{ "id": 2927158, "name": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. DELILAH GONZALEZ, Defendant-Appellant", "name_abbreviation": "People v. Gonzalez", "decision_date": "1993-05-26", "docket_number": "No. 1\u201490\u20143052", "first_page": "370", "last_page": "376", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "247 Ill. App. 3d 370" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "427 N.E.2d 1302", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "101 Ill. App. 3d 202", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3084513 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "204" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/101/0202-01" ] }, { "cite": "559 N.E.2d 948", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "202 Ill. App. 3d 316", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2587359 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/202/0316-01" ] }, { "cite": "259 N.E.2d 791", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "45 Ill. 2d 540", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2897570 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/45/0540-01" ] }, { "cite": "604 N.E.2d 858", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "152 Ill. 2d 229", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5603261 ], "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "267" }, { "page": "269" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/152/0229-01" ] }, { "cite": "527 N.E.2d 448", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "173 Ill. App. 3d 186", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3478279 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/173/0186-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 714, "char_count": 14699, "ocr_confidence": 0.781, "pagerank": { "raw": 4.03580807328026e-08, "percentile": 0.08575924696768035 }, "sha256": "b18922f98ddb2bd4734ca06043b7f2a087c2220cbbf9e3c63f5a025e7b5bb346", "simhash": "1:f53602fe27d89ff2", "word_count": 2427 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T17:38:22.874712+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. DELILAH GONZALEZ, Defendant-Appellant." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE CERDA\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nAfter a jury trial in the circuit court of Cook County, defendant Delilah Gonzalez was convicted of first-degree murder and sentenced to a 40-year term of imprisonment. On appeal, she argues that the prosecutor\u2019s closing argument denied her right to a fair trial. In addition, defendant asserts that the sentence was excessive.\nThe evidence presented at trial revealed that Anthony Bruno was fatally stabbed in the chest on a Chicago Transit Authority bus around 5 p.m. on September 18, 1988. Sandra Borges testified that she was a passenger on that bus at the time of the incident. She recalled that three people boarded the bus at Fullerton and Austin. Borges testified that she thought all three individuals were males. They moved to the back of the bus, speaking Spanish and some English. When the victim, Anthony Bruno, entered the bus, one of the three individuals stated that they were Cobras and Bruno was a Gay-lord, a rival gang. Bruno sat across from Borges.\nOne of the three individuals then walked to the front of the bus, one stood near the rear exit door and one stood next to the victim. The two people in the rear of the bus looked at each other and then one stabbed the victim while the other held the rear door open. The three individuals fled. Borges testified that she did not get a good look at them. Further, she never heard anyone state that he or she wanted to stab someone.\nTimothy Kimbler was a passenger on the bus with his girl friend, Sherry Burris. Kimbler and Burris sat near the back of the bus. Three Hispanics boarded the bus at Austin Avenue and walked to the rear of the bus. Defendant, who Kimbler thought was male, began fondling a five-inch brown knife which was closed. Burris then moved one seat forward and defendant changed seats. One of defendant\u2019s companions wrote graffiti on the windows of the bus with white shoe polish. In addition, defendant motioned toward the victim and said, \u201cGaylord.\u201d Defendant then handed the knife to one of her companions and the other companion walked to the front of the bus. As the bus slowed, the individual who had written the graffiti opened the knife. Defendant stood at the rear door of the bus. When the bus stopped, defendant\u2019s companion stabbed the victim in the chest and then ran to the rear door, which defendant was holding open.\nKimbler subsequently traveled to the police station. He identified defendant\u2019s companion who wielded the knife and defendant in separate lineups. At that time, Kimbler learned that defendant was female.\nSherry Burris corroborated Kimbler\u2019s testimony concerning the events surrounding the murder. She further testified that the stabber wrote \u201cSTM\u201d on the window, and the defendant stated, \u201cI\u2019ll hold the door open.\u201d Burris also identified defendant and her companion in lineups.\nAlana Freeman, the bus operator, testified that she was driving the bus on Fullerton Avenue. As she approached the intersection of Fullerton and Kildare, one individual walked to the front of the bus while his companions remained in the rear. One of them signalled for a stop. Freeman stopped the bus and, after a few seconds, looked in her rearview mirror to determine why the rear door remained open. She saw one of them holding the door open.\nAfter the three individuals exited the bus, Freeman was informed that someone had been stabbed. She requested assistance and then held the victim, who died in her arms. Freeman further testified that she noted white graffiti on a rear window of the bus which had not been there when she started her shift.\nDetective Phillip Boyle of the Chicago police department testified that he was assigned to investigate the murder of Anthony Bruno. Based upon information received by police officers, Boyle traveled to 3017 Keating Avenue in Chicago, where he recovered the murder weapon from an individual named Moratay.\nChicago police officer Michael Mason testified that he directed other officers to locate Julio Morejon, who was subsequently transported to police headquarters. Morejon admitted that he stabbed the victim.\nDetective Hugh Conwell testified that he arrested defendant on September 21, 1988. Defendant was transported to Area 5 headquarters and advised of her constitutional rights. Defendant related that she was riding on the Fullerton Avenue bus with William Moratay and Morejon when she saw an individual she recognized as a Gaylord gang member. She told Morejon that the individual was a Gaylord and handed her knife to Morejon. She knew that Morejon would stab the victim. Defendant walked to the rear exit, held the door open after the bus stopped, and exited with Morejon after he stabbed Bruno.\nDetective Renaldo Guevara testified as an expert in gang crime. This testimony revealed that about 70% of gang murders result in retaliation. This retaliation is characterized by murdering a rival gang member on the one-year anniversary of the initial killing.\nAssistant State\u2019s Attorney Mary Beth Kinnerk met defendant around 2 p.m. on September 21, 1988, at police headquarters. After defendant stated that she understood her rights and would give a statement, defendant indicated that no threats or promises were made to induce her statement and that she was making a statement of her own free will.\nDefendant\u2019s court-reported statement was read into evidence. Defendant related that she, Morejon and Moratay got on a Fullerton bus at Austin Avenue. Morejon was a member of the Imperial Gangsters. Defendant identified herself as a tagger, a person who writes graffiti on buses. Defendant recognized the victim as a member of the Gaylords\u2019 street gang. According to defendant, she had previously seen the victim arguing with one of Morejon\u2019s friends about gang matters. Defendant told Morejon about the previous argument. Morejon then told defendant to give him her knife and further told her to hold the rear door open. Morejon knew that defendant had a knife because she had used it to scrape graffiti on the bus window. Defendant also knew that Morejon intended to stab the victim, and she complied with his instructions, holding the door open so that Morejon could make his getaway.\nThis statement further revealed that defendant\u2019s brother, a member of the Spanish Cobras\u2019 gang, was murdered on September 17, 1987. Defendant thought that he was killed by a member of the Gay-lords\u2019 gang because blonde hair was found on his clothes, and the Gaylords are white. Defendant kept those hairs on her dresser at home.\nDefendant now asserts that the closing argument presented by the prosecutor served to deny her a fair trial. Defendant identifies the prosecutor\u2019s request that the jurors compare the rights accorded defendant against the lack of fairness accorded the victim.\nThe relevant colloquy occurred:\n\u201c[Assistant State\u2019s Attorney]: Throughout these proceedings, in fact, from the time that the police first went to Delilah Gonzalez\u2019 house to place her under arrest until the time she was brought to the police station until this day as we stand in this courtroom, the defendant has been accorded total fairness.\n[Defense Counsel]: Objection, your Honor. That is for the jury to decide.\nTHE COURT: Total \u2014 what was the last word?\n[Assistant State\u2019s Attorney]: Fairness, Judge.\nTHE COURT: That\u2019s for the jury to decide, counsel, proceed.\n[Assistant State\u2019s Attorney]: When the defendant was arrested, the police who went there offered her mother a ride to the police station. They brought the defendant to a police station, put her in an interview room and took the handcuffs off. She was advised of her rights. She was told that she didn\u2019t have to talk to the detectives if she didn\u2019t want to, that she could see a lawyer if she wanted to, that she could stop questioning at any time. And then she was interviewed.\nAnd then an Assistant State\u2019s Attorney came and told her all of the same things, all of her Constitutional rights. And the same thing again in front of a court reporter, she was told of her rights, told she didn\u2019t have to say these things, told that she could do what she wanted. While they are waiting for the court reporter, food is provided for the defendant. She stated she was hungry, and the State\u2019s Attorney provides her with food.\nThroughout the entire time at the police station I would submit to you nothing untoward was done towards this defendant. There is no inference, absolutely not a shred of evidence in this trial that this statement is anything other than the voluntary statement of Delilah Gonzalez.\nAnd when the defendant comes here, ladies and gentlemen, and in accordance with the rights that she has, she has a public trial, she is provided with competent defense counsel, an impartial judge\u2014\n[Defense Counsel]: Objection, Judge.\nTHE COURT: Overruled.\n[Assistant State\u2019s Attorney]: \u2014and a jury of her peers. All these things, ladies and gentlemen, the fairness that she has been accorded, was not accorded to Anthony Bruno. When Anthony Bruno was on that bus that day\u2014\n[Defense Counsel]: Objection, your Honor.\nTHE COURT: Overruled.\n[Assistant State\u2019s Attorney]: When Anthony Bruno was on that bus that day, ladies and gentlemen, he was tried in the court of Julio Morejon and Delilah Gonzalez, and he was not treated fairly. He didn\u2019t get a chance to see his accusers.\n[Defense Counsel]: Objection.\nTHE COURT: Objection noted. Overruled.\n[Assistant State\u2019s Attorney]: He never saw his accusers. He never knew what it was that he was suspected of doing wrong. He was never told what it was that he was accused of. His trial lasted the 10 or 15 seconds it took that bus to slow down while the defendant stood at the door waiting to hold the door for Julio Morejon, while Julio Morejon stood next to Bruno shaking his hand getting up the nerve to commit this first degree murder.\nThe fairness that was denied Anthony Bruno we are asking on behalf of the People of the State of Illinois today, we are asking for a fair and just verdict. And the only verdict I would submit to you that you can conclude based upon the evidence in this case, we are asking you to find the defendant, Delilah Gonzalez, guilty of the first degree murder of Anthony Bruno because she is guilty. Just as sure as she is sitting here today, ladies and gentlemen, she is guilty of the murder of Anthony Bruno. We are asking you to so find.\u201d\nA prosecutor is permitted wide latitude in the presentation of argument to the jury. (People v. Evans (1988), 173 Ill. App. 3d 186, 527 N.E.2d 448.) However, the Illinois Supreme Court \u201chas condemned prosecutorial references to the rights of the victim or the victim\u2019s family which tend to distract jurors from their consideration of the evidence of defendant\u2019s guilt.\u201d (People v. Smith (1992), 152 Ill. 2d 229, 267, 604 N.E.2d 858.) Based upon Smith, we determine that the prosecutor\u2019s comparison of the constitutional protections afforded the defendant and the violated rights of the victim constituted error.\nHowever, our inquiry does not end at this point. If evidence of a defendant\u2019s guilt was substantial and the fairness of the trial was not compromised, reversal is not required. (People v. Smith, 152 Ill. 2d at 269.) Thus, the arguments must be assessed within the context of the trial in its entirety. (People v. Tate (1970), 45 Ill. 2d 540, 259 N.E.2d 791.) The evidence presented in the instant case was not closely balanced and was clearly sufficient to support a guilty verdict in the absence of the prosecutor\u2019s improper argument.\nThe evidence in this case revealed that defendant identified the victim as a Gaylord gang member to her companion. Defendant fondled the knife before she handed the weapon to Morejon, who stabbed the victim. Defendant admitted that she knew Morejon was going to stab the victim when she gave him the knife, and that she held the rear door of the bus ajar thus assisting in the killer\u2019s escape. Her statement further revealed that defendant thought that her brother was killed by a Gaylords\u2019 gang member on September 17, 1987, a year and a day before the murder at issue. In light of the evidence demonstrating defendant\u2019s guilt, we cannot say that the prosecutor\u2019s arguments were significantly prejudicial to constitute a material factor in the jury\u2019s verdict. Thus, the error was harmless.\nDefendant further asserts that the imposed sentence violated the constitutional requirements of proportionality and rehabilitation. Defendant was convicted of first-degree murder with an applicable sentencing range of 20 to 60 years\u2019 imprisonment. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1989, ch. 38, par. 1005\u20148\u20141(a)(1).) Although the imposition of the 40-year sentence was within the trial court\u2019s statutory authority, the sentence may be reduced pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 615(b)(4) (134 Ill. 2d R. 615(b)(4)) if its imposition constitutes an abuse of the trial court\u2019s discretion. People v. Batchelor (1990), 202 Ill. App. 3d 316, 559 N.E.2d 948.\nDefendant specifically argues that her sentence is disproportionate when compared to the sentences imposed on other youthful defendants convicted of murder and other murder convictions characterized by similar or more aggravating factors. As noted in People v. Conaway (1981), 101 Ill. App. 3d 202, 204, 427 N.E.2d 1302, individuals who commit separate crimes are \u201cseldom, if ever, similarly situated,\u201d and thus, defendant\u2019s proportionality arguments cannot succeed.\nIn the instant case, the circumstances surrounding the instant offense and the mitigating and aggravating factors were before the trial court. In imposing sentence, the trial court noted that defendant was the instigator and that she used the stabber as her tool for vengeance. The trial court further noted that the stabber was sentenced to 40 years and defendant was at least equally responsible. Further, the court specifically found that defendant was proved to be a significant danger to others and that her actions exhibited callousness. The trial court considered numerous factors in imposing the sentence, and we find that defendant has not demonstrated that the imposed sentence constituted an abuse of discretion.\nFor the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the circuit court is affirmed.\nAffirmed.\nTULLY, P.J., and GREIMAN, J., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE CERDA" } ], "attorneys": [ "Rita A. Fry, Public Defender, of Chicago (Richard E. Gade, Assistant Public Defender, of counsel), for appellant.", "Jack O\u2019Malley, State\u2019s Attorney, of Chicago (Renee Goldfarb, Veronica X. Calderon, and Stephen Ferrucci, Assistant State\u2019s Attorneys, of counsel), for the People." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. DELILAH GONZALEZ, Defendant-Appellant.\nFirst District (3rd Division)\nNo. 1\u201490\u20143052\nOpinion filed May 26, 1993.\nRita A. Fry, Public Defender, of Chicago (Richard E. Gade, Assistant Public Defender, of counsel), for appellant.\nJack O\u2019Malley, State\u2019s Attorney, of Chicago (Renee Goldfarb, Veronica X. Calderon, and Stephen Ferrucci, Assistant State\u2019s Attorneys, of counsel), for the People." }, "file_name": "0370-01", "first_page_order": 388, "last_page_order": 394 }