{ "id": 2918683, "name": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. REGINALD SHANKLIN, Defendant-Appellant", "name_abbreviation": "People v. Shanklin", "decision_date": "1993-09-16", "docket_number": "No. 5-92-0085", "first_page": "689", "last_page": "698", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "250 Ill. App. 3d 689" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "543 N.E.2d 1366", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1371" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "188 Ill. App. 3d 95", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2692311 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "103" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/188/0095-01" ] }, { "cite": "561 N.E.2d 82", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1989, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "95" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "203 Ill. App. 3d 401", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2580044 ], "year": 1989, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "418" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/203/0401-01" ] }, { "cite": "568 N.E.2d 895", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "pin_cites": [ { "page": "899" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "142 Ill. 2d 548", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3236817 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "557" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/142/0548-01" ] }, { "cite": "606 N.E.2d 1186", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "153 Ill. 2d 335", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 4738160 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/153/0335-01" ] }, { "cite": "583 N.E.2d 589", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "596" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "222 Ill. App. 3d 58", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5262003 ], "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "69" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/222/0058-01" ] }, { "cite": "467 U.S. 431", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6201711 ], "weight": 6, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "444" }, { "page": "387" }, { "page": "2509" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/467/0431-01" ] }, { "cite": "410 N.E.2d 861", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "865" }, { "page": "865" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "81 Ill. 2d 513", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5481877 ], "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "518" }, { "page": "521" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/81/0513-01" ] }, { "cite": "296 N.E.2d 856", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "54 Ill. 2d 280", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2933485 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/54/0280-01" ] }, { "cite": "549 N.E.2d 1315", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1323" }, { "page": "1323" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "193 Ill. App. 3d 161", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2497581 ], "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "171" }, { "page": "171" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/193/0161-01" ] }, { "cite": "107 S. Ct. 1330", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "S. Ct.", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "94 L. Ed. 2d 181", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed. 2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "479 U.S. 1101", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6559402, 6559372, 6559345, 6559450, 6559324 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/479/1101-04", "/us/479/1101-03", "/us/479/1101-02", "/us/479/1101-05", "/us/479/1101-01" ] }, { "cite": "497 N.E.2d 995", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1987, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "999" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "113 Ill. 2d 83", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3172916 ], "year": 1987, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "94" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/113/0083-01" ] }, { "cite": "522 N.E.2d 1124", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1131" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "122 Ill. 2d 176", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5550081 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "186" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/122/0176-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 864, "char_count": 20148, "ocr_confidence": 0.798, "pagerank": { "raw": 5.807366253629069e-08, "percentile": 0.361640775195774 }, "sha256": "14feb70968f8a970c9fdee95f72e6245d2ad1af0e5e1436c704585e1389f8566", "simhash": "1:bf24d88e5b4d845e", "word_count": 3376 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T16:41:36.340475+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. REGINALD SHANKLIN, Defendant-Appellant." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE MAAG\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nAfter a jury trial, the defendant, Reginald Shanklin, was convicted in the circuit court of St. Clair County of aggravated criminal sexual assault (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1991, ch. 38, par. 12 \u2014 14(b)(1)) and was sentenced to 20 years\u2019 imprisonment.\nThe issues raised on appeal are whether:\n(1) the trial court erred in refusing to suppress the in-court identification of defendant by the 12-year-old victim where the in-court identification was based upon a suggestive lineup;\n(2) the trial court erred in denying defendant\u2019s motion to suppress evidence seized during an illegal search of defendant\u2019s home; and\n(3) the trial court erred in allowing the jury to hear inadmissible hearsay, thus denying defendant a fair trial.\nThe 12-year-old victim, E.W., testified that on the evening of April 11, 1991, she followed her 15-year-old sister, R.W., and R.W.\u2019s friend, Tomika. The older girls were walking to Tomika\u2019s home. The defendant was standing in front of Daisy\u2019s Flower Shop and engaged E.W. in conversation. Defendant asked E.W. if R.W. was her sister and whether E.W. would give R.W. his telephone number. When E.W. answered in the affirmative to both questions, the defendant went into a neighboring gray and white house with a blue roof and returned with a piece of paper.\nThe defendant, at E.W.\u2019s request, placed the paper on the ground and walked away. E.W. picked up the paper, and as the defendant rushed toward her, she attempted to flee by running into the street. E.W. testified that the defendant grabbed her by the back of the neck, slapped her because she struggled, and forced her into the gray and white house near Daisy\u2019s Flower Shop.\nE.W. noticed that the house lacked a screen or storm door over the brown front door. The first room she entered contained a couch, and the second room had no furnishings except two large red pillows, carpeting, and a sheet over the window. The third room contained some blankets and miscellaneous items but no furniture.\nE.W. testified that the defendant obtained a blanket, rope, and a roll of gray tape from the contents of the third room. He spread the blanket on the floor in the room with the red pillows and instructed E.W. to be seated on it. He placed the gray tape over her mouth. He ordered E.W. to remove her clothing, and he removed his own. The defendant then penetrated her vagina with his penis.\nDuring the assault someone knocked on the front door. The defendant stopped, got up, and got dressed. He told E.W. to dress, and after looking out the front door, he pushed E.W. out of the house. E.W. ran all the way home and reported the assault to her mother. The mother immediately contacted the East St. Louis police and took the child to the hospital. Before E.W. was taken to the hospital, R.W. questioned her sister regarding the identity of her attacker and the location of the assault.\nR.W. testified that she had not known that E.W. was following her. R.W. related that on the day before the assault she had talked to a boy at Daisy\u2019s Flower Shop and that boy had asked her her name and where she lived. She had told the boy her name but refused to tell him where she lived. She observed the boy enter a gray and white house with a brown door two doors from Daisy\u2019s on the same side of the street.\nR.W. testified that E.W., before being transported to the hospital, described her assailant as being dark and tall and sporting a high-low haircut. E.W. also told R.W. that the assault had occurred near Daisy\u2019s Flower Shop. R.W. immediately thought of the boy who had approached her the day before. She directed the police to a gray and white house at 1336 Market where she had observed the boy she spoke with the day before the assault. The police officers knocked on the door at 1336 Market and asked the defendant to walk out onto the porch. R.W. identified the defendant as the same person that had approached her the day before.\nDetective James Mister testified that on April 11 he and Inspector Lester Anderson were directed by R.W. to 1336 Market. Detective Mister testified that after R.W. identified the defendant as being the boy she spoke with the day before, and observing that the defendant matched the description E.W. had given of her assailant, the detective radioed the police station and asked E.W. to describe the house where she was assaulted. Detective Mister testified that the detectives could see from the porch that the furnishings of the gray and white house located at 1336 Market matched E.W.\u2019s description of the location of the assault. Detective Mister testified that from the porch he could see red pillows against a back wall of the bedroom. E.W. described her assailant as having a \u201chigh-low haircut\u201d and having been dressed in a hooded sweatshirt and sweatpants which, according to Detective Mister\u2019s testimony, was the style of defendant\u2019s hair and the type of clothes the defendant was wearing.\nThe defendant was placed under arrest and handcuffed. The police officers entered the house, and once inside, they saw a yellow blanket in another room. They searched the house, but could not find any additional items. A crime scene technician arrived and checked the pillows and blanket into evidence. No one else was present in the house. The defendant did not give the detectives permission to look around, but neither did he object. He did not sign a consent to search his home. At trial the crime scene technician identified the red pillows and yellow blanket as the items he took from defendant\u2019s home. They had not been examined by a forensic scientist. He also stated that he did not think that the pillows could be seen from the front porch of the home, although he was uncertain.\nAt the time of defendant\u2019s arrest, Detective Sandy Muckenstrum was interviewing E.W. Detective Muckenstrum testified that subsequent to the interview, she placed E.W. in her automobile and asked the child to direct her to the place where she was assaulted. E.W. directed Detective Muckenstrum to 1336 Market. Detective Muckenstrum located defendant\u2019s wife, and with her permission together they entered and searched 1336 Market on April 13. Detective Muckenstrum recovered a ball of rope or twine from the residence. Mrs. Shanklin testified at defendant\u2019s trial that the red pillows could not be seen from the front porch.\nAfter defendant\u2019s arrest, he was transported to the East St. Louis jail. The following day, defendant was placed in a lineup with five other guests of the jail. E.W. viewed the lineup and identified defendant as her assailant.\nOn August 5, 1991, defendant filed motions to suppress the physical evidence seized from his home and the lineup identification. At the suppression hearing held on September 6, 1991, Detective Muckenstrum testified that the defendant was the only lineup participant with a high-low haircut, wearing a hooded sweatshirt and sweatpants. The motion to suppress the lineup identification of defendant was granted, but defendant\u2019s motion to suppress the physical evidence seized from defendant\u2019s home was denied.\nOn September 4, 1991, the State filed a motion for admission of hearsay evidence of the commission of a sexual act on a child under the age of 13, pursuant to statute (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1991, ch. 38, par. 115 \u2014 10). The trial court ordered a hearing to determine the circumstances under which E.W.\u2019s statements were made. The hearing was held on September 9, and the trial court limited E.W.\u2019s mother\u2019s testimony.\nThe defendant did not take the stand. The jury heard medical and forensic evidence that semen was found in E.W.\u2019s vagina and that defendant by virtue of his blood type could have contributed the seminal material.\nThe defendant argues that he was denied a fair trial because the trial court erred in allowing the victim to identify the defendant at trial subsequent to a suggestive lineup at which the victim identified the defendant as her assailant. The State responds that the defendant failed to raise this issue in his post-trial motion and, therefore, the issue is waived. The State relies upon our supreme court\u2019s decision of People v. Enoch (1988), 122 Ill. 2d 176, 186, 522 N.E.2d 1124, 1131, which holds that to preserve alleged errors, the errors must be both objected to at trial and raised in a post-trial motion.\nIn his reply brief, defendant raises for the first time the issue of the plain error rule\u2019s application (134 Ill. 2d R. 615(a)). In People v. Szabo (1986), 113 Ill. 2d 83, 94, 497 N.E.2d 995, 999, cert. denied (1987), 479 U.S. 1101, 94 L. Ed. 2d 181, 107 S. Ct. 1330, the supreme court described the plain error rule as a narrow and limited exception to the general waiver rule. The purpose of the plain error rule is to correct serious errors of such magnitude that the accused was denied a fair trial. (People v. Sommerville (1990), 193 Ill. App. 3d 161, 171, 549 N.E.2d 1315, 1323.) The doctrine is applied in criminal cases only if the evidence is closely balanced or the alleged error is so serious that it deprives a defendant of a fair trial. (Sommerville, 193 Ill. App. 3d at 171, 549 N.E.2d at 1323.) Unfortunately, defendant failed to raise the argument of the plain error rule\u2019s application until his reply brief, in violation of Supreme Court Rule 341(e)(7), which provides that \u201c[pjoints not argued are waived and shall not be raised in the reply brief, in oral argument, or on petition for rehearing.\u201d (134 Ill. 2d R. 341(e)(7).) Supreme Court Rule 341 is made applicable to criminal appeals by Supreme Court Rule 612.134 Ill. 2d R. 612.\nEven if we were to reach the merits, we note that defendant\u2019s position is groundless. Our independent examination of the record reveals neither a close balance of the evidence nor any obvious prejudice that would merit departure from the general waiver rule (134 Ill. 2d R. 341(e)(7)). See People v. Pickett (1973), 54 Ill. 2d 280, 296 N.E.2d 856.\nIn People v. McTush (1980), 81 Ill. 2d 513, 518, 410 N.E.2d 861, 865, the supreme court held that where a lineup has been found to be impermissibly suggestive, a witness may still be permitted to make an in-court identification where it is established clearly and convincingly from the totality of the circumstances that the witness is making the identification based upon memory of the crime. The court enumerated factors to be considered which include: the witness\u2019 opportunity to view the perpetrator at the time of the crime; the witness\u2019 degree of attention; the accuracy of the witness\u2019 prior description of the perpetrator; the level of certainty demonstrated by the witness at the confrontation; the length of the time between the crime and the confrontation; and any acquaintance with the suspect prior to the crime. McTush, 81 Ill. 2d at 521, 410 N.E.2d at 865.\nThe record reveals that the State established clearly and convincingly an independent origin for E.W.\u2019s in-court identification of defendant as her assailant. At trial, E.W. testified as to her recollection of the events before, during, and after the sexual assault. E.W. extensively testified as to her opportunity to view and observe the assailant while they spoke on the sidewalk, after he forced her into the house, and during the sexual assault. With respect to the witness\u2019 degree of attention, the record reflects that E.W. gave extensive descriptions of the house and the furnishings of the house where the sexual assault took place. E.W. further gave a consistent description of the assailant to her mother, sister, and police and at trial. From the record it does not appear that E.W. was uncertain of her in-court identification of the defendant as her assailant. Lastly, the trial took place five months after the sexual assault. Accordingly, we believe that the trial court did not err in denying defendant\u2019s motion to suppress E.W.\u2019s in-court identification of the defendant.\nDefendant also alleges that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress the physical evidence, consisting of a yellow blanket and two red pillows, which were seized from his home without a warrant. The State admits in its brief that the record does not reveal any exigent circumstances requiring the police officers to enter defendant\u2019s home without a warrant. The State argues that the \u201cinevitable discovery exception\u201d to the exclusionary rule as recognized in Nix v. Williams (1984), 467 U.S. 431, 444, 81 L. Ed. 2d 377, 387, 104 S. Ct. 2501, 2509, is controlling.\nThe inevitable discovery exception to the exclusionary rule provides that where the record shows by a preponderance of the evidence that the challenged information or evidence would have been ultimately or inevitably discovered by lawful means, the evidence is admissible. (Nix v. Williams (1984), 467 U.S. 431, 81 L. Ed. 2d 377, 104 S. Ct. 2501.) For the inevitable discovery doctrine to apply, three criteria must be met: (1) the condition of the evidence must be the same when found illegally as it would have been when found legally; (2) the evidence would have been found by an independent line of investigation untainted by the illegal conduct; and (3) the independent line of investigation must have already begun when the evidence was discovered illegally. People v. Winsett (1991), 222 Ill. App. 3d 58, 69, 583 N.E.2d 589, 596, rev\u2019d on other grounds (1992), 153 Ill. 2d 335, 606 N.E.2d 1186.\nThe defendant contends that the inevitable discovery exception is inapplicable because the third factor as outlined above is absent. Defendant argues that no independent \u201clegitimate search\u201d had begun at the time the red pillows and yellow blanket were seized by the police, and therefore, the physical evidence should have been suppressed. We note that an independent \u201clegitimate search\u201d is not required, and it is apparent from the record that an independent line of investigation, as required, had begun at the time the police officers seized the red pillows and yellow blanket.\nE.W. was being interviewed by Detective Muckenstrum at the time the other officers arrested defendant and seized the physical evidence from defendant\u2019s home. Subsequent to the interview, Detective Muckenstrum placed the child in her automobile and asked the child to direct her to the house where she was assaulted. Detective Muckenstrum testified that E.W. directed her to 1336 Market. Detective Muckenstrum located defendant\u2019s wife, and on April 13, 1991, with defendant\u2019s wife\u2019s permission, together they searched the residence at 1336 Market. Neither the defendant\u2019s wife nor the defendant, who was in custody, was living at the residence during the intervening time. If the officers had not seized the yellow blanket and red pillows at the time of defendant\u2019s arrest, they would have been discovered at the time of Detective Muckenstrum\u2019s subsequent legal search. The trial court did not err in refusing to suppress the red pillows and yellow blanket.\nIgnoring for a moment the inevitable discovery doctrine, we believe that even if it was error not to suppress the physical evidence seized, that error was harmless. No forensic testing was performed upon the items, and thus only the pillows and blanket themselves were introduced into evidence. Detective Mister testified that he observed the red pillows from the front porch. From that lawful vantage point, Detective Mister could and did testify that red pillows were observed in defendant\u2019s home. The pillows\u2019 actual introduction into evidence could not in our belief have significantly contributed to defendant\u2019s conviction.\nThe yellow blanket is more troublesome as it was not observed by the police from a vantage point outside the home. Given E.W.\u2019s inability to relate the color of the blanket on which the assault took place, as well as the fact no forensic tests took place on the yellow blanket introduced, and further, that E.W. was not asked to identify the yellow blanket, we believe that the introduction of the yellow blanket was also, at worst, harmless error. As defense counsel brought out during the trial, the yellow blanket was admittedly taken from defendant\u2019s home. Yet that was the only fact established regarding the yellow blanket.\nLastly, defendant contends that he was denied a fair trial because R.W. was allowed to testify as to the description E.W. gave of her attacker and further was allowed to testify to the alleged conclusion that defendant was the assailant. Defendant argues first that the statements were inadmissible as hearsay and prior consistent statements and, second, that R.W.\u2019s conclusion that defendant was the assailant intruded upon the ultimate issue of fact presented to the jury, namely, whether defendant was the assailant.\nWhile it is true that \u201c[hjearsay evidence is an out-of-court statement offered to prove the truth of the matter asserted[ ] and is generally inadmissible unless it falls within an exception\u201d (People v. Lawler (1991), 142 Ill. 2d 548, 557, 568 N.E.2d 895, 899), such an exception is present in the case before us. In his brief, the defendant fails to recognize or address the statutory exception allowing the admission of hearsay evidence of the commission of sexual acts on children under 13 years of age. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1991, ch. 38, par. 115 \u2014 10.) The statute provides:\n\u201c(a) In a prosecution for a sexual act perpetrated upon a child under the age of 13, *** the following evidence shall be admitted as an exception to the hearsay rule:\n***\n(2) testimony of an out of court statement made by such child describing any complaint of such act or matter or detail pertaining to any act which is an element of an offense which is the subject of a prosecution for a sexual act perpetrated upon a child.\u201d (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1991, ch. 38, par. 115 \u2014 10.)\nPrior to trial, the State made a motion for admission of hearsay evidence pursuant to this statutory exception. After the required hearing, the trial court granted the motion; the court only limited the content of E.W.\u2019s mother\u2019s testimony.\nDefendant argues that R.W.\u2019s testimony regarding the description E.W. gave of her assailant does not fall within the statutory exception because it was not an identification, but rather a mere description, and the description was general in nature. \u201c \u2018Clearly, an identification of the perpetrator of an \u201cact\u201d is a \u201cdetail pertaining\u201d to that act.\u2019 \u201d (People v. Priola (1990), 203 Ill. App. 3d 401, 418, 561 N.E.2d 82, 95, quoting People v. Morton (1989), 188 Ill. App. 3d 95, 103, 543 N.E.2d 1366, 1371.) We see little distinction between an \u201cidentification\u201d by a child victim and a \u201cdescription\u201d by a child victim. A description, like an identification of the perpetrator of an act, is a detail pertaining to that act. To hold otherwise would defeat the purpose of the statute and allow testimony in only those cases where the children are familiar with their assailant and able to identify the assailant.\nFinally, the defendant contends that admitting R.W.\u2019s conclusion that the defendant was the assailant intruded upon the jury\u2019s role as fact finder. We disagree. Contrary to defendant\u2019s assertions, the record does not reflect that R.W. decided, based upon E.W.\u2019s description of the assailant and the location of the attack, that she knew E.W.\u2019s assailant. Rather, the record reflects that R.W. led the police to the boy she had observed the day before who matched E.W.\u2019s description and was observed in the vicinity of the location of the attack. We believe that R.W.\u2019s testimony did not intrude upon the jury\u2019s duty to determine if defendant was the assailant.\nFor the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the circuit court is affirmed.\nAffirmed.\nCHAPMAN, P.J., and LEWIS, J., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE MAAG" } ], "attorneys": [ "Daniel M. Kirwan and Rita K. Peterson, both of State Appellate Defender\u2019s Office, of Mt. Vernon, for appellant.", "Robert Haida, State\u2019s Attorney, of Belleville (Norbert J. Goetten, Stephen E. Norris, and Rebecca Sanders, all of State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor\u2019s Office, of counsel), for the People." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. REGINALD SHANKLIN, Defendant-Appellant.\nFifth District\nNo. 5 \u2014 92\u20140085\nOpinion filed September 16, 1993.\nDaniel M. Kirwan and Rita K. Peterson, both of State Appellate Defender\u2019s Office, of Mt. Vernon, for appellant.\nRobert Haida, State\u2019s Attorney, of Belleville (Norbert J. Goetten, Stephen E. Norris, and Rebecca Sanders, all of State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor\u2019s Office, of counsel), for the People." }, "file_name": "0689-01", "first_page_order": 707, "last_page_order": 716 }