{ "id": 2961095, "name": "MADISON MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. UNIVERSAL UNDERWRITERS GROUP et al., Defendants-Appellants (Helen Nagy et al., Defendants-Appellees; Jason E. Dorris et al., Defendants)", "name_abbreviation": "Madison Mutual Insurance v. Universal Underwriters Group", "decision_date": "1993-09-24", "docket_number": "No. 5\u201492\u20140571", "first_page": "13", "last_page": "17", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "251 Ill. App. 3d 13" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "578 N.E.2d 926", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "pin_cites": [ { "page": "930" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "144 Ill. 2d 64", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5592135 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "74" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/144/0064-01" ] }, { "cite": "607 N.E.2d 1204", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1212" }, { "page": "1212" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "154 Ill. 2d 90", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 4820940 ], "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "108" }, { "page": "108" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/154/0090-01" ] }, { "cite": "406 N.E.2d 131", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "pin_cites": [ { "page": "133" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "84 Ill. App. 3d 713", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3207661 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "715" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/84/0713-01" ] }, { "cite": "480 N.E.2d 533", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1980, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "535" }, { "page": "535" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "134 Ill. App. 3d 349", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3637327 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1980, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "351" }, { "page": "351" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/134/0349-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 452, "char_count": 8964, "ocr_confidence": 0.789, "pagerank": { "raw": 2.4763207860587035e-07, "percentile": 0.8070657787384515 }, "sha256": "5809dfbbcd51cc67510468459e77a780af5b5e3bf57cd50cf502d4e32472ec15", "simhash": "1:bef50cce5f4c85c4", "word_count": 1474 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T16:22:05.264174+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "MADISON MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. UNIVERSAL UNDERWRITERS GROUP et al., Defendants-Appellants (Helen Nagy et al., Defendants-Appellees; Jason E. Dorris et al., Defendants)." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "PRESIDING JUSTICE CHAPMAN\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nJason Dorris was driving a loaner car owned by Wood River Ford while his parents\u2019 car was being serviced, and he was involved in an accident with Helen Nagy. Dorris is insured under his father\u2019s automobile policy issued by Madison Mutual Insurance Company (Madison Mutual). Wood River Ford has coverage with Universal Underwriters Group (Universal). Madison Mutual sought a declaratory judgment of the rights and liabilities of the parties with respect to the insurance policies and a declaration that the Universal policy affords primary coverage as a result of the accident. The trial court ruled that the Universal policy affords primary coverage and that Madison Mutual\u2019s insurance policy affords excess coverage. Universal and Wood River Ford appeal.\nBefore reaching the substantive issue, we must first determine whether this court has jurisdiction. The Nagys question appellate jurisdiction because the trial court\u2019s order did not declare the limits of liability under Universal\u2019s policy applicable to the subject accident. For this court to have jurisdiction, the order of the trial court must be a final order (134 Ill. 2d R. 301) unless it comes within one of the exceptions set forth by the supreme court rules. A final order is one which fixes, determines, and disposes of the parties\u2019 rights regarding the litigation on some definite, separate part of the litigation. (Pottorf v. Clark (1985), 134 Ill. App. 3d 349, 351, 480 N.E.2d 533, 535; Wasserman v. Rosengarden (1980), 84 Ill. App. 3d 713, 715, 406 N.E.2d 131, 133.) To determine the finality of an order, the court must consider the substance rather than its form. (Pottorf, 134 Ill. App. 3d at 351, 480 N.E.2d at 535.) Madison Mutual\u2019s prayer that the trial court determine and adjudicate the rights and liabilities of the parties with respect to the insurance policies was a general prayer for relief, whereas the true relief requested was that the trial court declare that the Universal policy affords primary coverage. We believe the order of July 31, 1992, was final and appealable because the court determined which insurance policy afforded primary coverage and thereby granted the only relief the court could have granted. This appeal is properly before this court.\nIt is undisputed that Dorris is covered under the policy with Madison Mutual. What is at issue is whether Dorris is covered under Universal\u2019s policy of insurance. To determine whether a person is insured under Universal\u2019s policy, we turn first to the language of the policy:\n\u201cWHO IS AN INSURED\nWith respect to the Auto Hazard:\n1. YOU;\n2. Any of YOUR partners, paid employees, directors, stockholders, executive officers, a member of their household or a member of YOUR household, while using an AUTO covered by this Coverage Part, or when legally responsible for its use. The actual use of the AUTO must be by YOU or within the scope of YOUR permission;\n3. Any other person or organization required by law to be an INSURED while using an AUTO covered by this Coverage Part within the scope of YOUR permission.\u201d\nThe parties agree that Dorris does not fall within the definitions set forth in paragraph one or two. Definition number three is the only one under which he could qualify as an insured. The term in definition three, \u201crequired by law,\u201d is the dispositive term at issue. Universal argues that because Dorris was already insured when he borrowed Wood River Ford\u2019s vehicle he was not a person \u201crequired by law\u201d to have any additional insurance and, therefore, he is not covered under Universal\u2019s policy. Universal concedes that if Dorris had been an uninsured motorist he would have been covered by its policy, but Universal contends that it is only when a Wood River Ford customer is uninsured that he falls within definition number three.\nThe construction of an insurance policy\u2019s provisions is a question of law. (Outboard Marine Corp. v. Liberty Mutual Insurance Co. (1992), 154 Ill. 2d 90, 108, 607 N.E.2d 1204, 1212.) If the terms of an insurance policy are clear and unambiguous, a court must afford them their plain, ordinary, and popular meaning. (Outboard, 154 Ill. 2d at 108, 607 N.E.2d at 1212; United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co. v. Wilkin Insulation Co. (1991), 144 Ill. 2d 64, 74, 578 N.E.2d 926, 930.) With this standard in mind, we ask, \u201cWhat is the plain, ordinary, and popular meaning of the term \u2018required by law to be an insured\u2019?\u201d\nThe trial court determined that section 7 \u2014 601 of the Illinois Vehicle Code (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1989, ch. 951/2, par. 7 \u2014 601) required Dorris to have automobile liability insurance when he was operating the vehicle. Section 7 \u2014 601 provides in pertinent part:\n\u201c[N]o person shall operate, register or maintain registration of, and no owner shall permit another person to operate, register or maintain registration of, a motor vehicle designed to be used on a public highway unless the motor vehicle is covered, by a liability insurance policy.\u201d (Emphasis added.) (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1989, ch. 953-/2, par. 7-601.)\nIt is not clear from the language of the statute whether it is the operator or the owner that must provide the mandatory insurance. However, in this case we need not determine whether the owner or the operator of the vehicle was required to provide the mandatory insurance. Suffice it to say, when Dorris was operating the loaner vehicle, section 7 \u2014 601 required him to be covered by a liability insurance policy.\nThe trial court found that by virtue of the statute Dorris, while operating the loaner vehicle, was a person required by law to be an insured and thus, given the language of Universal\u2019s policy, Dorris was a person insured under the policy. Universal argues that because Dorris had insurance coverage with Madison Mutual at the time of the accident, he was not a person \u201crequired by law\u201d to be an insured under Universal\u2019s policy. This argument defies logic given the plain and ordinary meaning of the Universal policy\u2019s definition of insured. The basic difficulty with Universal\u2019s interpretation of its definition of insured is that it equates \u201crequired by law\u201d with someone who is otherwise uninsured, thus requiring or needing insurance. The third definition of insured in the Universal policy makes no mention of whether the person required by law to be insured has insurance coverage under a separate policy. Whether or not a person is insured under a separate policy when he or she borrows a car from Wood River Ford is of no consequence in determining whether he or she is \u201crequired by law\u201d to have insurance under Universal\u2019s definition of insured. Under Universal\u2019s policy the only conditions upon the person being deemed an insured are those conditions unambiguously set forth in the definition itself. Universal argues that there is no law prohibiting it from limiting the definition of who may be an insured under its policy. While this may be true, the fact is the limitations upon who may be an insured under definition number three do not eliminate Dorris as an insured as Universal contends.\nWe note parenthetically that the parties argue extensively over the interpretation of section 7 \u2014 601 of the Illinois Vehicle Code and whether it is the owner or the operator of the vehicle that is required by law to carry insurance. We do not believe this question is of import in this case, given the issue at bar: whether Dorris is an insured under Universal\u2019s policy. We conclude that the trial court did not err in determining that Dorris is an insured under the Universal insurance policy.\nUniversal also argues on appeal that in the event its policy is deemed to provide coverage to Dorris, the amount of coverage would be limited to the amount required by the Illinois Vehicle Code. The trial court determined that Universal\u2019s insurance coverage is primary and Madison Mutual\u2019s insurance coverage is excess. The trial court made no declaration as to the limits of liability under Universal\u2019s policy, and we decline to address an issue not decided by the trial court.\nFor the foregoing reasons, we affirm the decision of the circuit court of Madison County.\nAffirmed.\nLEWIS and MAAG, JJ., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "PRESIDING JUSTICE CHAPMAN" } ], "attorneys": [ "Jay S. Judge, of Judge & James, Ltd., of Park Ridge, and Michael S. Weinberg, of Goffstein, Kraus, Sherman, Seigel & Weinberg, of St. Louis, Missouri, for appellant Universal Underwriters Group.", "Dale L. Bode and John E. Sabo, both of Walker & Williams, P.C., of Belleville, for appellee Madison Mutual Insurance Company.", "Charles C. Compton, of Reed, Armstrong, Gorman, Coffey, Thomson, Gilbert & Mudge, P.C., of Edwardsville, for appellees Helen Nagy and John Nagy." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "MADISON MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. UNIVERSAL UNDERWRITERS GROUP et al., Defendants-Appellants (Helen Nagy et al., Defendants-Appellees; Jason E. Dorris et al., Defendants).\nFifth District\nNo. 5\u201492\u20140571\nOpinion filed September 24, 1993.\n\u2014 Rehearing denied October 26, 1993.\nJay S. Judge, of Judge & James, Ltd., of Park Ridge, and Michael S. Weinberg, of Goffstein, Kraus, Sherman, Seigel & Weinberg, of St. Louis, Missouri, for appellant Universal Underwriters Group.\nDale L. Bode and John E. Sabo, both of Walker & Williams, P.C., of Belleville, for appellee Madison Mutual Insurance Company.\nCharles C. Compton, of Reed, Armstrong, Gorman, Coffey, Thomson, Gilbert & Mudge, P.C., of Edwardsville, for appellees Helen Nagy and John Nagy." }, "file_name": "0013-01", "first_page_order": 33, "last_page_order": 37 }