{ "id": 2930979, "name": "ILLINOIS MUNICIPAL ELECTRIC AGENCY, Petitioner, v. ILLINOIS COMMERCE COMMISSION et al., Respondents", "name_abbreviation": "Illinois Municipal Electric Agency v. Illinois Commerce Commission", "decision_date": "1993-08-12", "docket_number": "No. 4\u201493\u20140173", "first_page": "857", "last_page": "862", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "247 Ill. App. 3d 857" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "542 N.E.2d 492", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "pin_cites": [ { "page": "497" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "186 Ill. App. 3d 402", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2655305 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "410" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/186/0402-01" ] }, { "cite": "531 N.E.2d 43", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 4, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "45" }, { "page": "45" }, { "page": "46" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "176 Ill. App. 3d 389", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3587892 ], "weight": 4, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "392" }, { "page": "393" }, { "page": "393" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/176/0389-01" ] }, { "cite": "449 N.E.2d 1000", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1002" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "114 Ill. App. 3d 1090", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3590275 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1092" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/114/1090-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 517, "char_count": 11238, "ocr_confidence": 0.786, "pagerank": { "raw": 5.527646540942415e-08, "percentile": 0.3466148026390728 }, "sha256": "37ab2f7ceba4714f432170833380a412fa75470fbda4f10c42a144e395ee2aaa", "simhash": "1:ac3b0cc4e1e6e1e0", "word_count": 1795 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T17:38:22.874712+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "ILLINOIS MUNICIPAL ELECTRIC AGENCY, Petitioner, v. ILLINOIS COMMERCE COMMISSION et al., Respondents." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE McCULLOUGH\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nPlaintiff, the Illinois Municipal Electric Agency (IMEA), filed a petition with the Illinois Commerce Commission (Commission) seeking \u201can order confirming that it does not have jurisdiction over the IMEA\u2019s contract with the City of Highland, Illinois, to share a portion of the cost of construction of the new 138 KV facilities serving Highland, Illinois.\u201d Illinois Power Company (IP) was allowed to intervene. The Commission entered an order on December 9, 1992, finding that the IMEA was seeking a declaratory judgment which it was without authority to issue. Accordingly, IMEA\u2019s petition was denied and it now appeals. We affirm.\nIMEA is a municipal power agency organized pursuant to the Illinois Joint Municipal Electric Power Act (Electric Power Act) (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1991, ch. 24, par. 11\u2014119.1\u20141 et seq.). On June 1, 1990, IMEA entered into a long-term power supply contract with the City of Highland to provide electrical power at wholesale rates. In an addendum to the contract, dated October 15, 1990, IMEA agreed \u201cto provide, subject to obtaining any required regulatory approval, no later than five (5) years from the date this contract takes effect, facilities in place and operating at the points of delivery rated at 138 kilo-volts.\u201d The City of Highland was to pay one-half the cost of constructing this new facility.\nIMEA filed its petition on October 4, 1991, seeking an order from the Commission that it had no jurisdiction over the contract. A hearing was held on June 2, 1992. The Commission issued its decision on December 9, 1992. After reviewing the arguments made by all the parties in their respective pleadings and briefs, the Commission concluded:\n\u201c[T]hat the IMEA is seeking a declaratory judgment from the Commission which the Commission is without authority to issue in light of the Harrisonville decision. In that case, the Court stated:\n[\u2018]Our research has revealed no rule of the Commerce Commission which provides for the rendering of declaratory rulings. Barring the adoption of such a rule in compliance with appropriate rule-making procedures, the Commission has no authority to render declaratory rulings.[\u2019] [Citation.]\nAt the present time, as at the time of the Harrisonville decision, the Commission has no rule governing the issuance of declaratory judgments. The Commission, therefore, finds that the petition should be denied.\u201d\nThe IMEA\u2019s application for rehearing and request for oral argument, filed on January 8, 1993, was denied on January 27, 1993. The IMEA timely filed its notice of appeal.\nThe IMEA raises two arguments on appeal. First, it contends the Commission has the authority to determine whether it has jurisdiction over the subject matter of a petition filed with it. The IMEA relies upon the case of Metropolitan Distributors, Inc. v. Illinois Department of Labor (1983), 114 Ill. App. 3d 1090, 449 N.E.2d 1000. Second, the IMEA believes the case relied upon by the Commission, Harrisonville Telephone Co. v. Illinois Commerce Comm\u2019n (1988), 176 Ill. App. 3d 389, 531 N.E.2d 43, provides no support for its decision. The IMEA concludes, based on the language quoted from Harrisonville, the Commission \u201cshould not be heard to argue the absence of \u2018rules\u2019 when it is the \u2018rulemaker\u2019 that has refused to make the rules.\u201d\nThe Commission contends there is no \u201ccontested case,\u201d as that phrase is defined in section 3.02 of the Illinois Administrative Procedure Act (Act) (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1991, ch. 127, par. 1003.02), but rather that the IMEA seeks a declaratory ruling. The Commission notes that section 9 of the Act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1991, ch. 127, par. 1009) allows an agency to provide for declaratory rulings. However, the Commission has not so provided; accordingly, it has no jurisdiction over the petition filed by the IMEA. Finally, the Commission believes Metropolitan has no relevance to this matter but that Harrisonville is dispositive of the issue presented.\nIP agrees with the Commission that the IMEA sought a declaratory ruling which the Commission was without authority to issue. It is also the position of IP that the Commission does not have jurisdiction over the ministerial act of executing a contract but that it does have jurisdiction over the subject matter of the contract, specifically the construction of the 138 KV power line and the acquisition by the IMEA of any necessary right of way for such line. IP is concerned that the IMEA will equate the lack of jurisdiction over the execution of the contract with the lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter of the contract, which has never been presented to or addressed by the Commission.\nAn administrative agency such as the Commerce Commission derives its power to act solely from the statute by which it was created and agency action which exceeds its authority is void. Chemed Corp. v. State (1989), 186 Ill. App. 3d 402, 410, 542 N.E.2d 492, 497.\nSection 3.02 of the Act provides:\n\u201c \u2018Contested case\u2019 means an adjudicatory proceeding, not including rate making, rule-making, quasi-legislative, informational or similar proceedings, in which the individual legal rights, duties or privileges of a party are required by law to be determined by an agency only after an opportunity for hearing.\u201d (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1991, ch. 127, par. 1003.02.)\nSection 9(a) of the Act states:\n\u201cEach agency may in its discretion provide by rule for the filing and prompt disposition of petitions or requests for declaratory rulings as to the applicability to the person presenting the petition or request of any statutory provision enforced by the agency or of any rule of the agency.\u201d Ill. Rev. Stat. 1991, ch. 127, par. 1009(a).\nIn Harrisonville, the petitioner, Harrisonville Telephone Company, appealed from an order of the Commission authorizing it to operate and maintain telecommunications cable and associated equipment along a private roadway and to acquire the necessary easement rights, granting Harrisonville a variance from the requirements of the Commission rules, and ordering Harrisonville to comply with certain Commission rules in all future projects. The court held that the portion of the Commission decision unrelated to the project under consideration was a declaratory ruling and therefore void.\nThe Commission\u2019s order directed Harrisonville to comply with certain Commission rules \u201c \u2018in all future projects which require a certificate under Section 8 \u2014 406 or an order under Section 8 \u2014 503 of the [Public Utilities] Act\u2019 \u201d unless a variance is obtained. (Harrisonville, 176 Ill. App. 3d at 392, 531 N.E.2d at 45.) The court believed the Commission was without authority to enter such an order given the procedural posture of the case.\nThe court noted the definition in the Act of \u201ccontested case\u201d and the section providing for declaratory rulings. The court then stated:\n\u201cOur research has revealed no rule of the Commerce Commission which provides for the rendering of declaratory rulings. Barring the adoption of such a rule in compliance with appropriate rulemaking procedures, the Commission has no authority to render declaratory rulings.\u201d Harrisonville, 176 Ill. App. 3d at 393, 531 N.E.2d at 45.\nThe court viewed the Commission\u2019s order, as it pertained to future projects not as yet undertaken, as a declaratory ruling. The Commission found that HarrisonviUe had not complied with the Commission\u2019s rules, but that a variance should be granted. Had HarrisonviUe been denied a variance, it could have appealed that denial and raised a question as to the rule\u2019s validity. However, HarrisonviUe was granted its variance and therefore no other action by the Commission was required to determine the correlative rights and duties of the parties before the Commission. The court stated:\n\u201cThat part of the Commission\u2019s order which addressed future projects unrelated to the project under consideration was gratuitous, unnecessary, and a determination not \u2018required by law\u2019 within the meaning of the statutory definition of a contested case. Since the Commission granted a variance in this case, its pronouncement as to future cases was superfluous. We believe the Commission\u2019s pronouncement was in essence a declaratory ruling on the duties of a telephone company \u2014 a ruling which the Commission was not authorized to enter.\u201d Harrisonville, 176 Ill. App. 3d at 393, 531 N.E.2d at 46.\nLikewise, the IMEA is asking for a declaratory ruling in this case. It merely wants a ruling from the Commission that it has no jurisdiction over the contract with the City of Highland. Section 11\u2014119.1\u201410 of the Electric Power Act provides that contracts between a municipal power agency and its wholesale customers, the rates to be charged by a municipal power agency to its wholesale customers, and the issuance of bonds by a municipal power agency shall not require the consent and approval of the Illinois Commerce Commission. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1991, ch. 24, par. 11\u2014119.1\u201410.) Thus, the statute clearly states that the IMEA does not need the consent of the Commission in order to contract with the City of Highland. Moreover, there is no factual dispute regarding the contract and neither party has challenged the propriety of the contract. Therefore, we find the ruling sought by the IMEA would be gratuitous, unnecessary and a determination not required by law within the meaning of the statutory definition of a contested case. Therefore, the Commission correctly determined it was without authority to issue the ruling sought by the IMEA since it would be a declaratory ruling.\nFinally, we briefly address the IMEA\u2019s argument that Metropolitan is dispositive of the issues presented by this appeal. In that case, the Illinois Department of Labor appealed an order which permanently enjoined it from conducting any further investigations into severance pay claims by former employees. The circuit court held that severance pay claims were beyond the jurisdiction of the Labor Department to investigate.\nThe court stated initially: \u201cThe Department asserts, and we agree, that the initial determination of whether an agency has jurisdiction over a particular matter should be made by the agency itself.\u201d (Metropolitan, 114 Ill. App. 3d at 1092, 449 N.E.2d at 1002.) The IMEA alleges, based on this language, the Commission has the duty to determine whether it has jurisdiction over the petition filed by the IMEA.\nThe Commission determined it had no authority to issue the order sought by the IMEA. No contested case existed and the Commission cannot issue declaratory rulings. Thus, the IMEA\u2019s reliance on Metropolitan is misplaced.\nFor the foregoing reasons, the Commission\u2019s order is affirmed.\nAffirmed.\nSTEIGMANN, P.J., and GREEN, J., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE McCULLOUGH" } ], "attorneys": [ "Douglas G. Brown and Troy A. Fodor, both of Douglas G. Brown, P.C., of Springfield, for petitioner.", "Gary B. Pasek, of Decatur, for respondent Illinois Power Company.", "Roland W. Burris, Attorney General, of Springfield (James E. Weging, Special Assistant Attorney General, of Chicago, of counsel), for respondent Illinois Commerce Commission." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "ILLINOIS MUNICIPAL ELECTRIC AGENCY, Petitioner, v. ILLINOIS COMMERCE COMMISSION et al., Respondents.\nFourth District\nNo. 4\u201493\u20140173\nOpinion filed August 12, 1993.\nDouglas G. Brown and Troy A. Fodor, both of Douglas G. Brown, P.C., of Springfield, for petitioner.\nGary B. Pasek, of Decatur, for respondent Illinois Power Company.\nRoland W. Burris, Attorney General, of Springfield (James E. Weging, Special Assistant Attorney General, of Chicago, of counsel), for respondent Illinois Commerce Commission." }, "file_name": "0857-01", "first_page_order": 875, "last_page_order": 880 }