{ "id": 2958312, "name": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. RAYMOND TURNAGE, Defendant-Appellee", "name_abbreviation": "People v. Turnage", "decision_date": "1993-10-28", "docket_number": "No. 2\u201491\u20140861", "first_page": "485", "last_page": "494", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "251 Ill. App. 3d 485" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "104 Ill. 2d 463", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3146993 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "477" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/104/0463-01" ] }, { "cite": "243 Ill. App. 3d 830", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5108370 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/243/0830-01" ] }, { "cite": "119 Ill. App. 3d 42", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3629768 ], "year": 1993, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/119/0042-01" ] }, { "cite": "128 Ill. App. 3d 668", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3525456 ], "year": 1983, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/128/0668-01" ] }, { "cite": "287 U.S. 241", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 370090 ], "weight": 3, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "250" }, { "page": "287" }, { "page": "131" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/287/0241-01" ] }, { "cite": "420 U.S. 103", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 11642843 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1932, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/420/0103-01" ] }, { "cite": "8 So. 594", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "So.", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "42 La. Ann. 838", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "La. Ann.", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "58 S.E. 1122", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.", "year": 1890, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1123" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "2 Ga. App. 686", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ga. App.", "case_ids": [ 1253867 ], "year": 1890, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "687" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ga-app/2/0686-01" ] }, { "cite": "73 S. Ct. 163", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "S. Ct.", "year": 1907, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "97 L. Ed. 674", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed.", "year": 1907, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "344 U.S. 870", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 11327893, 11327950, 11328023 ], "year": 1907, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/344/0870-01", "/us/344/0870-02", "/us/344/0870-03" ] }, { "cite": "190 F.2d 16", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.2d", "case_ids": [ 481243 ], "year": 1952, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "19-20" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f2d/190/0016-01" ] }, { "cite": "92 S. Ct. 1291", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "S. Ct.", "year": 1951, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "31 L. Ed. 2d 479", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed. 2d", "year": 1951, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "405 U.S. 1016", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 11768164, 11768232, 11768393, 11768556, 11768464, 11768625, 11768338, 11768756, 11768700 ], "year": 1951, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/405/1016-01", "/us/405/1016-02", "/us/405/1016-04", "/us/405/1016-06", "/us/405/1016-05", "/us/405/1016-07", "/us/405/1016-03", "/us/405/1016-09", "/us/405/1016-08" ] }, { "cite": "452 F.2d 249", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.2d", "case_ids": [ 783349 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1972, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "261" }, { "page": "261" }, { "page": "261" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f2d/452/0249-01" ] }, { "cite": "3 Or. App. 606", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Or. App.", "case_ids": [ 2064423 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1971, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "608" }, { "page": "434" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/or-app/3/0606-01" ] }, { "cite": "138 Ill. 2d 377", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5577248 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "389-90" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/138/0377-01" ] }, { "cite": "201 Ill. App. 3d 907", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2595054 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "911" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/201/0907-01" ] }, { "cite": "144 Ill. 2d 404", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5592090 ], "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "408-09" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/144/0404-01" ] }, { "cite": "208 Ill. App. 3d 87", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2547624 ], "weight": 5, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "91" }, { "page": "91-93" }, { "page": "92-93" }, { "page": "93" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/208/0087-01" ] }, { "cite": "468 U.S. 897", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 11340969 ], "weight": 21, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "913-14" }, { "page": "692-93" }, { "page": "3415-16" }, { "page": "919-21" }, { "page": "696-98" }, { "page": "3418-19" }, { "page": "922-23" }, { "page": "698-99" }, { "page": "3420-21" }, { "page": "916" }, { "page": "694" }, { "page": "3417" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/468/0897-01" ] }, { "cite": "422 U.S. 531", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 9640 ], "weight": 3, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "542" }, { "page": "384" }, { "page": "2320" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/us/422/0531-01" ] }, { "cite": "414 U.S. 338", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 11715874 ], "weight": 3, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "348" }, { "page": "571" }, { "page": "670" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/us/414/0338-01" ] }, { "cite": "208 Ill. App. 3d 87", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2547624 ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/208/0087-01" ] }, { "cite": "468 U.S. 897", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 11340969 ], "weight": 12, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "919" }, { "page": "696" }, { "page": "3418" }, { "page": "908" }, { "page": "689" }, { "page": "3413" }, { "page": "919" }, { "page": "696" }, { "page": "3419" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/us/468/0897-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 928, "char_count": 22195, "ocr_confidence": 0.791, "pagerank": { "raw": 6.158808969568711e-08, "percentile": 0.38266149879780637 }, "sha256": "e2b219bdd7320d03f5a7f5bcb0503f7e2da5974197360b4250b62543d90cfc1e", "simhash": "1:74aadd167b493cf3", "word_count": 3781 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T16:22:05.264174+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. RAYMOND TURNAGE, Defendant-Appellee." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE UNVERZAGT\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nThe State appeals an order quashing the arrest of defendant, Raymond Turnage, and suppressing evidence seized pursuant to that arrest. (See 134 Ill. 2d R. 604(a)(1).) Defendant\u2019s arrest was based on a warrant that was later recalled because defendant had already been arrested for the offense described in the warrant.\nOn appeal, the State argues that the trial court\u2019s decision was error because the warrant was valid; and (2) even if the warrant was technically invalid, law enforcement officers\u2019 reliance on the warrant was objectively reasonable, bringing this case within the \u201cgood-faith\u201d rule of United States v. Leon (1984), 468 U.S. 897, 82 L. Ed. 2d 677, 104 S. Ct. 3405.\nWe affirm the trial court\u2019s judgment.\nThe crucial facts of this case are not in dispute. On April 2, 1991, defendant was indicted in the case at bar on one count each of the unlawful possession of a controlled substance (cocaine) with the intent to deliver (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1991, ch. BO1^, par. 1401(a)(2)(A) (now 720 ILCS 570/401(a)(2)(A) (West 1992))); unlawful possession of a controlled substance (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1991, ch. 56V2, par. 1402(a)(1)(A) (now 720 ILCS 5707402(a)(2)(A) (West 1992))); unlawful use of a weapon (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1991, ch. 38, par. 24 \u2014 1(a)(4) (now codified, as amended, at 720 ILCS 5/24 \u2014 1(a)(4) (West 1992))); unlawful possession of a firearm without a firearm owner\u2019s identification card (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1991, ch. 38, par. 83 \u2014 2 (now 430 ILCS 65/2 (West 1992))); and unlawful possession of cannabis (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1991, ch. 56V2, par. 704(a) (now 720 ILCS 55074(a) (West 1992))).\nDefendant was arrested on March 22, 1991. The search of defendant\u2019s car pursuant to this arrest turned up evidence upon which the charges in this case are based. The arrest itself was based on a warrant issued by the trial court in case No. 90 \u2014 CF\u20141891, wherein defendant was charged with the unlawful delivery of a controlled substance, a Class 1 felony (the exact charge is not clear from the record). On December 10, 1990, defendant was indicted in case No. 90\u2014 CF \u2014 1891. On December 13, 1990, defendant was arrested for this offense pursuant to a valid warrant issued that day. On December 17, 1990, defendant was duly released on bail in case No. 90 \u2014 CF\u20141891. On December 18, 1990, the circuit court, relying on the grand jury\u2019s finding of probable cause, issued a second warrant for defendant\u2019s arrest on the charge of unlawful delivery of a controlled substance. Defendant missed no court appearances and violated none of the conditions of his bail in case No. 90 \u2014 CF\u20141891.\nOn April 11, 1991, the circuit court entered an order recalling the arrest warrant in case No. 90 \u2014 CF\u20141891. On April 16, 1991, in the case at bar, defendant moved to quash the March 22, 1991, arrest and to suppress the fruits of the search that was made pursuant to the arrest. The sole witness at the suppression hearing was Officer Randy Podschweit of the Aurora police department. Podschweit testified that at about 11 p.m. on March 22 he spotted defendant as defendant was driving south in Aurora. Podschweit acknowledged that the only basis he had to arrest defendant was the warrant in case No. 90\u2014 CF \u2014 1891.\nAt the time he spotted defendant, Podschweit knew that there had been a warrant for defendant\u2019s arrest but was unsure whether the warrant was still active. About a month earlier, Podschweit had verified that there was an outstanding warrant for defendant\u2019s arrest. Since then, he had checked the department warrant list about three times. Each time, defendant was on the list of people for whom there were outstanding warrants.\nPodschweit stopped defendant and told the latter there was a warrant out for defendant\u2019s arrest. Defendant denied that this was so. Podschweit called the department and received confirmation that the warrant was still valid. He arrested defendant. A search incident to the arrest uncovered a gun and a variety of controlled substances.\nAfter Podschweit testified, the trial judge took notice of the judicial proceedings in case No. 90 \u2014 CF\u20141981, over which he also presided. Although defendant had posted bond and had missed no court appearances, two warrants for defendant\u2019s arrest on the same charge had issued. Defendant did not receive notification of the indictment until well after the second warrant was issued. The judge opined that the second warrant should never have been issued. However, he also noted that the warrant was \u201cstill a valid warrant\u201d at the time of the arrest and that Officer Podschweit may have relied in good faith upon the warrant.\nAfter the arguments of counsel, the trial judge decided to grant the defendant\u2019s motion to quash the arrest and to suppress the evidence in the case at bar. The judge explained that (1) he believed that the issuance of the second warrant violated defendant\u2019s constitutional rights because the first warrant had already given the court jurisdiction over the defendant on the same charge. The judge then explained why he did not believe the good-faith doctrine of Leon applied:\n\u201c[Tjhey [the Supreme Court] talk about the reliance on a warrant which was objectively reasonable, and they talk about *** whether or not the officers were acting on a facially valid search warrant issued by a state court judge after an independent determination of probable cause.\nThis is not that kind of a warrant. This is a warrant based on a grand jury indictment. I don\u2019t think that makes for an independent determination of probable cause by a judge, and for that reason, I will grant the motion to quash.\u201d\nThe court entered a written order granting defendant\u2019s motion, and the State timely appealed.\nThe State argues that the trial judge erred as a matter of law in quashing the arrest and suppressing the evidence. The State asserts that the trial judge was simply mistaken in his belief that the grand jury\u2019s determination that there was probable cause to indict defendant was not an adequate substitute for a neutral magistrate\u2019s finding of probable cause.\nDefendant does not argue that the trial court\u2019s reasoning in this respect was correct. However, defendant maintains that the trial court\u2019s holding may still stand. He cites this court\u2019s decision in People v. Mourecek (1991), 208 Ill. App. 3d 87, where we determined that Leon does not apply to an arrest that is based on law enforcement officers\u2019 mistaken belief that a warrant exists for a defendant\u2019s arrest, as opposed to their mistaken belief in the validity of an existing warrant.\nWe do not fully agree with either party or with the trial court\u2019s reasoning. However, we affirm the trial court\u2019s decision to quash the arrest and suppress the evidence. More particularly, we hold that (1) the warrant upon which the arresting officer relied was invalid; (2) the trial court erred in holding Leon inapplicable merely because a grand jury rather than a magistrate determined that there was probable cause to arrest defendant; (3) Mourecek is distinguishable and does not in itself require that we refuse to apply Leon to this case; and (4) although the court\u2019s specific reason for refusing to apply Leon was unsound, the court did not err in refusing to apply Leon to a repetitive and unnecessary arrest that was the result of faulty police information.\nAs the relevant facts are undisputed, the trial court\u2019s rulings are ones of law which we review de novo. (See In re D.G. (1991), 144 Ill. 2d 404, 408-09; Mourecek, 208 Ill. App. 3d at 91.) We must decide whether the trial court\u2019s judgment was correct, and we may uphold that judgment on any proper basis, even if the trial court\u2019s reasoning was flawed. Ruddock v. First National Bank (1990), 201 Ill. App. 3d 907, 911.\nWe hold first that the arrest warrant on which the police relied was invalid. The State concedes, and from the limited record we conclude, that on April 11, 1991, the circuit court invalidated the warrant. Apparently, the State never appealed this ruling (see 134 Ill. 2d R. 604(a)(1)), and the State may not now maintain that the second warrant was properly issued. See People v. Williams (1990), 138 Ill. 2d 377, 389-90.\nMoreover, what applicable law we have found supports a holding that the second warrant was invalid. No Illinois statute authorizes a court which already has jurisdiction over a defendant to issue a warrant for the defendant\u2019s arrest merely because the defendant has been indicted in the same court for the same offense. In the only reported opinion we have found upholding such a rearrest, the relevant statute specifically authorized such a procedure. (See State v. Smith (1970), 3 Or. App. 606, 608, 475 P.2d 433, 434.) Otherwise, courts have required that the rearrest of a person admitted to bail have a valid basis other than \u201cthe continuing knowledge of his possible guilt of the offense charged in the indictment.\u201d (United States v. Holmes (7th Cir. 1971), 452 F.2d 249, 261, cert. denied (1972), 405 U.S. 1016, 31 L. Ed. 2d 479, 92 S. Ct. 1291; accord United States ex rel. Heikkinen v. Gordon (8th Cir. 1951), 190 F.2d 16, 19-20, vacated & remanded with directions to dismiss cause as moot (1952), 344 U.S. 870, 97 L. Ed. 674, 73 S. Ct. 163; Sherman v. State (1907), 2 Ga. App. 686, 687, 58 S.E. 1122, 1123.) Courts have recognized that to allow repetitive arrests could encourage police harassment of the accused and undermine the defendant\u2019s right to bail. Holmes, 452 F.2d at 261; State v. Black (1890), 42 La. Ann. 838, 8 So. 594.\nHaving determined that the second arrest warrant was invalid, we must decide whether the arrest and search made pursuant to the warrant were properly subject to the exclusionary rule. We reject the trial court\u2019s reasons for refusing to apply Leon here. Nonetheless, we hold that Leon does not extend to police reliance on the type of invalid warrant here.\nThe trial judge reasoned that the police could not reasonably rely on an arrest warrant that a judge issued after an indictment, as opposed to an arrest warrant that is based upon the judge\u2019s own determination of probable cause. This distinction is legally erroneous. It is well settled that a properly returned indictment, fair upon its face, conclusively settles the issue of probable cause and not only permits but requires the issuance of an arrest warrant without further inquiry. (Gerstein v. Pugh (1975), 420 U.S. 103, 117 n.19, 43 L. Ed. 2d 54, 67 n.19, 95 S. Ct. 854, 865 n.19, citing Ex parte United States (1932), 287 U.S. 241, 250, 77 L. Ed. 283, 287, 53 S. Ct. 129, 131.) Thus, the trial court erred in holding that Leon was inapplicable to the warrant because the warrant was based upon a grand jury\u2019s determination of probable cause.\nDefendant suggests a different ground on which to affirm the trial court. He argues this case is controlled directly by Mourecek and similar cases where the arresting officer incorrectly believed that there was a valid warrant outstanding for the defendant\u2019s arrest. (See Mourecek, 208 Ill. App. 3d at 91-93; People v. Joseph (1984), 128 Ill. App. 3d 668; People v. Lawson (1983), 119 Ill. App. 3d 42; see also People v. Sullivan (1993), 243 Ill. App. 3d 830.) However, these cases are distinguishable. Here the police relied on an outstanding warrant that was invalidated only after the arrest.\nIn Mourecek, the arresting officer was erroneously informed that a warrant was outstanding for defendant\u2019s arrest. In fact, the warrant had been quashed over 30 days before the arrest. This court held that although Leon allowed an officer to rely in reasonable good faith on an existing warrant, the Supreme Court\u2019s ruling was of no help where the officer reasonably believed that there was a warrant which in fact no longer was legally in existence. (Mourecek, 208 Ill. App. 3d at 92-93.) Where a warrant has been quashed prior to the arrest (or search), there is no existing warrant. Although the police may rely on a warrant that they reasonably believe to be valid, they may not rely on a belief, however reasonable, that there is a warrant where no warrant exists. (Mourecek, 208 Ill. App. 3d at 93.) Such a distinction is implicit in Leon, which is premised in part on the judicial preference for searches made pursuant to warrants over warrantless searches. Leon, 468 U.S. at 913-14, 82 L. Ed. 2d at 692-93, 104 S. Ct. at 3415-16.\nTo hold that Mourecek applies directly here would effectively hold that good faith will not validate police reliance on an existing warrant that is later found to have been defective. Such a blanket holding would conflict directly with Leon and with our supreme court\u2019s application of Leon. See People v. Stewart (1984), 104 Ill. 2d 463, 477.\nHowever, we agree with the trial court\u2019s ultimate determination that the Leon \u201cgood-faith\u201d doctrine did not shield the arrest and search of defendant from the operation of the exclusionary rule. Thus, we uphold the trial court\u2019s judgment.\nUnder Leon, evidence seized pursuant to a technically invalid search warrant is not subject to suppression if the police reasonably relied on the warrant. The rationale for this holding is that the purpose of the exclusionary rule \u2014 to deter improper or negligent police conduct \u2014 would be served minimally or not at all by excluding evidence that the police have seized in reliance on a neutral magistrate\u2019s determination that the arrest or search is proper. In most such instances, the officers executing the warrant cannot be expected to question the magistrate\u2019s determination. Leon, 468 U.S. at 919-21, 82 L. Ed. 2d at 696-98, 104 S. Ct. at 3418-19.\nThe Leon Court stressed that, in applying the test it set out, a court must consider whether the actions of law enforcement officers were objectively reasonable and not whether the officers subjectively believed that their actions were proper. (Leon, 468 U.S. at 919 n.20, 82 L. Ed. 2d at 696 n.20, 104 S. Ct. at 3419 n.20.) Moreover, a court must consider the reasonableness \u201cnot only of the officers who eventually executed a warrant, but also of the officers who originally obtained it or who provided information material to the probable cause determination.\u201d Leon, 468 U.S. at 923 n.24, 82 L. Ed. 2d at 698 n.24, 104 S. Ct. at 3420 n.24.\nWe conclude that the Leon good-faith doctrine is of no help to the State in this case. Under these facts, application of the good-faith doctrine is neither compelled by the reasoning of Leon nor consistent with the purposes of the exclusionary rule as recognized even after Leon.\nLeon\u2019s holding is premised on the assumption that law enforcement officers ordinarily have no reason to question the determination of a neutral magistrate that there is probable cause to execute the search or arrest for which the warrant has been issued. Even in the context of a probable-cause determination, however, there are certain instances, not directly applicable here, where law enforcement officers will have no reasonable grounds for believing that the warrant was issued. Leon, 468 U.S. at 922-23, 82 L. Ed. 2d at 698-99, 104 S. Ct. at 3420-21.\nWe believe that the issuance of an invalid repetitive warrant is such an instance. The procurement and execution of a previous warrant are historical facts which law enforcement officers know or should know at the time that a second warrant is issued. These are not matters with regard to which law enforcement officers may reasonably insist on deference to a magistrate\u2019s determination, for whether a warrant is redundant is not a question of degree; it is a simple fact of which the police as an entity are or should be aware. Thus, law enforcement officers in a case such as this one will have no reasonable grounds to believe that the warrant was proper. Even if such reasonable grounds could be envisioned in some hypothetical instance, nothing suggests that this case is such an instance.\nAlso, application of the exclusionary rule to this type of situation would promote the rule\u2019s central goal of deterring improper police conduct as opposed to simply \u201cpunishftng] the errors of judges and magistrates.\u201d (Leon, 468 U.S. at 916, 82 L. Ed. 2d at 694, 104 S. Ct. at 3417.) As both the trial judge here and one Federal appellate court have noted, to allow multiple arrests of a defendant on the same charge in the same jurisdiction could facilitate harassment of a defendant \u2014 or \u201cfishing expeditions\u201d for other-crimes evidence that might be turned up in a search incident to the redundant arrest. (See Holmes, 452 F.2d at 261.) Moreover, as defendant observes on appeal, to allow law enforcement officials to benefit from an arrest that is concededly the result of their failure to obtain full and accurate information about a given defendant might actually encourage negligent execution of police functions.\nWe do not mean to imply that any such motives were present in this case, as the record does not so suggest. However, the temptations to such police misconduct are evident in a case such as this one unless the fruits of the improper arrest and search are suppressed. Therefore, we hold that the trial court properly granted defendant\u2019s motion to suppress.\nThe judgment of the circuit court of Kane County is affirmed.\nAffirmed.\nWOODWARD, J., concurs.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE UNVERZAGT" }, { "text": "PRESIDING JUSTICE INGLIS,\ndissenting:\nBecause I feel that the good-faith doctrine does operate to shield the arrest and search of this defendant from the operation of the exclusionary rule, I respectfully dissent. I agree with the majority that the trial court erred in holding United States v. Leon (1984), 468 U.S. 897, 82 L. Ed. 2d 677, 104 S. Ct. 3405, inapplicable merely because the warrant issued from a grand jury rather than a magistrate. I also agree that People v. Mourecek (1991), 208 Ill. App. 3d 87, is distinguishable and that the subsequent warrant was ultimately invalid. It is the majority\u2019s application of Leon, and thus the ultimate disposition, with which I must take issue.\nWriting for the Court in Leon, Chief Justice Burger took great pains to explain that the key to the exclusionary rule is its deterrent effect. As the majority notes, the rule is designed to deter police misconduct rather than judicial or magistral error. The majority, however, seems to punish the police for the error of the circuit court or the State\u2019s Attorney.\nBurger directs \u201c[the rule] cannot be expected, and should not be applied, to deter objectively reasonable law enforcement activity.\u201d (Leon, 468 U.S. at 919, 82 L. Ed. 2d at 696, 104 S. Ct. at 3418.) I cannot see that the police erred in any way. Nor do I see that the officer acted in a less than reasonable manner. The officer in this case, like the officer in Leon, seems to have done all he could do to determine the validity of the warrant. Suspecting the warrant might be old, the officer radioed in to ask. There was nothing more he could have done.\n\u201c \u2018[T]he application of the [exclusionary] rule has been restricted to those areas where its remedial objectives are thought most efficaciously served.\u2019 \u201d (Leon, 468 U.S. at 908, 82 L. Ed. 2d at 689, 104 S. Ct. at 3413, quoting United States v. Calandra (1974), 414 U.S. 338, 348, 38 L. Ed. 2d 561, 571, 94 S. Ct. 613, 670.) It does not seem to me that application of the exclusionary rule in this case will serve its remedial objectives. The officer did not request the redundant warrant; he had nothing to do with its issuance. It does not appear that the police department requested the redundant warrant or that the department could have prevented its issuance. The majority asserts that the redundancy of a warrant is \u201ca simple fact of which the police as an entity are or should be aware.\u201d (251 Ill. App. 3d at 491.) I do not see this. How could they know?\n\u201c \u2018If the purpose of the exclusionary rule is to deter unlawful police conduct, then evidence obtained from a search should be suppressed only if it can be said that the law enforcement officer had knowledge, or may properly be charged with knowledge, that the search was unconstitutional under the Fourth Amendment.\u2019 \u201d (Leon, 468 U.S. at 919, 82 L. Ed. 2d at 696, 104 S. Ct. at 3419, quoting United States v. Peltier (1975), 422 U.S. 531, 542, 45 L. Ed. 2d 374, 384, 95 S. Ct. 2313, 2320.) The officer in this case had every reasonable ground to believe the warrant was valid and, after calling in to check, had absolutely no reason to doubt it. It does not appear that the officer here failed in his duty in any respect. I do not see how he or the department could be charged with knowledge of the redundant nature of the warrant.\nThe majority states in closing that we do not mean to imply misconduct but affirm the suppression because \u201ctemptations to such police misconduct are evident.\u201d (251 Ill. App. 3d at 492.) This strong language, I believe, does unkind and unmerited disservice to local law enforcement. It cannot but be interpreted as a lack of faith in the integrity of these public servants. Furthermore, I do not read the exclusionary rule to punish possible future misconduct. I simply do not agree that good faith does not apply here.\nFinally, I question the restriction of the good-faith doctrine which the majority seems to suggest: that the department as well as the individual officer must have no reasonable ground to doubt the validity of the warrant. I believe this was not intended in Leon, and I believe the warrant system would suffer if the police were expected to doubt every warrant.\nI believe the good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule applies to this case. I would therefore reverse the decision of the trial court.", "type": "dissent", "author": "PRESIDING JUSTICE INGLIS," } ], "attorneys": [ "David R. Akemann, State\u2019s Attorney, of Geneva (William L. Browers, Marshall M. Stevens, Robert J. Biderman, and Jeffrey K. Davison, all of State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor\u2019s Office, of counsel), for the People.", "Fred M. Morelli, Jr., and Vincent S. Cook, both of Law Offices of Morelli & Cook, of Aurora, and Vincent C. Argento and Jesse V. Barrientes, both of Law Offices of Vincent C. Argento, of Elgin, for appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. RAYMOND TURNAGE, Defendant-Appellee.\nSecond District\nNo. 2\u201491\u20140861\nOpinion filed October 28, 1993.\nINGLIS, P.J., dissenting.\nDavid R. Akemann, State\u2019s Attorney, of Geneva (William L. Browers, Marshall M. Stevens, Robert J. Biderman, and Jeffrey K. Davison, all of State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor\u2019s Office, of counsel), for the People.\nFred M. Morelli, Jr., and Vincent S. Cook, both of Law Offices of Morelli & Cook, of Aurora, and Vincent C. Argento and Jesse V. Barrientes, both of Law Offices of Vincent C. Argento, of Elgin, for appellee." }, "file_name": "0485-01", "first_page_order": 505, "last_page_order": 514 }