{ "id": 2945865, "name": "PATRICK RYNDAK, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. RIVER GROVE POLICE PENSION BOARD, Defendant-Appellee", "name_abbreviation": "Ryndak v. River Grove Police Pension Board", "decision_date": "1993-06-11", "docket_number": "No. 1 \u2014 92\u20142381", "first_page": "486", "last_page": "490", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "248 Ill. App. 3d 486" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "542 N.E.2d 835", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "186 Ill. App. 3d 715", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2656387 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/186/0715-01" ] }, { "cite": "533 N.E.2d 458", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "178 Ill. App. 3d 438", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2431938 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/178/0438-01" ] }, { "cite": "505 N.E.2d 1387", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "153 Ill. App. 3d 595", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3607394 ], "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "599" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/153/0595-01" ] }, { "cite": "526 N.E.2d 588", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "172 Ill. App. 3d 344", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5083639 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/172/0344-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 485, "char_count": 9901, "ocr_confidence": 0.715, "pagerank": { "raw": 1.4480505580331596e-07, "percentile": 0.6545203986796141 }, "sha256": "b38a225af6f6876c0ba2e8e02fab1ed44f914a3ba26e6639489920cc75e79a7a", "simhash": "1:f14b5556e706c472", "word_count": 1589 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T21:04:37.974036+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "PATRICK RYNDAK, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. RIVER GROVE POLICE PENSION BOARD, Defendant-Appellee." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE McNULTY\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nPlaintiff Patrick Ryndak appeals from an order of the circuit court of Cook County affirming the River Grove Police Pension Board decision which granted plaintiff a 50% disability pension, but denied him a 65% disability pension.\nThe relevant facts are as follows. On May, 29, 1991, plaintiff filed an application for a duty-related disability pension with the River Grove Police Pension Board (the Board or Pension Board). At the commencement of the administrative hearing to decide Ryndak\u2019s entitlement to the pension, the Pension Board allowed plaintiff to amend his disability application in order to seek a nonduty disability pension (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1991, ch. 108\u00bd, par. 3 \u2014 114.2) as an alternative to his claim for a duty disability pension (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1991, ch. 108\u00bd, par. 3-114.1).\nPlaintiff testified at the hearing and submitted a written statement that he has been a police officer for the village of River Grove for the past 22 years. Plaintiff stated that during that period of time, he had been shot at, beaten, seen people die in automobile accidents and had a fellow officer die right in front of him. Plaintiff believes that the negative aspects of being a police officer and his experiences over the span of time that he has been a police officer have caused him to suffer from depression, stress and headaches. In 1985, plaintiff became a patient of Dr. Demorest and was prescribed a tranquilizer. Plaintiff claims that his level of stress and depression increased in 1990 when he was named as a defendant in a civil rights lawsuit and received little or no support from the administration. Also in 1990, plaintiff was beaten by an offender and incurred bruises to his eye, nose, head and ribs and required reconstructive surgery. Plaintiff claims that he still suffers from headaches and a nervous condition as a result of the incident and is being treated with medication. Plaintiff claims that the medication makes him sleepy and affects his ability to make snap decisions regarding the use of force.\nReports were submitted by plaintiff\u2019s personal physician, Dr. Demorest, three psychiatrists chosen by plaintiff, Dr. Mohan, Dr. Reinstein, and Dr. Kaye, as well as a psychiatrist chosen by the attorney for the Board, Dr. D\u2019Agostino. Dr. Demorest stated in his report that plaintiff suffered multiple stresses while employed in the police department. Since his injury of 1990, plaintiff has complained of almost daily headaches. Dr. Demorest diagnosed plaintiff as disabled, suffering from post-traumatic headache syndrome and from stress, anxiety and depression as a result of the circumstances of his police occupation.\nDr. Kaye also diagnosed plaintiff as disabled and found that plaintiff\u2019s headaches were a symptom of post-traumatic nervous instability. Dr. Mohan diagnosed plaintiff as suffering from a major depressive disorder with anxiety. Dr. Reinstein diagnosed plaintiff as suffering from post-traumatic stress disorder.\nDr. D\u2019Agostino also rendered an opinion that plaintiff is mentally disabled. It was Dr. D\u2019Agostino\u2019s opinion that plaintiff\u2019s disability was not caused by an act of police service. Rather, Dr. D\u2019Agostino stated that although plaintiff described a multitude of traumatic events occurring during his service as a police officer, his major trauma and complaint concern the lack of support by the village during his trial in 1990. Dr. D\u2019Agostino also issued a second report which reiterated his conclusion that plaintiff\u2019s major trauma was his perceived lack of support by the village during his trial and not his beating in 1990. Dr. D\u2019Agostino also stated that he did not believe plaintiff\u2019s symptoms are related so much to \u201cpost concussion\u201d as they are related to various psychological factors that have come into play over the years prior to December 1990.\nBased on this evidence, the Board concluded that plaintiff was entitled to a nonduty, but not an in-the-line-of-duty, disability pension. Plaintiff filed a complaint for administrative review in the circuit court of Cook County, and the circuit court affirmed the Board\u2019s decision. For the following reasons, we affirm the decision of the circuit court.\nPlaintiff sought a line-of-duty pension pursuant to section 3 \u2014 114.1 of the Illinois Pension Code, which provides, in pertinent part:\n\u201cDisability Pension \u2014 Line of duty. If a police officer as the result of sickness, accident or injury incurred in or resulting from the performance of an act of duty, is found to be physically or mentally disabled for service in the police department, so as to render necessary his or her suspension or retirement from the police service, the police officer shall be entitled to a disability retirement pension of 65% of the salary attached to the rank of the police force held by the officer at the date of suspension of duty or retirement. A police officer shall be considered \u2018on duty\u2019, while on any assignment approved by the chief of the police department of the municipality he or she serves, whether the assignment is within or outside the municipality\u201d (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1991, ch. 108\u00bd, par. 3 \u2014 114.1.)\nThe Board found that plaintiff was indeed psychologically disabled, but that his disability resulted from a cause other than the performance of an act of duty, thereby entitling plaintiff to a disability pension of 50% of his salary See Ill. Rev. Stat. 1991, ch. 108\u00bd, par. 3\u2014 114.2.\nWhen reviewing a pension board\u2019s decision, the court will not reweigh the evidence, but instead will determine whether the Board\u2019s decision is against the manifest weight of the evidence. (English v. Village of Northfield (1988), 172 Ill. App. 3d 344, 526 N.E.2d 588.) Our review of the record in the instant case leads us to conclude that the Board\u2019s decision was not against the manifest weight of the evidence.\nIn order to succeed in a claim for a line-of-duty disability pension, plaintiff must establish a causal connection between plaintiff\u2019s condition and an act of police service. In Olson v. City of Wheaton Police Pension Board (1987), 153 Ill. App. 3d 595, 505 N.E.2d 1387, the plaintiff police officer sought a duty-related pension on the basis that he suffered from severe migraine headaches which he claimed were caused by job-related stress. The court denied plaintiff\u2019s pension request on the basis that \u201cdifferences in management style with his superior, the fact that charges were brought against him, and the fact that he was assigned as a patrol officer although he had attained the rank of sergeant\u201d do not demonstrate that plaintiff\u2019s stress resulted from his performance of an act of duty. (153 Ill. App. 3d at 599.) The court noted that these circumstances are not unique to plaintiff\u2019s duties as a police officer, but rather, are similar to those suffered by any citizen in any job.\nA similar result was reached in Wall v. Police Pension Board (1988), 178 Ill. App. 3d 438, 533 N.E.2d 458, wherein the plaintiff claimed that he suffered from duty-related stress reactions. The court found that plaintiff\u2019s complaints that he could no longer deal with the public\u2019s negative response to him and was frustrated because he was not advancing in his career were common to any type of employment. Therefore, the court concluded that plaintiff failed to show a causal connection between his particular, unique duties as a police officer and his stress. See also Batka v. Board of Trustees (1989), 186 Ill. App. 3d 715, 542 N.E.2d 835 (no causal connection between plaintiff\u2019s duties as a police officer and his stress.)\nThe record here likewise fails to establish a causal connection between plaintiff\u2019s stress and headaches and his unique duties as a police officer. The four psychiatrists who rendered an opinion as to plaintiff\u2019s mental state all found plaintiff to be psychologically disabled. Although Dr. Demorest, a family physician, found that plaintiff\u2019s psychological disability was caused by specific acts of his police service, the only psychiatrist to discuss a causal connection between plaintiff\u2019s employment and his psychological disability was Dr. D\u2019Agostino, who specifically stated that plaintiff\u2019s disability was not caused by an act of police service. Furthermore, we find that plaintiff\u2019s complaints of stress caused by being named as a defendant in a lawsuit and receiving little support from superiors and seeing a coworker die of a heart attack are not circumstances unique to police officers. Moreover, the stress and depression plaintiff claims he suffers as a result of the violent nature of police duties are problems related to the general nature of being a police officer and not to a specific act of police service.\nWe also note that although Dr. Demorest stated that plaintiff suffered from a post-traumatic headache syndrome as a result of the injuries he incurred on duty in 1990, Dr. D\u2019Agostino found that plaintiff\u2019s symptoms are related not so much to \u201cpost concussion\u201d as they are to various psychological factors that have come into play over the years prior to 1990. The Board resolved this conflicting evidence as to plaintiff\u2019s alleged physical disability against plaintiff, and it is not our position to reweigh this evidence or to substitute our opinion for that of the Board.\nWe therefore conclude that the Board\u2019s decision that plaintiff did not suffer an in-the-line-of-duty disability was not against the manifest weight of the evidence and thus affirm the decision of the circuit court.\nAffirmed.\nMURRAY and COUSINS, JJ., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE McNULTY" } ], "attorneys": [ "Stanley H. Jakala, of Berwyn, for appellant.", "Sklodowski, Franklin, Puchalski & Reimer, of Chicago (Richard J. Puchalski, of counsel), for appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "PATRICK RYNDAK, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. RIVER GROVE POLICE PENSION BOARD, Defendant-Appellee.\nFirst District (5th Division)\nNo. 1 \u2014 92\u20142381\nOpinion filed June 11, 1993.\nRehearing denied July 22, 1993.\nStanley H. Jakala, of Berwyn, for appellant.\nSklodowski, Franklin, Puchalski & Reimer, of Chicago (Richard J. Puchalski, of counsel), for appellee." }, "file_name": "0486-01", "first_page_order": 506, "last_page_order": 510 }