{ "id": 5409215, "name": "THE DEPARTMENT OF CENTRAL MANAGEMENT SERVICES (The Department of Children and Family Services), Petitioner, v. ILLINOIS STATE LABOR RELATIONS BOARD, Respondent and Cross-Respondent (American Federation of State, County, and Municipal Employees, Council 31, A F L-C I O, Respondent and Cross-Petitioner)", "name_abbreviation": "Department of Central Management Services v. Illinois State Labor Relations Board", "decision_date": "1993-08-26", "docket_number": "No. 4-92-0702", "first_page": "740", "last_page": "750", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "249 Ill. App. 3d 740" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "554 N.E.2d 155", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 3, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "158" }, { "page": "159" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "135 Ill. 2d 499", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3256350 ], "weight": 3, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "503" }, { "page": "507" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/135/0499-01" ] }, { "cite": "5 U.S.C. \u00a77103", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "U.S.C.", "weight": 2, "year": 1982, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "(a)(10)" }, { "page": "(a)(10)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "317 N.E.2d 343", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "pin_cites": [ { "page": "351" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "22 Ill. App. 3d 248", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2942981 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "259" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/22/0248-01" ] }, { "cite": "415 N.E.2d 1034", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1039" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "82 Ill. 2d 373", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5476077 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "385-86" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/82/0373-01" ] }, { "cite": "507 N.E.2d 482", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "pin_cites": [ { "page": "494" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "116 Ill. 2d 186", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5543542 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "216" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/116/0186-01" ] }, { "cite": "527 N.E.2d 1264", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1270-71" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "123 Ill. 2d 303", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5550589 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "316" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/123/0303-01" ] }, { "cite": "195 N.E.2d 680", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "pin_cites": [ { "page": "682" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "30 Ill. 2d 11", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2828328 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "14" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/30/0011-01" ] }, { "cite": "403 N.E.2d 242", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "pin_cites": [ { "page": "251" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "79 Ill. 2d 356", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3069254 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "376" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/79/0356-01" ] }, { "cite": "401 N.E.2d 491", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1980, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "496" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "78 Ill. 2d 387", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3075444 ], "year": 1980, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "398" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/78/0387-01" ] }, { "cite": "278 N.E.2d 84", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "88" }, { "page": "88" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "50 Ill. 2d 242", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2911790 ], "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "249" }, { "page": "249" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/50/0242-01" ] }, { "cite": "536 N.E.2d 438", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 5, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "440" }, { "page": "440-41" }, { "page": "441" }, { "page": "440" }, { "page": "440-41" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "180 Ill. App. 3d 591", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2615582 ], "weight": 5, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "595" }, { "page": "595" }, { "page": "595" }, { "page": "595" }, { "page": "595" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/180/0591-01" ] }, { "cite": "1983 Ill. Laws 6830", "category": "laws:leg_session", "reporter": "Ill. Laws", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "1984 Ill. Laws 4638", "category": "laws:leg_session", "reporter": "Ill. Laws", "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "Executive Order 84 - 5, issued by the Governor August 20, 1984, revoking Executive Order 73 - 6 and all rules and regulations promulgated thereunder" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "1979 Ill. Laws 5155", "category": "laws:leg_session", "reporter": "Ill. Laws", "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "Executive Order 73 - 6, issued by Governor Walker September 4, 1973" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "139 Ill. 2d 593", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "568 N.E.2d 139", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 4, "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "143" }, { "page": "143" }, { "page": "143" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "209 Ill. App. 3d 283", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2541657 ], "weight": 4, "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "288-89" }, { "page": "289" }, { "page": "289" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/209/0283-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 910, "char_count": 22478, "ocr_confidence": 0.762, "pagerank": { "raw": 1.3477788528821738e-07, "percentile": 0.6326569618537606 }, "sha256": "5a5bba5aa2563b0c2e98a50e6d034fe914d9a77abab447c6a0913258808c3abb", "simhash": "1:3db4dd18999721e6", "word_count": 3543 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T16:37:18.171744+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "THE DEPARTMENT OF CENTRAL MANAGEMENT SERVICES (The Department of Children and Family Services), Petitioner, v. ILLINOIS STATE LABOR RELATIONS BOARD, Respondent and Cross-Respondent (American Federation of State, County, and Municipal Employees, Council 31, A F L-C I O, Respondent and Cross-Petitioner)." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE LYTTON\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nThis petition and cross-petition are before this court on administrative review of a decision and order entered by the Illinois State Labor Relations Board (Board) on July 16, 1992. (Illinois Department of Central Management Services (Department of Children & Family Services), 8 Pub. Employee Rep. (Ill.) par. 2037, No. S \u2014 RC\u201492\u201446 (Illinois State Labor Relations Board, July 16, 1992) (hereinafter 8 Pub. Employee Rep. (Ill.) par. 2037).) We must consider whether the Board erred in determining that certain employees of the State of Illinois, Department of Central Management Services (Department of Children and Family Services (DCFS) (employer)), were supervisors within the meaning of section 3(r) of the Illinois Public Labor Relations Act (Act) (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1989, ch. 48, par. 1603(r)). After a complete review of the record and the parties\u2019 arguments, we affirm.\nI. Background\nOn October 15, 1991, the respondent-cross-petitioner, American Federation of State, County and Municipal Employees, Council 31, AFL-CIO (AFSCME), petitioned the Board to hold a secret ballot election among child welfare supervisors (CWS\u2019s) of DCFS. The petition sought to add approximately 200 CWS\u2019s to the existing statewide bargaining unit. Formal hearings on the petition were held over seven days in November and December 1991.\nThe hearing officer issued a recommended decision and order finding that the CWS\u2019s were supervisors within the meaning of section 3(r) of the Act and dismissed AFSCME\u2019s petition. Applying the Board\u2019s prior interpretation of section 3(r), he found State supervisors exempt from the statutory requirement of devoting a \u201cpreponderance\u201d of time to supervisory activity. However, the hearing officer also noted the First District Appellate Court\u2019s opinion in American Federation of State, County & Municipal Employees, Council 31 v. Chief Judge of the Circuit Court (1991), 209 Ill. App. 3d 283, 568 N.E.2d 139, appeal denied (1991), 139 Ill. 2d 593, holding State supervisors were not exempt from the preponderance requirement. Thus, he made additional findings that \u201cdownstate\u201d CWS\u2019s met the preponderance requirement, while Cook County CWS\u2019s did not.\nBoth parties filed exceptions to the hearing officer\u2019s recommended decision and order. On July 16, 1992, the Board adopted the hearing officer\u2019s recommended decision, but modified it to reflect that it was bound by the first district\u2019s opinion in Chief Judge. Therefore, the Board concluded that the Cook County CWS\u2019s were not supervisors according to section 3(r) of the Act, because they did not spend a preponderance of their time engaged in supervision. On the other hand, the \u201cdownstate\u201d CWS\u2019s were supervisors under the Act because they did spend a preponderance of their time exercising their supervisory authority. The Board ordered an election for the Cook County CWS\u2019s, and they elected AFSCME as their bargaining representative.\nII. Legislative History\nThe origin of section 3(r) of the Act can be traced to Executive Order No. 73 \u2014 6, issued by then-Governor Daniel Walker. (1979 Ill. Laws 5155 (Executive Order 73 \u2014 6, issued by Governor Walker September 4, 1973).) This executive order granted collective-bargaining rights to most State of Illinois employees and established the Office of Collective Bargaining. Executive Order No. 73 \u2014 6 was continued by then-Govemor James R. Thompson until the effective date of the Act in 1984. (1984 Ill. Laws 4638 (Executive Order 84 \u2014 5, issued by the Governor August 20, 1984, revoking Executive Order 73 \u2014 6 and all rules and regulations promulgated thereunder).) One of the rules promulgated pursuant to the executive order defined the term \u201csupervisor.\u201d (Rules and Regulations of the Director of Personnel for Public Employee Collective Bargaining \u00a71.16.) This definition is substantially the same as that contained in section 3(r) of the Act. However, section 3(r) adds the requirement that a supervisor must engage in supervisory activity a preponderance of the time, referred to as the \u201cpreponderance\u201d requirement.\nWhen the Senate presented Governor Thompson with the original Senate Bill 536 (83d Ill. Gen. Assem., Senate Bill 536, 1983 Sess.), he returned the bill unsigned with an amendatory veto message. (Final Legis. Synopsis and Dig. of 1983 Sess. of the 83d Ill. Gen. Assem., Senate Bill 536 (Sept. 23, 1983), at 327, 329.) The language contained in section 3(r) of the Act originally read, \u201c[e]xcept with respect to police employment, the term \u2018supervisor\u2019 includes only those individuals who devote a preponderance of their employment time to exercising such authority.\u201d (83d Ill. Gen. Assem., Senate Bill 536, 1983 Sess.) The Governor recommended that the words \u201cState supervisors notwithstanding\u201d be added to the end of the sentence. The bill was amended by the legislature, and the language at issue was added. The bill was then passed by both the House and Senate and was signed into law by Governor Thompson (Pub. Act 83 \u2014 1012, eff. July 1, 1984 (1983 Ill. Laws 6830)). See Illinois Department of Central Management Services, 1 Pub. Employee Rep. (Ill.) par. 2025, Nos. S \u2014 UC\u20144, S \u2014 UC\u201420 (Illinois State Labor Relations Board October 23, 1985) (both Board opinion and appended hearing officer\u2019s recommended decision discuss legislative history of this language).\nIII. Discussion\nSection 3(r) of the Act contains four prongs that are employed by the Board to determine whether an employee is a supervisor. The statute as enacted, in relevant part, provides as follows:\n\u201c \u2018Supervisor\u2019 [(1)] is an employee whose principal work is substantially different from that of his subordinates and [(2)] who has authority, in the interest of the employer, to hire, transfer, suspend, lay off, recall, promote, discharge, direct, reward, or discipline employees, or to adjust their grievances, or to effectively recommend such action, [(3)] if the exercise of such authority is not of a merely routine or clerical nature, but requires the consistent use of independent judgment. [(4)] Except with respect to police employment, the term \u2018supervisor\u2019 includes only those individuals who devote a preponderance of their employment time to exercising such authority State supervisors notwithstanding.\u201d (Emphasis added.) Ill. Rev. Stat. 1989, ch. 48, par. 1603(r).\nThe \u201cpreponderance\u201d requirement was first construed by the Board in Illinois Department of Central Management Services, 1 Pub. Employee Rep. (Ill.) par. 2025, Nos. S \u2014 UC\u20144, S \u2014 UC\u201420 (Illinois State Labor Relations Board, Oct. 23, 1985). The Board refused to employ the \u201cpreponderance\u201d requirement against a State supervisor in Illinois Department of Central Management Services. It reasoned that the \u201cState supervisors notwithstanding\u201d language was added by an amendatory veto, and that a veto, by its very nature, must effect a change. The change, according to the Board, was to exempt State supervisors from the \u201cpreponderance\u201d requirement. The Board also reasoned that a literal reading of the \u201cpreponderance\u201d requirement with the clause \u201cState supervisors notwithstanding\u201d was less than completely clear. Instead of assigning the language at issue in section 3(r) of the Act its plain and ordinary meaning, the Board believed that under the common law rules of statutory construction, it was required to interpret the Act in a manner which would avoid rendering any word, clause or sentence meaningless or superfluous.\nThe Board also rejected the argument that comments made by the sponsor of the bill, then-Representative Alan J. Grieman, were an indication of the Governor\u2019s intent behind adding the \u201cState supervisors notwithstanding\u201d language. In essence, Grieman stated that there was a difference between supervisors in the private sector and in the public sector in that supervisors in the public sector are often given honorific titles without any real authority over other employees\u2019 wages, hours and working conditions. (See Chief Judge, 209 Ill. App. 3d at 288-89, 568 N.E.2d at 143.) The Board reasoned that the comments were general statements concerning the recommended changes of the Governor. For the above reasons, the Board found that the clause \u201cState supervisors notwithstanding\u201d was added to exempt State supervisors from the \u201cpreponderance\u201d requirement.\nThis court is guided by the primary rule of statutory interpretation, to which all other canons and rules are subordinate: to ascertain and effectuate the true meaning and intent of the legislature. (Village of Buffalo v. Illinois Commerce Comm\u2019n (1989), 180 Ill. App. 3d 591, 595, 536 N.E.2d 438, 440.) It is fundamental that a court must give the legislative language at issue its plain and ordinary meaning. If the statutory language is plain, clear and unambiguous, and if a court can ascertain the intent from it, the language will be given effect by the court without resorting to other aids for construction. Buffalo, 180 Ill. App. 3d at 595, 536 N.E.2d at 440-41.\nWe agree with the first district\u2019s opinion in Chief Judge that the plain and ordinary meaning of the word \u201cnotwithstanding\u201d is unambiguous, and clearly does not exempt State supervisors from the \u201cpreponderance\u201d requirement. We also find that a literal reading of the statutory language at issue is that the term \u201csupervisor\u201d includes only those individuals who devote a preponderance of their employment time to exercising such authority in spite of their status as State supervisors. Chief Judge, 209 Ill. App. 3d at 289, 568 N.E.2d at 143.\nThe argument of the employer and the Board that we should construe the plain and unambiguous language of the statute is without merit. Because we have assigned the \u201cnotwithstanding\u201d clause its plain and unambiguous meaning, it is unnecessary to resort to any other rules of construction. Buffalo, 180 Ill. App. 3d at 595, 536 N.E.2d at 441.\nThe employer and the Board\u2019s interpretation of Governor Thompson\u2019s amendatory veto is misguided. The Governor\u2019s amendatory veto power was exercised pursuant to article IV, section 9(e), of the Illinois Constitution of 1970, where he is authorized to make \u201cspecific recommendations for change to the house in which it originated.\u201d (Ill. Const. 1970, art. IV, \u00a79(e).) While the exact boundaries of the Governor\u2019s power under this section have not been totally defined, a Governor may not substitute a completely new bill (People ex rel. Klinger v. Howlett (1972), 50 Ill. 2d 242, 249, 278 N.E.2d 84, 88), or change the fundamental purpose of the legislation. (Continental Illinois National Bank & Trust Co. v. Zagel (1979), 78 Ill. 2d 387, 398, 401 N.E.2d 491, 496.) The Governor\u2019s amendatory veto power may make changes that constitute minor enhancements which relate to clarity, fairness or the practical requirements of the legislation. People ex rel. City of Canton v. Crouch (1980), 79 Ill. 2d 356, 376, 403 N.E.2d 242, 251.\nWhen the Governor considers a bill, he is acting in a legislative capacity, and for that purpose, he is a part of the legislative department. (Williams v. Kerner (1963), 30 Ill. 2d 11, 14, 195 N.E.2d 680, 682.) If the Governor exercises his amendatory veto powers and returns a bill to the house in which it originated with specific recommendations for change, the legislature must take additional action. The bill is \u201cpassed\u201d when both houses of the legislature have voted to accept the Governor\u2019s recommendations for change. (Mulligan v. Joliet Regional Port District (1988), 123 Ill. 2d 303, 316, 527 N.E.2d 1264, 1270-71.) Any recommended changes by the Governor that are accepted by the legislature must be. interpreted as being part of the legislature\u2019s intent behind the statute, so long as the changes do not disturb the basic purpose of the legislation. The courts must review whether the amendatory veto changes disturb the basic purpose of the legislation or alter the system prescribed for carrying that purpose out. County of Kane v. Carlson (1987), 116 Ill. 2d 186, 216, 507 N.E.2d 482, 494; see Klinger, 50 Ill. 2d at 249, 278 N.E.2d at 88.\nWe find that the Governor\u2019s recommended changes simply clarify the fact that State supervisors are subject to the \u201cpreponderance\u201d requirement of section 3(r) of the Act. The legislative intent is ascertained by a plain and unambiguous reading of the statute at issue. The Board\u2019s decision and order are affirmed on these grounds.\nIn passing, we note that public statements made by legislators who are in a position to clarify legislative meaning carry weight and are helpful to the courts in determining legislative intent. (Maiter v. Chicago Board of Education (1980), 82 Ill. 2d 373, 385-86, 415 N.E.2d 1034, 1039.) Therefore, the Board and employer\u2019s argument that Representative Grieman\u2019s comments regarding public sector supervisors were not relevant is not persuasive. See Chief Judge, 209 Ill. App. 3d at 289, 568 N.E.2d at 143.\nWe turn next to the issue raised by AFSCME on its cross-petition, whether the Board erred in its interpretation of the term \u201cpreponderance.\u201d The Board defines \u201cpreponderance\u201d in the context of section 3(r) of the Act as meaning that supervisors must spend a \u201csignificant allotment\u201d of their time exercising their supervisory authority. According to the Board and the employer, \u201csignificant allotment\u201d involves a comparison of three or more activities, including supervisory activities, and will be satisfied if the supervisory activities amount to a \u201csignificant allotment\u201d of the supervisor\u2019s time. (In a situation involving three activities, a \u201csignificant allotment\u201d of supervisory activities would amount to more than 33.3%.) AFSCME contends that \u201cpreponderance\u201d means that supervisors must spend a \u201cmajority,\u201d or more than 50%, of their time engaged in supervisory activities.\nAFSCME argues that this issue is a matter of first impression in this State and that there is a split between the Local Labor Relations Board (Local Board), the Educational Labor Relations Board (Educational Board) and the Board construing identical language in a related act. (See Ill. Rev. Stat. 1989, ch. 48, par. 1702(g).) The Local Board and the Educational Board construe \u201cpreponderance\u201d to mean that supervisors must spend a \u201cmajority,\u201d or more than 50%, of their time engaged in supervisory activities. AFSCME also argues that the dictionary definition of \u201cpreponderance\u201d and the holdings of this court support the construction of the Local Board and the Educational Board.\nAgain we are guided by the primary rule of statutory interpretation, that is, to ascertain and effectuate the true meaning and intent of the legislature. (Buffalo, 180 Ill. App. 3d at 595, 536 N.E.2d at 440.) This is accomplished by giving the legislative language at issue its plain and ordinary meaning, and if a court can ascertain the intent from it, the language will be given effect by the court without resorting to other aids for construction. Buffalo, 180 Ill. App. 3d at 595, 536 N.E.2d at 440-41.\nThe dictionary definition of \u201cpreponderance\u201d is \u201ca superiority or excess in number or quantity[;] *** majority.\u201d (Webster\u2019s Third New International Dictionary 1791 (1976).) Webster\u2019s defines \u201cmajority\u201d as \u201ca number greater than half of a total.\u201d (Webster\u2019s Third New International Dictionary 1363 (1976).) A literal reading of the language at issue is that the term \u201csupervisor\u201d includes only those individuals who devote a majority of their employment time to exercising such authority. The purpose behind the four prongs of section 3(r) of the Act is to determine whether an employee is a supervisor. Therefore, the only inquiry that the Board is concerned with is whether the individual is a supervisor or an employee a majority of his or her employment time. We hold that the Board erred as a matter of law in requiring a showing that the employee was engaged in supervisory activities a \u201csignificant allotment\u201d of the time. This construction of the term \u201cpreponderance\u201d is contrary to the plain and ordinary meaning of the term. The Board erred in its construction of the term \u201cpreponderance.\u201d Cf. Black\u2019s Law Dictionary 1064 (5th ed. 1979) (defining \u201cpreponderance of the evidence\u201d); Moss-American, Inc. v. Illinois Fair Employment Practices Comm\u2019n (1974), 22 Ill. App. 3d 248, 259, 317 N.E.2d 343, 351 (defining \u201cpreponderance of the evidence\u201d as \u201cthe greater weight of the evidence, not necessarily in numbers of witnesses, but in merit and worth that which has more evidence for it than against it is said to be proven by a preponderance\u201d).\nThe Board attempts to justify its adoption of the \u201csignificant allotment\u201d standard in its decision in City of Burbank, 1 Pub. Employee Rep. (Ill.) par. 2008, No. S \u2014 RC\u201445 (Illinois State Labor Relations Board, June 6, 1985). In City of Burbank, the Board adopted the standards and rationale of the hearing officer citing similar language from a Federal statute (5 U.S.C. \u00a77103(a)(10) (1982)), which contained the \u201cpreponderance\u201d standard. The hearing officer relied on two Federal Labor Relations Authority (FLRA) cases to support his position that \u201cthe most significant allotment\u201d of an employee\u2019s time, as opposed to more than 50% of employment time, was the appropriate standard. Veterans Administration Hospital, Tucson, Arizona (1980), 4 F.L.R.A. No. 21, at 124; see also Veterans Administration Medical Center, Fayetteville, North Carolina (1982), 8 F.L.R.A. No. 115, at 660.\nA review of these FLRA cases, however, does not support the Board\u2019s proposition of law that the FLRA utilizes a \u201csignificant allotment\u201d standard. In Veterans Administration Hospital, Tucson, Arizona, the FLRA did not address or discuss the meaning of the terms \u201cpreponderance\u201d or \u201csignificant allotment.\u201d In fact, the issue involved in this case was whether the employee performed supervisory functions more often than nonsupervisory functions. In Veterans Administration Medical Center, Fayetteville, North Carolina, the FLRA did address an issue involving the interpretation of the term \u201cpreponderance.\u201d FLRA framed the critical inquiry under section 7103(a)(10) of the Federal Labor-Management and Employee Relations Act (5 U.S.C. \u00a77103(a)(10) (1982)) as \u201cwhether a head nurse is primarily a supervisor or primarily a rank-and-file employee during a majority of her employment time.\u201d (Emphasis added.) (Veterans Administration Medical Center, Fayetteville, North Carolina, 8 F.L.R.A. No. 115, at 660.) This inquiry is consistent with our analysis. Therefore, we conclude that the Board\u2019s reliance on these two FLRA cases was erroneous and does not support its application of the \u201csignificant allotment\u201d standard.\nThe Board and the employer next argue that City of Freeport v. Illinois State Labor Relations Board (1990), 135 Ill. 2d 499, 554 N.E.2d 155, supports their position that the Board did not err in employing its \u201csignificant allotment\u201d interpretation of the term \u201cpreponderance.\u201d They argue that the supreme court\u2019s assumption of the \u201csignificant allotment\u201d standard is an implicit acceptance of the Board\u2019s construction. We disagree.\nAlthough the court in Freeport assumed the Board\u2019s construction of \u201cpreponderance\u201d for the purpose of its discussion, the issue presented to the court was whether the Board erred in its application of section 3(r) of the Act to the City of Freeport\u2019s police department and the Village of Wheeling\u2019s fire department. (Freeport, 135 Ill. 2d at 503, 554 N.E.2d at 158.) Freeport did not discuss or confront the meaning of the term \u201cpreponderance,\u201d and it cannot be considered precedent for our decision.\nWe turn next to the remaining issues raised by AFSCME and the employer. AFSCME argues that the Board\u2019s holding that the \u201cdownstate\u201d CWS\u2019s were supervisors was against the manifest weight of the evidence, while the employer argues that the Board\u2019s holding that the Cook County CWS\u2019s were not supervisors under section 3(r) of the Act was against the manifest weight of the evidence.\nJudicial review of the Board\u2019s decisions is governed by the Administrative Review Law. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1989, ch. 110, par. 3 \u2014 101 et seq.) An agency\u2019s findings and conclusions on questions of fact shall be considered prima facie true and correct. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1989, ch. 110, par. 3 \u2014 110.) Only where the reviewing court determines that the agency\u2019s findings of fact are against the manifest weight of the evidence, and it is clearly evident that the agency should have reached the contrary conclusion, will the agency\u2019s findings be reversed. Freeport, 135 Ill. 2d at 507, 554 N.E.2d at 159.\nWe have reviewed the factual findings of the hearing officer as adopted by the Board and find that they are not against the manifest weight of the evidence. The hearing officer found that the \u201cdownstate\u201d CWS\u2019s spent between 65% and 90% of their time engaged in supervisory functions. This finding clearly satisfies the \u201cpreponderance\u201d requirement of section 3(r) of the Act.\nThe hearing officer found that the Cook County CWS\u2019s did not meet the \u201cpreponderance\u201d requirement because they did not spend a \u201csignificant allotment\u201d of their time engaged in supervisory activities. The hearing officer did not make a finding based on a percentage. However, because we have already concluded that \u201csignificant allotment\u201d is a lesser measure than the \u201cmajority of time\u201d standard, we find that the Cook County CWS\u2019s did not meet the \u201cpreponderance\u201d requirement.\nThe Board\u2019s findings as to the \u201cdownstate\u201d and Cook County CWS\u2019s are affirmed.\nThe decision and order of the Board is affirmed.\nMcCUSKEY, P.J., and BRESLIN, J., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE LYTTON" } ], "attorneys": [ "Gene Vernon, of Central Management Services, of Springfield, and Alan M. Levin (argued), Jill P. O\u2019Brien, and James R. Jenkins, all of Laner, Mu-chin, Dombrow, Becker, Levin & Tominberg, Ltd., of Chicago, for petitioner.", "Roland W. Burris, Attorney General, of Springfield (Rosalyn B. Kaplan, Solicitor General, and Alison E. O\u2019Hara, Assistant Attorney General (argued), of Chicago, of counsel), for respondent Illinois State Labor Relations Board.", "Jacob Pomeranz (argued), of Cornfield & Feldman, of Chicago, for other respondent." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "THE DEPARTMENT OF CENTRAL MANAGEMENT SERVICES (The Department of Children and Family Services), Petitioner, v. ILLINOIS STATE LABOR RELATIONS BOARD, Respondent and Cross-Respondent (American Federation of State, County, and Municipal Employees, Council 31, A F L-C I O, Respondent and Cross-Petitioner).\nFourth District\nNo. 4-92-0702\nArgued May 19, 1993.\nOpinion filed August 26, 1993.\nGene Vernon, of Central Management Services, of Springfield, and Alan M. Levin (argued), Jill P. O\u2019Brien, and James R. Jenkins, all of Laner, Mu-chin, Dombrow, Becker, Levin & Tominberg, Ltd., of Chicago, for petitioner.\nRoland W. Burris, Attorney General, of Springfield (Rosalyn B. Kaplan, Solicitor General, and Alison E. O\u2019Hara, Assistant Attorney General (argued), of Chicago, of counsel), for respondent Illinois State Labor Relations Board.\nJacob Pomeranz (argued), of Cornfield & Feldman, of Chicago, for other respondent." }, "file_name": "0740-01", "first_page_order": 758, "last_page_order": 768 }