because the contents of the article were properly brought before the jury during Dr. Kane\u2019s cross-examination, there is no need to reverse on the basis that this article was allowed to go to the jury room. The trial court has broad discretion in determining what exhibits may be taken to the jury room, and absent a determination that the exhibit was both erroneous and prejudicial, the appellate court will not reverse the trial court\u2019s decision. Bautista v. Verson Allsteel Press Co. (1987), 152 Ill. App. 3d 524, 504 N.E.2d 772.\nPlaintiff\u2019s final contention is that the trial court failed to instruct the jury on her theory of the case. The issues instruction given to the jury states plaintiff\u2019s claims that defendant negligently:\n\u201c(a) failed to properly treat plaintiff\u2019s completely torn left anterior cruciate ligament by placing sutures into it; (b) ordered physical therapy with flexion and extension to plaintiff\u2019s left knee at a point in time when such care was contraindicated; and (c) failed to keep plaintiff\u2019s left knee properly immobilized for a sufficient period of time to allow healing to take place.\u201d\nPlaintiff claims that the trial court erred when it refused to include in the instruction plaintiff\u2019s claim that defendant negligently \u201cfailed to undertake complete reconstruction of plaintiff\u2019s tom left anterior cmciate ligament.\u201d This statement, however, did not accurately reflect the evidence as presented at trial. Plaintiff\u2019s expert, Dr. Kane, testified that to repair a completely torn anterior cruciate ligament it would have been within the standard of care for defendant to perform complete reconstruction on plaintiff\u2019s knee or to do nothing at all. Since the instruction as proposed by plaintiff did not accurately or completely reflect the evidence at trial, the trial court properly refused to give this instruction to the jury. See Skonberg v. Owens-Corning Fiberglass Corp. (1991), 215 Ill. App. 3d 735, 576 N.E.2d 28 (where part of a jury instruction is correct and part is incorrect, the entire instruction should be denied).\nAccordingly, for the reasons set forth above, we affirm the decision of the trial court.\nAffirmed.\nMURRAY and COUSINS, JJ., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE McNULTY" } ], "attorneys": [ "Raymond P. Concannon, Ltd., of Chicago (Raymond P. Concannon and Michael P. Concannon, of counsel), for appellant.", "Lord, Bissell & Brook, of Chicago (William C. Anderson III, Hugh C. Griffin, and Diane I. Jennings, of counsel), for appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "SUSAN M. TOPPEL, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. LUIS REDONDO, DefendantAppellee.\nFirst District (5th Division)\nNo. 1\u201492\u20140999\nOpinion filed May 28, 1993.\nRehearing denied June 23, 1993.\nModified opinion filed July 30, 1993.\nRaymond P. Concannon, Ltd., of Chicago (Raymond P. Concannon and Michael P. Concannon, of counsel), for appellant.\nLord, Bissell & Brook, of Chicago (William C. Anderson III, Hugh C. Griffin, and Diane I. Jennings, of counsel), for appellee." }, "file_name": "0211-01", "first_page_order": 229, "last_page_order": 233 }