{ "id": 5424562, "name": "DONNA CLEAVER, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. R. ANTHONY MARRESE, Defendant (Wood River Township Hospital, Defendant-Appellee)", "name_abbreviation": "Cleaver v. Marrese", "decision_date": "1993-12-27", "docket_number": "No. 5\u201493\u20140102", "first_page": "778", "last_page": "783", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "253 Ill. App. 3d 778" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "120 N.E.2d 15", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "pin_cites": [ { "page": "31" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "3 Ill. 2d 175", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2696160 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "205" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/3/0175-01" ] }, { "cite": "610 N.E.2d 709", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "713" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "242 Ill. App. 3d 437", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5120782 ], "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "442" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/242/0437-01" ] }, { "cite": "425 N.E.2d 1349", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1352" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "99 Ill. App. 3d 835", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3101344 ], "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "838" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/99/0835-01" ] }, { "cite": "568 N.E.2d 914", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "918" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "210 Ill. App. 3d 81", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2534417 ], "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "87" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/210/0081-01" ] }, { "cite": "536 N.E.2d 963", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 3, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "966" }, { "page": "966" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "181 Ill. App. 3d 238", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 8498287 ], "weight": 3, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "242" }, { "page": "242" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/181/0238-01" ] }, { "cite": "496 N.E.2d 1203", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1205" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "146 Ill. App. 3d 163", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3570520 ], "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "167" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/146/0163-01" ] }, { "cite": "620 N.E.2d 463", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "250 Ill. App. 3d 870", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2921174 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/250/0870-01" ] }, { "cite": "602 N.E.2d 808", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1993, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "151 Ill. 2d 257", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3292262 ], "year": 1993, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/151/0257-01" ] }, { "cite": "595 N.E.2d 561", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "563" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "149 Ill. 2d 190", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5599792 ], "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "195" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/149/0190-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 577, "char_count": 12389, "ocr_confidence": 0.758, "pagerank": { "raw": 2.2792828242351866e-07, "percentile": 0.7849745294030656 }, "sha256": "1abbe9dd8e419c785806597a4095c0c724f8cf77fac8f206ab39eb545dd07659", "simhash": "1:3eb055743f5054fc", "word_count": 2021 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T15:28:32.530889+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "DONNA CLEAVER, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. R. ANTHONY MARRESE, Defendant (Wood River Township Hospital, Defendant-Appellee)." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE CHAPMAN\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nDonna Cleaver filed a medical malpractice action against Dr. R. Anthony Marrese and the Wood River Township Hospital (Hospital) on August 23, 1991. The trial court dismissed the Hospital because the plaintiff failed to file her cause of action within the one-year statute of limitations pursuant to the Local Governmental and Governmental Employees Tort Immunity Act (Tort Immunity Act) (745 ILCS 10/1\u2014 101 et seq. (West 1992)). Plaintiff appeals. We reverse.\nPlaintiff alleges that because Dr. Marrese intentionally misrepresented the need for her to undergo surgery, she permitted him to perform a cervical discectomy and interbody fusion on July 6, 1988, and a lumbar interbody fusion on September 13, 1989. Cleaver\u2019s complaint alleges that the Hospital was negligent in granting staff privileges to Dr. Marrese and allowing him to continue to operate on and treat patients,_ including the plaintiff, when the Hospital knew or should have known that Marrese had previously performed unnecessary surgery on patients and previously-had his staff privileges revoked. The trial court granted the Hospital\u2019s motion for summary judgment because plaintiff\u2019s claim was not filed within one year from the date that the injury was received or the cause of action accrued. Plaintiff contends that her suit was timely filed because the statute of limitations for medical malpractice actions is applicable to this case.\nThe key issue is whether the two-year medical malpractice statute of limitations or the one-year tort immunity statute of limitations applies to this cause of action. Section 8 \u2014 101 of the Tort Immunity Act provides:\n\u201cNo civil action may be commenced in any court against a local entity or any of its employees for any injury unless it is commenced within one year from the date that the injury was received or the cause of action accrued. For purposes of this Article, the term \u2018civil action\u2019 includes any action, whether based upon the common law or statutes or Constitution of this State.\u201d (Emphasis added.) (745 ILCS 10/8 \u2014 101 (West 1992).)\nSection 13 \u2014 212 of the Illinois Code of Civil Procedure provides:\n\u201c(a) Except as provided in Section 13 \u2014 215 of this Act, no action for damages for injury or death against any physician, dentist, registered nurse or hospital duly licensed under the laws of this State, whether based upon tort, or breach of contract, or otherwise, arising out of patient care shall be brought more than 2 years after the date on which the claimant knew, or through the use of reasonable diligence should have known, *** of the injury or death ***.\u201d (Emphasis added.) 735 ILCS 51 13-212 (West 1992).\nArguably, either statute could apply to plaintiff\u2019s cause. While section 8 \u2014 101 of the Tort Immunity Act applies to \u201ccivil actions against a local entity,\u201d section 13 \u2014 212 of the Code of Civil Procedure applies to \u201cactions for damages for injury or death against any physician, dentist, registered nurse or hospital.\u201d Plaintiff\u2019s cause of action for injuries sustained while a patient at Wood River Township Hospital falls within either statute of limitations. However, based upon general rules of statutory construction and our interpretation of the two statutes, we conclude that section 13 \u2014 212 of the Code governs this case.\nIt is well established in Illinois that where there are two statutory provisions, one of which is general and designed to apply to cases generally, and the other is particular and relates to only one subject, the particular provision must prevail. (Hernon v. E.W. Corrigan Construction Co. (1992), 149 Ill. 2d 190, 195, 595 N.E.2d 561, 563; Stone v. Department of Employment Security Board of Review (1992), 151 Ill. 2d 257, 602 N.E.2d 808; see also Estate of Herington v. County of Woodford (1993), 250 Ill. App. 3d 870, 620 N.E.2d 463.) Numerous cases in Illinois have determined that section 13 \u2014 212 of the Code of Civil Procedure is a specific statute.\nIn Desai v. Chasnoff (1986), 146 Ill. App. 3d 163, 496 N.E.2d 1203, a breach of warranty action brought against a doctor by the estate of an infant who died after receiving an injection, the doctor claimed that the two-year statute of limitations for medical malpractice claims applied. The plaintiff argued that the four-year statute of limitations provided by the Uniform Commercial Code \u2014 Sales (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1983, ch. 26, par. 2 \u2014 725(1)) was applicable. The Desai court held that section 13 \u2014 212 is applicable because it is a specific statute, as opposed to section 2 \u2014 725 of the Uniform Commercial Code, which is a general statute. The court reasoned:\n\u201c[SJection 2 \u2014 725(1) [citation] is a general statute regarding the applicable limitations period for an alleged breach of contract for a sale, and *** section 13 \u2014 212, on the other hand, is a specific statute which contains specific language regarding the filing of any malpractice action whether it is based on tort, contract, or \u2018otherwise\u2019 against a physician. Since section 13 \u2014 212 is specific in its language, it is controlling regarding the applicable time period in which to bring a malpractice action based on breach of warranty against a physician. Not only does the statute refer to causes of action based on tort or contract, but through the use of the word \u2018otherwise,\u2019 the legislature, we believe, clearly intended to include all malpractice claims brought against a physician in the State of Illinois, regardless of its basis.\u201d Desai, 146 Ill. App. 3d at 167, 496 N.E.2d at 1205.\nAgain, in Heneghan v. Sekula (1989), 181 Ill. App. 3d 238, 536 N.E.2d 963, the court found that section 13 \u2014 212 of the Code of Civil Procedure is a specific statute which must prevail over the more general section 13 \u2014 204 of the Code (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1983, ch. 110, par. 13 \u2014 204). In Heneghan, the defendant, Sekula, filed a third-party complaint for contribution against a hospital and other doctors after the statute of limitations for medical malpractice claims tolled. Sekula argued that the medical malpractice statute of repose contains only a general provision barring actions against doctors, dentists, nurses, and hospitals and does not specifically bar actions for contribution. The court rejected this argument and held that section 13 \u2014 212 applies because it is more specific than section 13 \u2014 204 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Therefore, the third-party claim was barred.\nSpecifically, the Heneghan court noted that the contribution provision, section 13 \u2014 204, applies to a broad range of actions, including those arising from the operation of motor vehicles, the maintenance of premises, construction activities, product liability claims, and actions against health care providers. In contrast, the malpractice statute of repose applies only to actions against \u201cany physician, dentist, registered nurse or hospital *** whether based upon tort, or breach of contract, or otherwise, arising out of patient care.\u201d (Heneghan, 181 Ill. App. 3d at 242, 536 N.E.2d at 966.) The court concluded that the malpractice statute of repose is \u201cclearly narrower and more specific than the contribution statute of limitations, which makes no distinction between actions against doctors and health care providers and actions against any other type of tort defendant.\u201d (Heneghan, 181 Ill. App. 3d at 242, 536 N.E.2d at 966.) Thus, Desai and Heneghan both conclude that section 13 \u2014 212 of the Code of Civil Procedure is a specific statute.\nThe conclusion of specificity for section 13 \u2014 212 is mirrored by a conclusion of generality that has been attributed to section 8 \u2014 101 of the Tort Immunity Act. In Halper v. Vayo (1991), 210 Ill. App. 3d 81, 568 N.E.2d 914, a high school wrestler brought suit against his coach for injuries he sustained as the alleged result of the coach\u2019s negligence or willful and wanton misconduct in connection with the treatment of plaintiff\u2019s knee injury. In Halper the court determined that the tort immunity statute barring personal injury actions against local government entities or their employees more than one year after the date of injury does not apply to minors, who may bring suit for injuries up to two years after they attain their majority. The court reasoned that the specific statutory language giving minors a two-year period for filing actions after they reach the age of 18 demonstrates that the legislature intended for minors to have this extended time within which to file claims, even though \u201cthe ordinary\u201d or general limitation period for the cause of action is one year. See Halper, 210 Ill. App. 3d at 87, 568 N.E.2d at 918.\nAnother case holding that the Tort Immunity Act is a general statute, as opposed to a specific statute, is Emulsicoat, Inc. v. City of Hoopeston (1981), 99 Ill. App. 3d 835, 425 N.E.2d 1349. In Emulsicoat, a subcontractor filed an action against the city, a village, and city officials for their alleged failure to obtain a contractor\u2019s bond. One of the issues addressed by the court was whether the Public Construction Bond Act (Bond Act) (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1979, ch. 29, pars. 15, 16) or the Tort Immunity Act applied. While determining that the Bond Act applied, the court noted that the Tort Immunity Act is a general statute, dealing with many general potential liabilities, whereas the Bond Act is a specific statute dealing with a specific liability. Emulsicoat, 99 Ill. App. 3d at 838, 425 N.E.2d at 1352.\nIn Zimmer v. Village of Willowbrook (1993), 242 Ill. App. 3d 437, 610 N.E.2d 709, the issue was whether the statute of limitations contained in section 13 \u2014 214 of the Code of Civil Procedure (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1991, ch. 110, par. 13 \u2014 214) or the statute of limitations in section 8 \u2014 101 was applicable to plaintiff\u2019s cause of action for flood damages against the village. The court compared the language of the two statutes and stated:\n\u201c[I]n order to determine which limitations period controls, we must decide which of these two statutory provisions is more specifically applicable to this case. Section 8 \u2014 101 provides a limitations period for civil actions commenced against a local entity. [Citation.] Section 13 \u2014 214(a) is a more recent statute of limitations than section 8 \u2014 101, and it expressly applies to any \u2018body politic\u2019 which is sued in an action based on tort for an act or omission in the construction of an improvement to real property.\u201d (Emphasis in original.) (Zimmer, 242 Ill. App. 3d at 442, 610 N.E.2d at 713.)\nThe court concluded that the legislature intended for section 13\u2014 214(a), which was enacted after section 8 \u2014 101, to constitute a limited exception to section 8 \u2014 101.\nIn the instant case, the court must decide which of the two limitations periods applies to this medical malpractice claim. Section 8 \u2014 101 of the Tort Immunity Act applies to any local entity, while section 13 \u2014 212 of the Code of Civil Procedure applies specifically to physicians, dentists, registered nurses, or hospitals. Further, section 8\u2014 101 applies to all civil actions, while section 13 \u2014 212 only applies to actions arising out of patient care. We further note that section 13\u2014 212 of the Code was enacted subsequent to section 8 \u2014 101 of the Tort Immunity Act. This fact is important in that the rule that a specific statutory provision prevails over a general provision is especially applicable where the specific provision was enacted more recently. Bowes v. City of Chicago (1954), 3 Ill. 2d 175, 205,120 N.E.2d 15, 31.\nBased on the type of claim plaintiff has filed, an analysis of the conflicting statutes of limitations, and the rules of statutory construction, we conclude that section 13 \u2014 212 more specifically applies to the instant case. Accordingly, the order granting the hospital\u2019s motion for summary judgment and dismissing plaintiff\u2019s cause of action is reversed, and this cause is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.\nReversed and remanded.\nLEWIS, P.J., and GOLDENHERSH, J., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE CHAPMAN" } ], "attorneys": [ "John L. McMullin and Kristine A. McGee, both of Belleville and of St. Louis, Missouri, for appellant.", "Ronald E. Fox and Rodney M. Sharp, both of Sandberg, Phoenix & von Gontard, P.C., of St. Louis, Missouri, for appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "DONNA CLEAVER, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. R. ANTHONY MARRESE, Defendant (Wood River Township Hospital, Defendant-Appellee).\nFifth District\nNo. 5\u201493\u20140102\nOpinion filed December 27, 1993.\nJohn L. McMullin and Kristine A. McGee, both of Belleville and of St. Louis, Missouri, for appellant.\nRonald E. Fox and Rodney M. Sharp, both of Sandberg, Phoenix & von Gontard, P.C., of St. Louis, Missouri, for appellee." }, "file_name": "0778-01", "first_page_order": 798, "last_page_order": 803 }