{ "id": 2945154, "name": "CENTRAL STATES TRUCKING COMPANY, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. THE DEPARTMENT OF EMPLOYMENT SECURITY, Defendant-Appellee", "name_abbreviation": "Central States Trucking Co. v. Department of Employment Security", "decision_date": "1993-06-03", "docket_number": "No. 1 \u2014 92\u20140166", "first_page": "86", "last_page": "90", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "248 Ill. App. 3d 86" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "549 N.E.2d 1266", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1268" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "133 Ill. 2d 349", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3260081 ], "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "355" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/133/0349-01" ] }, { "cite": "95 N.E.2d 864", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "407 Ill. 588", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 2640772 ], "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "595" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/407/0588-01" ] }, { "cite": "440 N.E.2d 112", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "92 Ill. 2d 1", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3098230 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/92/0001-01" ] }, { "cite": "486 N.E.2d 893", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1982, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "109 Ill. 2d 202", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3127069 ], "year": 1982, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/109/0202-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 470, "char_count": 10574, "ocr_confidence": 0.758, "pagerank": { "raw": 1.3319997921665163e-07, "percentile": 0.6291059826267863 }, "sha256": "d20c478ec2a72837fea1fa068d29fd3e0d6bfa95b9de0538a93053e3eaceb8cc", "simhash": "1:29008df5a8913e18", "word_count": 1723 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T21:04:37.974036+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "CENTRAL STATES TRUCKING COMPANY, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. THE DEPARTMENT OF EMPLOYMENT SECURITY, Defendant-Appellee." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "PRESIDING JUSTICE JIGANTI\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nThe plaintiff, Central States Trucking Company (Central), appeals from the trial court\u2019s dismissal of its complaint for administrative review of the decision of the defendant, the Department of Employment Security, in an underlying dispute over the plaintiff\u2019s failure to pay assessments pursuant to the Unemployment Insurance Act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1991, ch. 48, par. 300 et seq.). The court granted the defendant\u2019s motion to dismiss the plaintiff\u2019s complaint for failure to name the Director of the Department of Employment Security as a defendant. The court also denied the plaintiff\u2019s motion to amend the complaint.\nOn appeal, the plaintiff contends the court erred in dismissing the complaint because its failure to name the Director is not a jurisdictional requirement and the court should have allowed the plaintiff to amend its complaint under the \u201cgood-faith exception!\u201d The plaintiff further argues that although the word \u201cDirector\u201d was not in the caption of the complaint, the Director was incorporated by reference by virtue of two exhibits which were attached to the complaint naming the Director.\nOn December 31, 1990, the Director of the Department of Employment Security, Sally Jackson, issued a decision in which she affirmed the recommendation of her representative as to determinations and assessments against Central for unpaid contributions. On January 25, 1991, Central filed a complaint for administrative review with the circuit court of Cook County. In the complaint, Central named \u201cState of Illinois, Department of Employment Security\u201d as the only defendant. Central attached two exhibits to the complaint. One exhibit was the full text of the decision of the Director of Employment Security, dated December 30, 1990. The other exhibit was a letter from Central\u2019s attorney, dated January 23, 1991, and addressed to Sally Jackson, Director of Employment Security. The letter advised Jackson that Central was seeking review of the captioned cases. The letter stated that \u201c[t]he Complaint and summons will be served shortly.\u201d On January 25, 1991, a summons was issued in the case of \u201cCentral States Trucking Co., Plaintiff, v. State of Illinois, Department of Employment Security, Defendant.\u201d The certificate of mailing named the defendant as \u201cState of Illinois, Dept. of Employment Security (Sally A. Jackson, Director).\u201d The return receipt was stamped by an employee of the Department of Employment Security and the clerk of the court wrote \u201cD\u201d before Sally Jackson\u2019s (Ward) name.\nOn February 21, 1991, the Department filed a motion to dismiss the complaint because the circuit court lacked jurisdiction as a result of Central\u2019s failure to name the Director a necessary party defendant in the case. Following a hearing, the court dismissed the complaint, without granting leave to amend, ruling that it did not have jurisdiction because the failure to name the Director as a party defendant was a fatal defect depriving the court of jurisdiction over the case.\nThe procedural requirements for the judicial review of an administrative decision are governed by the Administrative Review Law (Act) (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1991, ch. 110, par. 3 \u2014 101 et seq.). Circuit courts derive their power to review administrative actions from our State Constitution. \u201cCircuit Courts shall have such power to review administrative action as provided by law.\u201d (Ill. Const. 1970, art. VI, \u00a79.) In the exercise of special statutory jurisdiction, if the mode of the procedure prescribed by statute is not strictly pursued, no jurisdiction is conferred on the circuit court. See Fredman Brothers Furniture Co. v. Department of Revenue (1985), 109 Ill. 2d 202, 486 N.E.2d 893; Demchuk v. Duplancich (1982), 92 Ill. 2d 1, 440 N.E.2d 112.\nPursuant to the Administrative Review Law, an action for administrative review \u201cshall be commenced by the filing of a complaint and the issuance of summons within 35 days from the date that a copy of the decision sought to be reviewed was served upon the party affected thereby.\u201d (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1991, ch. 110, par. 3 \u2014 103.) The form of the summons shall be according to the rules of the supreme court. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1991, ch. 110, par. 3 \u2014 103.) Summons must be issued on the administrative agency itself and on all defendants. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1991, ch. 110, par. 3 \u2014 105.) Section 3 \u2014 107 requires that \u201call persons, other than the plaintiff, who were parties of record to the proceedings before the administrative agency shall be made defendants.\u201d (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1991, ch. 110, par. 3 \u2014 107.) Section 3\u2014 102 provides that \u201cjujnless review is sought *** within the time and in the manner herein provided,\u201d a party is barred from bringing an action for administrative review. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1991, ch. 110, par. 3 \u2014 102.) Since administrative review law is a departure from common law, the procedures it establishes must be strictly adhered to. Winston v. Zoning Board of Appeals (1950), 407 Ill. 588, 95 N.E.2d 864.\nCentral does not dispute that the Director was a party of record to the proceedings and should have been made a defendant, as mandated by section 3 \u2014 107 of the Act. However, Central first asserts that it complied with sections 3 \u2014 103 and 3 \u2014 105 of the Act because, within the 35-day time period, a summons and a copy of the complaint were served upon the Director, Sally Jackson, and she was also named as the defendant on the summons.\nWe do not agree that Central complied with the Act\u2019s requirements as it pertains to the summons. As we mentioned earlier, section 3 \u2014 103 requires that the form of the summons shall be in accordance with the supreme court rules. Supreme Court Rule 101 specifies that the summons \u201cshall be directed to each defendant.\u201d (134 Ill. 2d R. 101(a).) Rule 101(d) states that each defendant must be named in the caption of the summons. Contrary to Central\u2019s assertion that the summons was proper, the Director was not named in the caption and was named only parenthetically on the certificate of mailing. The Director was served with the summons, not as a named defendant, but rather in her capacity as head of the department. Thus, the requirements of sections 3 \u2014 103 and 3 \u2014 105 were not met.\nCentral has further argued that the trial judge erred in finding that the Director was not named in the body of the complaint. Central asserts that the Director was included in the complaint by the incorporation of two exhibits, the full text of the Director\u2019s decision and a letter from Central\u2019s counsel which was addressed to the Director informing her that Central was seeking review of her decision. Central contends that the trial judge ignored well-settled case law which holds that exhibits which are attached to the complaint become part of the pleadings and the facts stated in such exhibits are considered as being alleged in the complaint.\nWe do not agree that parties can be incorporated by reference by attaching exhibits to a complaint. This conclusion is unsupported by case law. Moreover, this argument ignores the clear and unambiguous language of the Act, which requires that \u201call persons, other than the plaintiff, who were parties of record to the proceedings before the administrative agency shall be made defendants.\u201d (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1991, ch. 110, par. 3 \u2014 107(a).) Further, this requirement has been held to be mandatory and specific, and admits of no modification. (Winston v. Zoning Board of Appeals (1950), 407 Ill. 588, 595, 95 N.E.2d 864.) The Director was simply not named as a defendant in Central\u2019s complaint and the requirement of section 3 \u2014 107 of the Act was not met.\nCentral contends the court erred in finding that its failure to name the Director was jurisdictional. Central argues that the supreme court decision in Lockett v. Chicago Police Board (1990), 133 Ill. 2d 349, 549 N.E.2d 1266, should be read as holding that the section 3\u2014 107 requirement to name a necessary party is only mandatory. The significance of this distinction lies in the Lockett court\u2019s application of a good-faith exception to the mandatory 35-day summons requirement. Thus, Central argues, if naming a necessary party is considered a mandatory requirement, the court in the case at bar would have concluded that the facts warranted the good-faith exception and would not have dismissed the complaint.\nBoth Central and the Department cite various appellate court cases which have varying views on whether the naming of defendants in administrative review cases should be considered a jurisdictional or mandatory requirement. It is not necessary that we determine the correct interpretation of Lockett as to this issue because no evidence exists in the instant case that Central made any effort to name the Director as a defendant. Central points to the attachments to the complaint, service of summons on the Director, and the timely filing of the complaint. We do not believe that these facts prove that Central made a good-faith effort to name the Director in its complaint. The good-faith exceptions, as depicted in Lockett, are situations where \u201cdue to some circumstance beyond their control, summons was not issued within the statutory period.\u201d (Lockett, 133 Ill. 2d at 355, 549 N.E.2d at 1268.) We find no indication of circumstances beyond Central\u2019s control which led to its failure to name the Director in its complaint. Our research has not found any cases in which a plaintiff\u2019s inadvertence in naming a necessary party was considered to be a good-faith effort.\nWe conclude that in the instant case the Director was not properly named in the complaint, the form of the summons was not according to the supreme court rules, and we have\" not found any evidence of a good-faith effort to comply with the requirements of the Act. (See Ill. Rev. Stat. 1991, ch. 110, pars. 3 \u2014 103, 3 \u2014 105, 3 \u2014 107.) Accordingly, we find that the complaint for administrative review was properly dismissed by the circuit court.\nFor all of the aforementioned reasons, the judgment of the circuit court is affirmed.\nAffirmed.\nCAHILL and HOFFMAN, JJ., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "PRESIDING JUSTICE JIGANTI" } ], "attorneys": [ "J. Kevin Hennessy and Ann L. Crane, both of Banta, Cox & Hennessy, of Chicago, for appellant.", "Roland W. Burris, Attorney General, of Springfield (Rosalyn B. Kaplan, Solicitor General, and Daniel N. Malato, Assistant Attorney General, of Chicago, of counsel), for appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "CENTRAL STATES TRUCKING COMPANY, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. THE DEPARTMENT OF EMPLOYMENT SECURITY, Defendant-Appellee.\nFirst District (4th Division)\nNo. 1 \u2014 92\u20140166\nOpinion filed June 3, 1993.\nJ. Kevin Hennessy and Ann L. Crane, both of Banta, Cox & Hennessy, of Chicago, for appellant.\nRoland W. Burris, Attorney General, of Springfield (Rosalyn B. Kaplan, Solicitor General, and Daniel N. Malato, Assistant Attorney General, of Chicago, of counsel), for appellee." }, "file_name": "0086-01", "first_page_order": 106, "last_page_order": 110 }