{ "id": 5421639, "name": "STATE FARM MUTUAL AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE COMPANY, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. ANTHONY REINHARDT et al., Defendants-Appellees", "name_abbreviation": "State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance v. Reinhardt", "decision_date": "1993-12-07", "docket_number": "No. 5\u201492\u20140695", "first_page": "823", "last_page": "827", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "253 Ill. App. 3d 823" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "599 N.E.2d 446", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "234 Ill. App. 3d 222", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5188151 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/234/0222-01" ] }, { "cite": "592 N.E.2d 332", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "227 Ill. App. 3d 913", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5794785 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/227/0913-01" ] }, { "cite": "534 N.E.2d 220", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1992, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "178 Ill. App. 3d 1077", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2433710 ], "year": 1992, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/178/1077-01" ] }, { "cite": "435 N.E.2d 944", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "pin_cites": [ { "page": "947" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "106 Ill. App. 3d 188", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3031740 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "190" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/106/0188-01" ] }, { "cite": "615 N.E.2d 64", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1982, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "245 Ill. App. 3d 969", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5385080 ], "year": 1982, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "971" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/245/0969-01" ] }, { "cite": "511 N.E.2d 188", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "pin_cites": [ { "page": "189" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "158 Ill. App. 3d 129", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3577652 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "131" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/158/0129-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 511, "char_count": 9365, "ocr_confidence": 0.759, "pagerank": { "raw": 7.349410823568315e-08, "percentile": 0.4407839993760254 }, "sha256": "762aaee4357ae61fa900f0debce4debaf3dddbf3da493ba235092fdd6d1aba60", "simhash": "1:3bbd09e46cf5ccc2", "word_count": 1554 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T15:28:32.530889+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "STATE FARM MUTUAL AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE COMPANY, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. ANTHONY REINHARDT et al., Defendants-Appellees." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE CHAPMAN\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nAnthony and Donna Reinhardt were married on May 20, 1989, and separated in July of 1990, when they each left the marital home and moved in with their respective parents. Anthony sustained personal injuries in an automobile accident on October 20, 1990. He made a claim for damages on Donna\u2019s underinsured motorist policy. Donna had purchased the policy from State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company (State Farm) during the marriage and was the named insured on the policy.\nState Farm petitioned for declaratory relief that Donna\u2019s policy did not provide underinsured coverage to Anthony because he was not a spouse as defined under the policy. The circuit court found that, although Donna and Anthony were separated, the evidence demonstrated that they intended to maintain the marital relationship. The court also found that the policy language defining spouse as a \u201chusband or wife while living with you\u201d was ambiguous. The court declared that the policy provided coverage to Anthony for the accident. We affirm.\nThe State Farm policy provides coverage to the following persons:\n\u201cInsured \u2014 means the person or persons covered by uninsured motor vehicle or underinsured motor vehicle coverage.\nWith respect to bodily injury, this is:\n1. The first person named in the declarations;\n2. His or her spouse;\n3. Their relatives; and\n4. Any other person while occupying:\n(a) Your car, a temporary substitute car, a newly acquired car or a trailer attached to such car. Such vehicle has to be used within the scope of the consent of you or your spouse; or\n(b) A car not owned by you, your spouse or any relative, or a trailer attached to such car. It has to be driven by the first person named in the declarations or that person\u2019s spouse and within the scope of the owner\u2019s consent.\u201d\nThe policy also contains a definition section which defines spouse as \u201cyour husband or wife while living with you.\u201d\nWhere the words of an insurance policy are clear and unambiguous, the court should give effect to the plain and obvious meaning of those words. (Allstate Insurance Co. v. Stewart (1987), 158 Ill. App. 3d 129, 131, 511 N.E.2d 188, 189.) However, in interpreting insurance policies, as with other contracts, policy provisions are deemed ambiguous if they are subject to more than one reasonable interpretation. (Coriasco v. Hutchcraft (1993), 245 Ill. App. 3d 969, 971, 615 N.E.2d 64.) Where an ambiguity exists the policy is to be construed liberally to effectuate coverage. Dinges v. Lawyers Title Insurance Corp. (1982), 106 Ill. App. 3d 188, 190, 435 N.E.2d 944, 947.\nState Farm relies on two recent cases, Coley v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. (1989), 178 Ill. App. 3d 1077, 534 N.E.2d 220, and State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v. Taussig (1992), 227 Ill. App. 3d 913, 592 N.E.2d 332, which held that the term \u201clive with\u201d is not ambiguous. In each of those cases the court found that no ambiguity existed in the policy definition of \u201crelative\u201d defined as a person related to you or your spouse by blood, marriage, or adoption who lives with you. While it is true that Coley and Taussig found the term \u201clive with\u201d unambiguous, those cases are distinguishable from the case at bar.\nIn Coley the plaintiffs were attempting to have the decedent, their grandson, declared an insured under their policy. The decedent had left his father\u2019s home and moved in with his grandfather two years prior to graduating from high school. From that time the grandfather provided him with food, clothing, and a room. After high school graduation, decedent enlisted in the Air Force for a four-year period and was stationed at several locations throughout the United States and overseas. The evidence further showed that the decedent kept some of his belongings at his grandfather\u2019s house and continued to use it as his address for receiving mail. The Coley court concluded that because decedent was a young emancipated man serving in the armed forces, where he could have only an occasional, transitory presence in his grandfather\u2019s house, he did not \u201clive with\u201d his grandfather for the purpose of the insurance policy.\nIn Taussig the court held that the insured\u2019s son, the defendant, was not \u201cliving with\u201d the insured so as to bring him within the policy. The defendant had moved from his parent\u2019s home into an apartment. Defendant\u2019s father signed the lease on his behalf. In the month preceding defendant\u2019s January 1988 accident, defendant slept and ate most of his meals at his apartment, where he remained until October 1988. The court held that defendant\u2019s argument that he was away at school and intended on returning home to be without merit. Defendant voluntarily terminated his education well before the accident. He testified that it was his intention to \u201cgo out and make it on his own,\u201d thereby negating his position that he was away at school. The court further held that while defendant continued to use his parent\u2019s mailing address and occassionally visited his parents, he was not \u201cliving with\u201d them for purposes of the insurance policy.\nUnlike the case at bar, the claimants in Coley and Taussig did not intend to return to their insureds\u2019 homes. The decedent in Coley was emancipated, was a member of the armed forces, and had a mere transitory presence at his grandfather\u2019s home. The defendant in Taussig was not attending school but was employed full time, lived away from home, and intended to \u201cmake it on his own.\u201d In the case at bar State Farm\u2019s focus is on the fact that the parties were not living together and were experiencing marital difficulties. Carried to its logical extreme, to deny coverage on those facts would preclude coverage where, for instance, a young mother, recently released from the hospital with her newborn, leaves her spouse\u2019s home to reside with her mother for two weeks for the purpose of recuperating. The point is, the fact that the parties in this case were not physically living together at the time of the accident is of no matter in determining coverage given the facts of this case. While Anthony and Donna were not physically living together, they were married and continued to visit and have intimate relations together, and each testified that they were attempting reconciliation.\nIn Murphy v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. (1992), 234 Ill. App. 3d 222, 599 N.E.2d 446, the decedent\u2019s father brought a suit for declaratory judgment against his own insurer to determine whether the underinsured motorist provision of the policy covered the decedent. At issue was whether the decedent was a \u201crelative\u201d of the insured as that term was defined in the insured\u2019s insurance policies. Relative was defined as \"a person related to you or your spouse by blood, marriage or adoption who lives with you.\u201d The court found that the phrase \u201clive with\u201d was ambiguous under the factual circumstances presented. The court explained that ambiguity is not limited to grammatical imprecision of a policy, because the particular factual setting of the insurance policy provides a framework for determining if the policy as executed is consistent with the parties\u2019 intent. In addition, the court determined that although coverage under a policy is determined at the time of an accident, the policies did not state this when they used the phrase \u201clive with,\u201d and a lay person should not have to resort to research in the case law to ascertain the coverage.\nIn the instant case, an examination of the record reveals that Anthony was living with his wife, Donna, at the time the policy was issued. After the couple separated but prior to the accident, they saw each other approximately two or three times a week so that Anthony could visit with his daughter Sarah. Perhaps three or four times after their separation, Anthony and Donna saw each other socially without their daughter and on a few occasions had intimate relations together. Both Anthony and Donna testified that after the separation, but prior to the accident, they believed that reconciliation was possible and were attempting to do just that even though they had made no specific plans toward that end.\nThe term \u201clive with\u201d found in the definition of spouse as used in the State Farm policy is ambiguous. As in Murphy, the definition of spouse failed to state when the claimant, in this case Anthony, had to be living with the insured, at the time the policy was issued or when the accident occurred. Donna and Anthony were separated at the time of the accident but had intimate relations during their separation and were working toward reconciliation. We find the phrase \u201clive with\u201d in the policy at bar was ambiguous under the factual circumstances presented here. We cannot find that the circuit court erred in construing the policy provision in favor of the insured. The decision of the circuit court of St. Clair County is affirmed.\nAffirmed.\nWELCH and MAAG, JJ., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE CHAPMAN" } ], "attorneys": [ "Rosemary D. McGuire and Michael B. Constance, both of Brennan, Cates & Constance, of Belleville, for appellant.", "Robert J. Sprague, of Sprague & Sprague, of Belleville, for appellee Anthony Reinhardt." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "STATE FARM MUTUAL AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE COMPANY, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. ANTHONY REINHARDT et al., Defendants-Appellees.\nFifth District\nNo. 5\u201492\u20140695\nOpinion filed December 7, 1993.\n\u2014 Rehearing denied January 12, 1994.\nRosemary D. McGuire and Michael B. Constance, both of Brennan, Cates & Constance, of Belleville, for appellant.\nRobert J. Sprague, of Sprague & Sprague, of Belleville, for appellee Anthony Reinhardt." }, "file_name": "0823-01", "first_page_order": 843, "last_page_order": 847 }