{
  "id": 2929531,
  "name": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. RICHARD LILLARD, Defendant-Appellant",
  "name_abbreviation": "People v. Lillard",
  "decision_date": "1993-07-16",
  "docket_number": "No. 3-92-0949",
  "first_page": "683",
  "last_page": "686",
  "citations": [
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      "cite": "247 Ill. App. 3d 683"
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  "court": {
    "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.",
    "id": 8837,
    "name": "Illinois Appellate Court"
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    "id": 29,
    "name_long": "Illinois",
    "name": "Ill."
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    {
      "cite": "104 Ill. 2d 8",
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  "last_updated": "2023-07-14T17:38:22.874712+00:00",
  "provenance": {
    "date_added": "2019-08-29",
    "source": "Harvard",
    "batch": "2018"
  },
  "casebody": {
    "judges": [],
    "parties": [
      "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. RICHARD LILLARD, Defendant-Appellant."
    ],
    "opinions": [
      {
        "text": "PRESIDING JUSTICE McCUSKEY\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nThe defendant, Richard Lillard, was convicted of retail theft and sentenced to three years\u2019 imprisonment. On appeal, the defendant argues that his sentence should be vacated and his cause remanded for resentencing because of the trial court\u2019s failure to advise him of his right to elect treatment for alcoholism under the Illinois Alcoholism and Other Drug Dependency Act (Act) (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1991, ch. 1111/2, par. 6351\u20141 et seq.). We agree and reverse.\nSection 10 \u2014 102 of the Act states in relevant part:\n\u201cIf a court has reason to believe that an individual *** convicted of a crime is an addict or alcoholic and the court finds that he is eligible to make the election provided for under Section 10 \u2014 101, the court shall advise him that he may be placed on probation if he elects to submit to treatment and is accepted for treatment by a designated program.\u201d (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1991, ch. 1111/2, par. 6360-2.)\nThe language of this Act is mandatory, not discretionary. People v. Richardson (1984), 104 Ill. 2d 8, 470 N.E.2d 1024.\nThe issue in this case is whether the evidence before the trial court was sufficient to give the court \u201creason to believe\u201d that the defendant was an alcoholic.\nSection 1 \u2014 103 of the Act states:\n\u201c \u2018Alcoholic\u2019 means a person who suffers from an illness characterized by preoccupation with alcohol which is typically associated with physical disability and impaired emotional, occupational or social adjustments as a direct consequence of loss of control over consumption of alcohol and demonstrated by persistent and excessive use of alcohol such as usually leads to intoxication if drinking is begun; by chronicity, by progression, and by tendency toward relapse.\u201d Ill. Rev. Stat. 1991, ch. 1111/2, par. 6351-3.\nIn the case at hand, the record shows that the defendant testified that he had been an alcoholic for 12 years and had suffered from blackouts for about six years. In addition, he told the presentence investigation officer that he had twice received treatment for alcoholism. Other evidence showed that the defendant suffered from cirrhosis of the liver and had to seek medical attention while incarcerated because he was vomiting blood.\nThe record also shows that the trial judge asked the defendant how long he had been an alcoholic. In addition, the judge noted that the defendant\u2019s substance abuse had affected his memory.\nBased on this evidence, we find that sufficient evidence was presented to give the trial court \u201creason to believe\u201d that the defendant was an alcoholic. As such, the court was required to inform the defendant that he could elect to submit to treatment. Since the court failed to do this, we remand this cause and order the trial court to advise the defendant of his option of probation if he elects to submit to alcohol treatment.\nWe note that our decision does not reach the question of whether the defendant should be given treatment as an alternative to a prison term. That decision is for the trial court to make after it has evaluated the information concerning the defendant\u2019s examination.\nThe defendant also argues on appeal that the trial court erred in sentencing him to three years of imprisonment. Specifically, he contends that the court failed to take into consideration the fact that he only attempted to steal a $5 bottle of wine and that his actions were affected by his alcoholism.\nAlthough we are remanding this case, we would note that the defendant\u2019s sentence appears to be proper. Sentencing is largely a matter of judicial discretion and, absent an abuse of that discretion, it will not be altered on review. People v. Perruquet (1977), 68 Ill. 2d 149, 368 N.E.2d 882.\nHere, the record shows that the defendant has a criminal record dating back to 1966 which included eight prior theft convictions, four possession of cannabis convictions, a possession of a controlled substance conviction, and a disorderly conduct conviction. Based on the defendant\u2019s extensive criminal record, we cannot say that the trial court abused its discretion in sentencing the defendant to three years\u2019 imprisonment.\nThe judgment of the circuit court of Kankakee County is reversed and the cause remanded for proceedings consistent with this decision.\nReversed and remanded.\nBARRY and LYTTON, JJ., concur.",
        "type": "majority",
        "author": "PRESIDING JUSTICE McCUSKEY"
      }
    ],
    "attorneys": [
      "Stephen Omolecki, of State Appellate Defender\u2019s Office, of Ottawa, for appellant.",
      "Clarke Erickson, State\u2019s Attorney, of Kankakee (John X. Breslin and Gary F. Gnidovec, both of State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor\u2019s Office, of counsel), for the People."
    ],
    "corrections": "",
    "head_matter": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. RICHARD LILLARD, Defendant-Appellant.\nThird District\nNo. 3-92-0949\nOpinion filed July 16, 1993.\nStephen Omolecki, of State Appellate Defender\u2019s Office, of Ottawa, for appellant.\nClarke Erickson, State\u2019s Attorney, of Kankakee (John X. Breslin and Gary F. Gnidovec, both of State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor\u2019s Office, of counsel), for the People."
  },
  "file_name": "0683-01",
  "first_page_order": 701,
  "last_page_order": 704
}