{ "id": 2946653, "name": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. ELYRIA ALCALA, Defendant-Appellant", "name_abbreviation": "People v. Alcala", "decision_date": "1993-06-07", "docket_number": "No. 1 \u2014 90\u20143198", "first_page": "411", "last_page": "426", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "248 Ill. App. 3d 411" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. 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App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2604509 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1979, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "565" }, { "page": "565" }, { "page": "565" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/213/0560-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 1442, "char_count": 34620, "ocr_confidence": 0.722, "pagerank": { "raw": 1.1868588355370571e-07, "percentile": 0.5904276658600559 }, "sha256": "b5a4300a2d4b4074bcfed951350383398a5e3f893158443ea9cfe6a28f39b114", "simhash": "1:a335b91e7f1d7c43", "word_count": 5740 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T21:04:37.974036+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. ELYRIA ALCALA, Defendant-Appellant." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE O\u2019CONNOR\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nFollowing a jury trial, defendant, Elyria Alcala, was convicted of delivery of a controlled substance (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1989, ch. 56\u00bd, par. 1401(a)(2)(C)) and was sentenced to a 13-year prison term.\nWe affirm.\nDefendant\u2019s conviction was obtained with the aid of Octavio Villegas, who had agreed to cooperate with the Cook County State\u2019s Attorney\u2019s office of narcotics investigation following his own arrest for drug possession.. The conviction arose from a transaction to sell cocaine in which Michael Trejo, a Cook County State\u2019s Attorney investigator, posed as purchaser.\nVillegas testified that he met defendant in a bar at 93rd Street and Commercial Avenue. He had seen defendant before because she worked at the bar as a bartender. On April 22, 1989, Villegas approached defendant at the bar and told her that he \u201cknew some one who would buy.\u201d Defendant replied that she \u201chad some\u201d and \u201cto bring\u201d the person who would buy. No specific amount of drugs was discussed. The next day, Villegas called defendant and then contacted police regarding the sale.\nAt 1:30 p.m., Villegas and Trejo arrived at defendant\u2019s home, located at 9825 South Exchange Avenue, in Chicago. Villegas entered the home first and then signaled for Trejo to come in. Ville-gas introduced defendant and Trejo. Defendant and Trejo then went into another room, where Villegas could not hear what was being said.\nTrejo testified that he arrived at defendant\u2019s home with Ville-gas. Villegas entered the home first while Trejo waited by the car. After a couple of minutes, Villegas motioned for Trejo to come in. Villegas introduced Trejo to a woman, identified as defendant, sitting on a couch. Another woman sat on the couch, but Trejo was not introduced to her. Defendant stood up, shook hands with Trejo, and instructed him to follow her to another room.\nTrejo followed defendant to what appeared to be a woman\u2019s bedroom. Defendant sat on the bed and asked Trejo how much \u201ccoca\u201d he wanted. Trejo explained that the term \u201ccoca\u201d was Spanish slang for cocaine. Trejo responded that he wanted \u201ca half a key.\u201d Again, Trejo explained that the term was slang for one half of one kilo of cocaine. Defendant then reached into a drawer and pulled out a \u201clittle brown cassette box.\u201d The box contained a clear, plastic \u201cbaggie\u201d which defendant handed to Trejo. Trejo asked if the bag contained \u201ca half a key,\u201d and defendant assured him that it did, but that if he was \u201cshorted,\u201d he was to return, and she would make up the difference. Trejo continued to examine the substance in the bag which he stated was \u201ckind of rocky.\u201d Defendant told him that the \u201cstuff\u201d came from Waukegan and not from \u201cthe neighborhood.\u201d Trejo then asked her how much the drug would cost to which defendant replied $16,500. Trejo told her the price was too high and offered only $16,000. Defendant turned this counteroffer down, indicating that she had to \u201cmake a profit.\u201d Trejo then agreed to the price and asked her to come outside to his car for the money. Defendant refused and told Trejo that she would wait there. Trejo asked her again to come out to his car, and again, defendant refused. Trejo ultimately capitulated to defendant\u2019s request.\nTrejo went out to his car and opened his trunk, which indicated to Trejo\u2019s backup surveillance units that the deal was \u201cgoing down.\u201d Trejo reentered the home and, with defendant, exchanged the money for the drugs. At that point, the backup units entered the residence and arrested them.\nChicago police officer Robert Navigato was part of the surveillance team assigned to monitor Trejo\u2019s drug purchase. Navigato watched Trejo and Villegas arrive together at the residence and later enter the home separately. When Navigato saw Trejo open the trunk of the car, he and his fellow surveillants entered the home. As he entered the home, he saw a young Hispanic woman seated on the couch in the living room with Villegas. He then saw Trejo exiting from a bedroom followed by defendant, who was inside the bedroom doorway. Navigato arrested defendant and read her the Miranda warnings from his police handbook.\nNavigato described the bedroom from which defendant and Trejo emerged as a female\u2019s room because perfumes, jewelry, and powders were displayed on the dresser. When Navigato told defendant that she was under arrest for selling drugs, she denied that she had done anything wrong and that she had any knowledge of drugs. Defendant agreed to sign a consent to search form, which was read into evidence. After she signed the form, Navigato informed her that she had just sold drugs to an undercover police officer. Defendant then began to cry and stated that she was \u201csorry\u201d that she ever \u201cgot involved.\u201d Navigato then asked her if there were any more drugs in the house. Defendant pointed to the nightstand in the room, in which Navigato subsequently found two more packets of cocaine.\nDefendant was then taken to the kitchen and interviewed by a State\u2019s Attorney investigator. Defendant admitted to the sale and stated that she had obtained the cocaine from her ex-husband, Jose Romero.\nNavigato then resumed his search of the residence and discovered two \u201cOhaus\u201d scales in a closet in defendant\u2019s bedroom. Navigato explained that these scales were \u201ctriple beam,\u201d very accurate, and inevitably found at drug raids because of their popularity with drug dealers. Navigato also found $900 in United States currency on the dresser in defendant\u2019s bedroom. In defendant\u2019s nightstand, Navigato discovered \u201csnow seals,\u201d papers used to package cocaine in quantities of one gram or less.\nDefendant was taken to the police station at 35th Street and Normal Avenue, where she signed a Miranda release form. During her interview, defendant admitted that her \u201cend\u201d of the transaction was to be $500 and a ticket to Hawaii to visit her daughter.\nThe State also presented the testimony of two other officers assigned to provide backup to Trejo. Investigator William R Walsh of the Cook County State\u2019s Attorney office entered defendant\u2019s residence after she had been placed under arrest. Walsh observed officers discovering the scales in the bedroom. Walsh also observed defendant being interviewed at the kitchen table. Defendant told her interrogators that she was \u201cgoing to have to pay the price\u201d for her actions. At that time, two of defendant\u2019s grandchildren came into the house. Defendant stated that she did not want to be led away in handcuffs in front of the children. Walsh agreed to the request and did not use handcuffs until defendant was placed into the squad car. As defendant exited her home, she told her grandchildren to \u201clearn a lesson from this,\u201d \u201cnot to do what\u201d she \u201chad done\u201d and that .she \u201cwas sorry.\u201d Defendant then turned to the other woman in the apartment, who was \u201ccrying,\u201d \u201cscreaming\u201d and \u201ccarrying on\u201d and told her to \u201cshut up,\u201d \u201cquit crying,\u201d and to \u201ctake care of the kids.\u201d Defendant told Walsh that the woman was not involved in the transaction.\nChicago police officer Raymond Golnick also testified to the events which occurred during the raid. Villegas was Golnick\u2019s informer. Although the raiding team was not aware of the exact amount of drugs to be purchased, they were aware that they were \u201cgoing\u201d for \u201cat least a half a kilo.\u201d Golnick was present when defendant signed the consent to search form in her bedroom. Golnick observed Navigate discover the packets of cocaine in defendant\u2019s nightstand. He also was present when the scales and cocaine packaging papers were found.\nGolnick interviewed defendant at the police station. There, defendant told him that the drugs had been given to her by her ex-husband, Jose Romero. She did not mention either \u201cArmando\u201d or \u201cLupe.\u201d Defendant stated that she was to receive $500 and a plane ticket to Hawaii for her participation in the purchase.\nThe parties stipulated that if called to testify Art Kruske, a Chicago police chemist, would state that he had analyzed the white substance purchased by Trejo from defendant, utilizing the proper and correct testing procedures. In Kruske\u2019s expert opinion, the bag contained 495.1 grams of cocaine. The two packets discovered in the nightstand contained 59.82 grams of cocaine. The cocaine was found to 87.4% pure.\nDefendant asserted an entrapment defense and sought to establish that she had been induced to participate in the transaction by both Villegas and a young woman named Lupe. Defendant resided at her home with her three grandchildren, Lupe, and Lupe\u2019s boyfriend, Armando. Defendant had met Lupe a year prior to her arrest. Lupe had recently undergone surgery and asked defendant if she could stay with her at her house.\nIt was defendant\u2019s testimony that on April 19, 1989, she discovered Lupe in tears because one of Lupe\u2019s children was \u201cgoing blind\u201d and Lupe needed money for the surgery. Lupe explained that Armando and Villegas \u201chad a buyer\u201d for drugs. When defendant asked what that had to do with her, Lupe responded that they needed defendant to act as an interpreter. Defendant refused to help. Defendant stated that she had never been involved with drugs and \u201ccouldn\u2019t handle this.\u201d\nOver the next few days, Lupe continued to cry and ask defendant for her assistance. Again, defendant refused to help. On April 22, Lupe and defendant went out to eat dinner. At the restaurant, Villegas came over to their table and Lupe informed him that she \u201cwould meet [him] later.\u201d Villegas then left. Lupe and defendant then went to the LaPlaya Lounge on 93rd Street. The bar was owned by defendant\u2019s nephew, and defendant was \u201chelping out\u201d by taking care of it while he was out of town. Villegas entered the bar, and he and Lupe went into a rear stockroom. Defendant followed them and was introduced to Villegas by Lupe as the man \u201cthat has the buyer.\u201d Defendant told them that she did not wish to be involved. Villegas told her that \u201cnothing will happen\u201d if she let him use her house and she acted as an interpreter. Villegas also told her there was no reason to be afraid and promised her $500 and a plane ticket to Hawaii. Defendant explained that her daughter was to undergo surgery in Hawaii and that she could not afford the airfare. Defendant also admitted she was concerned about being arrested and was aware that what she was to do was wrong.\nAccording to defendant, Villegas called defendant\u2019s home the next day and asked for Lupe. After 11 a.m., Armando came to the house with the drugs, which were contained in a \u201cCrown Royal\u201d satchel. The drugs were left on the kitchen table. Lupe then called Villegas, and he later arrived at the home with Trejo. When Trejo entered the house, Villegas instructed defendant to bring the \u201cmerchandise\u201d from the kitchen to the bedroom. There, Trejo opened the satchel and asked defendant for a scale. Trejo then offered her $16,000 for the drugs. Defendant told him that \u201cthey\u201d had said $16,500. Trejo agreed to the price and subsequently left the house to retrieve the money. When he reentered with the money, he placed her under arrest.\nDefendant denied ever seeing the two packets of drugs, the scales, and the other paraphernalia which had been found in her bedroom and had no idea how those items came to be discovered in her home. Defendant stated that the $900 found on her dresser represented the \u201creceipts\u201d from her nephew\u2019s bar. Defendant denied telling police that Jose Romero had delivered her the drugs. Defendant stated that she was not a drug dealer and only became involved because she \u201cfelt sorry for a person because I have children of my own, and I put myself in her place.\u201d Defendant also denied that police ever gave her Miranda warnings. Defendant admitted signing the consent to search form.\nOn appeal, defendant argues that the State failed to prove her guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, in view of the evidence of entrapment. The State responds that defendant has waived this claim because she did not raise it in her post-trial motion for a new trial. We disagree.\nOur review of the post-trial motion reveals that defendant included in it the argument that the State failed to prove her guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. This sufficiently preserved the issue for appeal.\nSection 7 \u2014 12 of the Criminal Code of 1961 provides that a defendant cannot be found guilty of an offense where the conduct forming the basis for the offense was incited or induced by a public officer or agent for purposes of obtaining evidence to prosecute. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1989, ch. 38, par. 7 \u2014 12.) This affirmative defense is inapplicable, however, where defendant merely is provided with the opportunity or the facility for committing the offense in furtherance of a criminal purpose originating with the defendant. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1989, ch. 38, par. 7 \u2014 12.) Accordingly, defendant\u2019s predisposition to commit crime is the critical inquiry. (People v. Gannon (1991), 213 Ill. App. 3d 560, 565, 572 N.E.2d 1133; People v. Cross (1979), 77 Ill. 2d 396, 396 N.E.2d 812, cert. denied sub nom. Thomas v. Illinois (1980), 445 U.S. 929, 63 L. Ed. 2d 762, 100 S. Ct. 1316.) Generally, predisposition is established by a defendant\u2019s willingness to participate in criminal activity before his initial exposure to government agents. (People v. Poulos (1990), 196 Ill. App. 3d 653, 661, 554 N.E.2d 448.) Factors to be considered in assessing predisposition include the defendant\u2019s initial reluctance or her ready willingness to commit the crime, the defendant\u2019s familiarity with drugs and her willingness to accommodate the needs of drug users, the defendant\u2019s willingness to make a profit from the illegal act, the defendant\u2019s prior or current drug usage, the defendant\u2019s participation in testing or cutting the drugs, and whether defendant had ready access to a drug supply. See People v. Poulos, 196 Ill. App. 3d at 661 (and cases cited therein).\nA defendant who asserts the entrapment defense is entitled to instruct the jury on the defense, if, when viewing evidence presented in a light most favorable to the defendant, there is some evidence supporting the defense. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1989, ch. 38, pars. 7\u2014 12, 3 \u2014 2; People v. Poulos, 196 Ill. App. 3d 653, 554 N.E.2d 448.) In order to convict, the State must then prove defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt as to the defense together with all other elements of the crime. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1989, ch. 38, par. 3 \u2014 2(b).) Our courts have recognized that the determination of defendant\u2019s predisposition to commit crime is fact dependent and, as such, is an issue to be decided by the trier of fact. People v. Tipton (1980), 78 Ill. 2d 477, 401 N.E.2d 528; People v. Gannon, 213 Ill. App. 3d at 565.\nUpon review, that determination is given particular deference. (See People v. Gannon, 213 Ill. App. 3d at 565.) Accordingly, this court must affirm, where, when viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt (People v. Collins (1985), 106 Ill. 2d 237, 478 N.E.2d 267, cert. denied (1985), 474 U.S. 935, 88 L. Ed. 2d 274, 106 S. Ct. 267) unless entrapment can be found as a matter of law. (See People v. Tipton, 78 Ill. 2d at 487; see also People v. Paulos, 196 Ill. App. 3d 653, 554 N.E.2d 448.) Entrapment as a matter of law is not established where there is any substantial evidence from which it may be inferred that the criminal intent to commit a particular offense originated in the mind of the accused. People v. D\u2019Angelo (1992), 223 Ill. App. 3d 754, 585 N.E.2d 1239, appeal denied (1992), 145 Ill. 2d 638, 596 N.E.2d 632.\nInitially, we note that defendant\u2019s sufficiency of the evidence argument can succeed only if her trial testimony is taken as true. That testimony, however, conflicted with that presented by the State\u2019s witnesses. Where, as here, entrapment is involved, a reviewing court is precluded from substituting its judgment for that of the jury with regard to the weight of the evidence or the credibility of witnesses. (People v. Lambrecht (1992), 231 Ill. App. 3d 426, 595 N.E.2d 1358, appeal denied (1992), 146 Ill. 2d 641, 602 N.E.2d 465.) That is so because it is the trier of fact\u2019s responsibility to weigh the credibility of the witnesses and to resolve the conflicts and inconsistencies. (People v. Aguilar (1991), 218 Ill. App. 3d 1, 578 N.E.2d 109, appeal denied (1991), 142 Ill. 2d 656, 584 N.E.2d 131.) Here, the jury heard both Villegas\u2019 and defendant\u2019s versions of the events giving rise to the transaction and apparently resolved the discrepancies against defendant. Moreover, defendant\u2019s version of what occurred in the house with Trejo during the actual sale was markedly different from Trejo\u2019s testimony. Again, these conflicts and inconsistencies were resolved against defendant.\nKeeping the foregoing principles in mind and viewing the testimony presented in a light most favorable to the State, defendant\u2019s conviction must be affirmed. Villegas testified that he told defendant that he \u201cknew someone who would buy.\u201d Defendant did not refuse this offer, but told Villegas \u201cto bring\u201d him around. This court must accept Villegas\u2019 testimony as true as all the evidence must be viewed in the light most favorable to the State. (See People v. D\u2019Angelo, 223 Ill. App. 3d at 777.) The transaction was set for the next day. This evidence established defendant\u2019s \u201cready willingness\u201d to commit the crime and her \u201cready access\u201d to a drug supply. Trejo testified that when he was examining the cocaine, defendant told him \u201cthe stuff\u201d came from Waukegan and was not from the neighborhood, apparently to indicate the high quality of the cocaine. She also assured Trejo to return if he found that he was \u201cshorted.\u201d This evidence tends to establish defendant\u2019s \u201cfamiliarity\u201d with drugs and her willingness to \u201caccommodate the needs\u201d of drug users. Trejo\u2019s testimony further established that defendant was familiar with the slang used in the drug trade. Additionally, defendant\u2019s refusal of Trejo\u2019s lower price offer indicates her eagerness to make a profit. Indeed, defendant\u2019s own testimony established that she was willing to make a profit from what she knew to be an illegal act. This evidence, taken as a whole, is sufficient to establish defendant\u2019s predisposition to commit the crime. Defendant, however, points to her reluctance to get involved in the transaction as evidence of her lack of predisposition. Again, the only evidence of such reluctance was provided by defendant\u2019s own testimony. A close reading of her testimony, however, reveals that this reluctance can be interpreted as a demonstration of the \u201cnatural hesitancy and caution of one acquainted with and engaged in illegal activity.\u201d (See People v. D\u2019Angelo, 223 Ill. App. 3d at 779.) The evidence, when taken as a whole, sufficiently supports the jury\u2019s rejection of defendant\u2019s entrapment defense and its finding of guilt.\nDuring its deliberations, the jury sent a note to the judge which contained the following inquiry:\n\u201cWas Octavio [Villegas] considered an agent of any of the following: the Chicago Police Department, State\u2019s Attorney\u2019s Office, DEA, other prosecuting body in this trial.\u201d\nDefense counsel sought to have the question answered \u201cdirectly\u201d that \u201cyes, he is an agent.\u201d The State asked that the jury be told that it has the evidence, the exhibits, and the instructions and to resume its deliberations. The circuit court agreed, and the jury was instructed in that manner. Defendant now argues that the court committed error by failing to answer the inquiry in the affirmative.\nGenerally, jurors are entitled to have their questions answered. (People v. Reid (1990), 136 Ill. 2d 27, 39, 554 N.E.2d 174; People v. Clark (1972), 52 Ill. 2d 374, 391, 288 N.E.2d 363.) The circuit court has a duty to instruct the jury where clarification is requested, the original instructions are incomplete, and the jurors are manifestly confused. (People v. Reid, 136 Ill. 2d at 39.) Moreover, the circuit court is obliged to answer a jury\u2019s questions even if the jury has received proper instructions. People v. Reid, 136 Ill. 2d at 39.\nNevertheless, our supreme court has indicated that, under the appropriate circumstances, a circuit court may, in the exercise of its discretion, refrain from answering a jury\u2019s questions. (People v. Reid, 136 Ill. 2d at 39.) Such a course of action is acceptable if the jury instructions are readily understandable and sufficiently explain the relevant law (People v. Palmer (1982), 111 Ill. App. 3d 800, 444 N.E.2d. 678) and further instructions would serve no useful purpose (People v. Jones (1976), 40 Ill. App. 3d 771, 353 N.E.2d 79) or would potentially mislead the jury (People v. Dunigan (1981), 96 Ill. App. 3d 799, 421 N.E.2d 1319) or if the inquiry involves a question of fact. (People v. Hooker (1977), 54 Ill. App. 3d 53, 369 N.E.2d 147.) A circuit court also may properly refuse to answer a jury inquiry if an answer or explanation by the court would cause the court to express an opinion which would probably direct a verdict one way or the other. (People v. Reid, 136 Ill. 2d at 39.) Furthermore, if the inquiry may require \u201c \u2018a colloquy between the court and the jury, a further explanation of the facts, and perhaps an expression of the trial court\u2019s opinion on the evidence,\u2019 \u201d then the court may decline to answer the question. People v. Reid, 136 Ill. 2d at 39-40, quoting People v. Tostado (1981), 92 Ill. App. 3d 837, 839, 416 N.E.2d 353.\nThe State suggests that had the trial judge answered the jury\u2019s inquiry with a direct \u201cyes\u201d answer, the judge would have offered an expression of his opinion as to the evaluation of the evidence. Support for this position appears in both the committee comments to the entrapment statute and People v. Wielgos (1991), 142 Ill. 2d 133, 568 N.E.2d 861.\nAccording to the committee comments accompanying the entrapment statute, there are four elements of the defense, including \u201cthe concept of committing the offense originates with the State or its agent.\u201d (Ill. Ann. Stat., ch. 38, par. 7 \u2014 12, Committee Comments, at 440 (Smith-Hurd 1989).) Our supreme court has ruled that this element \u201cimplicitly includes a finding that an agency relationship exists between the government officer and the alleged entrapping party.\u201d (People v. Wielgos, 142 Ill. 2d at 137.) In view of this, the jury\u2019s inquiry, whether Villegas was considered an agent, sought a factual determination that they, as jurors, were required to make. Accordingly, the circuit court correctly refused to answer the inquiry.\nDefendant next alleges that she was denied her constitutional right to confront witnesses when the circuit court disallowed defense counsel\u2019s questions regarding the extension of time given by the State\u2019s Attorney\u2019s office to Villegas with regard to his agreement.\nAt trial, Villegas stated that he was arrested on June 28, 1988, for possession of drugs and weapons. Seeking to avoid a lengthy prison term, Villegas entered into an agreement with authorities on December 15, 1988. This agreement called for Villegas\u2019 assistance in obtaining five indictments stemming from drug seizures of at least 60 grams. In the agreement, Villegas was given until January 31, 1989, to complete his part of the contract. On cross-examination, defense counsel asked Villegas if defendant\u2019s arrest was the \u201cone that gets you off the hook,\u201d to which Villegas responded in the affirmative. Counsel also asked Villegas if he was given an extension of time because defendant\u2019s arrest occurred some three months after the expiration of the original contract. Villegas admitted that he had been given an extension. Villegas further admitted that he had aided police in the arrest of an individual known as Armando on April 12, 1990. Counsel proceeded to develop another line of questioning. He then returned to the subject of the time extension, seeking to determine the expiration date of the extension. Objections to these two questions were sustained on the grounds that they had been asked and answered.\nIn its redirect examination, the prosecutor established that the extension was to expire on May 30, 1989. Although invited to recross-examine the witness, defense counsel declined.\nThe sixth amendment to the United States Constitution protects the defendant\u2019s right of cross-examination. (Davis v. Alaska (1974), 415 U.S. 308, 39 L. Ed. 2d 347, 94 S. Ct. 1105.) The exposure of a witness\u2019 motivation in testifying is a proper and important function of that right. (Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. at 316-17, 39 L. Ed. 2d at 353-54, 94 S. Ct. at 1110.) Although the scope of the cross-examination lies within the discretion of the circuit court, that discretion must be exercised in such a way as to allow the defendant wide latitude in establishing bias, motive, or interest by that witness. People v. Wilkerson (1981), 87 Ill. 2d 151, 429 N.E.2d 526.\nIn the present case, the crux of defendant\u2019s argument is that the defense \u201ctwice attempted to adduce when Villegas\u2019 contract extension terminated but the court sustained objections each time. The date Villegas\u2019 contract extension terminated was directly relevant to demonstrating Villegas\u2019 bias, interest, and motive to testify falsely.\u201d We agree that the trial judge improperly sustained the objections to defense counsel\u2019s questions. Despite this error, however, defense counsel established that defendant\u2019s arrest represented the final arrest under the agreement and the fact that Ville-gas benefited from it. Moreover, the information counsel sought to elicit, the expiration date of the contract extension, was brought out in redirect examination. Inexplicably, defense counsel did not recross-examine the witness although given the opportunity to do so by the circuit court. Had that information not been elicited during redirect examination, defendant\u2019s argument would be meritorious and this court could have found reversible error. (See People v. Perez (1991), 209 Ill. App. 3d 457, 568 N.E.2d 250 (it is reversible error, in entrapment case, to limit defense counsel\u2019s inquiries to informant because such a case turns on witness credibility).) However, we hold that reversal is unwarranted in the present case in view of defense counsel\u2019s failure to follow up on the very information now asserted as error.\nDefendant next maintains that she received ineffective assistance of counsel when her trial counsel failed to file a motion to suppress evidence obtained during an illegal search.\nGenerally, in order to establish ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant must show both that counsel\u2019s representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness and that a reasonable probability exists that, but for the error, the result of the trial would have been different. (Strickland v. Washington (1984), 466 U.S. 668, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674, 104 S. Ct. 2052.) In adopting Strickland, our supreme court noted that a defendant bears a heavy burden to overcome the strong presumption in favor of a finding that defense counsel\u2019s advocacy was effective. (People v. Albanese (1984), 104 Ill. 2d 504, 473 N.E.2d 1246, cert. denied (1985), 471 U.S. 1044, 85 L. Ed. 2d 335, 105 S. Ct. 2061.) Further, the determination of the reasonableness of trial counsel\u2019s actions must be evaluated from counsel\u2019s perspective at the time of the alleged error, without hindsight, in light of the totality of the circumstances. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674, 104 S. Ct. 2051.\nThe basis for defendant\u2019s claim of ineffectiveness is that the warrantless police entry into and subsequent search of her home following her arrest did not fall under any of the exceptions to the requirement of first obtaining a warrant.\nThis issue was addressed by the supreme court in People v. Eichelberger (1982), 91 Ill. 2d 359, 438 N.E.2d 140, cert. denied (1982), 459 U.S. 1019, 74 L. Ed. 2d 514, 103 S. Ct. 383. There, the court held that the warrantless entry into defendant\u2019s residence, a hotel room, for the purpose of effecting an arrest during a drug buy did not violate defendant\u2019s fourth amendment rights because police reasonably believed that a felony was being committed. (People v. Eichelberger, 91 Ill. 2d at 370.) That arrest being valid, the officers then had the right to conduct a contemporaneous search of defendant\u2019s person and the area within her immediate control. People v. Eichelberger, 91 Ill. 2d at 371.\nParenthetically, we note that defendant allowed Villegas into her home. Villegas then motioned for Trejo to join them. When Trejo entered the living room, he was introduced to defendant, who shook hands with him and asked him to follow her into a bedroom, where the cocaine was shown to him. This type of scenario has been recognized by our courts as a consensual entry. See People v. Galdine (1991), 212 Ill. App. 3d 472, 571 N.E.2d 182, appeal denied (1991) , 141 Ill. 2d 549, 580 N.E.2d 123; United States v. Scherer (7th Cir. 1982), 673 F.2d 176, cert. denied (1982), 457 U.S. 1120, 73 L. Ed. 2d 1334, 102 S. Ct. 2935.\nGiven that defendant\u2019s arrest was obtained legally, defendant\u2019s assertions regarding her \u201ctainted\u201d consent to search form necessarily must fail.\nAs the foregoing analyses show, trial counsel did not act unreasonably in failing to present a motion to suppress evidence. It has been recognized that \u201c[d]efense counsel has no duty to advance specious claims of constitutional deprivation.\u201d (People v. Gray (1981), 95 Ill. App. 3d 879, 884, 420 N.E.2d 856.) Defendant, therefore, has failed to meet her burden in establishing that counsel was ineffective.\nDefendant next contends that several comments made by the prosecutor during closing argument operated to deny her a fair trial. The State responds that the claim is waived due to defendant\u2019s failure to make either a contemporaneous objection or to include the issue in her post-trial motion.\nOur supreme court has held repeatedly that a defendant must both make a contemporaneous objection at trial and include the issue in the post-trial motion in order to preserve properly a claim of error for appellate review. (See, e.g., People v. Pasch (1992) , 152 Ill. 2d 133, 604 N.E.2d 294; People v. Turner (1989), 128 Ill. 2d 540, 539 N.E.2d 1196, cert. denied (1989), 493 U.S. 939, 107 L. Ed. 2d 326, 110 S. Ct. 337; People v. Enoch (1988), 122 Ill. 2d 176, 522 N.E.2d 1124, cert. denied (1988), 488 U.S. 917, 102 L. Ed. 2d 263, 109 S. Ct. 274.) Indeed, none of the contentions made by defendant in this court were included in her post-trial motion. Accordingly, they are waived. However, defendant asks that we excuse the waiver under the plain error exception to the waiver rule. (134 Ill. 2d R. 615(a).) That exception is invoked in instances where the evidence is closely balanced or where the alleged error deprived defendant of a fair and impartial trial. (People v. Palmer (1989), 188 Ill. App. 3d 414, 545 N.E.2d 743.) Although defendant argues that the evidence as to her predisposition to commit crime was closely balanced, the evidence, set forth in detail above, as to predisposition was to the contrary. Moreover, none of the errors complained of here appear to be so substantial as to warrant the application of the second prong of the waiver exception. For these reasons, we decline to excuse the waiver.\nFinally, defendant claims that her 13-year prison sentence should be reduced by one year to the statutory minimum of 12 years. She maintains that the trial judge impermissibly increased her sentence based upon his consideration of factors which are inherent in the offense, namely the amount of cocaine involved and the harm to society caused by the drug trade. Additionally, she argues that the trial judge did not give sufficient consideration to the mitigating factors, including that she was a 53-year-old mother of nine and grandmother of three, with no prior criminal background.\nSentencing is discretionary with the circuit court and will not be changed upon review absent an abuse of that discretion. (People v. Perruquet (1977), 68 Ill. 2d 149, 368 N.E.2d 882; People v. Holloway (1985), 131 Ill. App. 3d 290, 475 N.E.2d 915.) There exists, a presumption that the circuit court based its sentence on proper legal reasoning, and for that reason, reviewing courts are reluctant to reduce a sentence which is within the applicable statutory guidelines. People v. Lambrechts (1977), 69 Ill. 2d 544, 372 N.E.2d 641.\nIt should be noted that the sentence imposed in the present case falls within the applicable statutory guidelines. Defendant was convicted of the delivery of 495.1 grams of 87.4% pure cocaine, which carries a sentencing range of not less than 12 years and not more than 50 years. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1989, ch. 56\u00bd, par. 1401(a)(2)(C).) Additionally, defendant\u2019s argument regarding factors inherent in the offense has been rejected by the appellate court. In People v. Peter (1991), 220 Ill. App. 3d 626, 581 N.E.2d 128, appeal denied (1992), 143 Ill. 2d 645, 587 N.E.2d 1022, the fifth division of this court noted that it is not improper for the circuit court to have noted the amount of the drug at issue when deciding what might be an appropriate sentence within the sentencing range. (People v. Peter, 220 Ill. App. 3d at 632.) Indeed, the quantity of a drug in excess of the minimum, 400 grams, but less than 900 grams, \u201cis susceptible to the same range of sentencing.\u201d (People v. Peter, 220 Ill. App. 3d at 632.) Accordingly, the fact that defendant delivered a quantity of drugs in excess of the minimum for that sentencing range and the fact that the drug had a high purity level, \u201cindicating its potency and potential for having a far-reaching impact on society\u201d (People v. Peter, 220 Ill. App. 3d at 632) are considered factors which the circuit court may properly take into account when setting sentence. Furthermore, the trial judge indicated that it had considered defendant\u2019s lack of criminal background as a factor in mitigation. For these reasons, no abuse of sentencing discretion is apparent in the present case.\nDefendant\u2019s conviction and sentence are affirmed.\nAffirmed.\nMANNING, P.J., and CAMPBELL, J., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE O\u2019CONNOR" } ], "attorneys": [ "Michael J. Pelletier and Todd Avery Shanker, both of State Appellate Defender\u2019s Office, of Chicago, for appellant.", "Jack O\u2019Malley, State\u2019s Attorney, of Chicago (Renee Goldfarb and Joan F. Frazier, Assistant State\u2019s Attorneys, of counsel), for the People." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. ELYRIA ALCALA, Defendant-Appellant.\nFirst District (1st Division)\nNo. 1 \u2014 90\u20143198\nOpinion filed June 7, 1993.\nRehearing denied August 2, 1993.\nMichael J. Pelletier and Todd Avery Shanker, both of State Appellate Defender\u2019s Office, of Chicago, for appellant.\nJack O\u2019Malley, State\u2019s Attorney, of Chicago (Renee Goldfarb and Joan F. Frazier, Assistant State\u2019s Attorneys, of counsel), for the People." }, "file_name": "0411-01", "first_page_order": 431, "last_page_order": 446 }