{ "id": 2927997, "name": "THE PEOPLE ex rel. THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE POLICE, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. ZBIGNIEW MAMOK, Defendant-Appellee", "name_abbreviation": "People ex rel. Department of State Police v. Mamok", "decision_date": "1993-05-24", "docket_number": "No. 1\u201491\u20143594", "first_page": "366", "last_page": "370", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "247 Ill. App. 3d 366" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "138 N.E. 658", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.", "year": 1962, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "307 Ill. 322", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 5089671 ], "year": 1962, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "327" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/307/0322-01" ] }, { "cite": "8 Ill. App. 3d 313", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2764711 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/8/0313-01" ] }, { "cite": "184 N.E.2d 882", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "25 Ill. 2d 241", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5352660 ], "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "244" }, { "page": "244" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/25/0241-01" ] }, { "cite": "378 N.E.2d 239", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "61 Ill. App. 3d 495", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3345677 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "498" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/61/0495-01" ] }, { "cite": "290 N.E.2d 677", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "8 Ill. App. 3d 315", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2762942 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "317" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/8/0315-01" ] }, { "cite": "442 N.E.2d 546", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "110 Ill. App. 3d 379", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2996802 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "381" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/110/0379-01" ] }, { "cite": "570 N.E.2d 484", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1982, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "211 Ill. App. 3d 682", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2529225 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1982, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "687" }, { "page": "690" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/211/0682-01" ] }, { "cite": "451 N.E.2d 874", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "96 Ill. 2d 457", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3113801 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/96/0457-01" ] }, { "cite": "485 N.E.2d 1076", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1983, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "109 Ill. 2d 143", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3127156 ], "weight": 4, "year": 1983, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "152-53" }, { "page": "153" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/109/0143-01" ] }, { "cite": "546 N.E.2d 580", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1985, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "131 Ill. 2d 428", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5569862 ], "year": 1985, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/131/0428-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 511, "char_count": 8780, "ocr_confidence": 0.75, "pagerank": { "raw": 6.233605815818255e-08, "percentile": 0.3854077979063644 }, "sha256": "549b60409ac876a8755312d7d36bd9d28059ac20a56c06adf455c46b5e9a30ba", "simhash": "1:12864c9582e09642", "word_count": 1425 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T17:38:22.874712+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "THE PEOPLE ex rel. THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE POLICE, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. ZBIGNIEW MAMOK, Defendant-Appellee." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE O\u2019CONNOR\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nPlaintiff, People of the State of Illinois ex rel. the Illinois Department of State Police, appeals from a June 5, 1991, order of the circuit court of Cook County which granted defendant Zbigniew Mamok\u2019s motion to dismiss its complaint as time barred pursuant to the two-year limitations period of section 13\u2014202 of the Code of Civil Procedure (the Code) (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1989, ch. 110, par. 13\u2014202). The sole issue on appeal is whether the circuit court properly granted defendant\u2019s motion to dismiss. We affirm.\nOn December 27, 1986, defendant was involved in an automobile accident with James Warren, an employee of the Illinois Department of State Police. Warren was injured in the accident, and the Department paid Warren $8,266.89 in workers\u2019 compensation benefits and medical bills totaling $1,529.20.\nPlaintiff\u2019s complaint, filed January 26, 1989, sought reimbursement of these sums. Defendant successfully moved to dismiss plaintiff\u2019s complaint as time barred pursuant to section 13 \u2014 202\u2019s two-year limitation period.\nPlaintiff posits on appeal that reversal is warranted because it is immune from defendant\u2019s statute of limitations defense. In support, plaintiff relies on cases such as Board of Education v. A, C & S, Inc. (1989), 131 Ill. 2d 428, 546 N.E.2d 580, County of Du Page v. Graham, Anderson, Probst & White, Inc. (1985), 109 Ill. 2d 143, 485 N.E.2d 1076, and City of Shelbyville v. Shelbyville Restorium, Inc. (1983), 96 Ill. 2d 457, 451 N.E.2d 874, which helped develop and apply the common law doctrine that governmental entities are immune from statutes of limitations in actions involving \u201cpublic\u201d rights. Plaintiff asserts that its complaint asserts such a public right.\nDefendant responds that plaintiff\u2019s action is nothing more than a subrogation suit. Accordingly, because Warren, the subrogor, cannot maintain a time-barred suit against defendant, neither can his subrogee, plaintiff herein. Defendant further responds that plaintiff\u2019s suit does not involve a public right.\nWe need go no further than the Illinois Workers\u2019 Compensation Act (the Act) (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1989, ch. 48, par. 138.1 et seq.) to affirm the circuit court\u2019s dismissal of plaintiff\u2019s action. Section 1 of the Act defines \u201cemployer\u201d to include \u201c[t]he State and each county, city, town, township, incorporated village, school district, body politic, or municipal corporation therein.\u201d Ill. Rev. Stat. 1989, ch. 48, par. 138.1.\nSection 5 of the Act provides the mechanism by which an \u201cemployer\u201d under the Act can obtain reimbursement of monies paid to one of its \u201cemployees\u201d from a third party who has injured the employee. Section 5 provides in relevant part:\n\u201c(b) Where the injury or death for which compensation is payable under this Act was caused under circumstances creating a legal liability for damages on the part of some person other than his employer to pay damages, then legal proceedings may be taken against such other person to recover damages notwithstanding such employer\u2019s payment of or liability to pay compensation under this Act. ***\n* * *\nIf the injured employee or his personal representative agrees to receive compensation from the employer or accept from the employer any payment on account of such compensation, or to institute proceedings to recover the same, the employer may have or claim a lien upon any award, judgment or fund out of which such employee might be compensated from such third party.\n* * *\nIn the event the employee or his personal representative fails to institute a proceeding against such third person at any time prior to 3 months before such action would be barred, the employer may in his own name or in the name of the employee, or his personal representative, commence a proceeding against such other person for the recovery of damages on account of such injury or death to the employee, and out of any amount recovered the employer shall pay over to the injured employee or his personal representative all sums collected from such other person by judgment or otherwise in excess of the amount of such compensation paid or to be paid under this Act ***.\u201d Ill. Rev. Stat. 1989, ch. 48, par. 138.5(b).\nSection 5(b) of the Act has been interpreted as creating \u201cin the employer a right akin to the common law right of subrogation.\u201d (Knowles v. Mid-West Automation Systems, Inc. (1991), 211 Ill. App. 3d 682, 687, 570 N.E.2d 484, citing Chicago Transit Authority v. Yellow Cab Co. (1982), 110 Ill. App. 3d 379, 381, 442 N.E.2d 546.) Its purpose is \u201cto \u2018make whole\u2019 an employer who, though not liable under ordinary tort law, is nevertheless liable to his injured employee under the [Act].\u201d (Public Litho Service, Inc. v. City of Chicago (1972), 8 Ill. App. 3d 315, 317, 290 N.E.2d 677.) Section 5(b) embraces both an action for \u201cdamages\u201d by the employer on behalf of its employee as well as one seeking merely reimbursement of monies paid to its employee. Department of Law Enforcement v. Willis (1978), 61 Ill. App. 3d 495, 498, 378 N.E.2d 239.\nIn Joseph Schlitz Brewing Co. v. Chicago Rys. Co. (1923), 307 Ill. 322, 327, 138 N.E. 658, the court held that the right of the employer to sue a third-party tortfeasor is not a new cause of action ereated by the Act, but is \u201cthe employee\u2019s right of action taken from him and transferred to the employer.\u201d In McCormick v. Zander Reum Co. (1962), 25 Ill. 2d 241, 244, 184 N.E.2d 882, the supreme court stated that as a subrogee, the employer can have no greater rights than its employee/subrogor and can enforce only such rights as its subrogor could enforce. Thus, an employer is time barred from asserting a claim against a third-party tortfeasor if the suit was not brought within the time limit which the employee had to bring the suit initially. McCormick, 25 Ill. 2d at 244; accord Knowles, 211 Ill. App. 3d at 690; Public Litho Service, Inc., 8 Ill. App. 3d 313, 290 N.E.2d 677.\nIn this case, we believe the State\u2019s action against defendant is time barred. In stepping into the shoes of Warren, the State received only what Warren possessed against defendant \u2014 a time-barred action.\nCounty of Du Page (109 Ill. 2d 143, 485 N.E.2d 1076) supports our conclusion. There, the County of Du Page sued architects and contractors for the defective design and construction of the Du Page County administration building. These defendants moved to dismiss the county\u2019s suit based on section 13 \u2014 214 of the Code, which sets forth the applicable limitations period in lawsuits involving the design and construction of improvements to real property. The county replied that it was immune from defendant\u2019s section 13 \u2014 214 defense, and the circuit court agreed. Defendants\u2019 motion to dismiss was accordingly denied.\nThe supreme court reversed the circuit court. Applying standard canons of statutory construction, the supreme court held that section 13 \u2014 214, which defined \u201cperson\u201d to mean any \u201cindividual, any business or legal entity, or any body politic\u201d (emphasis added) (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1989, ch. 110, par. 13\u2014214), abrogated the county\u2019s common law governmental limitations immunity. The court stated that \u201cit is well established that where a statute of limitations does \u2018expressly include the State, county, municipality, or other governmental agencies,\u2019 common law governmental limitations immunity will not bar a limitations defense predicated on that statute.\u201d County of Du Page, 109 Ill. 2d at 152-53.\nIn light of its holding, the supreme court found it unnecessary to address whether the county\u2019s suit asserted a \u201cpublic\u201d right. \u201cThat becomes an appropriate inquiry only where a statute of limitation does not expressly state that it applies to a governmental entity.\u201d County of Du Page, 109 Ill. 2d at 153.\nHere, the term \u201cemployer\u201d within the Act expressly includes the State. Thus, when asserting a right of reimbursement under section 5(b) of the Act, the State is to be treated no differently than other employers. As Warren\u2019s subrogee, the State received Warren\u2019s time-barred claim. Whether the State\u2019s action asserted a \u201cpublic\u201d right is, under County of Du Page, an irrelevant inquiry.\nFor these reasons, defendant\u2019s motion to dismiss was properly granted. Accordingly, the June 5, 1991, dismissal order of the circuit court of Cook County is affirmed.\nAffirmed.\nMANNING, P.J., and CAMPBELL, J., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE O\u2019CONNOR" } ], "attorneys": [ "Roland W. Burris, Attorney General, of Springfield (John A. Morrissey, Assistant Attorney General, of Chicago, of counsel), for appellant.", "Donald Rendler-Kaplan & Associates, of Chicago (Jeffrey M. Cohen, of counsel), for appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "THE PEOPLE ex rel. THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE POLICE, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. ZBIGNIEW MAMOK, Defendant-Appellee.\nFirst District (1st Division)\nNo. 1\u201491\u20143594\nOpinion filed May 24, 1993.\nRoland W. Burris, Attorney General, of Springfield (John A. Morrissey, Assistant Attorney General, of Chicago, of counsel), for appellant.\nDonald Rendler-Kaplan & Associates, of Chicago (Jeffrey M. Cohen, of counsel), for appellee." }, "file_name": "0366-01", "first_page_order": 384, "last_page_order": 388 }