{ "id": 5424675, "name": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. ALI HASSAN, Defendant-Appellant", "name_abbreviation": "People v. Hassan", "decision_date": "1993-09-07", "docket_number": "No. 1\u201491\u20140418", "first_page": "558", "last_page": "576", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "253 Ill. App. 3d 558" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "436 U.S. 499", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 1490288 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1983, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "509" }, { "page": "498" }, { "page": "1950" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/436/0499-01" ] }, { "cite": "411 N.E.2d 223", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "pin_cites": [ { "page": "226" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "81 Ill. 2d 571", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5479830 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "577" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/81/0571-01" ] }, { "cite": "500 N.E.2d 80", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "pin_cites": [ { "page": "81" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "148 Ill. App. 3d 957", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3643262 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "959" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/148/0957-01" ] }, { "cite": "662 F.2d 1325", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.2d", "case_ids": [ 1185405 ], "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1330" }, { "page": "1330" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f2d/662/1325-01" ] }, { "cite": "447 N.E.2d 218", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 3, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "227" }, { "page": "227" }, { "page": "227" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "94 Ill. 2d 378", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3105961 ], "weight": 3, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "396-97" }, { "page": "397" }, { "page": "397" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/94/0378-01" ] }, { "cite": "399 U.S. 30", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6168009 ], "weight": 3, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "35" }, { "page": "414" }, { "page": "1972" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/399/0030-01" ] }, { "cite": "417 N.E.2d 1056", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1059" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "93 Ill. App. 3d 830", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3131840 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "833" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/93/0830-01" ] }, { "cite": "401 N.E.2d 507", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "pin_cites": [ { "page": "510" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "78 Ill. 2d 511", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3075987 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "516" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/78/0511-01" ] }, { "cite": "525 N.E.2d 888", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 3, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "891" }, { "page": "891" }, { "page": "893" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "169 Ill. App. 3d 499", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3552098 ], "weight": 3, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "503" }, { "page": "503-04" }, { "page": "506" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/169/0499-01" ] }, { "cite": "456 N.E.2d 1369", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 4, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1376" }, { "page": "1376" }, { "page": "1376" }, { "page": "1376" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "98 Ill. 2d 502", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3122553 ], "weight": 4, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "515" }, { "page": "515" }, { "page": "515" }, { "page": "515-16" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/98/0502-01" ] }, { "cite": "407 N.E.2d 543", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 3, "year": 1978, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "549" }, { "page": "549" }, { "page": "547-49" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "81 Ill. 2d 159", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5481541 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1978, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "173" }, { "page": "173" }, { "page": "169-72" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/81/0159-01" ] }, { "cite": "92 L. Ed. 436", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed.", "pin_cites": [ { "page": "440" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "333 U.S. 10", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6156920 ], "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "14" }, { "page": "369" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/333/0010-01" ] }, { "cite": "496 U.S. 128", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 12122066 ], "weight": 5, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "136-37" }, { "page": "123" }, { "page": "2308" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/496/0128-01" ] }, { "cite": "460 U.S. 730", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6199658 ], "weight": 11, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "738" }, { "page": "511" }, { "page": "738" }, { "page": "511" }, { "page": "738" }, { "page": "511" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/460/0730-01" ] }, { "cite": "425 N.E.2d 5", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "98 Ill. App. 3d 990", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 8500281 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/98/0990-01" ] }, { "cite": "389 U.S. 347", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 11339173 ], "weight": 6, "year": 1981, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "351" }, { "page": "582" }, { "page": "511" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/389/0347-01" ] }, { "cite": "463 U.S. 765", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6200096 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1967, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "771" }, { "page": "1010" }, { "page": "3324" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/463/0765-01" ] }, { "cite": "395 U.S. 752", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 1772077 ], "weight": 6, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/395/0752-01" ] }, { "cite": "494 U.S. 325", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 5456 ], "weight": 6, "year": 1969, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "334" }, { "page": "286" }, { "page": "1098" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/494/0325-01" ] }, { "cite": "357 U.S. 493", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6163905 ], "weight": 6, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "497-98" }, { "page": "1518-19" }, { "page": "1256-57" }, { "page": "497-98" }, { "page": "1518-19" }, { "page": "1256-57" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/357/0493-01" ] }, { "cite": "432 N.E.2d 630", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1958, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "632" }, { "page": "632" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "104 Ill. App. 3d 51", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5472497 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1958, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "54" }, { "page": "53-54" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/104/0051-01" ] }, { "cite": "403 U.S. 443", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 12027286 ], "weight": 15, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "468" }, { "page": "584" }, { "page": "2039" }, { "page": "468" }, { "page": "584" }, { "page": "2039" }, { "page": "466-67" }, { "page": "583-84" }, { "page": "2038-39" }, { "page": "468" }, { "page": "584" }, { "page": "2039" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/403/0443-01" ] }, { "cite": "445 U.S. 573", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 1777746 ], "weight": 21, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "586" }, { "page": "651" }, { "page": "1380" }, { "page": "585" }, { "page": "650" }, { "page": "1379" }, { "page": "586" }, { "page": "651" }, { "page": "1380" }, { "page": "587-88" }, { "page": "651-52" }, { "page": "1381" }, { "page": "590" }, { "page": "653" }, { "page": "1382" }, { "page": "587" }, { "page": "651" }, { "page": "1380" }, { "page": "587" }, { "page": "651" }, { "page": "1380" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/445/0573-01" ] }, { "cite": "516 N.E.2d 491", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1980, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "496" }, { "page": "496" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "163 Ill. App. 3d 81", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3547478 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1980, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "87" }, { "page": "87" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/163/0081-01" ] }, { "cite": "404 N.E.2d 233", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1987, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "238" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "79 Ill. 2d 564", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3069192 ], "year": 1987, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "576-77" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/79/0564-01" ] }, { "cite": "561 N.E.2d 1", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1980, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "7-8" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "137 Ill. 2d 195", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3251719 ], "year": 1980, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "209-10" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/137/0195-01" ] }, { "cite": "470 N.E.2d 1157", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1161" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "128 Ill. App. 3d 464", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3524173 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "469" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/128/0464-01" ] }, { "cite": "426 N.E.2d 871", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "pin_cites": [ { "page": "877" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "86 Ill. 2d 78", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5469878 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "91" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/86/0078-01" ] }, { "cite": "522 N.E.2d 1124", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1981, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1130" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "122 Ill. 2d 176", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5550081 ], "year": 1981, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "187" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/122/0176-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 1494, "char_count": 45656, "ocr_confidence": 0.77, "pagerank": { "raw": 8.500390303435982e-08, "percentile": 0.4865015296258585 }, "sha256": "6b9a2087c4f9ac517432a6a97868396b3be1229f8fc3ae6a6f7f197ea26a7a8b", "simhash": "1:2b5ab904f3c0a2da", "word_count": 7804 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T15:28:32.530889+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. ALI HASSAN, Defendant-Appellant." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE BUCKLEY\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nFollowing a jury trial, defendant Ali Hassan was found guilty of delivery of a controlled substance of less than one gram of cocaine, possession of a controlled substance with intent to deliver more than 15 grams but not more than 100 grams of cocaine, and armed violence. The trial judge sentenced defendant to 15 years in the Illinois State Penitentiary. The issues defendant raises on appeal are: (1) that the evidence discovered in his home should have been suppressed as the result of an unconstitutional, warrantless search; (2) that he was prejudiced by the trial judge\u2019s improper refusal to allow into evidence a police tape that impeached the testimony of the arresting officers; (3) that he was denied the effective assistance of counsel; (4) that he was prejudiced by the State\u2019s failure to produce a copy of the contingency fund voucher prior to trial; and (5) that he was prejudiced by improper statements made to the jury by the trial judge and the prosecutor.\nOn August 18, 1989, at approximately 1 p.m., defendant was arrested in the middle of his front yard at 3721 South Wabash by plainclothes police officers after defendant allegedly sold a package of cocaine to an undercover officer. The officers then entered defendant\u2019s home and, in \u201cplain view,\u201d discovered 104 packets of cocaine, a quantity of money and several firearms.\nAt the hearing on the motion to suppress, defendant first examined llena Rogers, a witness to the arrest. llena had lived across the street from defendant at 3716 South Wabash for five years. llena stated that, on August 18, 1989, at approximately 12 noon, she was standing on her front porch when she noticed two plainclothes officers enter a house at 3707 Wabash. According to llena, the house at 3707 Wabash is known to be a \u201ccrack house.\u201d She testified that, after about five minutes, the officers exited the crack house with a woman known both as \u201cDebra\u201d and \u201cQueen Bee\u201d and walked with her to defendant\u2019s home. One detective stood by defendant\u2019s gate while the other walked up to defendant\u2019s front door with Debra. The officer who walked up to the front door with Debra hid behind a garbage can next to the door. llena testified that Debra knocked on the door, then began to walk back to the end of the gate, but turned around and returned to the door to knock again.\nAccording to llena, after Debra knocked this second time, defendant opened the door. llena stated that the officer behind the garbage can jumped from hiding and attempted to pull the door open completely while defendant struggled to close his door. The officer successfully got defendant\u2019s door open and defendant ran out of his house. According to llena, the officers tackled him in his yard by his front gate and handcuffed him. She stated that the officer who was hiding behind the garbage can then went into defendant\u2019s home and defendant and the other officer followed him into the house. They were in the house about 20 minutes before they left with defendant in handcuffs. llena was not cross-examined by the State.\nDefendant then testified that, on August 18, 1989, at approximately 12 noon, he was lying in bed watching a soap opera when Debra knocked on his door. He stated that he knew her as the \u201chouse lady\u201d of the crack house down the street and he told her to get out of his yard. When she started to leave, he went back to watching his soap opera. According to defendant, he did not open the door the first time she knocked and, as far as he could see, she was alone. He testified that a few moments later Debra knocked on his door again and she had $20 in her hand. He said that, as he opened the door to tell her to get out of his yard and that he was not afraid of her or her boy friend, a man jumped up from behind the garbage can and grabbed the door. Defendant testified that he was afraid they were trying to \u201cstick me up \u2019cause I know they smoke cocaine,\u201d so he tried to shut his door. The man was too strong so he \u201clet the door go and ran out the house\u201d toward the street. He thought that if he was going to get shot at least everybody would see it. He testified that he tried to jump the fence, but the man tackled him. Another man then walked up, put a gun to his head and said they were the police.\nAccording to defendant, as soon as they got the handcuffs on him, the officer who had tackled him \u201cgot up and ran into the house.\u201d Defendant and the other officer then followed. Defendant testified that he did not give the officers permission to enter his house and that the officers \u201ctore up\u201d his house. He stated that he was unaware of the presence of cocaine and that there were no drugs lying out in the open. He further testified that there were several guns in the house. Several he had purchased from a gun shop and two he had taken from his father\u2019s apartment after his father died. He stated that at no time did he offer any drugs to Debra or the officer.\nOn cross-examination, defendant denied that he had had any other visitors at his house all morning. He also testified that he had told Debra and her friends over at the crack house not to set foot in his yard. He said that the officer who jumped out from behind the garbage can did not identify himself. Since the man appeared to be with Debra, defendant assumed he was going to rob him.\nOfficer Linden Franco was called by the State and testified that, on August 18, 1989, at approximately 12:30 p.m., he and his partners, Michael Jamison and Officer Strickland, were investigating an anonymous informer\u2019s tip that a light-skinned black male wearing a blue silk shirt was selling narcotics out of a house at 3721 South Wabash. Franco stated that they set up surveillance and witnessed several people walk up to the house and exchange money for a small package which was given to them through the door by a man fitting the description given by the informer. Franco then identified defendant as the man who was selling the small packages.\nFranco stated that he returned to the station to obtain $15 in \u201ccontingency fund money\u201d in order to attempt to make a drug buy. He testified that he returned to 3721 South Wabash and knocked on the door. He noticed a black women whom he had never seen before standing on the porch when he arrived. He stated that defendant asked him what he wanted and he responded \u201cwhat you got?\u201d According to Franco, defendant answered \u201cI got that girl, she going for $15.\u201d Franco said that he interpreted defendant\u2019s statement to mean that he was selling cocaine for $15 and so he gave defendant the contingency fund money. He testified that defendant closed and locked the door, but that he could see defendant walk back to the bar. According to Franco, he could clearly see numerous small plastic bags with white powder in them on the bar. He stated that defendant picked up one of them, returned to the door, and handed it to him. Franco testified that he then announced that he was a police officer and attempted to grab defendant\u2019s wrist. Defendant attempted to pull away and close the door, but Franco was too strong. Defendant pushed the door open, therefore, and ran by Franco into the front yard. Franco stated that he grabbed defendant as he was trying to scale the fence. The other officers then arrived and defendant was placed under arrest.\nAccording to Franco, they then proceeded to enter defendant\u2019s home, where they recovered 104 small plastic bags of cocaine and a quantity of money off the bar. He testified that they also recovered a revolver from on top of the bar, another revolver from behind the bar, and a rifle leaning at the side of the door.\nOn cross-examination, Franco stated that he did not know the name of the informer because the informer wanted to remain anonymous. He also admitted that he and the other officers did not stop any of the persons whom they allegedly saw conducting transactions with defendant. Defense counsel also attempted to impeach Franco by showing that he filled out the contingency fund voucher form after the arrest and not before. Franco stated that he understood that official police department policy prohibits officers from using personal funds to make narcotics transactions, but that he did not use his own money. He explained that he signed his name to a blank contingency fund voucher in order to receive the money. After the arrest, he filled in the form and that is the reason the form indicated that an arrest had already been made. He also testified that he had never heard that a \u201ccrack house\u201d was located at 3707 South Wabash and did not know any person named \u201cDebra\u201d or \u201cQueen Bee\u201d who lives at that address.\nDefense counsel also pointed out that, in his arrest report, Franco only stated that defendant sold him narcotics. The report fails to indicate that he saw defendant go over to the bar to get the cocaine or that he could see numerous packages of white powder on the bar in plain view. Franco admitted that he did not include in his report the location where he discovered the cocaine or the guns. Defense counsel also pointed out that Franco\u2019s report stated that, after selling a package of cocaine to the officer, \u201c[a]bove was arrested and advised of his rights. Further above search revealed 104 small packets of white powder ***; also in his house revealed [several firearms].\u201d Franco denied that his report indicated that, after arresting defendant, he searched his house. He asserted that \u201c[everything that I recovered in his house was in plain view.\u201d He denied that he \u201ctore-up\u201d defendant\u2019s apartment.\nFranco\u2019s case report indicated that defendant was placed under arrest, sent to the second district for processing, and then further search revealed three handguns, a rifle, and 65 grams of cocaine. Franco explained that \u201cfurther\u201d did not mean after defendant was taken to the station, but meant \u201cfurther to the arrest\u201d and was merely written as an inventory.\nThe State rested upon defense counsel\u2019s completion of questioning, and defendant put on Earl Rogers and Everly Frazier, Sr., as rebuttal witnesses. Earl stated that he was llena Rogers\u2019 cousin and lived with her at 3716 South Wabash. His testimony was virtually identical to that of llena Rogers. Everly stated that he had lived at 3715 South Wabash for nine years and was married to defendant\u2019s sister. He testified that he had not seen the arrest, but that after the arrest, he had occasion to enter defendant\u2019s home. The State objected and the court sustained the objection, ruling that if the testimony was going to the fact that defendant had a neat house and the police \u201ctossed it,\u201d it was irrelevant to the motion. Defense counsel then made an offer of proof as to the disarray that Everly found the house in and then rested. After closing statements by defense counsel and the prosecutor, the trial judge simply stated, \u201cbased on the totality of the evidence that I have heard in this case, the motion to suppress the evidence will be denied.\u201d\nOn September 20, 1990, defendant indicated that he wanted to continue pro se and the court allowed defense counsel to withdraw. Jury selection was set for the next day on September 21 and the judge had another attorney sit with defendant throughout the process. On Monday, September 24, 1990, when the trial began, the trial judge explained to the jury that defendant had decided to allow the attorney who had been seated with him through jury selection to represent him at trial.\nThe first witness the State called at trial was Franco. Franco\u2019s testimony differed from his testimony at the hearing on the motion to suppress in the following respects: (1) at trial, he stated that the money he received from the contingency fund was prerecorded, whereas at the suppression hearing he stated that he placed his signature on a blank form in order to receive the money and the substance of the form was recorded after the arrest; (2) in addition to testifying that he could see through the doorway numerous packages of cocaine in plain view on the bar, he also said at trial that he saw the sawed-off rifle leaning against the joist of the door; (3) he testified he was only with Jamison and did not mention Strickland; and (4) in contrast to his testimony at the suppression hearing when he testified that one gun was on the bar, one was behind the bar, and a rifle was leaning against the door, at trial he stated that one gun was on the bar, one was sticking up from between the pillows of the couch, and a third gun was underneath a table.\nOn cross-examination, defense counsel brought out that Franco did not know the name of the alleged informer and never stopped any of the persons who allegedly went up to defendant\u2019s door to make suspected drug transactions. Defense counsel also inquired as to how Franco obtained the contingency fund money. Franco responded that he and his partner drove back to the station and filled out a sheet which included the amount of money and the serial numbers of the bills. Defense counsel did not have a copy of this form. The officer had previously given a copy to the prosecutor at the suppression hearing. A different assistant State\u2019s Attorney was prosecuting the case at trial, however, and he did not have a copy of the document either.\nDefense counsel also asked Franco if he had ever been to 3707 South Wabash. The trial judge sustained an objection by the prosecutor and refused to allow Franco to answer. Defense counsel asked for a side bar and the judge had the jury removed from the courtroom. Defense counsel informed the judge that he had a police tape which would show that Franco asked for assistance at 3707 Wabash just prior to going to defendant\u2019s home. He argued that the tape would illustrate that Franco and his partner arrested Debra at the \u201ccrack house\u201d at 3707 Wabash and then brought her to defendant\u2019s home to knock on defendant\u2019s door and draw him outside. He stated that the tape would contradict Franco\u2019s assertion that he had never been to 3707 Wabash. The prosecutor contended that the tape was still irrelevant. The trial judge stated that Franco did not say he was never at 3707 Wabash because the objection to the question was sustained. It appears from the record that the trial judge refused to allow the tape to be used.\nJamison\u2019s testimony supported Franco\u2019s version of events. He stated, however, that after they entered defendant\u2019s home and saw the drugs in plain view on the bar, Franco \u201ccontinued to search around.\u201d He testified that he stayed with the defendant until the transport vehicle arrived. He stated that he only saw the guns after Franco showed them to him, but he did not see them actually recovered. He admitted that Franco searched the house.\nOn cross-examination, Jamison admitted that, during the alleged drug buy, he could not see the doorway from where he was standing and did not observe his partner make the drug purchase. Additionally, his partner never told him that there was a black female by the door when he got there and, from his vantage point, he did not see one.\nMartinique Rutherford, criminalist one with the Chicago police department, analyzed the white powdery substance contained in the packages recovered from defendant's apartment. According to Rutherford, her tests revealed that the substance was cocaine.\nThe State rested and the defense called three witnesses. llena Rogers testified consistently with her testimony at the suppression hearing. Earl Rogers\u2019 testimony was also identical with his testimony at the suppression hearing. On cross-examination, however, the prosecutor brought out that Earl had recently pleaded guilty to burglary of an automobile. Additionally, Earl admitted that Jamison was the officer who arrested him.\nDefendant\u2019s testimony also was consistent with the testimony he gave at the suppression hearing. He stated that to his knowledge no drugs were in his home and he did not see Franco retrieve any drugs. He also stated that Franco never offered him $15 for drugs.. He testified that his rifle was in a bag in the closet, another gun was in his tool box, another was in a coat in the closet, and the last was broken and did not even work. He said that the $305 was not on the bar, but in the tool box with one of the guns.\nDefendant\u2019s first contention on appeal is that the evidence discovered in his home should have been suppressed as the fruit of an unconstitutional, warrantless search. He argues that, even assuming Franco did see cocaine in plain view on the bar, the evidence should have been suppressed because Franco had no right to physically enter his home without a warrant. The State asserts that defendant has waived this issue on appeal by failing to raise it at the suppression hearing, during trial, or with specificity in a post-trial motion. Notwithstanding waiver, the State maintains that the warrantless entry into defendant\u2019s home and the subsequent seizure of the evidence lying in \u201cplain view\u201d was constitutionally permissible due to (a) the fact that the police action did not constitute a search and, alternatively, (b) \u201cexigent circumstances\u201d existed which justified the entry.\nAs a general rule, issues not raised during trial and renewed in a timely post-trial motion are waived on appeal. (People v. Enoch (1988), 122 Ill. 2d 176, 187, 522 N.E.2d 1124, 1130; People v. Holloway (1981), 86 Ill. 2d 78, 91, 426 N.E.2d 871, 877.) A review of the proceedings at the suppression hearing reveals that defendant\u2019s position was that he did not sell drugs to Franco and that there were no drugs lying in plain view. Defense counsel attempted to show that the officers used a third party named Debra who was known to defendant to gain entry to defendant\u2019s home and that the officers \u201ctore up\u201d his house looking for evidence. Clearly, defendant did not argue that the officers\u2019 warrantless entry mandated the suppression of the evidence they discovered in his home. Moreover, defendant did not raise this issue with specificity in his post-trial motion for a new trial, which merely alleged that \u201cthis Honorable Court erred in denying defendant\u2019s motion to suppress evidence.\u201d General references in a post-trial motion to alleged trial errors without specific factual detail are insufficient to preserve that issue for review. (People v. McGrew (1984), 128 Ill. App. 3d 464, 469, 470 N.E.2d 1157, 1161.) Therefore, defendant has waived this issue on appeal.\nHowever, we may review plain errors affecting substantial rights even though they were not properly preserved (134 Ill. 2d R. 615(a)) if, as a result of the error, an innocent person may have been convicted or the error was of such magnitude that the accused was denied a fair trial. (People v. Herrett (1990), 137 Ill. 2d 195, 209-10, 561 N.E.2d 1, 7-8, citing People v. Carlson (1980), 79 Ill. 2d 564, 576-77, 404 N.E.2d 233, 238.) Since the warrantless entry of a person\u2019s home is \u201cthe chief evil against which the wording of the fourth amendment is directed,\u201d we believe it appropriate to address this issue -under the circumstances of this case. People v. Spicer (1987), 163 Ill. App. 3d 81, 87, 516 N.E.2d 491, 496, citing Payton v. New York (1980), 445 U.S. 573, 586, 63 L. Ed. 2d 639, 651, 100 S. Ct. 1371, 1380.\nIt is apparent that without the weapons and cocaine which the officers seized upon their entry into defendant\u2019s home, defendant would not have been charged with either armed violence or possession of a controlled substance with intent to deliver more than 15 grams but not more than 100 grams of cocaine. The fourth amendment to the United States Constitution provides that \u201c[t]he right of the people to be secure in their *** houses *** against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause.\u201d (U.S. Const., amend. IV.) The \u201cchief evil\u201d against which the fourth amendment was intended to protect the people was the \u201cphysical entry of the home.\u201d (Spicer, 163 Ill. App. 3d at 87, 516 N.E.2d at 496, citing Payton, 445 U.S. at 585, 63 L. Ed. 2d at 650, 100 S. Ct. at 1379.) Therefore, any search or seizure within a home without a warrant is presumptively unreasonable. (Payton, 445 U.S. at 586, 63 L. Ed. 2d at 651, 100 S. Ct. at 1380.) The Payton Court recognized \u201cthe long-settled premise that, absent exigent circumstances, a warrantless entry to search for weapons or contraband is unconstitutional even when a felony has been committed and there is probable cause to believe that incriminating evidence will be found within.\u201d (Payton, 445 U.S. at 587-88, 63 L. Ed. 2d at 651-52, 100 S. Ct. at 1381.) \u201c[N]o amount of probable cause can justify a warrantless search or seizure absent \u2018exigent circumstances.\u2019 \u201d (Coolidge v. New Hampshire (1971), 403 U.S. 443, 468, 29 L. Ed. 2d 564, 584, 91 S. Ct. 2022, 2039.) If an officer merely needed probable cause in order to search a suspect\u2019s home, \u201c \u2018the provisions of the Fourth Amendment would become empty phrases, and the protection it affords largely nullified.\u2019 \u201d (People v. Kelley (1982), 104 Ill. App. 3d 51, 54, 432 N.E.2d 630, 632, quoting Jones v. United States (1958), 357 U.S. 493, 497-98, 2 L. Ed. 2d 1514, 1518-19, 78 S. Ct. 1253, 1256-57.) The Supreme Court also has recognized certain narrow exceptions to the warrant requirement besides the existence of \u201cexigent circumstances,\u201d such as the \u201cprotective sweep\u201d (Maryland v. Buie (1990), 494 U.S. 325, 108 L. Ed. 2d 276, 110 S. Ct. 1093) and the \u201csearch incident to arrest.\u201d Chimel v. California (1969), 395 U.S. 752, 23 L. Ed. 2d 685, 89 S. Ct. 2034.\nIn this case, defendant was arrested outside of his home in his front yard. He does not contest that the police possessed probable cause and the State does not assert that defendant consented to the search of his home. Therefore, if the entry of defendant\u2019s home by the police fell within the protection of the fourth amendment, then the evidence obtained should have been suppressed as the result of an unconstitutional, warrantless \u201csearch and seizure\u201d unless there existed either \u201cexigent circumstances\u201d or some other exception to the warrant requirement which would justify the police action in this case.\nFirst, the State argues that defendant\u2019s motion to suppress properly was denied because the police action did not constitute a \u201csearch\u201d and the seizure of the evidence was reasonable. The State latches onto general language explaining the nature of fourth amendment privacy protections from cases inapplicable to the facts in this situation (see Illinois v. Andreas (1983), 463 U.S. 765, 771, 77 L. Ed. 2d 1003, 1010, 103 S. Ct. 3319, 3324; Katz v. United States (1967), 389 U.S. 347, 19 L. Ed. 2d 576, 88 S. Ct. 507; People v. Beroukas (1981), 98 Ill. App. 3d 990, 425 N.E.2d 5) and interweaves it with cases dealing with the \u201cplain view\u201d doctrine (see Texas v. Brown (1983), 460 U.S. 730, 75 L. Ed. 2d 502, 103 S. Ct. 1535; Coolidge, 403 U.S. 443, 29 L. Ed. 2d 564, 91 S. Ct. 2022) in an attempt to assert that when \u201cdefendant opened his door and thereby exposed his home\u2019s interior to view by any member of the public that might happen by on the sidewalk,\u201d he relinquished any expectation of privacy he may have had in the visible interior of his home. As such, \u201cthere was no police action which was prohibited by the Fourth Amendment.\u201d\nThe State contends that these familiar words from Katz support its argument: \u201cthe Fourth Amendment protects people, not places. What a person knowingly exposes to the public, even in his own home or office, is not a subject of Fourth Amendment protection.\u201d (Katz, 389 U.S. at 351, 19 L. Ed. 2d at 582, 88 S. Ct. at 511.) We accept that defendant may have relinquished any legitimate expectation of privacy he had in the narcotics which he left exposed to the \u201cplain view\u201d of the public, but this does not change the fact that \u201cthe police may not enter and make a warrantless seizure\u201d of evidence absent \u201cexigent circumstances\u201d or some other exception to the warrant requirement. The State informs us that it realizes that the \u201cplain view\u201d doctrine is not an independent exception to the warrant requirement (Brown, 460 U.S. at 738, 75 L. Ed. 2d at 511, 103 S. Ct. at 1541), but asserts that it is not relying solely on the doctrine to justify the police entry into defendant\u2019s home. We believe that is exactly what the State is doing.\nThe State has blurred the difference between the \u201cplain view\u201d doctrine which permits the seizure of an object, and the mere observation of an object left in plain view on private property. \u201c[PJlain view alone is never enough to justify the warrantless seizure of evidence.\u201d (Emphasis in original.) (Coolidge, 403 U.S. at 468, 29 L. Ed. 2d at 584, 91 S. Ct. at 2039.) The doctrine \u201csupplements\u201d a prior valid reason for being present and permits the warrantless seizure of evidence in \u201cplain view\u201d because it does not constitute a general, intrusive invasion of a person\u2019s privacy. (Coolidge, 403 U.S. at 466-67, 29 L. Ed. 2d at 583-84, 91 S. Ct. at 2038-39.) The three requirements for a valid warrantless seizure under the \u201cplain view\u201d doctrine are: (1) that the officer must not have violated the fourth amendment in arriving at the location from which he can plainly see the evidence; (2) that it must be \u201cimmediately apparent\u201d that the object in \u201cplain view\u201d is evidence; and (3) \u201cnot only must the officer be lawfully located in a place from which the object can be plainly seen, but he or she must also have a lawful right of access to the object itself.\u201d (Emphasis added.) (Horton v. California (1990), 496 U.S. 128, 136-37, 110 L. Ed. 2d 112, 123, 110 S. Ct. 2301, 2308.) If the officer\u2019s access is impeded, such as by the warrant requirement, his observation of the object in plain view may still be sufficient to serve as the basis for the probable cause needed to obtain that warrant. Brown, 460 U.S. at 738 n.4, 75 L. Ed. 2d at 511 n.4,103 S. Ct. at 1541 n.4.\nIn this case, Franco was lawfully in the location from which he could see the packages of white powder and their incriminating nature was \u201cimmediately apparent.\u201d However, Franco did not have a lawful right of access to the cocaine itself because to make the seizure he had to cross the \u201cfirm line\u201d that \u201cthe Fourth Amendment has drawn *** at the entrance to the house.\u201d (Payton, 445 U.S. at 590, 63 L. Ed. 2d at 653, 100 S. Ct. at 1382.) At best, his observation was sufficient to establish the probable cause necessary to obtain a search warrant. As the Supreme Court has recently reaffirmed:\n\u201c \u2018[incontrovertible testimony of the senses that an incriminating object is on premises belonging to a criminal suspect may establish the fullest possible measure of probable cause. But even where the object is contraband, this Court has repeatedly stated and enforced the basic rule that the police may not enter and make a warrantless seizure. [Citations.]\u2019 \u201d Horton, 496 U.S. at 137 n.7, 110 L. Ed. 2d at 123 n.7, 110 S. Ct. at 2308 n.7, quoting Coolidge, 403 U.S. at 468, 29 L. Ed. 2d at 584, 91 S. Ct. at 2039.\nIt may seem needlessly inconvenient to require an officer to go through the motions of obtaining a search warrant for evidence which is plainly visible simply because such evidence lies just inside the entranceway to the suspect\u2019s home. The distinction between a warrant-less seizure in a public place, however, and such a seizure in a private home is significant. (Payton, 445 U.S. at 587, 63 L. Ed. 2d at 651, 100 S. Ct. at 1380.) The seizure of property in plain view in public \u201c \u2018involves no invasion of privacy and is presumptively reasonable, assuming that there is probable cause to associate the property with criminal activity.\u2019 \u201d (Brown, 460 U.S. at 738, 75 L. Ed. 2d at 511, 103 S. Ct. at 1541, quoting Payton, 445 U.S. at 587, 63 L. Ed. 2d at 651, 100 S. Ct. at 1380.) Such a seizure in a person\u2019s home, however, implicates the fourth amendment\u2019s privacy protections. (Brown, 460 U.S. at 738, 75 L. Ed. 2d at 511, 103 S. Ct. at 1541.) As Justice Jackson stated in Johnson v. United States (1948), 333 U.S. 10, 14, 92 L. Ed. 436, 440, 68 S. Ct. 367, 369, \u201c[w]hen the right of privacy must reasonably yield to the right of search is, as a rule, to be decided by a judicial officer, not by a policeman\u201d who is \u201cengaged in the often competitive enterprise of ferreting out crime.\u201d If the search of a suspect\u2019s home could be based upon a police officer\u2019s own determination that probable cause existed, \u201cthe provisions of the Fourth Amendment would become empty phrases, and the protection it affords largely nullified.\u201d (Kelley, 104 Ill. App. 3d at 53-54, 432 N.E.2d at 632, quoting Jones, 357 U.S. at 497-98, 2 L. Ed. 2d at 1518-19, 78 S. Ct. at 1256-57.) Therefore, unless the State can show \u201cexigent circumstances\u201d or another exception to the warrant requirement, the evidence seized as a result of the officers\u2019 warrantless entry and seizure must be suppressed.\n\u201cEXIGENT CIRCUMSTANCES\u201d\nA police officer may make a warrantless entry into a suspect\u2019s home if exigent circumstances exist which would justify the action under the fourth amendment, i.e., \u201c \u2018there is a compelling need for official action and no time to secure a warrant.\u2019 \u201d (People v. Abney (1980), 81 Ill. 2d 159, 173, 407 N.E.2d 543, 549, quoting Michigan v. Tyler (1978), 436 U.S. 499, 509, 56 L. Ed. 2d 486, 498, 98 S. Ct. 1942, 1950.) The \u201cguiding principle\u201d in determining whether exigent circumstances exist is \u201creasonableness\u201d and each case must be decided based upon its own facts. People v. Yates (1983), 98 Ill. 2d 502, 515, 456 N.E.2d 1369, 1376; Abney, 81 Ill. 2d at 173, 407 N.E.2d at 549.\nThe supreme court in Abney listed numerous factors to be considered when determining whether exigent circumstances existed such that a warrantless entry of a suspect\u2019s home was reasonable. The Abney factors include: (1) the need for prompt action; (2) the absence of any deliberate or unjustified delay by the officers during which time a warrant could have been obtained; (3) the belief that a suspect was armed and exhibited some sign of a violent character; (4) the officers were acting on a clear showing of probable cause based on reasonably trustworthy information; (5) the defendant was clearly identified as the perpetrator; (6) the officers had a strong reason to believe that the defendant was in the premises entered; and (7) the entry was peaceful. (Abney, 81 Ill. 2d at 169-72, 407 N.E.2d at 547-49; see People v. Hoddenbach (1988), 169 Ill. App. 3d 499, 503, 525 N.E.2d 888, 891.) Three years later in Yates (98 Ill. 2d at 515, 456 N.E.2d at 1376), the court listed additional factors to consider. These factors include: (1) a grave offense is involved, particularly one of violence; (2) a likelihood exists that the suspect will escape if not swiftly apprehended; and (3) the time of arrest is a reasonable time of the day. (Yates, 98 Ill. 2d at 515, 456 N.E.2d at 1376; see Hoddenbach, 169 Ill. App. 3d at 503-04, 525 N.E.2d at 891.) The Yates court stressed that these factors are merely guidelines and should not be viewed as \u201ccardinal maxims to be rigidly applied in each case.\u201d (Yates, 98 Ill. 2d at 515-16, 456 N.E.2d at 1376.) Clearly, some factual scenarios will fit these factors more comfortably than others.\nAfter considering the facts of this case under the Yates and Abney factors, we do not believe that exigent circumstances existed to justify the warrantless entry into defendant\u2019s home. In this case, unlike in most cases we are aware of in this area, the suspect was in custody prior to the warrantless entry. Most of the factors to be considered appear to apply best to situations where the entry is for the purpose of apprehending the suspect. As such, the majority of factors listed above cannot be given much weight in our analysis.\nWe believe that there was probable cause to believe that a quantity of cocaine was on the premises, but there was no \u201cemergency\u201d which required a quick response. The officers could have obtained a warrant without the risk that the suspect would escape or harm others. Additionally, he was suspected of selling drugs, not of committing a crime of violence. In short, the police action here was not reasonable because there was no need for swift action.\nThe State argues that the destructibility of the narcotics created exigent circumstances and, as such, the officers were justified in entering defendant\u2019s home. In People v. Ouellette (1979), 78 Ill. 2d 511, 516, 401 N.E.2d 507, 510, the supreme court expressly declined to establish a rule that the easy disposability of drugs creates exigent circumstances when drugs are the subject of the investigation. If the destruction of narcotics is the primary motivation for the warrantless entry, the police \u201cmust have particular reasons to believe that the evidence will be destroyed\u201d before exigent circumstances will arise. People v. Patrick (1981), 93 Ill. App. 3d 830, 833, 417 N.E.2d 1056, 1059.\nIn this case, the police did not have any particular information which would have led them to believe that the evidence would be destroyed before a warrant was obtained. The information they possessed was that one man was selling drugs from 3721 South Wabash. Subsequently, this man was placed under arrest. During their surveillance, the officers did not see anyone other than defendant exchanging packages for money. While one officer went to obtain a search warrant, the other could have stayed behind with other officers to watch the suspected narcotics through the doorway. It was not impractical for these officers to have obtained a search warrant and, therefore, \u201c[w]e decline to hold that an arrest on the street can provide its own \u2018exigent circumstance\u2019 so as to justify a warrantless search of the arrestee\u2019s house.\u201d Vale v. Louisiana (1970), 399 U.S. 30, 35, 26 L. Ed. 2d 409, 414, 90 S. Ct. 1969, 1972.\n\u201cSEARCH INCIDENT TO ARREST\u201d\nThe State also maintains that the evidence was lawfully seized as incident to an arrest under Chimel v. California (1969), 395 U.S. 752, 23 L. Ed. 2d 685, 89 S. Ct. 2034. The State contends that the officer was \u201clegitimately in defendant\u2019s doorway\u201d attempting to arrest him when the officer observed the narcotics. The State argues that we should not allow defendant\u2019s attempted escape to affect the legality of the seizure.\nIn Chimel, the Supreme Court established that, upon lawfully arresting a person in his home, the police may search the area within the suspect\u2019s \u201cimmediate control\u201d from which he might obtain a weapon or destroy evidence against him. If Franco was lawfully within defendant\u2019s home when attempting to place him in custody, then the seizure of the narcotics would have been valid. However, Franco was never within defendant\u2019s home. The testimony of all involved shows that Franco was outside trying to pull the door open when defendant ran past him into his yard. At the time defendant was arrested, Franco had never lawfully been inside defendant\u2019s home. Therefore, the Chimel exception to the warrant requirement does not provide a basis for the admissibility of the evidence.\n\u201cPROTECTIVE SWEEP\u201d\nFinally, the State argues that the police were lawfully on defendant\u2019s premises while conducting a \u201cprotective sweep.\u201d In Maryland v. Buie (1990), 494 U.S. 325, 334, 108 L. Ed. 2d 276, 286, 110 S. Ct. 1093, 1098, the Supreme Court held that an officer, after lawfully arresting a suspect in his home, may make a \u201cprotective sweep\u201d of the premises to check for other dangerous individuals if the officer possesses specific \u201carticulable facts which, taken together with the rational inferences from those facts, would warrant a reasonably prudent officer in believing that the area to be swept harbors an individual posing a danger to those on the arrest scene.\u201d The Illinois Supreme Court has recognized the permissibility of a \u201cprotective sweep\u201d of a suspect\u2019s house \u201c \u2018even though the arrest itself was achieved without entry.\u2019 \u201d (People v. Free (1983), 94 Ill. 2d 378, 396-97, 447 N.E.2d 218, 227, quoting 2 W. LaFave \u00a76.4(c), at 431 (1978).) An officer\u2019s suspicion, however, must be based \u201cupon something more concrete than the mere physical capacity of a structure to harbor unseen occupants.\u201d (United States v. Wiga (9th Cir. 1981), 662 F.2d 1325, 1330.) \u201c[B]are suspicion unsupported by articulable facts will not justify a protective search.\u201d Wiga, 662 F.2d at 1330.\nIn this case, there were no specific facts which the officers could articulate which would lead them to believe there was another individual on the premises who posed them harm. The informer told them that one male was selling drugs. During their surveillance, the officers did not observe any person other than the suspect sell drugs, nor did they observe anyone else enter or leave the house. When defendant was arrested, he did not inform them that anyone else was in the house, nor was it generally known to the officers that there were other people in the house. Therefore, the officers could not articulate any specific facts that would lead them to believe other people were on the premises other than that the physical capacity of the structure could harbor unseen persons.\nFranco did testify that, when he was struggling to get defendant\u2019s door open, he observed a rifle leaning against the door joist. In Free, the Illinois Supreme Court stated that after an arrest without entry \u201c \u2018the police may have good reason to doubt whether they can withdraw from the area with their prisoner without being fired upon, in which case an entry and \u201cprotective sweep\u201d is justified.\u2019 \u201d (Free, 94 Ill. 2d at 397, 447 N.E.2d at 227, quoting 2 W. LaFave, Search & Seizure \u00a76.4(c), at 431 (1978).) In Free, however, defendant had used a gun during the commission of his crimes. Several factors the Free court considered in concluding that a protective sweep was reasonable were that (1) when defendant was arrested outside his house, he did not have the gun, and (2) an officer testified that he saw someone in the house at both the front and back windows before defendant came out and he could not be sure that both were the same person. Therefore, the court held that a \u201cdemonstrable potential for danger clearly existed\u201d which justified the protective sweep. (Free, 94 Ill. 2d at 397, 447 N.E.2d at 227.) In People v. Parent (1986), 148 Ill. App. 3d 957, 959, 500 N.E.2d 80, 81, the appellate court also upheld a \u201cprotective sweep\u201d conducted after a defendant was arrested outside his home. In Parent, the officers could see weapons in plain view at the same time that another occupant of the premises told them that there were no other people or weapons in the house.\nIn this case, a rifle was seen in the house by Franco, but there was absolutely no evidence that there was anyone present in the house to fire it. Therefore, we cannot hold that this was a valid protective sweep.\nA trial judge\u2019s determination on a motion to suppress will not be disturbed unless it is manifestly erroneous. (Hoddenbach, 169 Ill. App. 3d at 506, 525 N.E.2d at 893.) Under the facts of the instant case, the police made an unconstitutional, warrantless entry into defendant\u2019s home and, as a result, the evidence discovered must be suppressed. Consequently, the defendant\u2019s convictions for possession of a controlled substance with the intent to deliver and armed violence must be reversed.\nDefendant also contends on appeal that the trial judge committed reversible error and denied him a fair trial when he refused to allow defense counsel to impeach the officers with a police recording of their radio calls to the station near the time of defendant\u2019s arrest. The State argues that the tape was both irrelevant and inadmissible hearsay.\nThe State\u2019s theory of the events surrounding defendant\u2019s arrest was that the officers received an anonymous tip that defendant was selling cocaine out of his home. They conducted surveillance, went back to the station to obtain money for a buy, then arrested defendant after successfully making a drug purchase. At the time of the purchase, the officers saw narcotics lying out in plain view in his home. Defendant\u2019s theory at the suppression hearing and at trial, on the other hand, was that the officers did not receive an anonymous tip, conduct surveillance, or make an attempted drug buy. Defendant attempted to show through his testimony and the testimony of llena and Earl that the officers merely pulled Debra out of the crack house down the block at 3707 Wabash and attempted to use her to gain access to defendant\u2019s home. Defendant also wanted the jury to believe that there were no drugs or weapons in plain view, but that the officers \u201ctore up\u201d his apartment in their search.\nIn presenting his case at trial, defense counsel attempted to impeach Franco with a police tape recording of radio calls the officers made to the station before and after the defendant\u2019s arrest. On the tape, the officers requested assistance at 3707 Wabash just prior to calling for assistance at the defendant\u2019s home. A few calls later, the officers called for a transport to be sent to defendant\u2019s home. The officer on the tape, however, indicated there was no rush. The officer stated, \u201cTell him to take his time. We\u2019re still searchin\u2019.\u201d\nWhen defense counsel asked Franco whether he had ever been to 3707 South Wabash, a known \u201ccrack house,\u201d the prosecutor objected and the judge sustained the objection. Subsequently, the attorneys and the judge had a discussion out of the presence of the jury. The judge expressed his belief that the tape was irrelevant. Apparently, the parties went into chambers to hear the tape off the record. When the proceedings resumed, the tape was never mentioned again.\nBoth during the suppression hearing and later during the defense presentation at trial, both llena and Earl Rogers testified that the officers had first stopped at the crack house at 3707 Wabash before going to defendant\u2019s home with a woman named Debra. They testified that the officers had Debra knock on defendant\u2019s door while Franco hid behind a garbage can. According to their testimony, when defendant opened his door, Franco jumped up and grabbed for defendant. Franco had testified at the suppression hearing that he did not know Debra and that he had never been to 3707 South Wabash.\nFirst, the tape was not irrelevant. It lent credence to defendant\u2019s theory and directly supported the testimony of all his witnesses. Additionally, it contradicted the testimony Franco gave at the suppression hearing that he had never been to 3707 South Wabash. Had counsel been permitted to proceed with his line of questioning, it may have contradicted the officers\u2019 trial testimony. Moreover, as it is, the statement on the tape that the transport driver should not hurry because \u201c[wje\u2019re still searchin\u2019 \u201d substantially contradicts Franco\u2019s testimony that \u201ceverything that I recovered in his house was in plain view.\u201d Clearly, this statement was not irrelevant.\nAdditionally, it was not inadmissible hearsay. Hearsay is any oral or written evidence of an out-of-court statement offered to establish the truth of the matter asserted in the statement and is inadmissible. (People v. Rogers (1980), 81 Ill. 2d 571, 577, 411 N.E.2d 223, 226.) The tape was not offered by defendant as substantive evidence to prove the truth of the matters asserted on the tape. It was offered as impeachment evidence to contradict the officers\u2019 in-court testimony and to undermine the officers\u2019 credibility. Therefore, the tape recording was relevant and admissible impeachment evidence.\nThe question is whether the erroneous exclusion of this recording was so prejudicial to defendant\u2019s case that it denied him a fair trial. Clearly, the statements on the tape would have severely undermined the testimony of the police officers and reduced their credibility in the eyes of the trier of fact while at the same time bolstering the testimony of defendant\u2019s witnesses. We cannot say that this error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt and believe that defendant was substantially prejudiced by the trial judge\u2019s erroneous refusal to allow the tape into evidence. There is a reasonable probability that, had the jury heard this tape, it would have concluded that the officers never purchased cocaine from defendant and did not find the 104 packages of cocaine and the three handguns and one rifle in plain view in defendant\u2019s living room. Consequently, we must reverse defendant\u2019s conviction of delivery of a controlled substance and remand for a new trial on this count. In light of our disposition of the above two issues, we need not address defendant\u2019s remaining arguments.\nFor the foregoing reasons, we reverse defendant\u2019s convictions for possession of a controlled substance with intent to deliver and armed violence because the police obtained the evidence necessary for these convictions through an unconstitutional, warrantless search. We also reverse defendant\u2019s conviction of delivery of a controlled substance and remand for a new trial on this count on the ground that defendant was substantially prejudiced by the trial court\u2019s improper refusal to allow into evidence a police tape which contradicted the testimony of the arresting officers.\nReversed and remanded.\nMANNING, P.J., and O\u2019CONNOR, J., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE BUCKLEY" } ], "attorneys": [ "Daniel E. Radakovich, of Chicago, for appellant.", "Jack O\u2019Malley, State\u2019s Attorney, of Chicago (Renee Goldfarb, Donald T. Lyman, and Cory J. Pollack, Assistant State\u2019s Attorneys, of counsel), for the People." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. ALI HASSAN, Defendant-Appellant.\nFirst District (1st Division)\nNo. 1\u201491\u20140418\nOpinion filed September 7, 1993.\nDaniel E. Radakovich, of Chicago, for appellant.\nJack O\u2019Malley, State\u2019s Attorney, of Chicago (Renee Goldfarb, Donald T. Lyman, and Cory J. Pollack, Assistant State\u2019s Attorneys, of counsel), for the People." }, "file_name": "0558-01", "first_page_order": 578, "last_page_order": 596 }