{ "id": 2962061, "name": "In re C.R.H., a Minor; (The People of the State of Illinois, Petitioner-Appellee, v. C.R.H., Respondent-Appellant)", "name_abbreviation": "People v. C.R.H.", "decision_date": "1993-09-23", "docket_number": "No. 2\u201491\u20141419", "first_page": "102", "last_page": "110", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "251 Ill. App. 3d 102" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "147 Ill. 2d 40", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3278337 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "48" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/147/0040-01" ] }, { "cite": "136 Ill. 2d 441", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3254594 ], "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "446" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/136/0441-01" ] }, { "cite": "38 Ill. 2d 223", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2861276 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "225" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/38/0223-01" ] }, { "cite": "65 Ill. App. 3d 703", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3325894 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "705" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/65/0703-01" ] }, { "cite": "32 Ill. App. 3d 971", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2796759 ], "year": 1978, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "978" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/32/0971-01" ] }, { "cite": "60 Ill. 2d 173", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5416090 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "179-81" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/60/0173-01" ] }, { "cite": "75 Ill. 2d 180", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2989804 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "187" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/75/0180-01" ] }, { "cite": "397 U.S. 742", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 12058257 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1979, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "748" }, { "page": "756" }, { "page": "1469" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/397/0742-01" ] }, { "cite": "304 U.S. 458", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 10805 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1970, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "464" }, { "page": "1466" }, { "page": "1023" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/304/0458-01" ] }, { "cite": "109 Ill. 2d 129", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3125654 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "135" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/109/0129-01" ] }, { "cite": "94 Ill. 2d 77", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3106172 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "81" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/94/0077-01" ] }, { "cite": "387 U.S. 1", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 11333627 ], "weight": 15, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "30-31" }, { "page": "548" }, { "page": "1445" }, { "page": "33" }, { "page": "549" }, { "page": "1446-47" }, { "page": "33" }, { "page": "549" }, { "page": "1446" }, { "page": "55" }, { "page": "561" }, { "page": "1458" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/387/0001-01" ] }, { "cite": "121 Ill. App. 3d 77", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3559683 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "83" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/121/0077-01" ] }, { "cite": "66 Ill. 2d 385", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5465012 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1984, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "389" }, { "page": "390" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/66/0385-01" ] }, { "cite": "68 U.S. 223", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 3471225 ], "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "233" }, { "page": "534" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/68/0223-01" ] }, { "cite": "94 L. Ed. 865", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed.", "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "873" }, { "page": "873" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "339 U.S. 306", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 362818 ], "weight": 4, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "313" }, { "page": "657" }, { "page": "314" }, { "page": "657" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/339/0306-01" ] }, { "cite": "419 U.S. 565", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6177671 ], "weight": 9, "year": 1950, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "579" }, { "page": "737" }, { "page": "738" }, { "page": "565" }, { "page": "737" }, { "page": "738" }, { "page": "579" }, { "page": "737" }, { "page": "738" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/419/0565-01" ] }, { "cite": "193 Ill. App. 3d 968", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2499920 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "979" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/193/0968-01" ] }, { "cite": "132 Ill. 2d 304", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5588617 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "318" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/132/0304-01" ] }, { "cite": "104 Ill. 2d 8", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3146647 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "16" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/104/0008-01" ] }, { "cite": "106 Ill. 2d 290", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3137767 ], "year": 1984, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "298" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/106/0290-01" ] }, { "cite": "139 Ill. 2d 24", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5574033 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "50-51" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/139/0024-01" ] }, { "cite": "216 Ill. App. 3d 896", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5290425 ], "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "898" }, { "page": "898" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/216/0896-01" ] }, { "cite": "104 Ill. 2d 1", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3146924 ], "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "6" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/104/0001-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 936, "char_count": 20457, "ocr_confidence": 0.8, "pagerank": { "raw": 4.947487136851577e-08, "percentile": 0.3101385447568565 }, "sha256": "ec603fe898f5503e44abf1de4fa5432df97734fc8d626c0346fda10763fa305d", "simhash": "1:792605dc82164d7e", "word_count": 3451 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T16:22:05.264174+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "In re C.R.H., a Minor (The People of the State of Illinois, Petitioner-Appellee, v. C.R.H., Respondent-Appellant)." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE COLWELL\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nRespondent, C.R.H., appeals from the orders of the circuit court of Winnebago County adjudicating him a delinquent minor and committing him to the Department of Corrections. Respondent contends that, because his mother was not properly notified of the juvenile proceedings, the trial court was deprived of jurisdiction and its orders are void. We reverse.\nOn October 11, 1991, the State filed a supplemental petition for an adjudication of delinquency pursuant to section 5 \u2014 3 of the Juvenile Court Act of 1987 (Act) (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1991, ch. 37, par. 805 \u2014 3 (now 705 ILCS 405/5 \u2014 3 (West 1992))). The petition alleged that on October 9, 1991, respondent committed the offenses of home invasion (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1991, ch. 38, par. 12 \u2014 11 (now 720 ILCS 5/12 \u2014 11 (West 1992))), residential burglary (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1991, ch. 38, par. 19 \u2014 3 (now 720 ILCS 5/19 \u2014 3 (West 1992))), drinking as a minor (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1991, ch. 43, par. 134a (now 235 ILCS 5/6 \u2014 20 (West 1992))), and battery (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1991, ch. 38, par. 12 \u2014 3(aXl) (now 720 ILCS 5/12 \u2014 3(aXl) (West 1992))). The petition requested that an arraignment be held on October 11 and listed, under names and residences of the minor\u2019s parents, respondent\u2019s mother, along with her address, and respondent\u2019s father, \u201caddress unknown.\u201d\nRespondent had a two-year history of dealings with the juvenile court when the supplemental petition was filed. Having admitted to a petition to adjudicate him a delinquent minor at age 13, respondent began an alternating sequence of probations and detentions, interspersed with drug and alcohol assessments and treatments. Respondent\u2019s mother attended most of the earlier proceedings held against respondent in juvenile court. His father, whose whereabouts were unknown to both respondent and his mother, failed twice to respond to notices by publication, causing the court to enter default orders against him.\nAt the arraignment and detention hearing on October 11, 1991, the judge inquired as to the whereabouts of respondent\u2019s parents and the parents of a cominor, similarly charged. The prosecutor stated that \u201c[t]hey have attempted to notify the parents.\u201d Respondent\u2019s juvenile probation officer told the judge, \u201cI talked with the minor\u2019s mother this morning. She said she could not make it.\u201d Another probation officer made a similar representation regarding the absence of the cominor\u2019s parents. The judge then said, \u201cI will order summons to issue for the respondents, respondent parents or stepparents.\u201d After hearing testimony, the court ordered that respondent be kept in detention pending the outcome of the proceedings on the petition.\nOn October 23, the State filed an amended supplemental petition that repeated the allegations made in the first petition and added charges of criminal trespass to residence (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1991, ch. 38, par. 19 \u2014 4 (now 720 ILCS 5/19 \u2014 4 (West 1992))), criminal damage to property (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1991, ch. 38, par. 21 \u2014 1(lXa) (now 720 ILCS 5/21 \u2014 1(l)(a) (West 1992))), and theft (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1991, ch. 38, par. 16 \u2014 l(aXlXA) (now 720 ILCS 5/16-l(aXlXA) (West 1992))). Respondent\u2019s parents\u2019 names and mother\u2019s address were listed. The record includes a summons addressed to Mrs. H., dated October 18, 1991, informing her that a hearing would be held on the cause on October 23. On the reverse side of the summons is stapled a short document in affidavit form, dated October 21 and signed by a Winnebago County deputy sheriff, stating that the summons was not served on Mrs. H. because, \u201c[e]xpired/not enough time to serve.\u201d The record does not indicate that respondent\u2019s mother or father was present at the hearing held on October 23, at which time a new attorney was appointed to represent respondent.\nThe judge explained the new charges to respondent at an arraignment held on October 30. Neither respondent\u2019s parents nor his attorney was present. The judge entered a denial on respondent\u2019s behalf and scheduled the cause for trial.\nAn adjudicatory hearing was held on November 4, 1991. The record contains no indication that either of respondent\u2019s parents was present or that they were notified of the hearing. The court adjudicated respondent delinquent after finding that he had committed home invasion, residential burglary, drinking as a minor, battery, and criminal damage to property.\nA dispositional hearing, first set for November 19, 1991, was held on November 20. Again, the record indicates that neither parent was present and that no notice of either dispositional hearing date was sent to them. Respondent was committed to the Department of Corrections for an indeterminate term.\nRespondent claims on appeal that the failure to give proper notice to his mother of the proceedings begun in October 1991 violated both respondent\u2019s and his mother\u2019s right to due process of law and rendered the lower court without jurisdiction to hold adjudicatory and. dispositional proceedings. Therefore, respondent maintains, the lower court\u2019s adjudicatory and dispositional orders in this case are void. The State argues in response that respondent\u2019s objection to the court\u2019s jurisdiction on the ground of lack of service to his mother is waived. The State\u2019s sole basis for this assertion is an amendment to the Act, section 1 \u2014 15(b) (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1991, ch. 37, par. 801 \u2014 15(b) (now 705 ILCS 405/1 \u2014 15(b) (West 1992))). According to the State, section 1\u2014 15(b), which became effective July 1, 1990, supersedes previous law on the subject of notice to juveniles.\nThe Act requires that a petition to adjudicate a minor delinquent name the minor\u2019s parents, legal guardian, or persons having custody of the minor (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1991, ch. 37, par. 805 \u2014 13(2) (now 705 ILCS 405/5 \u2014 13(2) (West 1992))) and that a summons with a copy of the petition attached be served on the persons so named (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1991, ch. 37, par. 805-15(1) (now 705 ILCS 405/5-15(1) (West 1992))). Thus, the legislature, at least before the addition of section 1 \u2014 15(b), determined that parents are necessary respondents who must be named and served with notice in order for the trial court to conduct an adjudicatory hearing. People v. R.S. (1984), 104 Ill. 2d 1, 6; In re E.D. Mc. (1991), 216 Ill. App. 3d 896, 898.\nEffective July 1, 1990, the General Assembly amended the notice provisions of the Act as follows:\n\u201cA party respondent who either has been properly served, or who appears before the court personally or by counsel at the adjudicatory hearing or at any earlier proceeding on a petition for wardship under this Act leading to that adjudicatory hearing, and who wishes to object to the court\u2019s jurisdiction on the ground that some necessary party either has not been served or has not been properly served must raise that claim before the start of the adjudicatory hearing conducted under any Article of this Act. No order or judgment is void because of a claim of inadequate service unless that claim is raised in accordance with this Section.\u201d Ill. Rev. Stat. 1989, ch. 37, par. 801 \u2014 14(b) (amended to Ill. Rev. Stat. 1991, ch. 37, par. 801 \u2014 15(b) (see Pub. Act 86 \u2014 1475, eff. January 10, 1991)) (now 705 ILCS 405/ 1 \u2014 15(b) (West 1992)).\nNo cases decided under the new provision have been cited by either party. Since it appears that we are the first court to review its application, we will examine section 1 \u2014 15(b) under the rules of statutory construction.\nWhen interpreting a statute, courts must give the language of the statute its plain and ordinary meaning and should look first to the statutory language as the best indication of the intent of the drafters. (Williams v. Illinois State Scholarship Comm\u2019n (1990), 139 Ill. 2d 24, 50-51.) The amendment\u2019s wording is straightforward. \u201cA party respondent *** who wishes to object to the court\u2019s jurisdiction on the ground that some necessary party either has not been served or has not been properly served must raise that claim before the start of the adjudicatory hearing.\u201d (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1991, ch. 37, par. 801 \u2014 15(b) (now 705 ILCS 405/1 \u2014 15(b) (West 1992)).) The plain language of section 1 \u2014 15(b) indicates to us a legislative intent to place the ultimate responsibility for notifying necessary parties of an adjudicatory hearing on the party respondent.\nThe Act does not define \u201cparty respondent.\u201d As used elsewhere in the Act, the term refers to the minor who is the subject of the proceeding and also to his parents, guardian, legal guardian, responsible relative, or other person named as a respondent in the petition. See Ill. Rev. Stat. 1991, ch. 37, par. 801 \u2014 5(1) (now codified, as amended, at 705 ILCS 405/1-5(1) (West 1992)); Ill. Rev. Stat. 1991, ch. 37, par. 805-15(1) (now 705 ILCS 405/5-15(1) (West 1992)).\nIn the instant case, respondent and both of his parents are named in the petition. Respondent\u2019s father was previously declared in default following the court\u2019s attempts to notify him through publication, and lack of notice to him is not an issue on appeal. Therefore, the potential party respondents in this case are respondent and respondent\u2019s mother.\nThe State contends that respondent alone is the party respondent targeted by the amendment, because he had notice of the adjudicatory hearing and because applying the section to his mother would produce an absurd result: if she wished to timely object to lack of notice on herself, she first would have to be properly served. The amendment addresses only party respondents who have been properly served or who make an appearance at the adjudicatory hearing or earlier proceedings leading to that hearing. Respondent\u2019s mother was neither properly served nor present, personally or by counsel, at the proceedings beginning on October 11 that led to the adjudicatory hearing. Therefore, we agree with the State that the minor is the party respondent contemplated under section 1 \u2014 15(b) in this instance.\nUnder the unamended Act, this court determined that notice to parents is essential to a juvenile court\u2019s jurisdiction. (See In re E.D. Mc. (1991), 216 Ill. App. 3d 896, 898.) Section 1 \u2014 15(b) confronts us with the proposition that notice to parents is waivable by the minor respondent.\nAn amendment is presumed to have been made for a purpose. (In re Marriage of Freeman (1985), 106 Ill. 2d 290, 298; People v. Richardson (1984), 104 Ill. 2d 8, 16.) It is possible, as the State posits, that the legislature\u2019s purpose in effecting this change was to prevent a party respondent from benefitting on appeal from procedural lapses. However, a statute must be read as a whole (Castaneda v. Illinois Human Rights Comm\u2019n (1989), 132 Ill. 2d 304, 318), and all relevant parts considered (Beierman v. Edwards (1990), 193 Ill. App. 3d 968, 979). Whatever the evil to be remedied by this amendment, we find that it conflicts with other provisions of the Act, the constitutionality of which has been firmly established.\nSection 1 \u2014 5 of the Act sets forth the rights of parties to juvenile proceedings. With certain discretionary exceptions,\n\u201cthe minor who is the subject of the proceeding and his parents, guardian, legal custodian or responsible relative who are parties respondent have the right to be present, to be heard, to present evidence material to the proceedings, to cross-examine witnesses, [and] to examine pertinent court files and records ***\n* * *\n(3) Parties respondent are entitled to notice in compliance with Sections 2 \u2014 15 and 2 \u2014 16, 3 \u2014 17 and 3 \u2014 18, 4 \u2014 14 and 4\u2014 15 or 5 \u2014 15 and 5 \u2014 16, as appropriate.\u201d (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1991, ch. 37, pars. 801-5(1), (3) (now 705 ILCS 405/1-5(1), (3) (West 1992)).)\nSections 5 \u2014 15 and 5 \u2014 16, which apply to delinquent minors, delineate the Act\u2019s requirements for the issuance and the service of summons and for notice by publication. Most pertinently, section 5 \u2014 15 provides:\n\u201cWhen a petition is filed, the clerk of the court shall issue a summons with a copy of the petition attached. The summons shall be directed to the minor\u2019s legal guardian or custodian and to each person named as a respondent in the petition [except, under certain circumstances, a minor respondent under 8 years of age].\u201d (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1991, ch. 37, par. 805 \u2014 15(1) (now 705 ILCS 405/5-15(1) (West 1992)).)\nThe petition \u201cshall allege that the minor is delinquent and set forth *** facts sufficient\u201d to establish that the minor violated or attempted to violate a Federal or State law or a municipal ordinance (see Ill. Rev. Stat. 1991, ch. 37, pars. 805-13(2), 805-1, 805-3(1) (now 705 ILCS 405/5-13(2), 405/5-1, 405/5-3(1) (West 1992))).\nThe Act\u2019s notice provisions before the addition of section 1 \u2014 15(b) fully comported with Federal and State constitutional law.\nThe due process clause requires at a minimum \u201c \u2018that deprivation of life, liberty or property by adjudication be preceded by notice and opportunity for hearing appropriate to the case.' \u201d (Goss v. Lopez (1975), 419 U.S. 565, 579, 42 L. Ed. 2d 725, 737, 95 S. Ct. 729, 738, quoting Mullane v. Central Hanover Trust Co. (1950), 339 U.S. 306, 313, 94 L. Ed. 865, 873, 70 S. Ct. 652, 657.) The fundamental requisite of due process of law, the opportunity to be heard, would be a right that \u201c \u2018has little reality or worth unless one is informed that the matter is pending and can choose for himself whether to ... contest.\u2019 \u201d (Goss, 419 U.S. at 565, 42 L. Ed. 2d at 737, 95 S. Ct. at 738, quoting Mullane, 339 U.S. 306 at 314, 94 L. Ed. at 873, 70 S. Ct. at 657.) \u201c \u2018Parties whose rights are to be affected are entitled to be heard; and in order that they may enjoy that right they must first be notified.\u2019 \u201d Goss, 419 U.S. at 579, 42 L. Ed. 2d at 737, 95 S. Ct. at 738, qaotmg Baldwin v. Hale (1864), 68 U.S. 223, 233, 17 L. Ed. 531, 534.\nAlthough a juvenile proceeding retains certain adversary characteristics, it is not an adversary proceeding in the usual sense but is one to be administered in a spirit of humane concern for the minor, to promote his welfare, and to serve the best interests of the community. (In re Beasley (1977), 66 Ill. 2d 385, 389; see also In re M.D.B. (1984), 121 Ill. App. 3d 77, 83 (delinquency proceedings are protective, not penal in nature; the purpose of the Act is not to punish but to correct and rehabilitate).) A juvenile proceeding is not criminal in nature; however, certain constitutional due process safeguards normally associated with criminal proceedings have been extended for the protection of juveniles to accord to them fundamental fairness. Beasley, 66 Ill. 2d at 390.\nIn a landmark case, the United States Supreme Court established that the basic requirements of due process and fairness must be satisfied in juvenile court proceedings (In re Application of Gault (1967), 387 U.S. 1, 30-31, 18 L. Ed. 2d 527, 548, 87 S. Ct. 1428, 1445) and, further, that due process in a juvenile proceeding requires adequate notice to a minor and his parents. (Gault, 387 U.S. at 33, 18 L. Ed. 2d at 549, 87 S. Ct. at 1446-47.) Specifically, the Gault Court stated that due process requires that a minor and his parents or guardian be notified, in writing, of the specific charge or factual allegations to be considered at an adjudicatory hearing on delinquency and that such written notice be given at the earliest practicable time, and in any event sufficiently in advance of the hearing to permit preparation. (Gault, 387 U.S. at 33, 18 L. Ed. 2d at 549, 87 S. Ct. at 1446.) The Court further held that neither \u201cknowledge\u201d of the charge by one of the parents nor an asserted failure to object on this ground would excuse the lack of constitutionally adequate notice. Gault, 387 U.S. at 34 n.54,18 L. Ed. 2d at 550 n.54, 87 S. Ct. at 1447 n.54.\nOur supreme court has affirmed that due process of law requires that notice in juvenile proceedings be equivalent to that constitutionally required in criminal or civil cases (People v. R.D.S. (1983), 94 Ill. 2d 77, 81) and that adequate notice to both the minor and his parents is a requirement of due process (In re J.P.J. (1985), 109 Ill. 2d 129, 135).\nWe interpret the Federal and State case law to mean that inadequate service to the parents, who are necessary parties, violates the minor\u2019s right to due process as well as that of the parents. Notice to parents may be viewed as a right that is shared by both the minor and his parents. Therefore, we find that, notwithstanding the dictates of section 1 \u2014 15(b), the right to due process of both respondent and his mother was violated by the failure to give proper notice to respondent\u2019s mother.\nWe believe section 1 \u2014 15(b) is constitutionally suspect for a further reason: the new provision qualifies the due process right to notice by mandating waiver if objection to lack of service or inadequate service is not timely made. Waiver of a constitutional right is valid only if it is clearly established that there was \u201can intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right.\u201d (Johnson v. Zerbst (1938), 304 U.S. 458, 464, 82 L. Ed. 1461, 1466, 58 S. Ct. 1019, 1023.) \u201cWaivers of constitutional rights not only must be voluntary but must be knowing, intelligent acts done with sufficient awareness of the relevant circumstances and likely consequences.\u201d Brady v. United States (1970), 397 U.S. 742, 748, 25 L. Ed. 2d 747, 756, 90 S. Ct. 1463, 1469; People v. Johnson (1979), 75 Ill. 2d 180, 187.\nMoreover, special care must be taken when determining the voluntariness of a minor\u2019s waiver of rights. (Gault, 387 U.S. at 55, 18 L. Ed. 2d at 561, 87 S. Ct. at 1458; People v. Simmons (1975), 60 Ill. 2d 173, 179-81.) Although this court has held that a juvenile\u2019s waiver of constitutional rights is not rendered ineffective by the absence of his parents or guardian, we stated that good practice provides that it is preferable, whenever possible, to be sure that a parent or guardian is present when a juvenile waives his rights. In re Stiff (1975), 32 Ill. App. 3d 971, 978; In re Bertrand (1978), 65 Ill. App. 3d 703, 705.\nContrary to established constitutional principle, the new amendment permits waiver of a constitutional right with no inquiry whatsoever into a party\u2019s capacity or intention to waive his right.\nFinally, we believe the amendment is constitutionally unsound in that it places an unwarranted restriction upon a reviewing court\u2019s prerogative to consider the issue of inadequate notice. Section 1\u2014 15(b) states that no order or judgment is void because of a claim of inadequate service unless that claim is raised before the start of the adjudicatory hearing. Although an issue not raised below is generally waived on appeal (134 Ill. 2d R. 341(e)(7)), our supreme court has long held that the rule of waiver states an admonition to the parties and not a limitation on the jurisdiction of reviewing courts. (Hux v. Raben (1967), 38 Ill. 2d 223, 225.) It is well established that a reviewing court may, in the furtherance of its responsibility to provide a just result, override considerations of waiver and consider a point either not raised or not argued by an appellant. (In re Marriage of Sutton (1990), 136 Ill. 2d 441, 446; Welch v. Johnson (1992), 147 Ill. 2d 40, 48.) Under section 1 \u2014 15(b), a reviewing court\u2019s ability to reach the notice issue is statutorily constrained. We believe that such a restriction on a discretionary function of the reviewing court oversteps the constitutional line separating governmental powers.\nFor the foregoing reasons, we find that section 1 \u2014 15(b) infringes upon a parent\u2019s constitutional right to receive adequate notice of a juvenile proceeding involving a minor child. Because' notice to respondent\u2019s mother was constitutionally required, we hold that jurisdiction was improperly assumed by the Winnebago County circuit court and reverse the orders adjudicating respondent a delinquent minor and committing him to the Department of Corrections for an indeterminate term.\nReversed.\nBOWMAN and QUETSCH, JJ., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE COLWELL" } ], "attorneys": [ "G. Joseph Weller, Paul J. Glaser, and Kathleen J. Hamill, all of State Appellate Defender\u2019s Office, of Elgin, for appellant.", "Paul A. Logli, State\u2019s Attorney, of Rockford (William L. Browers and Marshall M. Stevens, both of State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor\u2019s Office, of counsel), for the People." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "In re C.R.H., a Minor (The People of the State of Illinois, Petitioner-Appellee, v. C.R.H., Respondent-Appellant).\nSecond District\nNo. 2\u201491\u20141419\nOpinion filed September 23, 1993.\nG. Joseph Weller, Paul J. Glaser, and Kathleen J. Hamill, all of State Appellate Defender\u2019s Office, of Elgin, for appellant.\nPaul A. Logli, State\u2019s Attorney, of Rockford (William L. Browers and Marshall M. Stevens, both of State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor\u2019s Office, of counsel), for the People." }, "file_name": "0102-01", "first_page_order": 122, "last_page_order": 130 }