{ "id": 2928300, "name": "CASUALTY INSURANCE COMPANY, Plaintiff and Counterdefendant-Appellee, v. E.W. CORRIGAN CONSTRUCTION COMPANY, INC., Defendant and Counterplaintiff-Appellant", "name_abbreviation": "Casualty Insurance v. E.W. Corrigan Construction Co.", "decision_date": "1993-05-17", "docket_number": "No. 1\u201491\u20142403", "first_page": "326", "last_page": "336", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "247 Ill. App. 3d 326" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "484 S.W.2d 570", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.W.2d", "case_ids": [ 10069191 ], "weight": 4, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "574-75" }, { "page": "575" }, { "page": "576" }, { "page": "576" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/sw2d/484/0570-01" ] }, { "cite": "371 F.2d 541", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.2d", "case_ids": [ 2046438 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f2d/371/0541-01" ] }, { "cite": "255 F. Supp. 858", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F. Supp.", "case_ids": [ 1546216 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1967, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "861" }, { "page": "862" }, { "page": "862" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f-supp/255/0858-01" ] }, { "cite": "107 R.I. 469", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "R.I.", "case_ids": [ 3025553 ], "weight": 6, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "477" }, { "page": "285" }, { "page": "477" }, { "page": "285" }, { "page": "477" }, { "page": "285" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ri/107/0469-01" ] }, { "cite": "411 F.2d 862", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.2d", "case_ids": [ 2191706 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "866" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f2d/411/0862-01" ] }, { "cite": "335 Pa. Super. 410", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Pa. Super.", "case_ids": [ 620679 ], "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "417" }, { "page": "771-72" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/pa-super/335/0410-01" ] }, { "cite": "202 A.2d 498", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "A.2d", "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "502" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "152 Conn. 31", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Conn.", "case_ids": [ 1579975 ], "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "39" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/conn/152/0031-01" ] }, { "cite": "49 P.2d 590", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "P.2d", "weight": 4, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "598" }, { "page": "597" }, { "page": "597-98", "parenthetical": "notice referring to a policy concerning one department of insurer satisfies the requirements of notice in another policy concerning a different department" }, { "page": "598" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "4 Cal. 2d 336", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Cal. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2200135 ], "weight": 4, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "351" }, { "page": "350" }, { "page": "350-51" }, { "page": "350" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/cal-2d/4/0336-01" ] }, { "cite": "383 F.2d 871", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.2d", "case_ids": [ 2078486 ], "weight": 4, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "874" }, { "page": "875" }, { "page": "874" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f2d/383/0871-01" ] }, { "cite": "368 N.E.2d 465", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 5, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "467" }, { "page": "471" }, { "page": "471" }, { "page": "470" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "52 Ill. App. 3d 1034", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3391077 ], "weight": 5, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1036" }, { "page": "1041" }, { "page": "1041" }, { "page": "1041" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/52/1034-01" ] }, { "cite": "164 N.E.2d 297", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "pin_cites": [ { "page": "302" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "24 Ill. App. 2d 285", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5209471 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "296" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-2d/24/0285-01" ] }, { "cite": "294 N.E.2d 7", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "pin_cites": [ { "page": "12" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "10 Ill. App. 3d 115", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5393223 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "121" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/10/0115-01" ] }, { "cite": "578 N.E.2d 926", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1973, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "930" }, { "page": "930" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "144 Ill. 2d 64", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5592135 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1973, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "74" }, { "page": "74" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/144/0064-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 967, "char_count": 27310, "ocr_confidence": 0.757, "pagerank": { "raw": 8.683177417394473e-08, "percentile": 0.4923532221376613 }, "sha256": "6eb43157a3cbdbeb9ff24140f6db15cd3333dd576f549cf9ac0bccf42c0aeabf", "simhash": "1:3a32c3cecc58f40d", "word_count": 4346 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T17:38:22.874712+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "CASUALTY INSURANCE COMPANY, Plaintiff and Counterdefendant-Appellee, v. E.W. CORRIGAN CONSTRUCTION COMPANY, INC., Defendant and Counterplaintiff-Appellant." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE BUCKLEY\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nPlaintiff, Casualty Insurance Company (Casualty), brought a declaratory judgment action against defendant, E.W. Corrigan Construetion Company, Inc. (Corrigan), seeking a declaration that it had no duty to defend or indemnify Corrigan due to Corrigan\u2019s failure to comply with the notice requirement of an insurance policy. Corrigan then filed a cross-motion for declaratory judgment and a motion for summary judgment. Casualty responded by filing a cross-motion for summary judgment. The trial court entered summary judgment in favor of Casualty and against Corrigan on the grounds that the notice by Corrigan was not given \u201cas soon as practicable\u201d as required by the contract.\nCorrigan is a Delaware corporation licensed to do business in Illinois. It is a general contractor involved in building construction. In July 1986, Corrigan was the general contractor for Phase Two of the construction of the Stewart Glenn Apartments project (Stewart Glenn) in Willowbrook, Illinois. E.W.C. Contractors, Inc. (E.W.C.), is an Illinois corporation. E.W.C. is a concrete subcontractor and was never involved in any manner with the Stewart Glenn construction project.\nCorrigan and E.W.C. share the same suite of offices at 1900 Spring Road in Oakbrook, Illinois, and have the same phone number. Additionally, the officers of both corporations are the same. Corrigan employs secretaries, accounting clerks, and a controller while E.W.C. does not employ office help. Consequently, phone calls to E.W.C. are answered by employees of Corrigan. Additionally, any paperwork for E.W.C. is done and received by employees of Corrigan.\nThe Gustafson-Lindberg Company (Gustafson) was the subcontractor on the Stewart Glenn project. Gustafson had two insurance policies with Casualty: an employer\u2019s liability policy (WC 85 \u2014 28367), which covered Gustafson against any workers\u2019 compensation claims, and a general liability policy (GAL 85 \u2014 28367), which insured against any claims of bodily injury or property damage. The Insurance Group, Inc. (Insurance Group), is an insurance \u201cproducer\u201d authorized by Casualty to issue insurance certificates in Casualty\u2019s name. The Insurance Group issued a certificate adding Corrigan as an additional insured on Gustafson\u2019s general liability policy. According to the policy, it is a prerequisite to coverage that Casualty be given notice of any incident which it may ultimately be under a duty to indemnify or defend. The relevant portion of the policy provides as follows:\n\u201c4. Insured\u2019s duties in the event of occurrence, claim, or suit:\n(a) In the event of an occurrence, written notice containing particulars sufficient to identify the insured and also reasonably obtainable information with respect to the time, place and circumstances thereof, and the names and addresses of the injured and of available witnesses, shall be given by or for the insured to the company or any of its authorized agents as soon as practicable.\n(b) If claim is made or suit is brought against the insured, the insured shall immediately forward to the company every demand, notice, summons, or other process received by him or his representative.\u201d\nGerard Hernon (Hemon) was an employee of Gustafson. On July 29, 1986, Hernon was injured while on the job at the Stewart Glenn jobsite when he fell from the roof. On July 30, 1986, Gustafson mailed written notice of the incident by sending to Casualty \u201cForm 46\u201d captioned \u201cEmployer\u2019s First Report of Injury or Illness.\u201d Casualty received the notice on or about August 1, 1986. The form referenced Gustafson\u2019s employer liability number WC 85 \u2014 28367 and included, inter alia, the name of the injured employee, the date, place and circumstances of the occurrence, the name of the insured, Gustafson, and the fact that Gustafson was a subcontractor on the job. The form did not mention Corrigan, nor did it reference Gustafson\u2019s general liability policy, number GAL 85 \u2014 28367. According to Casualty\u2019s answers to interrogatories, Casualty then opened a workers\u2019 compensation file. Its investigation centered around the extent of Hernon\u2019s injuries and, after Hemon\u2019s workers\u2019 compensation claim was settled, the file was closed.\nOn July 29, 1988, the last day of the two-year statute of limitations, Hemon filed suit against E.W.C. for personal injuries arising out of his fall at the Stewart Glenn jobsite. On August 4, 1988, E.W.C. received service of summons and complaint at its offices. On August 5, 1988, it tendered the defense of the case to the Wausau Insurance Company. The summons and complaint were the first notice to either E.W.C. or Corrigan of the occurrence involving Hemon.\nSubsequently, Hernon realized he mistakenly had sued the wrong party and E.W.C. was dismissed from the suit. On April 21, 1989, Hemon filed an amended complaint against Corrigan. On May 19, 1989, Corrigan was served with summons and complaint and the same day it tendered its defense to Casualty claiming it was an additional insured under the general liability policy written for Gustafson. On June 2, 1989, Corrigan sent its second notice to Casualty of the occurrence. On February 21, 1990, Casualty filed its complaint seeking a declaration that it was not obligated to defend or indemnify Corrigan. Casualty asserted that Corrigan \u201cknew or should have known\u201d from the date the original suit incorrectly was filed against E.W.C. in July 1988 that a claim was being asserted against it. Therefore, its failure to notify Casualty until May 1989 was a breach of the provision of the insurance contract requiring reasonable notice. Subsequently, on March 26,1990, Casualty refused Corrigan\u2019s tender of defense.\nOn October 2, 1990, Corrigan filed a counterclaim for declaratory judgment. Corrigan then filed a motion for summary judgment in which it maintained that it gave reasonable notice to Casualty. Casualty filed a cross-motion for summary judgment contending that Corrigan violated the policy\u2019s notice requirement by failing to give notice for more than nine months. On June 26, 1991, the trial judge heard arguments on the motions and granted summary judgment in favor of Casualty and against Corrigan.\nThe trial judge held that Corrigan breached the notice requirement of the insurance contract by not giving notice \u201cas soon as practicable.\u201d The judge found that Corrigan received notice of the occurrence when E.W.C. was served with summons and complaint and, at that time, should have informed Casualty of the existence of a potential claim. The judge also concluded that the notice to Casualty from Gustafson immediately following the occurrence did not inure to the benefit of Corrigan because of the \u201csignificant differences with respect to the liability question in a personal negligence lawsuit and workmen\u2019s compensation cases.\u201d Therefore, the judge held that Corrigan failed to give reasonable notice under the circumstances to Casualty as a matter of law and entered summary judgment for Casualty. Corrigan appeals.\nThe first issue to be addressed is whether notice of an occurrence from the employer of an injured party under a workers\u2019 compensation policy satisfies the notice requirements for an additional named insured under a general liability policy issued by the same insurer. Specifically, the question in this case is whether the timely notice of the occurrence given by Gustafson to Casualty inured to Corrigan\u2019s benefit by including \u201cparticulars sufficient to identify the insured.\u201d This is an issue of first impression in Illinois as no Illinois court has addressed the portion of an insurance contract\u2019s notice provision which requires that the insured be sufficiently identified.\nCasualty asserts that the workers\u2019 compensation notice by its insured, Gustafson, was insufficient to satisfy the additional insured\u2019s, Corrigan\u2019s, notice obligations under the general liability policy. Specifically, Casualty points out that Gustafson\u2019s notice did not name Corrigan and did not refer to Gustafson\u2019s general liability policy. The notice only referred to Gustafson\u2019s workers\u2019 compensation policy.\nCorrigan, on the other hand, points to the \u201cplain language\u201d of the policy. Corrigan argues that the policy does not require that an insured be explicitly named or that the party giving notice \u201cidentify to the insurer which of two policies, general liability or worker[s\u2019] compensation, may cover a particular personal injury occurrence.\u201d\nA general principle in Illinois is that insurance policies are to be liberally construed and clear provisions are to be interpreted in their \u201c \u2018plain, ordinary, and popular sense.\u2019 \u201d (United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co. v. Wilkin Insulation Co. (1991), 144 Ill. 2d 64, 74, 578 N.E.2d 926, 930, quoting Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co. v. Case Foundation Co. (1973), 10 Ill. App. 3d 115, 121, 294 N.E.2d 7, 12.) Any ambiguities are to be interpreted in favor of the insured. (United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co., 144 Ill. 2d at 74, 578 N.E.2d at 930.) Additionally, notice to an insurer of an occurrence need not be given by the insured to be sufficient; any responsible person may be the source of the information \u201cas long as a reasonable notice is given.\u201d (Gregory v. Highway Insurance Co. (1960), 24 Ill. App. 2d 285, 296, 164 N.E.2d 297, 302.) In view of the \u201cplain language\u201d of the provision which requires that notice include \u201cparticulars sufficient to identify the insured,\u201d we must initially agree with Corrigan that failure to include the name of the additional insured and the relevant policy number is not, in and of itself, fatal to the adequacy of the notice.\nCorrigan next contends that Gustafson\u2019s notice provided all the necessary \u201cparticulars\u201d such as the time, place and circumstances of the occurrence such that Corrigan could easily be identified as an additional insured \u201cfrom the policy documents readily available to Casualty.\u201d Casualty responds, however, that the documents identifying Corrigan as an additional insured are not readily available to it and, therefore, the notice provided was insufficient. Casualty asserts that, although the Insurance Group had the authority to issue an insurance certificate naming Corrigan as an additional insured, \u201cCasualty did not have a copy of the certificate, nor did its procedure mandate that it have a copy.\u201d According to Casualty, it relies upon the notice provision of its insurance contracts which requires that notice of an occurrence include \u201cparticulars sufficient to identify the insured.\u201d Casualty asserts that Corrigan\u2019s argument would require the court to ignore the terms of the contract and would shift the obligation of notice of an occurrence from the insured to the insurer. Casualty contends that, if Corrigan prevails, the investigation the insurance companies would need to conduct would be both impractical and economically unfeasible. Casualty maintains that, after initial notice of an occurrence, it would have to determine if any other of its policies were in force. This would mean that the insurance company not only could not safely stop with reviewing the policies in its possession, but would have to contact \u201call of its producers, agents, and/or brokers which may have, during the respective policies periods, issued any certificates of insurance naming an additional insured.\u201d Casualty asserts that, in contrast to this burdensome investigation, all Corrigan needed to do is to provide written notice of the incident and to identify itself as an additional insured under Gustafson\u2019s policy.\nCasualty is correct in that all Corrigan had to do was to provide notice identifying itself. However, the notice provision, which we note was written by the insurance company, only requires \u201cparticulars sufficient to identify the insured\u201d and not written notice expressly identifying the insured. We cannot say that the insured must provide a type of notice which the policy does not require.\nAccording to Casualty, if a policy is written or an insured is added to an existing policy, Casualty does not know until notice of an occurrence is sent to it by the insured. If this is so and Casualty does not keep track of who it has insured, how does Casualty determine what its monetary reserves require or even what its projected liability over a period will be? On its face, it is nonsensical to contend that Casualty does not know who it has insured, or that, once Casualty receives notice of an occurrence, it would be \u201cimpractical and economically unfeasible\u201d for it to determine if other policies are in force.\nCasualty also argues that notice of a workers\u2019 compensation claim should not be deemed to satisfy the notice requirement of a general liability policy handled by a different department and cites to Mollihan v. Stephany (1977), 52 Ill. App. 3d 1034, 368 N.E.2d 465, for the proposition that knowledge of one department of an insurance company is not automatically attributed to another department. In Mollihan (52 Ill. App. 3d at 1036, 368 N.E.2d at 467), defendant made a \u201cmaterial misrepresentation\u201d on his application for automobile insurance and, when the misrepresentation was discovered, the company began the process of rescinding the policy. Before the rescission information was able to be processed into the computer, however, defendant was involved in a collision and an agent for the insurance company paid defendant for the damage to his car. The Mollihan court held that the insurance company did not waive the defense of rescission because no intent to relinquish the defense could be implied from the conduct of the insurer or its agent. The agent\u2019s lack of knowledge of the rescission when he paid the claim was based solely on the fact that the information had not yet been given to the computer. (Mollihan, 52 Ill. App. 3d at 1041, 368 N.E.2d at 471.) Additionally, the court noted that in order to find waiver, it must be clear that to allow the defense to be advanced would be \u201cunjust, inequitable or unconscionable.\u201d (Mollihan, 52 Ill. App. 3d at 1041, 368 N.E.2d at 471.) Based on this case, defendant asserts that notice to one department of an insurance company should not be attributed to another department.\nThe Mollihan case is clearly distinguishable. The issue of whether the insurer has waived a defense is not analogous to whether it has received adequate notice of an occurrence. Waiver of a defense requires an intent implied from the insurer\u2019s conduct. (Mollihan, 52 Ill. App. 3d at 1041, 368 N.E.2d at 470.) If a department of an insurance company inadvertently does not have notice of certain information, intent to waive a defense clearly cannot be implied. This does not mean the department would not be held to have notice of that information in a different situation or context.\nWe believe that \u201cthe better rule of law\u201d is that a department of an insurance company should not be able to \u201cdisclaim knowledge of that which is known to another department of the same company.\u201d As Corrigan points out in its brief \u201ca contrary rule would put a premium on ignorance and encourage insurers to conceal their knowledge.\u201d We find persuasive the following rhetorical question from Duggan v. Travelers Indemnity Co. (1st Cir. 1967), 383 F.2d 871, 874:\n\u201c[0]nce a notice of claim is filed, is it too much to ask that an insurer have a reasonable filing system, that its employees check the files for more than one policy covering the same insured for the same risk, and that, if questions arise over coverage, it surface them and, while reserving such rights as it sees fit to assert, proceed both to preserve the rights of its policyholder and itself? [Citation.] We think not. And we are confident that contemporary office systems and management are up to the task.\u201d (Duggan, 383 F.2d at 874.)\nIf notice of an occurrence is sent to a large insurance company, there is \u201cno reasonable excuse\u201d why that notice should only be received by the workers\u2019 compensation department and not the liability department. We agree with the Duggan court and conclude that an insurer \u201c \u2018is chargeable with knowledge of all policies issued by it to the insured.\u2019 \u201d (Duggan, 383 F.2d at 875, quoting Dietlin v. General American Life Insurance Co. (1935), 4 Cal. 2d 336, 351, 49 P.2d 590, 598.) In other words, if an insurer receives timely written notice of an occurrence, it is \u201csufficient to charge [the insurer] on all policies running in favor of the insured.\u201d (Dietlin, 4 Cal. 2d at 350, 49 P.2d at 597.) Additionally, we note that the policy requires that notice be given \u201cto the company or any of its authorized agents.\u201d It does not require that notice be given to a specific department of the company. Therefore, if an insured notifies its insurer of an occurrence and references its workers\u2019 compensation policy, it should be considered notice in regard to any general liability policy the insured might have with the same insurer. (See Dietlin, 4 Cal. 2d at 350-51, 49 P.2d at 597-98 (notice referring to a policy concerning one department of insurer satisfies the requirements of notice in another policy concerning a different department).) Consequently, it should also be considered adequate notice to the insurer for any additional insured named on the general liability policy.\nCasualty asserts, however, that an investigation undertaken pursuant to a general liability policy is \u201ccompletely different\u201d from an investigation pursuant to a workers\u2019 compensation claim. Since fault is not an issue, a workers\u2019 compensation investigation is concerned with the extent of the injury and whether it was incurred during the scope of employment. An investigation pursuant to a liability policy, on the other hand, is concerned with the question of liability. Casualty cites several cases from other jurisdictions which recognize the potential difference between a workers\u2019 compensation investigation and a liability investigation. In Commercial Contractors Corp. v. American Insurance Co. (1964), 152 Conn. 31, 202 A.2d 498, Commercial contended that American was not prejudiced by lack of timely notice since it had received notice from another entity pursuant to a workers\u2019 compensation policy and had immediately conducted an investigation. In the context of determining whether American was prejudiced by lack of timely notice, the supreme court of errors of Connecticut determined that Commercial had the burden of showing lack of prejudice to American and without evidence in the record of the extent and nature of American\u2019s investigation \u201cit [cannot] be held as a matter of law on the facts before us that the compensation investigation was substantially similar to an investigation which would have been made under a liability policy or was or should have been of a character such as to result in the discovery of Commercial as an additional, unnamed insured under [the] liability policy.\u201d (Emphasis added.) (Commercial Contractors, 152 Conn, at 39, 202 A.2d at 502.) In Philadelphia Electric Co. v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. (1984), 335 Pa. Super. 410, 417, 484 A.2d 768, 771-72, the superior court of Pennsylvania stated:\n\u201c[A]s the lower court\u2019s opinion correctly points out, the investigation conducted by Aetna pursuant to that [workers\u2019 compensation] claim was materially different from the type of investigation Aetna would have conducted in preparation for this personal liability defense. Therefore, we cannot say that this worker\u2019s compensation claim, in and of itself, alerted Aetna of its potential responsibility.\u201d\nWe recognize that there is potentially a distinct difference between an investigation undertaken pursuant to a workers\u2019 compensation claim and an investigation started in connection with a general liability policy. An insurer should not be able to claim prejudice on this ground, however, simply because the insured referenced his workers\u2019 compensation file and not any general liability policies he may have had with the insurer when he sent notice. The requirement that notice of an occurrence be given to the company and include \u201cparticulars sufficient to identify the insured\u201d does not require that, if the insured holds more than one policy with the insurer, he identify to the insurer which of the two policies, general liability or workers\u2019 compensation, covers the particular accident nor that the notice be directed to a particular department. As Corrigan points out, its business and Gustafson\u2019s business is construction, not insurance. Therefore, the burden of determining how to treat an insured\u2019s notice of occurrence should fall solely upon the insurer. If Casualty treated Gustafson\u2019s notice of occurrence solely as a workers\u2019 compensation case, the decision was solely Casualty\u2019s, and the burden of any difference in the focus of its investigation must lie with the insurance company. As the Dietlin court stated, \u201c[t]he defendant\u2019s division of its business among several departments should not be permitted to work a hardship upon the insured.\u201d (Dietlin, 4 Cal. 2d at 350, 49 P.2d at 598.) We note the commonsense reasoning of the Duggan court when it asks\n\u201cwhether there are many [insureds] who can answer correctly the question: for just what risks are you covered by your various policies, or, how comprehensive is a comprehensive policy? We grant that basic commitments are to be undertaken seriously by policyholders. And one of the most important is to inform the insurer when and how \u2014 and soon \u2014 [that] something has happened that has or might hurt them. This done, we think they have fulfilled their initial duty.\u201d Duggan, 383 F.2d at 874.\nCasualty cites Employers\u2019 Liability Assurance Corp. v. Travelers Insurance Co. (2d Cir. 1969), 411 F.2d 862, 866, which stands for the proposition that notice to an insurer by the employer of an injured employee for purposes of workers\u2019 compensation coverage is insufficient to serve as notice by an unnamed additional insured under an automobile liability policy. This case is distinguishable, however, because the additional insured was unnamed and was an insured by virtue of his status as a permissive user of a motor vehicle. Short of being expressly notified of the insured\u2019s existence, the insurer would never know of him. In this case, however, Corrigan was an additional insured who was named in the certificate of insurance as an additional insured.\nIn support of its argument that Gustafson\u2019s notice to Casualty was sufficient to satisfy its obligation to give notice, Corrigan refers the court to three cases in addition to Duggan. Corrigan cites to Sinclair Oil Corp. v. New Hampshire Insurance Co. (1970), 107 R.I. 469, 477, 268 A.2d 281, 285, in which the insurance company argued that because notice was received from its named insured in connection with its workers\u2019 compensation policy, it was insufficient to satisfy the notice requirement required to be given by the additional insured under a general automobile liability policy. The supreme court of Rhode Island held that, in view of the fact that the insurance company was informed of the name of its named insured, the notice of occurrence given in connection with a workers\u2019 compensation policy was sufficient to satisfy the additional insured\u2019s notice obligation under the general policy issued by the same insurer. (Sinclair, 107 R.I. at 477, 268 A.2d at 285.) The Sinclair court stated that the insurance company was \u201cwithout standing to claim that one of its divisions is so unrelated to another as to make notice to one inoperative to the other.\u201d Sinclair, 107 R.I. at 477, 268 A.2d at 285.\nIn Western Freight Association v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. (W.D. Pa. 1966), 255 F. Supp. 858, 861, aff\u2019d (3d Cir. 1967), 371 F.2d 541, the named insured gave notice one day after the accident. The Western Freight court reasoned that the notice from the named insured placed Aetna in a position to be able to identify the additional insureds and determine \u201con whose behalf notice should be deemed to have been given.\u201d (Western Freight, 255 F. Supp. at 862.) The court concluded, therefore, that the notice from the named insured inured to the benefit of the additional insureds because Aetna had prompt notice of the occurrence, knowledge of all the relevant facts of the incident, and was not prejudiced. Western Freight, 255 F. Supp. at 862.\nFinally, in Employers Casualty Co. v. Glens Falls Insurance Co. (Tex. 1972), 484 S.W.2d 570, 574-75, the supreme court of Texas addressed the issue of whether written notice of an accident from a named insured inured to the benefit of an additional insured. The question was one of first impression for the court. The Texas court concluded that, although there is a difference of opinion in other jurisdictions,\n\u201cthe weight of authority and the better rule appears to be that written notice of an accident by the named insured inures to the benefit of any additional or omnibus insureds if it is timely and sufficient to place the insurer on inquiry as to the extent of its possible liability and omnibus coverage under the policy.\u201d (Employers Casualty, 484 S.W.2d at 575.)\nAdditionally, the Texas court noted that there was evidence in the record that, in response to the notice, the insurance company made \u201ca timely, full and complete investigation\u201d of the accident. (Employers Casualty, 484 S.W.2d at 576.) Therefore, the purpose of the notice requirement was fulfilled and the insurer was not prejudiced by any lack of notice. As a result, the court held that the notice from the named insured satisfied the additional insured\u2019s obligation and that any other conclusion would permit the insurer \u201cto escape liability on a technicality\u201d unrelated to its ability to promptly investigate the accident and prepare to defend any claims thereafter asserted against the additional insureds. Employers Casualty, 484 S.W.2d at 576.\nAfter reviewing the arguments, briefs, and authority from this and other jurisdictions, we conclude that the timely notice from Gustafson referencing its workers\u2019 compensation policy was \u201csufficient to place the insurer on inquiry as to the extent of its possible liability.\u201d Therefore, the notice satisfied the requirements for Corrigan as an additional named insured under a general liability policy issued by Casualty by including \u201cparticulars sufficient to identify the insured.\u201d Consequently, we reverse the trial court\u2019s entry of summary judgment in favor of Casualty and against Corrigan and enter judgment in favor of Corrigan and against Casualty. In light of our disposition of this issue, we need not determine whether Corrigan\u2019s notice to Casualty nine months after it became aware of the occurrence constituted reasonable notice.\nFor the foregoing reasons, we reverse the decision of the circuit court of Cook County and remand with instructions to enter an order consistent with this opinion.\nReversed and remanded.\nMANNING, P.J., and O\u2019CONNOR, J., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE BUCKLEY" } ], "attorneys": [ "Schaffenegger, Watson & Peterson, Ltd., of Chicago (John J. Piegore, of counsel), for appellant.", "Kiesler & Berman, of Chicago (Robert L. Kiesler and Patti M. Deuel, of counsel), for appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "CASUALTY INSURANCE COMPANY, Plaintiff and Counterdefendant-Appellee, v. E.W. CORRIGAN CONSTRUCTION COMPANY, INC., Defendant and Counterplaintiff-Appellant.\nFirst District (1st Division)\nNo. 1\u201491\u20142403\nOpinion filed May 17, 1993.\nSchaffenegger, Watson & Peterson, Ltd., of Chicago (John J. Piegore, of counsel), for appellant.\nKiesler & Berman, of Chicago (Robert L. Kiesler and Patti M. Deuel, of counsel), for appellee." }, "file_name": "0326-01", "first_page_order": 344, "last_page_order": 354 }