{ "id": 2961642, "name": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. STEVEN GASSMAN, Defendant-Appellant", "name_abbreviation": "People v. Gassman", "decision_date": "1993-10-22", "docket_number": "No. 2\u201491\u20141136", "first_page": "681", "last_page": "694", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "251 Ill. App. 3d 681" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "112 Ill. 2d 356", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5538043 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "367" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/112/0356-01" ] }, { "cite": "121 Ill. 2d 491", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3201594 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "501" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/121/0491-01" ] }, { "cite": "152 Ill. 2d 489", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5603208 ], "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "499-500" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/152/0489-01" ] }, { "cite": "192 Cal. Rptr. 184", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Cal. Rptr.", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "143 Cal. App. 3d 709", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Cal. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2116604 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/cal-app-3d/143/0709-01" ] }, { "cite": "120 Ill. App. 3d 123", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3593009 ], "year": 1983, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "131" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/120/0123-01" ] }, { "cite": "108 Ill. 2d 182", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3130415 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "188" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/108/0182-01" ] }, { "cite": "151 Ill. 2d 257", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3292262 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "262" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/151/0257-01" ] }, { "cite": "143 Ill. 2d 281", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5591622 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/143/0281-01" ] }, { "cite": "96 L. Ed. 288", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed.", "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "300" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "342 U.S. 246", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 641097 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "263" }, { "page": "250" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/342/0246-01" ] }, { "cite": "155 Ill. 2d 103", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 4810424 ], "weight": 3, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "111" }, { "page": "111" }, { "page": "111" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/155/0103-01" ] }, { "cite": "155 Ill. 2d 188", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 4810501 ], "weight": 3, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "195" }, { "page": "195" }, { "page": "195" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/155/0188-01" ] }, { "cite": "141 Ill. App. 3d 234", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3496185 ], "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "238-39" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/141/0234-01" ] }, { "cite": "90 S. Ct. 263", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "S. Ct.", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "24 L. Ed. 2d 208", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed. 2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "396 U.S. 39", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 11327850 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/396/0039-01" ] }, { "cite": "42 Ill. 2d 461", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2849197 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1969, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "464-65" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/42/0461-01" ] }, { "cite": "76 Ill. App. 3d 124", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3280554 ], "weight": 4, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "125" }, { "page": "126" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/76/0124-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 1166, "char_count": 29822, "ocr_confidence": 0.801, "pagerank": { "raw": 2.5376077522101294e-07, "percentile": 0.8131155522966783 }, "sha256": "3e3e1bc5315f605a88f73f3c0f2fc3a2f15e0940f74bc4365e22c9739e8176ac", "simhash": "1:73c995f2931261a4", "word_count": 4950 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T16:22:05.264174+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. STEVEN GASSMAN, Defendant-Appellant." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE GEIGER\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nThe defendant, Steven Gassman, was charged with one count each of the unlawful possession of cannabis (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1989, ch. 56V2, par. 704(c) (now 720 ILCS 550/4(c) (West 1992))); failure to dim headlights (Ill. Rev. Stat 1989, ch. 95V2, par. 12 \u2014 210(a) (now 625 ILCS 5/12 \u2014 210(a) (West 1992))); unlawful transportation of open liquor (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1989, ch. 95^2, par. 11 \u2014 502(a) (now 625 ILCS 5/11 \u2014 502(a) (West 1992))); driving while under the influence of drugs to a degree that rendered him incapable of safely driving (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1989, ch. 95V2, par. 11 \u2014 501(a)(3) (now codified, as amended, at 625 ILCS 5/ll-501(a)(3) (West 1992))) (subsection 11-501(a)(3)); driving while under the combined influence of alcohol and drugs to a degree which rendered him incapable of safely driving (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1989, ch. 95V2, par. 11 \u2014 501(a)(4) (now codified, as amended, at 625 ILCS 5/11 \u2014 501(a)(4) (West 1992))) (subsection 11\u2014 501(a)(4)); and driving with any amount of a drug in his blood or urine resulting from the unlawful use or consumption of cannabis or a controlled substance (Ill. Rev. Stat., 1990 Supp., ch. 95V2, par. 11 \u2014 501(a)(5) (now codified, as amended, at 625 ILCS 5/11 \u2014 501(a)(5) (West 1992))) (subsection 11 \u2014 501(a)(5)).\nAfter a bench trial, the defendant was acquitted of violating subsections 11 \u2014 501(a)(3) and 11 \u2014 501(a)(4) but convicted of violating subsection 11 \u2014 501(a)(5). The defendant was convicted of the remaining charges. The defendant received one year of court supervision and was ordered to pay a $300 fine for violating subsection 11 \u2014 501(a)(5).\nThe defendant appeals only his conviction under subsection 11\u2014 501(a)(5). He argues that (1) this subsection and the corresponding charging document are constitutionally deficient because they fail to specify a requisite mental state as an element of the offense; (2) subsection 11 \u2014 501(a)(5) violates due process because it is not a proper exercise of the police power; (3) subsection 11 \u2014 501(a)(5) violates the Federal and State constitutional guarantees of equal protection; and (4) subsection 11 \u2014 501(a)(5) is unconstitutionally vague.\nWe set out the relevant evidence from the trial. After the trial court denied the defendant\u2019s motion to dismiss the charge of violating subsection 11 \u2014 501(a)(5), the case went to trial. The State\u2019s first witness was John Tannahill, a police officer for the Village of Westmont. Officer Tannahill testified that, at about 11:10 p.m. on October 1, 1990, he was driving south on Cass Avenue when he observed a Cadillac about 500 to 600 feet away. The Cadillac had all four bright headlights on and was traveling at or slightly under the posted speed limit of 35 miles per hour. Tannahill noticed nothing unusual or suspicious about the way the car was driven other than the condition of the headlights. The officer flashed his bright lights, requesting the other driver to dim his lights. The two cars passed each other. Tannahill ordered the driver of the Cadillac to stop.\nThe Cadillac stopped. By the time Officer Tannahill approached the car, the driver, whom the officer identified in court as the defendant, had exited the car. The defendant was standing against the vehicle, but he was not holding onto anything for support, and he did not appear to be nervous. As Tannahill spoke to the defendant, the officer noticed that the defendant\u2019s breath smelled of alcohol. The defendant admitted that he had consumed three or four beers that evening.\nAfter a search of the defendant\u2019s car turned up two cans of beer and a bag of a substance later identified as cannabis, Tannahill arrested defendant for possession of cannabis. Tannahill could not detect any odor of marijuana or any residue of marijuana cigarettes in the defendant\u2019s car. Tannahill noticed nothing unusual about the way the defendant walked to the squad car; the defendant did not stagger or sway. A pat-down search of the defendant at the scene revealed that the defendant had been carrying a small pipe in his pocket. Tannahill\u2019s experience led him to conclude that this was the type of pipe used to smoke cannabis and that there was some burned cannabis in the bowl of the pipe.\nAfter Tannahill and the defendant arrived at the police station, Tannahill put the defendant through several field sobriety tests. The defendant performed poorly, although he was well short of \u201cfalling-down drunk.\u201d Tannahill placed the defendant under arrest for DUI. The defendant\u2019s breathalyzer test gave a reading of only .04, which the officer believed was not enough to put the defendant into the \u201ccondition he had.\u201d\nAfter he arrested the defendant for DUI, Tannahill read the defendant his Miranda rights. The defendant signed a Miranda waiver form and answered some questions. Tannahill asked the defendant what the defendant had been doing in the past three hours. The defendant replied that he had drunk three or four beers and had had \u201ca couple of hits\u201d of cannabis. Tannahill\u2019s accident report stated that the defendant had admitted to having done \u201cseveral tokes\u201d of cannabis earlier that evening. At Tannahill\u2019s instruction, the defendant underwent a blood and urine test at Hinsdale Hospital that evening.\nThe State\u2019s next witness was Dr. Jeffrey Benson, an Illinois State Police forensic scientist who performed the blood and urine test. Benson performed quantitative analyses on a blood sample, testing for the presence of phencyclidine (PCP) and cannabinoids, or substances which are indicative of the consumption of cannabis. The tests revealed a concentration of less than 10 micrograms per liter of PCP in the defendant\u2019s blood and less than 50 micrograms per liter of cannabinoids in the defendant\u2019s blood (a microgram is one-millionth of a gram). From these results, Dr. Benson concluded with a reasonable degree of scientific certainty that the defendant had consumed cannabis and PCP. However, he could not say when the defendant had used these substances. Dr. Benson testified that, in the case of habitual users, PCP and cannabinoids can be detected up to 30 days after drug use. The period is shorter for casual users.\nDr. Benson acknowledged that the measurements he made were imprecise in another respect. The instruments he used were not sensitive enough to give a precise reading of cannabinoid concentrations outside a range of 50 to 500 micrograms per liter or of PCP levels outside 10 to 50 micrograms per liter. Thus, Dr. Benson\u2019s estimates for the defendant\u2019s sample were extrapolations. Dr. Benson could say that the level of PCP in the defendant\u2019s blood sample was closer to one microgram per liter than to nine micrograms per liter. Dr. Benson estimated that the concentration of cannabinoids was 8 micrograms per liter, but he admitted that this figure was based on a calculation that could not provide scientific certainty.\nFurthermore, Dr. Benson could not state firmly whether the concentrations of cannabinoids or PCP found in the defendant\u2019s blood were sufficient to cause any driving impairment. Although there is a general correlation between the level of cannabis use and impairment, Dr. Benson stressed that the relationship was not simple. He could not say with certainty either that the small amount of cannabinoids in the defendant\u2019s blood would impair driving or that such an amount would not impair driving. Of the substances known as cannabinoids, only THC is psychoactive. Also, the consensus among scientists is that there is no hard and fast relationship between the amount of PCP consumed and the seriousness of the drug\u2019s effects.\nDr. Benson acknowledged that a person could unknowingly ingest or inhale cannabinoids, such as by inhaling smoke from cannabis. Also, a person could consume PCP without realizing that he was doing so, a common way being through the smoking of a marijuana cigarette onto which PCP has been sprayed.\nThe defendant testified last. He stated that, on the night that Officer Tannahill stopped him, he had consumed two or three beers at about 8 p.m. while he was watching television with friends. At this gathering, he had also taken \u201cone or two drags\u201d from a joint. The defendant did not know that the cigarette had PCP on it, and he never knowingly used PCP.\nThe defendant conceded that he had told Officer Tannahill that he had drunk three or four beers between 8 and 11:30 p.m. on the evening that he was stopped. He smoked the marijuana \u201cto get high\u201d and because he did not feel like refusing the offer from his friends. He held the smoke in his lungs for a while before he blew it out. The marijuana he smoked was from friends and not from the bag that was discovered in his car.\nThe trial court acquitted defendant of violating subsection 11\u2014 501(a)(3) and of violating subsection 11 \u2014 501(a)(4). The court convicted the defendant of the remaining charges, including violating subsection 11 \u2014 501(a)(5); for this offense, defendant received one year of court supervision and was fined $300. After the court denied his motion to reconsider, defendant filed a late notice of appeal with leave from this court.\nDefendant makes a variety of constitutional challenges to subsection 11 \u2014 501(a)(5). For clarity, we set out the language of this subsection along with the others involved here:\n\u201c\u00a711 \u2014 501. Driving while under the influence of alcohol, other drug, or combination thereof, (a) A person shall not drive or be in actual physical control of any vehicle within this State while:\n* * *\n2. under the influence of alcohol;\n3. under the influence of any other drug or combination of drugs to a degree which renders such person incapable of safely driving;\n4. under the combined influence of alcohol and any other drug or drugs to a degree which renders such person incapable of safely driving; or\n5. there is any amount of a drug, substance or compound in such person\u2019s blood or urine resulting from the unlawful use or consumption of cannabis listed in the Cannabis Control Act, or a controlled substance listed in the Illinois Controlled Substance Act.\n(b) The fact that any person charged with violating this Section is or has been legally entitled to use alcohol, or other drugs, or any combination of both, shall not constitute a defense against any charge of violating this Section.\u201d Ill. Rev. Stat., 1990 Supp., ch. 95V2, par. 11 \u2014 501 (now codified, as amended, at 625 ILCS 5/11 \u2014 501 (West 1992)).\nSubsection 11 \u2014 501(a)(5) was added by the passage of Public Act 86 \u2014 1019, effective July 1, 1990. The remainder of the quoted material predates subsection 11 \u2014 501(a)(5).\nThe defendant\u2019s first argument centers on whether the State needed to prove that the defendant intentionally violated subsection 11 \u2014 501(a)(5) or whether the legislature created an absolute liability offense, i.e., one where a conviction does not require proof of intent or another particular mental state. The defendant argues that, because the violation of subsection 11 \u2014 501(a)(5) is a felony which may be punishable by incarceration, the failure of subsection 11\u2014 501(a)(5) to specify a mental state does not mean that a particular mental state is not an element of the offense. The defendant argues that we must construe section 11 \u2014 501(a)(5) to include a requirement of intention or knowingness; thus, the defendant reasons, his conviction may not stand because (1) the State never alleged that the defendant intentionally drove while knowing that he had any amount of cannabis or another controlled substance in his system; and (2) the trial court did not find that defendant intentionally or knowingly engaged in the prohibited conduct.\nThe State makes two responses. First, the State argues that, because defendant admittedly smoked marijuana only a few hours before Officer Tannahill stopped him, it would make no difference whether subsection 11 \u2014 501(a)(5) required a particular mental state. Thus, the State argues, the defendant lacks standing to challenge the statute on this basis because he is not within the class of those who would be aggrieved by the legislature\u2019s failure to include a requisite mental state.\nSecond, the State argues that subsection 11 \u2014 501(a)(5) creates an absolute liability offense. The State maintains that subsection 11 \u2014 501(a)(5), like its companion provisions in section 11 \u2014 501 of the Illinois Vehicle Code, is a regulatory measure designed to protect the public from potentially unsafe drivers. The State analogizes this case to this court\u2019s decision in People v. Teschner (1979), 76 Ill. App. 3d 124, in which we held that driving while intoxicated (then section 11 \u2014 501(a) of the Illinois Vehicle Code) (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1977, ch. 951-/2, par. 11 \u2014 501(a)) is an absolute liability offense.\nWe hold first that the defendant has standing to raise the issue of whether we must read a particular mental state into the elements of a violation of subsection 11 \u2014 501(a)(5). The State maintains that because the defendant admitted to having consumed cannabis some time before he was stopped, he has conceded that he had whatever culpable mental state subsection 11 \u2014 501(a)(5) may require.\nThe State relies principally on City of Chicago v. Lawrence (1969), 42 Ill. 2d 461, cert. denied (1969), 396 U.S. 39, 24 L. Ed. 2d 208, 90 S. Ct. 263, in which the supreme court held that the defendants, who were convicted of interfering with a police officer, lacked standing to argue that the applicable statute was invalid because it lacked a scienter requirement. The court explained that as there was no question that the defendants acted intentionally, they were not prejudiced by any lack of a scienter requirement. Lawrence, 42 Ill. 2d at 464-65.\nHere, however, the defendant correctly notes that the trial court, which concluded that subsection 11 \u2014 501(a)(5) imposes strict liability, never made any finding as to the defendant\u2019s mental state at the time of the offense. Although the record might well support a finding that the defendant drove with knowledge that he had illegal substances still in his system, we decline to make this finding on our own. Conceivably, the defendant believed (if unreasonably) that the small amount of cannabis in his system had been dissipated in the interval between his consumption of the drug and his operation of the car.\nSomewhat analogous to this case is People v. Palmer (1986), 141 Ill. App. 3d 234, in which the defendant appealed his conviction of aggravated arson. The defendant argued that the aggravated arson statute under which he was convicted was unconstitutional because it did not require a culpable mental state even though it created a Class X felony. The appellate court held that the defendant had standing to challenge the statute (which the court then invalidated), noting that the trial court had interpreted the statute as imposing strict liability and thus had made no finding as to whether the defendant acted with criminal intent. Palmer, 141 Ill. App. 3d at 238-39.\nHaving concluded that the defendant has standing to challenge subsection 11 \u2014 501(a)(5), we inquire next whether that provision creates a strict liability offense. We agree with the State that subsection 11 \u2014 501(a)(5) imposes strict liability and that, as a result, the charge was not defective.\nThe defendant places his primary reliance on the following provision of the Criminal Code of 1961:\n\u201c\u00a74 \u2014 9. Absolute Liability. A person may be guilty of an offense without having, as to each element thereof, one of the mental states described in Sections 4 \u2014 4 through 4 \u2014 7 if the offense is a misdemeanor which is not punishable by incarceration or by a fine exceeding $500, or the statute defining the offense clearly indicates a legislative purpose to impose absolute liability for the conduct described.\u201d (Emphasis added.) Ill. Rev. Stat. 1991, ch. 38, par. 4 \u2014 9 (now 720 ILCS 5/4 \u2014 9 (West 1992)).\nThe defendant observes that a violation of subsection 11\u2014 501(a)(5) is at minimum a Class A misdemeanor and may, under certain circumstances, be a Class 4 felony (see Ill. Rev. Stat. 1991, ch. 95V2, pars. 11 \u2014 501(c), (d) (now 625 ILCS 5/11 \u2014 501(c), (d) (West 1992))); therefore, such a violation may result in the imposition of a penalty more severe than a $500 fine (see Ill. Rev. Stat. 1991, ch. 38, pars. 1005-1-14, 1005-8-1(a)(7) (now 730 ILCS 5/5-1-14, 5/ 5 \u2014 8\u20141(a)(7) (West 1992))). The defendant concludes that subsection 11 \u2014 501(a)(5) may impose absolute liability only if there is a clear legislative intent to do so. Relying on both the language of subsection 11 \u2014 501(a)(5) and its legislative history, the defendant maintains that there is insufficient proof of such a legislative intent.\nWe agree with the State that subsection 11 \u2014 501(a)(5), like the other four provisions of subsection 11 \u2014 501(a), is a traffic regulation for which the legislature intended absolute liability. To explain our conclusion, we begin with basic principles of statutory construction. Our fundamental task in construing the statute is to ascertain and effectuate the intent of the legislature. (People v. Bole (1993), 155 Ill. 2d 188, 195.) Our inquiry begins with the statutory language itself, which is usually the best indication of the legislature\u2019s intent. (Bole, 155 Ill. 2d at 195; Collins v. Board of Trustees of the Firemen\u2019s Annuity & Benefit Fund (1993), 155 Ill. 2d 103, 111.) In reading the statute as a whole (see Collins, 155 Ill. 2d at 111), we consider the reason for the law, the evils it was intended to remedy, and the objects it was designed to attain. Bole, 155 Ill. 2d at 195; Collins, 155 Ill. 2d at 111.\nBoth at the trial level and in this court, the defendant has introduced evidence of the challenged law\u2019s history, including statements by its sponsors as to the purpose of subsection 11 \u2014 501(a)(5). We need not decide to what degree we ought look past the language of the statute and consider its legislative history; we have reviewed the legislative history the defendant has supplied, and we find that it is together consistent with the interpretation of subsection 11\u2014 501(a)(5) that we have derived from the statute itself without direct reference to legislative history.\nThe defendant observes that subsection 11 \u2014 501(a)(5) does not explicitly state that it creates an absolute liability offense. We do not believe that this consideration is dispositive. As the State points out, the subsection imposes liability without specifying a particular mental state, and this purposeful omission itself militates in favor of a finding that the legislature did not intend that a culpable mental state be an element of a violation of subsection 11 \u2014 501(a)(5).\nOf course, this consideration is not by itself conclusive, as the absence of a specified mental state does not mean that one ought not be read in, particularly where the possible punishment is substantial. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1991, ch. 38, par. 4 \u2014 9 (now 720 ILCS 5/4\u2014 9 (West 1992))); Morissette v. United States (1952), 342 U.S. 246, 263, 96 L. Ed. 288, 300, 72 S. Ct. 240, 250; People v. Gean (1991), 143 Ill. 2d 281.) Crucial to our consideration is that subsection 11\u2014 501(a)(5) is one of a set of traffic regulations that are all intended to protect the public against motorists who drive under the influence of substances that may impair safe driving. Because subsection 11 \u2014 501(a)(5) addresses the same subject matter as the other provisions of subsection 11 \u2014 501(a), we read all these provisions in pari materia. (See Stone v. Department of Employment Security Board of Review (1992), 151 Ill. 2d 257, 262.) We conclude that the legislature intended subsection 11 \u2014 501(a)(5) to operate in the same manner as subsections 11 \u2014 501(a)(1) through 11 \u2014 501(a)(4): as a strict liability provision.\nIn People v. Teschner (1979), 76 Ill. App. 3d 124, the defendant appealed his conviction of violating subsection 11 \u2014 501(a) of the Illinois Vehicle Code, which at that time provided that \u201c[n]o person who is under the influence of intoxicating liquor may drive or be in actual physical control of any vehicle within this State.\u201d (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1977, ch. 951/2, par. 11 \u2014 501(a).) The defendant contended that because subsection 11 \u2014 501(a) was punishable by imprisonment, he could riot be convicted of the offense unless the State alleged and proved that he had acted with a particular requisite mental state.\nIn rejecting this contention and thereby holding that subsection 11 \u2014 501(a) created an absolute liability offense, this court emphasized that the statute came under the \u201cgeneral rule\u201d that \u201cfor motor vehicle offenses a defendant\u2019s intent, knowledge, or motive is immaterial to the question of guilt. The only intention necessary for liability *** is the doing of the act prohibited.\u201d (Teschner, 76 Ill. App. 3d at 125.) This court stressed that laws such as subsection 11 \u2014 501(a) are intended to ensure the proper regulation of traffic and traffic accidents and that this broad regulatory goal requires absolute liability. The court observed that, unlike criminal statutes where criminal intent is a necessary element, the Vehicle Code is \u201cregulatory, as opposed to penal.\u201d Teschner, 76 Ill. App. 3d at 126.\nThis reasoning is applicable to subsection 11 \u2014 501(a)(5) of the present Vehicle Code. As the legislative history that the defendant supplies makes evident (and as we would conclude even absent such legislative history), the legislature\u2019s intent in passing subsection 11 \u2014 501(a)(5) was to protect the public against the danger of those who drive while under the influence of cannabis or other illegal drugs.\nAlthough subsections 11 \u2014 501(a)(3) and 11 \u2014 501(a)(4) already make it unlawful to drive while under the influence of illegal drugs, the legislature may well have concluded that a more sweeping prohibition against driving with drugs in one\u2019s system was necessary because of the difficulty of ascertaining whether drug use has in fact impaired the driver\u2019s ability. Indeed, the legislative history that the defendant cites makes it evident that such was the reasoning of the legislation\u2019s sponsors. The senator who sponsored the legislation stated that it was designed \u201cto curb the incidence of drug [sic] driving, as we have drunk driving.\u201d (86th Ill. Gen. Assem., Senate Proceedings, May 25, 1989, at 21 (statements of Senator Barkhausen).) The flat prohibition against driving with any amount of a controlled substance in one\u2019s system was considered necessary because \u201cthere is no standard that one can come up with by which, unlike alcohol in the bloodstream, one can determine whether one is \u2014 is driving under the influence.\u201d 86th Ill. Gen. Assem., Senate Proceedings, May 25,1989, at 23 (statements of Senator Barkhausen).\nThe defendant argues that construing section 11 \u2014 501(a)(5) as a strict liability offense would unjustly create criminal liability for those who ingested controlled substances inadvertently or unknowingly. We disagree. A straightforward reading of section 11\u2014 501(a)(5) demonstrates that it imposes liability only on those motorists who have controlled substances in their systems as the result of the unlawful use of those substances. Also, the defendant admitted that he intentionally ingested cannabis. Thus, even were this particular argument valid, the defendant would lack standing to raise it.\nNext, we reject the defendant\u2019s assertion that section 11\u2014 501(a)(5) is unconstitutionally vague. A statute is void for vagueness only if it fails to give people of ordinary intelligence a reasonable opportunity to know what conduct is lawful and what conduct is prohibited. (People v. Bales (1985), 108 Ill. 2d 182, 188.) Subsection 11 \u2014 501(a)(5) plainly prohibits individuals from driving with any amount of a controlled substance unlawfully in their systems. Thus, like the language of subsection 11 \u2014 501(a)(1), which prohibits motorists from driving with a blood-alcohol content of .10 or more, \u201cthe terms [of subsection 11 \u2014 501(a)(5)] defining the offense in conduct [sic] could not be more precise.\u201d People v. Kappas (1983), 120 Ill. App. 3d 123, 131, approving People v. Galante (1983), 143 Cal. App. 3d 709, 192 Cal. Rptr. 184.\nAdditionally, subsection 11 \u2014 501(a)(5) punishes only those who have already knowingly ingested illegal substances. Thus, the defendant scarcely may argue that the statute at issue blurs the line between prohibited and lawful conduct; a conviction of violating subsection 11 \u2014 501(a)(5) presupposes that the defendant has violated laws that this defendant does not even argue are invalid.\nWe move next to the defendant\u2019s assertion that subsection 11 \u2014 501(a)(5) violates equal protection (see U.S. Const., amend. XIV; Ill. Const. 1970, art. I). The defendant argues that the law arbitrarily distinguishes between two similarly situated groups of motorists: (1) those who drive after having unlawfully ingested any amount of a controlled substance; and (2) those who drive after having inadvertently or innocently ingested any amount of a controlled substance. The defendant notes that only drivers in the former class may be convicted even though drivers in the latter class are as likely to be impaired as a result of having controlled substances in their systems. Thus, the defendant reasons, the law unreasonably distinguishes between these \u201csimilarly situated\u201d sets of drivers.\nAs subsection 11 \u2014 501(a)(5) burdens no fundamental right and implicates no suspect classification, it does not violate equal protection as long as it bears a rational relation to a legitimate State interest. (People v. Shephard (1992), 152 Ill. 2d 489, 499-500.) Moreover, as no fundamental right is at stake, the legislature may distinguish between similarly situated groups if there is a rational basis to do so. People v. Esposito (1988), 121 Ill. 2d 491, 501.\nInitially, we reject the defendant\u2019s assertion that the two groups to which he refers are \u201csimilarly situated.\u201d In fact, a motorist in the first group has violated the laws prohibiting certain drugs, while a driver in the second group has not intentionally consumed illicit substances. Moreover, we may take notice that one who deliberately uses controlled substances ordinarily does so with the intention of altering his state of consciousness in ways that are likely to interfere with safe driving. The same cannot be said of those who inadvertently absorb illicit substances, especially as a person who does not intend to do so is not likely to absorb a drug in as great an amount as one who deliberately uses the drug to produce a \u201chigh.\u201d\nAssuming arguendo that these two types of motorists are similarly situated, subsection 11 \u2014 501(a)(5)\u2019s classification is valid anyway. The legislature may have rationally concluded that only drivers who have deliberately absorbed illegal drugs into their systems deserve subsection 11 \u2014 501(a)(5)\u2019s penalties because they present a more pervasive and severe problem to society than the occasional driver who has inadvertently consumed a controlled substance. Furthermore, the legislature may have concluded that those who do not intentionally violate the drug laws are less deserving of punishment than those who do; thus, the legislature reasonably could have decided not to punish the former group absent specific evidence that the inadvertent consumption impaired their ability to drive safely.\nFinally, we reject the defendant\u2019s argument that subsection 11 \u2014 501(a)(5) violates due process. As is true of equal protection, the requirements of substantive due process are satisfied as long as the statute bears a reasonable relation to the public interest that the law has been enacted to serve. Boynton v. Kusper (1986), 112 Ill. 2d 356, 367.\nThe defendant concedes that the State has a legitimate interest in protecting the public from drivers whose driving ability may be impaired by the consumption of controlled substances. However, the defendant notes that subsections 11 \u2014 501(a)(3) and 11 \u2014 501(a)(4) already prohibit people from driving while they are impaired by illegal drugs. Thus, he reasons, the extra prohibition of subsection 11\u2014 501(a)(5) serves no added purpose and does not contribute to the legitimate goal of keeping impaired drivers off the roads.\nThe legislative history the defendant has provided us supplies the refutation to the argument that he now makes. As we have noted, proponents of the bill that became subsection 11 \u2014 501(a)(5) were concerned that there is no simple or clear standard to apply to determine whether an individual is driving under the influence of one or more of the many illegal drugs to which subsection 11\u2014 501(a)(5) applies. The legislature may have concluded with reason that the sweeping language of subsection 11 \u2014 501(a)(5) increased the power of law enforcement officials to deter \u201cdrugged driving\u201d beyond what deterrent power had been provided by subsections 11\u2014 501(aX3) and ll-501(aX4).\nAs the defendant has failed to persuade us that subsection 11\u2014 501(aX5) is unconstitutional, we affirm his conviction of violating that provision. As the defendant does not raise any other issues on appeal, the entire judgment of the circuit court of Du Page County is affirmed.\nAffirmed.\nUNVERZAGT and QUETSCH, JJ., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE GEIGER" } ], "attorneys": [ "Kenneth W. Torluemenke, Public Defender, of Wheaton (Stephen W. Baker and Ronald Fraley, Assistant Public Defenders, of counsel), for appellant.", "James E. Ryan, State\u2019s Attorney, of Wheaton (William L. Browers and Lisa A. Hoffman, both of State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor\u2019s Office, of counsel), for the People.", "Richard D. Frazier, of Metnick, Barewin, Wise & Cherry, of Springfield, for amicus curiae." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. STEVEN GASSMAN, Defendant-Appellant.\nSecond District\nNo. 2\u201491\u20141136\nOpinion filed October 22, 1993.\nKenneth W. Torluemenke, Public Defender, of Wheaton (Stephen W. Baker and Ronald Fraley, Assistant Public Defenders, of counsel), for appellant.\nJames E. Ryan, State\u2019s Attorney, of Wheaton (William L. Browers and Lisa A. Hoffman, both of State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor\u2019s Office, of counsel), for the People.\nRichard D. Frazier, of Metnick, Barewin, Wise & Cherry, of Springfield, for amicus curiae." }, "file_name": "0681-01", "first_page_order": 701, "last_page_order": 714 }