{ "id": 2962283, "name": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. STEVEN GAGLIANI, Defendant-Appellant", "name_abbreviation": "People v. Gagliani", "decision_date": "1993-11-10", "docket_number": "No. 2\u201491\u20141441", "first_page": "1019", "last_page": "1029", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "251 Ill. App. 3d 1019" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "144 Ill. 2d 636", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "223 Ill. App. 3d 247", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5254464 ], "year": 1991, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/223/0247-01" ] }, { "cite": "150 Ill. App. 3d 506", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3501349 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "515" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/150/0506-01" ] }, { "cite": "134 Ill. App. 3d 228", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3636978 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/134/0228-01" ] }, { "cite": "102 Ill. 2d 54", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3155800 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "80-81" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/102/0054-01" ] }, { "cite": "229 Ill. App. 3d 336", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5215372 ], "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "340" }, { "page": "340" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/229/0336-01" ] }, { "cite": "68 Ill. 2d 149", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5809665 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "154" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/68/0149-01" ] }, { "cite": "241 Ill. App. 3d 276", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2436532 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "283" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/241/0276-01" ] }, { "cite": "85 Ill. 2d 281", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5469875 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/85/0281-01" ] }, { "cite": "122 Ill. App. 3d 141", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3523927 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/122/0141-01" ] }, { "cite": "106 Ill. App. 3d 774", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3030464 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/106/0774-01" ] }, { "cite": "66 Ill. 2d 551", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5463653 ], "weight": 3, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "566" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/66/0551-01" ] }, { "cite": "216 Ill. App. 3d 913", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5288467 ], "weight": 13, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "916-17" }, { "page": "917" }, { "page": "914" }, { "page": "915" }, { "page": "917" }, { "page": "915" }, { "page": "915" }, { "page": "915" }, { "page": "915" }, { "page": "915" }, { "page": "915" }, { "page": "915" }, { "page": "917" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/216/0913-01" ] }, { "cite": "108 Ill. 2d 70", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3130235 ], "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "81" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/108/0070-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 978, "char_count": 25959, "ocr_confidence": 0.78, "pagerank": { "raw": 6.403993536457144e-08, "percentile": 0.3963343036601748 }, "sha256": "92cee4d063135c401e8d091962663ab0f3aa4e661b4e7305ada5afada35435a9", "simhash": "1:bb23769c6a80e43d", "word_count": 4447 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T16:22:05.264174+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. STEVEN GAGLIANI, Defendant-Appellant." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE QUETSCH\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nFollowing a jury trial in Du Page County, the defendant, Steven Gagliani, was found guilty of home invasion (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 38, par. 12 \u2014 ll(aXl) (now codified, as amended, at 720 ILCS 5/12\u2014 11(a)(1) (West 1992))), residential burglary (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 38, par. 19 \u2014 3(a) (now 720 ILCS 5/19 \u2014 3(a) (West 1992))), armed robbery (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 38, par. 18 \u2014 2(a) (now 720 ILCS 5/18 \u2014 2(a) (West 1992))), and two counts of aggravated criminal sexual assault (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 38, par. 12 \u2014 14(a)(1) (now codified, as amended, at 720 ILCS 5/12 \u2014 14(a)(1) (West 1992))). The trial court sentenced the defendant to 30 years\u2019 imprisonment for the home invasion conviction, 30 years\u2019 for the aggravated sexual assault convictions, and 8 years\u2019 for the residential burglary conviction, each term to run concurrently. The court also sentenced the defendant to 12 years\u2019 imprisonment for armed robbery to run consecutively to the other sentences. The defendant filed a timely notice of appeal.\nThe defendant contends on appeal that: (1) the trial court erred by refusing to give jury instructions on the lesser included offenses of robbery (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 38, par. 18 \u2014 1(a) (now 720 ILCS 5/ 18 \u2014 1(a) (West 1992))) and criminal sexual assault (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 38, par. 12 \u2014 13 (now codified, as amended, at 720 ILCS 5/12 \u2014 13 (West 1992))); (2) his conviction of armed robbery must be vacated because it is carved from the same act underlying the home invasion conviction; and (3) the court abused its discretion in imposing a cumulative sentence of 42 years\u2019 imprisonment. We affirm.\nThe victim, Gwen, testified at trial that she arrived home from work on August 2, 1988, shortly after 10 p.m. She parked her car in the driveway, locked the doors, and then went inside the house. Shortly after entering her house, Gwen walked into the bedroom, turned on the television at the head of the bed, and lay down. When she first went to bed, Gwen was wearing a T-shirt, bra, and underwear. She later took off the shirt and bra and fell asleep while watching television. No other lights were on in the room. Gwen woke up when she heard a noise, and she then saw the defendant standing in the bedroom. He was holding a \u201clong thin club\u201d in his right hand.\nGwen asked the defendant what he was doing in her house, and he told her to \u201cshut up\u201d or he would kill her. Gwen asked him to leave, and he repeatedly told her to \u201cshut up.\u201d The defendant then walked to the doorway of a bathroom which was connected to her bedroom. Gwen again asked him to leave, and he again told her to \u201cshut up\u201d or he would kill her. The defendant walked over to the television set and spent a few minutes attempting to turn it off. Gwen was able to see the defendant\u2019s reflection in the mirrors located near the television set.\nAfter he successfully turned off the television, the defendant hollered at Gwen to come to the edge of the bed and put his penis in her mouth. The defendant held the club at the back of Gwen\u2019s head and told her that if she bit him he would kill her. After Gwen complied, the defendant hollered at her to move over. He then lay down in the bed and told her to again put his penis in her mouth. The defendant continued to hold the club at the back of her head. Gwen complied for a second time. The defendant then told her to take off her underwear, and he proceeded to have vaginal intercourse with her.\nThe defendant got up and told Gwen that he wanted the keys to her car, and he followed her downstairs to retrieve them. After Gwen gave the defendant the car keys, he went to the front door and told her that if she called the police he would come back and kill her. The defendant left, and Gwen closed and locked the door.\nAfter Gwen heard the defendant start her car, she put on some clothes, ran over to a neighbor\u2019s house, and asked the neighbor to call the police. A police officer arrived at the neighbor\u2019s house and talked with Gwen. The officer went with Gwen back to her house, at which time Gwen noticed that a pair of jeans and some jewelry had been moved from the bedroom to the basement. She also discovered that some money, a watch, and a ring were missing. An ambulance then took her to the Glendale Heights Community Hospital, where she submitted to an examination.\nThe following afternoon, Gwen went to the police station and spoke with Detective Harrison. He showed Gwen a series of photographs, and she identified the defendant from the photographs as the person who had assaulted her. Detective Harrison told Gwen that they had found her car, and he took her to the garage. Gwen testified that the exterior of the car looked the same, but the car radio was \u201cbroken off.\u201d A club which she usually kept under the front seat was on top of the seat, and a hand-held radio had been moved from the backseat to the front seat.\nOn cross-examination, Gwen stated that she could not recall telling Officer Kirstein, the officer who spoke with her at the neighbor\u2019s house, that she had been unable to see the intruder\u2019s face. Gwen stated that she did remember telling Officer Kirstein that she did not know the person who had assaulted her. Gwen also testified that on the night in question the drapes in her bedroom were closed, the shades were drawn, and the only light in her bedroom came from the 13-inch television set which was angled toward the headboard of the bed.\nDefense counsel asked Gwen whether the club she had kept locked in her car was the same club she had seen in the intruder\u2019s hand. Gwen first replied that she was not sure whether it was the same club, but later stated that she believed it was the same club. Gwen also testified that the intruder had not been wearing gloves while holding onto the club.\nJerome Zacny, Gwen\u2019s neighbor, testified that shortly after 1 a.m. on August 3, 1988, he was awakened by a pounding on the door. Zacny opened the door, and Gwen \u201cjumped\u201d into the house and grabbed him by both arms. Gwen was crying, and she asked Zacny to call the police. Zacny called the police, who arrived shortly thereafter.\nPaul Frey, a police sergeant with the Village of Glendale Heights, testified that he discovered Gwen\u2019s car near her home at about 5:40 a.m. on August 3. There was nobody in the vehicle at that time. Frey called for a police tow truck and an evidence technician and then followed the tow truck and vehicle back to the police garage. Frey never went into the interior of the car.\nOfficer Ronald Kirstein testified that on August 3, 1988, at approximately 1:40 a.m., he was dispatched to the Zacnys\u2019 residence. Kirstein spoke with Gwen, who appeared \u201cemotionally upset.\u201d Kirstein then accompanied Gwen back to her house, where he noticed a pair of jeans, a purse, and some jewelry in the basement. The basement window was open and the screen was up. On cross-examination, Kirstein stated that Gwen told him that she had been unable to see the intruder\u2019s face.\nOfficer Gary Harrison testified that on August 3, 1988, at about 2 a.m., he was dispatched to Gwen\u2019s residence. He took photographs of the scene and recovered fingerprints from the screen window in the basement and the television set in the bedroom. Harrison then drove to the Glendale Heights Hospital, where he spoke with Gwen and obtained a description of the intruder. Harrison went back to the police station, where he photographed Gwen\u2019s car and dusted it for fingerprints.\nOn August 4, at approximately 1 p.m., Harrison met with Gwen at the Glendale Heights police department and showed her a photographic lineup which included a picture of the defendant. Gwen picked out the defendant\u2019s photograph within seconds of viewing the lineup. Harrison and his partner arrested the defendant at 9:15 p.m. on August 4 and brought him back to the police station.\nAt 10:30 p.m., Harrison met with the defendant and told him that \u201cif you are not going to be honest with me, at least be honest with yourself and get yourself some help if you need it.\u201d The defendant began crying and told Harrison that he had \u201cdone it.\u201d The defendant also told Harrison that he had only intended to commit a burglary, but he did not know \u201cwhat came over him\u201d when he saw the woman lying in her underwear. Harrison asked the defendant where he had gotten the club, and the defendant replied that he had gotten it out of her car.\nOn cross-examination, Harrison stated that although the police department owned both a videotape camera and a tape recorder, he did not use any such equipment to record his conversation with the defendant. On re-cross-examination, Harrison stated that he wrote down notes while the defendant was making his statement, but that those notes were destroyed once a police report was written.\nPaul Sahs, a detective with the Du Page County sheriff\u2019s office who specializes in fingerprint, tire mark and footwear identification, testified that the fingerprint found on the control panel of Gwen\u2019s television set matched the defendant\u2019s left thumb print. Fingerprints found on the inside top edge of the passenger window of Gwen\u2019s car matched the defendant\u2019s left ring and middle fingerprints. A fingerprint found on the broken stereo component in Gwen\u2019s car matched the defendant\u2019s right thumb print. Sahs was not able to obtain any prints from the club which Gwen kept in her car.\nKristin Sahs, a forensic chemist at the Du Page County crime lab, testified that a microscopic examination of vaginal and rectal smears taken from Gwen during a physical examination on August 3, 1988, revealed the presence of sperm.\nThe defendant did not testify or offer any evidence in his behalf. After closing arguments, the jury returned guilty verdicts as to each offense charged. The defendant\u2019s motion for a new trial was denied, and the court sentenced the defendant to the previously mentioned terms of imprisonment. This appeal followed.\nA common element of two of the offenses of which the defendant was convicted, aggravated criminal sexual assault and armed robbery, is that the defendant has a dangerous weapon when he commits the crime. The defendant contends, however, that there was evidence in the record from which the jury could conclude that he did not have a dangerous weapon when he allegedly robbed and sexually assaulted Gwen. He argues that the trial court therefore erred by refusing to give his tendered jury instructions on the lesser included offenses of robbery and criminal sexual assault, which do not require the presence of a dangerous weapon.\nIt is well settled that an instruction on a lesser included offense is required only if the trier of fact could rationally find the defendant guilty of the lesser offense and not guilty of the greater offense. (People v. Perez (1985), 108 Ill. 2d 70, 81; People v. Austin (1991), 216 Ill. App. 3d 913, 916-17.) An instruction on the lesser offense is properly refused where the evidence shows that the defendant is either guilty of the greater offense or not guilty of any offense. Austin, 216 Ill. App. 3d at 917.\nThe defendant argues that he could have been found guilty of the lesser offenses because there were no fingerprints found on the club which he allegedly used. Further, Gwen testified that she locked the club in her car on the night of the offense. The club was later found in her car, and there were no signs of damage to the exterior of the vehicle to establish a forced entry into the car in order for the defendant to obtain the weapon. The defendant also points out that Gwen confronted her assailant in a darkened room. The defendant contends that from this evidence the jury could have reasonably found that Gwen was mistaken or had not testified truthfully regarding the presence of a weapon.\nWe disagree. Gwen consistently testified that the defendant was holding a weapon, a long thin club, the entire time he was in her house. She also testified that the defendant held the club at the back of her head and threatened to kill her while he forced her to engage in oral sex. Detective Harrison testified that the defendant confessed to the crime and admitted that he had used the club from Gwen\u2019s automobile. Furthermore, although Paul Sahs testified that he was unable to develop fingerprints from the club, he also stated that the club has a painted, grainy wood surface which is less amenable to fingerprints than a smoother, \u201chard type of surface.\u201d We hold that from this evidence the jury could not have rationally convicted the defendant of robbery and criminal sexual assault and acquitted him of armed robbery and aggravated criminal sexual assault.\nThis holding is consistent with People v. Austin. There, the defendant was charged with two counts of residential burglary (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 38, par. 19-3(a) (now 720 ILCS 5/19 \u2014 8(a) (West 1992))) for knowingly and without authority entering the victim\u2019s home with the intent to commit therein a theft. (Austin, 216 Ill. App. 3d at 914.) At the instructions conference, the defendant asked the trial court to give two jury instructions on the lesser included offense of criminal trespass to residence. (Austin, 216 Ill. App. 3d at 915.) Criminal trespass to residence is committed when a person knowingly enters or remains within a residence without authority. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 38, par. 19 \u2014 4(a) (now 720 ILCS 5/19 \u2014 4(a) (West 1992)).) The trial court refused to give the tendered instructions, and the defendant was subsequently found guilty of the charged offenses.\nWe affirmed the trial court because the jury could not have rationally convicted the defendant of criminal trespass to residence and acquitted him of residential burglary. (Austin, 216 Ill. App. 3d at 917.) The victim had testified that when she awoke at 2:30 a.m. on July 22, 1986, an intruder wearing rubber gloves was standing next to her. (Austin, 216 Ill. App. 3d at 915.) His right hand was near her mouth and his left hand was reaching to turn off a nearby lamp. (Austin, 216 Ill. App. 3d at 915.) The victim pulled the glove off the intruder\u2019s right hand and screamed. (Austin, 216 Ill. App. 3d at 915.) The intruder then ran out the patio door. He never touched the victim nor did he take anything from her home. (Austin, 216 Ill. App. 3d at 915.) The victim identified the defendant as the intruder. Austin, 216 Ill. App. 3d at 915.\nThe defendant did not testify or offer any evidence in his behalf. (Austin, 216 Ill. App. 3d at 915.) In his opening statement and closing argument defense counsel argued that the defendant was misidentified. (Austin, 216 Ill. App. 3d at 915.) We held that since the only defense arising from the evidence and defense counsel\u2019s arguments was misidentification, the defendant was either guilty of the offenses as charged or not guilty. Austin, 216 Ill. App. 3d at 917.\nSimilarly, in this case, the defendant offered no evidence refuting Gwen\u2019s testimony that she had been assaulted and robbed by a man holding a long, thin club. However, Gwen testified that the bedroom was dark on the night of the attack and that the only light in her bedroom came from the 13-inch television set. Officer Kirstein testified that Gwen told him that she had been unable to see her attacker\u2019s face. The only defense arising from this evidence was misidentification. The defendant was either guilty of the offenses as charged or not guilty. The trial court properly refused the defendant\u2019s instructions on the lesser included offenses.\nWe next address the defendant\u2019s argument that only one act formed the basis for his convictions of home invasion and armed robbery and, therefore, his conviction of and sentence for armed robbery should be vacated. The defendant was convicted of home invasion based upon his alleged entry into Gwen\u2019s house and the use of force or threat of the imminent use of force against her while armed with a dangerous weapon. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 38, par. 12 \u2014 ll(aXl) (now codified, as amended, at 720 ILCS 5/12 \u2014 ll(aXl) (West 1992)).) The defendant contends that the use of force or threat of imminent use of force had to consist of either the aggravated criminal sexual assault or the armed robbery. The defendant asks that his conviction of and sentence for armed robbery be vacated because that offense was carved from the same act as that resulting in his conviction of home invasion and, based upon the trial court\u2019s sentence, it was the least serious of the offenses of which he was convicted.\nIn People v. King (1977), 66 Ill. 2d 551, the supreme court set forth the standard by which we are to determine the propriety of multiple convictions and sentences:\n\u201cPrejudice results to the defendant only in those instances where more than one offense is carved from the same physical act. Prejudice, with regard to multiple acts, exists only when the defendant is convicted of more than one offense, some of which are, by definition, lesser included offenses. *** \u2018Act,\u2019 when used in this sense, is intended to mean any overt or outward manifestation which will support a different offense.\u201d King, 66 Ill. 2d at 566.\nWe hold that the use of force or threat of imminent use of force underlying the home invasion conviction was not carved from the aggravated criminal sexual assault or the armed robbery. Gwen\u2019s testimony revealed that when she first woke up on the night of the offense, the defendant was standing in her bedroom holding a nightstick. She asked him to leave, and he repeatedly told her to \u201cshut up\u201d or he would kill her. This threat of the imminent use of force was an act independent of the aggravated criminal sexual assault or the armed robbery. See People v. Tate (1982), 106 Ill. App. 3d 774 (the entry into the victim\u2019s home and the stabbing of the victim constituted separate acts which supported convictions of home invasion and aggravated battery); People v. Dixon (1984), 122 Ill. App. 3d 141 (stepping one foot into the door and shooting the victim constituted separate acts which supported convictions of home invasion, burglary, and murder); People v. Myers (1981), 85 Ill. 2d 281 (there were two separate acts supporting convictions of attempted murder and armed violence based on aggravated battery where the defendant cut the victim\u2019s throat with a knife, took the knife off the victim\u2019s throat in order to menace another person, then put the knife back to the victim\u2019s throat and gave it a \u201cpretty hefty yank\u201d).\nSince we have determined that the defendant\u2019s multiple offenses did not arise out of the same act, and the defendant does not argue that he was convicted of any lesser included offenses, the multiple convictions and sentences can stand. See King, 66 Ill. 2d 551.\nThe defendant next challenges the propriety of his sentence. The State contends that the sentencing issues are waived because the defendant did not file a motion to reduce the sentences. We agree. See People v. Hess (1993), 241 Ill. App. 3d 276, 283.\nThe defendant asks us to review the cause on the basis of plain error. (134 Ill. 2d R. 615(a).) Based on the record before us, we do not find that any plain error requiring us to reduce the defendant\u2019s sentence has occurred. The trial judge is usually in a better position to determine the punishment to be imposed than the courts of review. (People v. Perruquet (1977), 68 Ill. 2d 149, 154.) A reviewing court will not modify a sentence unless it clearly departs from the spirit and purpose of the constitutional requirement that the sentence be proportionate to the nature of the offense and that the possibilities for rehabilitation be taken into account. (People v. Fort (1992), 229 Ill. App. 3d 336, 340.) A sentence is presumptively proper, and a reviewing court will find an abuse of discretion only where that presumption has been rebutted by an affirmative showing of error. Fort, 229 Ill. App. 3d at 340.\nThe record in this case reveals that the trial judge considered the evidence in mitigation and aggravation. He also read the presentence report and the report prepared by Kevin & Associates dealing with the defendant\u2019s family background and his use of alcohol and drugs. The trial judge found that there were no statutory mitigating factors. However, he found several statutory factors in aggravation, including that \u201cthe defendant\u2019s conduct caused or threatened serious harm\u201d to Gwen. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1991, ch. 38, par. 1005 \u2014 5\u20143.2(aXl) (now codified, as amended, at 730 ILCS 5/5 \u2014 5\u20143.2(aXl) (West 1992)).) The defendant also had an extensive \u201chistory of prior delinquency or criminal activity\u201d (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1991, ch. 38, par. 1005 \u2014 5\u20143.2(a)(3) (now codified, as amended, at 730 ILCS 5/5 \u2014 5\u20143.2(a)(3) (West 1992))), including two burglaries, theft, and possession of stolen vehicles. In addition, during his first term of incarceration in the Du Page County jail and his initial term of imprisonment in the Joliet Correctional Facility in 1988 and 1989, the defendant damaged property, started fires, and physically assaulted, battered, and threatened correctional officers.\nThe court also found as an aggravating factor that the defendant committed the felonies against Gwen while on probation for prior felonies. (See Ill. Rev. Stat. 1991, ch. 38, par. 1005 \u2014 5\u20143.2(aX12) (now codified, as amended, at 730 ILCS 5/5 \u2014 5\u20143.2(aX12) (West 1992)).) Finally, the trial judge specifically commented upon the defendant\u2019s lack of remorse, which is a proper subject for consideration at sentencing. People v. Albanese (1984), 102 Ill. 2d 54, 80-81.\nThe defendant argues that the trial court failed to consider that he did not physically harm Gwen. The fact that a defendant\u2019s conduct \u201cneither caused nor threatened serious physical harm to another\u201d is recognized as a factor in mitigation. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1991, ch. 38, par. 1005\u2014 5-3.1(aXl) (now 730 ILCS 5/5-5-3.1(aXl) (West 1992)).) However, the aggravated criminal sexual assaults of which the defendant was found guilty, accompanied by threats that he would kill the victim if she resisted, at the very least threatened serious physical harm. See People v. Burba (1985), 134 Ill. App. 3d 228 (the attempted rape and deviate sexual assault of a 64-year-old woman with a fractured hip, accompanied by threats that he would break her arms if she resisted, at the very least threatened serious physical harm).\nThe defendant also argues that the court\u2019s sentence fails to acknowledge any possibility of rehabilitative potential and provides him with no realistic opportunities to become a productive citizen. The defendant contends that his rehabilitative potential is demonstrated by the fact that he earned his G.E.D. and attended 12 Alcoholics Anonymous meetings and 11 substance abuse classes during his second period of incarceration at the Du Page County jail in 1991. Further, Du Page County sheriff\u2019s deputies Patrick Leahy and David Lyons testified that the defendant\u2019s behavior was much improved from his behavior in 1988.\nHowever, there was testimony that the defendant continued his violent behavior during his second period of incarceration. Sergeant James Hochhauser of the Du Page County sheriff\u2019s department testified that on October 5, 1991, the defendant threatened another inmate after the two had been involved in an altercation. Deputy Timothy Walsh also testified that on October 5, 1991, he gave the defendant a verbal warning for an earlier incident. The defendant became \u201cverbally belligerent.\u201d When Walsh asked to see the defendant\u2019s wrist band in order to make a positive identification, the defendant told him that he would \u201cslap the shit\u201d out of him.\nIn sentencing the defendant, the trial judge considered the seriousness of the offenses, the defendant\u2019s extensive criminal history, his lack of remorse, and the protection of society. In weighing the defendant\u2019s rehabilitative potential, the trial judge was not required to give greater weight to that consideration than to the seriousness of the offenses or the other aggravating factors. People v. Brajcki (1986), 150 Ill. App. 3d 506, 515.\nWe also note that section 5 \u2014 8\u20144(a) of the Unified Code of Corrections (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 38, par. 1005\u20148\u20144(a) (now codified, as amended, at 730 ILCS 5/5\u20148\u20144(a) (West 1992))) mandates consecutive sentences for offenses which were committed as part of a single course of conduct where one of the offenses of which the defendant was convicted was criminal sexual assault or aggravated criminal sexual assault. (See People v. Bole (1991), 223 Ill. App. 3d 247, appeal allowed (1991), 144 Ill. 2d 636.) In this case, the defendant held a club to the back of the victim\u2019s head and forced her to perform oral sex on him. He then immediately forced her to engage in vaginal sex. The defendant\u2019s separate acts of aggravated criminal sexual assault were committed as part of a single course of conduct, and pursuant to section 5 \u2014 8\u20144(a) of the Unified Code of Corrections (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 38, par. 1005\u20148\u20144(a) (now codified, as amended, at 730 ILCS 5/5\u20148\u20144(a) (West 1992))), the trial court was required to sentence him to consecutive sentences for those acts. The trial judge, though, sentenced the defendant to concurrent terms of 30 years\u2019 imprisonment for the two aggravated criminal sexual assault convictions. Thus, the sentence imposed by the trial judge erred in favor of the defendant. However, we find no plain error requiring us to reduce the defendant\u2019s sentence.\nFor the foregoing reasons, we affirm the trial court.\nAffirmed.\nBOWMAN and GEIGER, JJ., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE QUETSCH" } ], "attorneys": [ "Josette Skelnik, of Law Offices of Josette Skelnik, of Elgin, for appellant.", "James E. Ryan, State\u2019s Attorney, of Wheaton (William L. Browers and Martin P. Moltz, both of State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor\u2019s Office, of counsel), for the People." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. STEVEN GAGLIANI, Defendant-Appellant.\nSecond District\nNo. 2\u201491\u20141441\nOpinion filed November 10, 1993.\nJosette Skelnik, of Law Offices of Josette Skelnik, of Elgin, for appellant.\nJames E. Ryan, State\u2019s Attorney, of Wheaton (William L. Browers and Martin P. Moltz, both of State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor\u2019s Office, of counsel), for the People." }, "file_name": "1019-01", "first_page_order": 1039, "last_page_order": 1049 }