{ "id": 2943875, "name": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. CHARLES COLEMAN, Defendant-Appellant", "name_abbreviation": "People v. Coleman", "decision_date": "1993-06-04", "docket_number": "No. 1 \u2014 90\u20140971", "first_page": "371", "last_page": "382", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "248 Ill. App. 3d 371" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "522 N.E.2d 1146", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "122 Ill. 2d 221", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5549839 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/122/0221-01" ] }, { "cite": "75 Ill. App. 3d 580", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3272073 ], "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "594-95" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/75/0580-01" ] }, { "cite": "248 N.E.2d 96", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1979, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "42 Ill. 2d 425", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2846681 ], "year": 1979, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/42/0425-01" ] }, { "cite": "167 N.E. 857", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.", "pin_cites": [ { "page": "858" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "335 Ill. 590", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 5790220 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "592" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/335/0590-01" ] }, { "cite": "249 N.E.2d 224", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "110 Ill. App. 2d 329", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 2d", "case_ids": [ 1594010 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-2d/110/0329-01" ] }, { "cite": "365 N.E.2d 737", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "50 Ill. App. 3d 695", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5641981 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/50/0695-01" ] }, { "cite": "360 U.S. 264", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 9052 ], "weight": 3, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/360/0264-01" ] }, { "cite": "386 U.S. 1", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6167205 ], "weight": 6, "year": 1959, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "6" }, { "page": "694" }, { "page": "788" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/386/0001-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 957, "char_count": 24086, "ocr_confidence": 0.758, "pagerank": { "raw": 5.061447019797991e-08, "percentile": 0.3174536430502319 }, "sha256": "20b75c7c9963d0ed010c844eaea6321edd68f55bdbaa363f378d60bf4370ec0b", "simhash": "1:b2db30753b6a2ad2", "word_count": 4063 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T21:04:37.974036+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. CHARLES COLEMAN, Defendant-Appellant." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE EGAN\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nThe defendant, Charles Coleman, was indicted with his brother, Maurice Coleman, and Willie Powell for the first degree murder and armed robbery of Willie Melson. The defendant waived a jury and was tried alone. Maurice Coleman testified for the State. The defendant was found guilty of first degree murder and armed robbery and sentenced to 60 years\u2019 imprisonment for murder and 30 years for armed robbery, with the sentences to run concurrently. The defendant contends that procedural or evidentiary errors deprived him of a fair trial; he does not contend that the evidence was insufficient to establish his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.\nIn August 1988, the defendant was living with Elizabeth Stampley in her apartment on the second floor of a building at 4810 South Michigan in Chicago. Seventy-year-old Willie Melson lived in the third-floor apartment directly above Stampley\u2019s apartment. On August 10, Melson\u2019s decomposed body was found in his apartment. Under a sheet that covered the body, police officer Owens found a butcher knife and a fork sticking out of Melson\u2019s chest. Owens also found $200 in Melson\u2019s pants pocket and a bullet near Melson\u2019s body. An autopsy disclosed a cooking fork in Melson\u2019s right chest, a carving knife in his left chest, nine stab wounds in his chest; neck and back and a gunshot wound in the back of the head. The decomposed condition of the. body was consistent with a July 29, 1988, date of death, but the exact date of death could not be determined. A \u201cdeformed small caliber bullet\u201d was recovered from the autopsy cart at the time of the autopsy; the bullet was beneath the head and upper neck of Melson.\nWillie Powell was arrested on September 13, 1988, and implicated the defendant and his brother. Powell did not testify at the trial, but his statement to the police is involved in one of the errors assigned by the defendant and will be discussed in detail later.\nThe defendant was also arrested on September 13, 1988, but no statement was taken from him. On December 2, 1988, Maurice Coleman was arrested. He also gave a statement to the police that will be discussed later.\nBrian Melson, the son of the deceased and a Chicago police officer, last saw his father in early June 1988. At that time he visited his father at his apartment, where he had lived alone for the past 10 years. During that period, Brian had visited his father at the apartment on 10 to 12 occasions; most of the time his father came over to Brian\u2019s house.\nBrian testified that his father had been employed by Walgreens for 18 years and was paid by check. His father had cashed his checks \u201cfor years\u201d at a currency exchange on 47th Street and kept his cash either in his wallet or in a shoe at home. His father had recently received vacation checks totalling over $2,000. On his last visit to the apartment, Brian saw Budweiser beer, which his father bought by the case, and Scotch whiskey. His father kept a black .25 automatic handgun with a woodgrain finish handle at home; he sometimes carried it with him.\nMaurice Coleman was living with his sister at 4803 South Wabash on July 29, 1988. He testified that at one o\u2019clock that afternoon, the defendant, his brother, came through the back door of Maurice\u2019s home. The defendant\u2019s \u201cleft baby finger\u201d was bleeding; he was carrying a 12-pack of Budweiser, had a bottle of Scotch in his hand and $60. The defendant also had a .25 automatic handgun with a brown handle. The defendant told Maurice that he had stuck someone up on 51st and Wentworth. After he and the defendant talked about going to the hospital, Maurice called an ambulance, but the defendant decided to go to the hospital with Maurice in his car. Maurice and the defendant first went to visit a friend named Rodney and purchased some heroin. After \u201csnorting\u201d the heroin, the defendant and Maurice were dropped off by Rodney at 59th and Ashland. The defendant asked Maurice what Maurice would say if the defendant told him that he killed someone. Maurice did not respond but just shrugged his shoulders.\nThey both went to Bernard Mitchell Hospital, but after waiting two hours they left without the defendant receiving any stitches. On the way back to their sister\u2019s house, the defendant told Maurice that if there were not any police around they would go up to the \u201capartment.\u201d In the apartment, which was Melson\u2019s, Maurice saw the deceased on the floor with cooking utensils sticking, out of his chest. The defendant went into the deceased\u2019s pockets and removed about $500. Maurice also reached into the deceased\u2019s back pocket and took his wallet. They returned to their sister\u2019s house, and Maurice gave his sister some rent money.\nMaurice and the defendant then left their sister\u2019s house to visit Edward Gibson; they purchased some drugs; spent the evening with Gibson; and returned to their sister\u2019s house. On the following day, Maurice and the defendant went to 100th Street and sold the gun to a \u201cfriend.\u201d They made contact with that \u201cfriend,\u201d to whom they sold the gun, through the friend\u2019s brother, whose name Maurice did not recall. He remembered that the brother lived at 64th and Eberhart.\nMaurice was arrested on December 2, 1988, and charged with murder and armed robbery. On the same day, he made a statement to to an assistant State\u2019s Attorney in which he implicated the defendant.\nEdward Gibson testified that the Coleman brothers came to his place of work and the three of them went to 50th and Cottage Grove, where the defendant and Maurice purchased heroin. Gibson noted a bandage on the defendant\u2019s right little finger. He saw that the defendant had either $1,100 or $1,300 in cash with him and a small caliber revolver with a brown handle. When Gibson asked the defendant about purchasing the gun, the defendant responded, \u201cYou don\u2019t want this one. *** That was a throw-away piece.\u201d The defendant told Gibson that he got the money from an old man he saw coming out of a currency exchange on 47th Street; he followed the man into an alley and strong-armed him and took his money. When Gibson asked about the cut on the defendant\u2019s hand, the defendant said that he got it because the old man had a knife and the defendant had to wrestle it out of the old man\u2019s hands.\nEthel Stampley testified that she had been living with the defendant in the second-floor apartment at 4810 South Michigan. The defendant told her that his bleeding finger resulted from cutting cheese with the butcher knife that Stampley had received as a gift. The defendant told her that he threw the knife away after he had cut himself. She identified the knife that had been taken from the deceased\u2019s body as her missing butcher knife.\nThe defendant first contends that the State knowingly used perjured testimony by calling Maurice Coleman as a witness. The defendant filed a pretrial motion to bar the State from calling either Maurice Coleman or Willie Powell as witnesses. The motion alleged that the State had engaged in plea bargaining with Maurice Coleman and Powell and that Powell had accepted an offer of three years\u2019 imprisonment in return for his testimony against the defendant. Attached to the motion were the statement given to Assistant State\u2019s Attorney Tyrell by Maurice Coleman and the statement given by Powell to Assistant State\u2019s Attorney William McGarr.\nMaurice Coleman\u2019s statement was, in substance, the same as his subsequent testimony but contained the following additional information: On the way to the hospital, the defendant told Maurice that he had killed someone. When the defendant went to \u201crip off\u201d the old man, he took a knife with him. The old man lived upstairs from the defendant. When the defendant \u201cstuck up\u201d the old man, the old man started struggling and got the knife away. The defendant took a kitchen fork and a knife and stabbed the old man. The defendant then took the old man\u2019s money and liquor and shot him.\nWillie Powell was arrested on September 13, 1988, and made a statement in which he said that sometime in early August the defendant asked him to knock on the deceased\u2019s door and ask if the deceased wanted Powell to clean his house or to shop for him. Powell was to see if the deceased \u201chad a big wad.\u201d Powell did knock on the deceased\u2019s door, but he was not home. On the following day he saw the deceased arrive home, and he told the defendant. The defendant picked up a gun from a table and whispered something to his brother, Maurice. The defendant and Maurice went upstairs, and Powell sat at the table and waited. He heard Willie Melson \u201choller,\u201d and later he heard two or three shots. A minute later he heard footsteps running downstairs and out the building. Powell left the building, returned and went up to Melson\u2019s apartment. The door was slightly open, and Powell was able to see Melson\u2019s body lying in the apartment. Powell left the building and never returned.\nAt the hearing in support of the defendant\u2019s motion in limine, Ronald Babb testified that he was an attorney appointed to represent Willie Powell. Babb testified that, on his advice, Powell accepted the State\u2019s offer in exchange for testimony consistent with his statement. He was not permitted to testify to the specific terms of the offer, apparently on the supposed ground that any conversation between Babb and the assistant State\u2019s Attorney was barred by the attorney-client relationship. No issue is raised of this ruling. On cross-examination, Babb said that the offer was extended to his client \u201cin exchange for his truthful testimony.\u201d He also said that he did not know whether Powell\u2019s statement was true.\nMary Lambert, Maurice Coleman\u2019s attorney, testified that two offers had been made to Maurice in exchange for his testimony. Maurice accepted the second offer, which was for a shorter period of recommended imprisonment. Again the State\u2019s objection to the terms of the specific offer was sustained, again apparently on the ground that the conversation between the assistant State\u2019s Attorney and the defendant\u2019s attorney was protected by the attorney-client relationship between Maurice Coleman and Lambert. Ms. Lambert also testified on direct examination that the offer was made in exchange for Maurice Coleman\u2019s testimony \u201cconsistent with\u201d his previous statement. On cross-examination she testified that it was her understanding that the offer was in exchange for Maurice Coleman\u2019s \u201ctruthful testimony.\u201d She also testified that she did not know whether Maurice Coleman\u2019s statement was true.\nThe defendant relies upon Miller v. Pate (1967), 386 U.S. 1, 17 L. Ed. 2d 690, 87 S. Ct. 785, and Napue v. Illinois (1959), 360 U.S. 264, 3 L. Ed. 2d 1217, 79 S. Ct. 1173. Neither case supports the defendant\u2019s argument. In Miller, a key piece of evidence was a pair of shorts. The trial judge sustained the State\u2019s objection to the defendant\u2019s pretrial motion to permit a scientific examination , of all physical evidence. A chemist testified for the State that the shorts were stained by blood type A. The deceased had type A blood. At the time the chemist testified, the prosecutor knew that the stains were paint, not blood. In reversing the conviction, the supreme court noted that the \u201cprosecution [had] deliberately misrepresented the truth.\u201d Miller, 386 U.S. at 6, 17 L. Ed. 2d at 694, 87 S. Ct. at 788.\nIn Napue, cited in Miller, on cross-examination, a prosecution accomplice witness testified that he had not been promised anything for his testimony. On redirect examination the prosecutor specifically asked whether he had made any promises to the witness, and the witness said that he had not. It was later conceded that that answer was false and was known to be false by the prosecutor who asked the question.\nIt is safe to say that the evil in Miller and Napue lay in the deliberate misrepresentation by the prosecutors or, at least, the suppression of the truth by the prosecutors. The procedure followed by the State in this case was unusual, but there was no suppression of the truth and there were no misrepresentations by the prosecutors. We agree with the defendant\u2019s contention that both Maurice and Powell could not have been telling the truth, but that fact is not relevant to the issue before us. We also agree with the State that, in the face of conflicting witnesses\u2019 statements, the State may frame its own theory in the case, choose to call its witnesses and is not required to present every witness. (People v. Beacham (1977), 50 Ill. App. 3d 695, 365 N.E.2d 737.) The State may also advance alternative theories of guilt. (Cf. People v. Bracey (1969), 110 Ill. App. 2d 329, 249 N.E.2d 224 (principal State witness identified defendant as the shooter in murder prosecution; appellate court affirmed trial judge\u2019s finding of guilt on accountability theory).) The State, therefore, was not required to call Powell, and it could not prevent the defendant from calling him if he was willing to testify for the defendant. We can understand why the defendant would not call Powell, even if he were willing to testify. His story would have contradicted Maurice but would also have been highly damaging to the defendant.\nThe defendant next contends that an ex parte conference between Maurice Coleman and his private attorney during a recess denied the defendant a fair trial.\nMaurice testified that, in exchange \u201cfor his truthful testimony,\u201d \u2022the prosecutors would file a charge of concealment of a homicidal death and recommend a sentence of imprisonment of two years. He had been convicted of indecent liberties in 1984.\nMaurice then gave the testimony which we have previously recited. The prosecutor attempted to question Maurice about conversations he had had with the defendant about the robbery and the murder. A defense objection that a question was leading was sustained. Maurice was then asked a number of times if he had had conversations with the defendant, and he said that he had not. The prosecutor was then permitted to bring out from Maurice the contents of the statement he had made to Assistant State\u2019s Attorney Tyrell, in which he said that the defendant had told him that he had shot the deceased and stabbed him with a knife he had taken from his apartment. The prosecutor showed the defendant the four-page statement that he had given to Tyrell. The defendant\u2019s attorney objected, not on the basis of hearsay, but rather that the questions were leading or that the answers were not impeaching. The only reasonable inference that may be drawn from what then transpired is that Maurice\u2019s denial that the defendant told him that he had shot and stabbed the deceased had taken the prosecutor and the defendant\u2019s attorney by surprise. We judge that the State was trying either to refresh Maurice\u2019s recollection, or \u201cto awaken his conscience.\u201d See People v. Michaels (1929), 335 Ill. 590, 592, 167 N.E. 857, 858; 134 Ill. 2d R. 238.\nWhen the judge said that he would have a short recess, Mr. Gevirtz, who then represented Maurice Coleman, asked if he would \u201chave a moment to confer with [his] client.\u201d When the defendant\u2019s attorney objected, the court said:\n\u201cMr. Gevirtz is not here as a representative of the State. He is here as an attorney representing the witness in this matter. And I believe he is well within his right to ask to confer with him.\u201d\nAfter a recess, the following occurred:\n\u201cMR. GEVIRTZ: I have talked to Mr. Coleman a number of times, and there are portions of this testimony that are not clear as to whether or not Mr. Coleman understood, based on conversations he had had with me and with Miss Shines [the assistant State\u2019s Attorney] earlier today. If the Court would permit me to just ask him that question, if he understood specifically the difference between the wording of certain of the questions here now\u2014\nSTATE\u2019S ATTORNEY: Judge, I would object to that. Counsel is here as a lawyer for the witness. He is neither a proponent or opponent of anyone on trial here. I don\u2019t think that he has any standing at all to put questions to the witness.\nTHE JUDGE: I agree.\nDEFENDANT\u2019S ATTORNEY: Judge, just so the record is clear, I want it to reflect that on behalf of Charles Coleman, the defendant in this case, Mr. Sarley [another defense attorney] objected to Your Honor\u2019s ruling allowing Mr. Gevirtz to confer with him in the first place. I would point out, as an officer of the court, that the conference did occur; it occurred over our objection in the jury room of this courtroom. In addition to that, that the State\u2019s Attorneys, one of the State\u2019s Attorneys involved in the prosecution of this case, was also called into the jury room and conferred with Mr. Gevirtz and with the witness, which I found highly objectionable.\u201d\nMs. Gordon, an assistant State\u2019s Attorney, denied that she was in the room with Gevirtz and the witness in which there were \u201cconversations going on.\u201d She said that Mr. Gevirtz called her to the room and asked her a question and she \u201canswered his question\u201d and then left. The defendant\u2019s attorney accepted Mr. Gevirtz\u2019 assertion that Ms. Gordon\u2019s statement was correct. The record, therefore, shows that no prosecutor had a conversation with Maurice Coleman during the conference.\nMaurice Coleman was then examined further by the judge as well as the assistant State\u2019s Attorney. His testimony, which is confusing, may be interpreted at one point as a denial that he told Assistant State\u2019s Attorney Tyrell that the defendant admitted to him that he had shot and stabbed the deceased; at another point that Maurice was confused when Tyrell questioned him; or that Maurice was confused when he answered questions on direct examination in which he said that the defendant had made those statements to him. Later, on cross-examination, Maurice expressly denied telling the assistant State\u2019s Attorney that his brother had told him that he shot and stabbed the deceased. One thing is clear from the last part of Maurice\u2019s testimony and that is that he was denying that the defendant told him that he had stabbed the deceased with a knife and a fork and that he had shot the deceased.\nThe State does not attempt to justify the judge\u2019s ruling permitting Maurice\u2019s attorney the \u201cright\u201d to confer with him during his examination. We have found no case supporting a rule that an attorney has an absolute \u201cright\u201d to confer with his client while the client is testifying. The facts of this case are not to be confused with those cases involving the right of a defendant to confer with his attorney before examination has been completed. (See, e.g., People v. Noble (1969), 42 Ill. 2d 425, 248 N.E.2d 96.) In People v. Pendleton (1979), 75 Ill. App. 3d 580, 248 N.E.2d 96, the appellate court reversed a conviction on double jeopardy grounds where a mistrial had previously been declared because the prosecutors, during a recess, improperly conferred with a complaining witness about the witness\u2019 unfinished testimony. The appellate court observed:\n\u201cAs a general rule, an attorney may also consult with a witness, regarding his testimony, even after the witness is placed on the stand, provided a legitimate need arises for such a discussion. [Citation.] The attorney, for example, may require additional information made relevant by the days\u2019 testimony, or he may find it necessary to inquire along lines not fully explored earlier. However, since such discussions (after a witness has taken the stand and is still subject to examination) pose a tantalizing potential for misconduct, they are to be strictly scrutinized.\u201d (Emphasis in original.) (Pendleton, 75 Ill. App. 3d at 594-95.)\nThus, even the assistant State\u2019s Attorney in the case before us would not have had an absolute right to confer with Maurice Coleman during his examination.\nWhile we appreciate Mr. Gevirtz\u2019 concern that his client\u2019s testimony may have jeopardized the plea agreement, we wish to make our position clear that we withhold a blanket approval of an attorney\u2019s \u201cright\u201d to confer with his client during the client\u2019s examination. There may be circumstances where permitting an attorney to intercede during the examination of his client and to confer with his client would be reversible error.\nIn any event, we also find that the record does not support a conclusion that the prosecutor \u201ccoached\u201d Maurice Coleman during the recess. However, the record would have been better served if the prosecutor voluntarily, or at the request of the defendant\u2019s attorney, or at the direction of the judge, had informed the judge of what question was asked of her by Mr. Gevirtz and what her answer was. The principal reason we find no reversible error in the procedure followed is the fact that the record shows that no prejudice inured to the defendant because of what transpired between Mr. Gevirtz, the prosecutor and Maurice Coleman. Indeed, Maurice Coleman\u2019s testimony after the conference was damaging to his credibility and was a denial of evidence that would have been harmful to the defendant.\nThe defendant\u2019s last claim of error centers on the testimony of Brian Melson that his father cashed his checks at a particular currency exchange; had cashed his checks there \u201cfor years\u201d; and received vacation checks that exceeded $2,000. We find no reversible error in Brian Melson\u2019s testimony. The defendant made a general objection to the question of where the deceased cashed his checks. The judge overruled the objection and said, \u201cHe can answer, if he knows.\u201d The following occurred:\n\u201cQ. And how long had he been cashing his checks at that currency exchange, if you can tell us?\nA. For years.\nDEFENSE ATTORNEY: Objection.\nTHE JUDGE: Overruled.\n* * *\nQ. Where did your father, sir, keep the money from the checks that he cashed at the currency exchange?\nDEFENDANT\u2019S ATTORNEY: Objection.\nTHE JUDGE: Overruled.\nWITNESS: He kept it in his house.\n* * *\nQ. And did your father have any type of weapons in his apartment, if you know?\nA. Yes. He had several knives and he had\u2014\nDEFENDANT\u2019S ATTORNEY: Objection, Your Honor; foundation.\nTHE JUDGE: Sustained.\nQ. Had you ever seen any knives in your father\u2019s apartment?\nA. Yes.\nQ. Can you describe those knives that you saw for us, please.\nA. He had several pocket knives.\u201d (Emphasis added.)\nThe witness then described the automatic handgun that his father kept in his apartment.\nWe judge that the defendant\u2019s general objection to the testimony of which he now complains was insufficient. He did not object to the initial questions on the ground of a lack of foundation. His later objection on the ground of lack of foundation alerted the State, and the State did provide the proper foundation. Moreover, Melson\u2019s answers made after the cautionary remarks of the judge, \u201cif he knows,\u201d and of the prosecutor, \u201cif you can tell us,\u201d lead to the reasonable inference that the witness was testifying to matters which were within his personal knowledge and were not based on hearsay.\nThe defendant also assigns as error other testimony of the witness that his father kept the cash from his checks on his person or in a shoe at his apartment; that he drank Budweiser beer and Scotch; and took vacations in August. No objection was made to that testimony. Consequently, any claim of error now is waived. (People v. Gacho (1988), 122 Ill. 2d 221, 522 N.E.2d 1146.) Again, we believe that the record shows that that testimony also was based on the personal knowledge of the witness. Finally, we disagree with the defendant\u2019s claim that the evidence was not relevant.\nBecause we find that the defendant has failed to establish any prejudicial error, the judgment of the circuit court is affirmed.\nJudgment affirmed.\nMcNAMARA, P.J., and RAKOWSKI, J., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE EGAN" } ], "attorneys": [ "Rita A. Fry, Public Defender, of Chicago (Alison Edwards, Assistant Public Defender, of counsel), for appellant.", "Jack O\u2019Malley, State\u2019s Attorney, of Chicago (Renee Goldfarb, Linda Woloshin, and Ann L. Benedek, Assistant State\u2019s Attorneys, of counsel), for the People." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. CHARLES COLEMAN, Defendant-Appellant.\nFirst District (6th Division)\nNo. 1 \u2014 90\u20140971\nOpinion filed June 4, 1993.\nRita A. Fry, Public Defender, of Chicago (Alison Edwards, Assistant Public Defender, of counsel), for appellant.\nJack O\u2019Malley, State\u2019s Attorney, of Chicago (Renee Goldfarb, Linda Woloshin, and Ann L. Benedek, Assistant State\u2019s Attorneys, of counsel), for the People." }, "file_name": "0371-01", "first_page_order": 391, "last_page_order": 402 }