{ "id": 5423573, "name": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. DORSEY D. DOWDS, Defendant-Appellant", "name_abbreviation": "People v. Dowds", "decision_date": "1993-12-09", "docket_number": "No. 4\u201492\u20140805", "first_page": "955", "last_page": "958", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "253 Ill. App. 3d 955" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "182 N.E.2d 206", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "209" }, { "page": "209" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "24 Ill. 2d 390", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2802750 ], "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "394" }, { "page": "394" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/24/0390-01" ] }, { "cite": "570 N.E.2d 584", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "pin_cites": [ { "page": "593" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "211 Ill. App. 3d 628", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2529366 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "640" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/211/0628-01" ] }, { "cite": "550 N.E.2d 1163", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1166" }, { "page": "1166" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "193 Ill. App. 3d 838", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2500677 ], "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "843" }, { "page": "843" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/193/0838-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 405, "char_count": 6539, "ocr_confidence": 0.782, "pagerank": { "raw": 7.06758786115664e-08, "percentile": 0.4258070644273083 }, "sha256": "5b3a995ae4fe96ac5ca441cf9d29cb5e9014a29ae918616176f4c4c3ca4f7b6e", "simhash": "1:73e329e4e09586cc", "word_count": 1078 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T15:28:32.530889+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. DORSEY D. DOWDS, Defendant-Appellant." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE STEIGMANN\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nIn April 1992, a jury convicted defendant, Dorsey D. Dowds, of driving under the influence of alcohol (DUI) (625 ILCS 5/11 \u2014 501 (West 1992)). In August 1992, the trial court sentenced defendant to 60 days in jail. On appeal, defendant argues that he was denied a fair trial by the prosecutor\u2019s \u201cunnecessary and inflammatory demonstration of pouring seven beers into a pitcher during rebuttal argument.\u201d We disagree and affirm.\nBecause defendant does not challenge the sufficiency of the evidence to sustain his conviction, we address the evidence only as it pertains to the prosecutor\u2019s demonstration during rebuttal argument, the sole issue before us.\nAt trial, the State trooper who arrested defendant testified that defendant first told him he drank two or three beers at the Log Cabin tavern, but later volunteered that he actually consumed seven or eight beers. When defendant testified, he admitted that he told the trooper he had consumed seven or eight beers, but testified that the trooper never asked him during what time frame he had done so. Defendant claimed that he consumed his first beer around 2 p.m. on the day in question and the last one around 12:30 a.m.\nThe bartender from the Log Cabin tavern testified that he had served beer to defendant during the day in question and that defendant was not under the influence of alcohol when he left the tavern shortly before his arrest. On cross-examination, the bartender identified People\u2019s exhibit No. 3, a 12-ounce beer mug, as being \u201cjust like\u201d the mugs he used to serve draft beer to defendant.\nDuring his rebuttal argument, the prosecutor first reminded the jury about the bartender\u2019s testimony and then used People\u2019s exhibit No. 3 in a courtroom demonstration. Over defendant\u2019s continuing objection, the prosecutor poured seven cans of beer into the mug and, in turn, poured the beer from the mug into a large pitcher. As he did so, the prosecutor stated to the jury, \u201cSo let\u2019s take a look at what you have, when you drink seven cans of beer, which is the amount that he admits to having.\u201d The court overruled defendant\u2019s objection, explaining, \u201cAs long as [the demonstration is] based on what\u2019s been admitted into evidence, it will be permitted.\u201d\nDefendant filed a post-trial motion challenging the propriety of this demonstration. At the hearing on that motion, another prosecutor handling the case stated the following:\n\u201cWhat was shown in closing argument was merely the quantity of alcohol the defendant had consumed on [the] evening in question[. The prosecutor who tried the case] had even obtained the exact same type of mug from the bar [where] defendant indicated he had been drinking ***. [The prosecutor] poured the same quantity into the mug that corresponded with the defendant\u2019s testimony as to how much he had to drink.\u201d\nThe trial court denied defendant\u2019s post-trial motion, explaining its ruling as follows:\n\u201cThe defendant testified that he\u2019d had between seven and eight beers of a 12[-]ounce quantity each, mainly from the mugs at The Log Cabin. What the Assistant State\u2019s Attorney did was to show the volume of that quantity. He first demonstrated the 12[-]ounce mug, putting a 12[-]ounce can of beer into that mug to demonstrate the mug would hold 12 ounces of beer. The only difference between it was the kind of beer. ***\nSo, what was shown was the volume of what the defendant said he had drunk out of 12[-]ounce mugs, and the demonstration by the [prosecutor] was not done by some other party, denying the defendant the right of cross-examination. It was a demonstration based on the evidence that had been presented both by the People and the defendant during the course of the trial.\u201d\nOn appeal, defendant argues that the prosecutor\u2019s demonstration was prejudicial and improper, and that the trial court committed reversible error by permitting it. We disagree.\nIn People v. Harp (1990), 193 Ill. App. 3d 838, 843, 550 N.E.2d 1163, 1166, this court wrote that \u201c[t]he admissibility of courtroom demonstrations is discretionary, and a decision regarding admissibility will not be reversed unless the court abused its discretion to the prejudice of the defendant.\u201d (See also People v. Malone (1991), 211 Ill. App. 3d 628, 640, 570 N.E.2d 584, 593 (\u201c[n]o abuse will be found if the demonstration [during closing argument] was based on evidence at trial\u201d).) Defendant heavily relies upon the statement in Harp that \u201c[demonstration evidence should be used to aid the jury in understanding other testimony, and not for dramatic effect.\u201d (Harp, 193 Ill. App. 3d at 843, 550 N.E.2d at 1166.) However, one person\u2019s helpful illustration may be another\u2019s dramatic effect. The trial court is in a far better position than this court to evaluate a particular demonstration, and this court will not second-guess the trial court\u2019s determination. Instead, the question before us is whether the trial court\u2019s determination that the prosecutor\u2019s demonstration constituted a helpful demonstration based on the evidence was an abuse of discretion. We hold that it was not.\nWe also note that the holding of the supreme court of Illinois in Caley v. Manicke (1962), 24 Ill. 2d 390, 394, 182 N.E.2d 206, 209, applies to the present case. In Caley, the supreme court addressed a closing argument in which plaintiff\u2019s lawyer wrote on a blank sheet of paper the various elements of damage he claimed his client suffered. The supreme court approved counsel\u2019s doing so, noting that \u201c[t]he method and means here used showed the jury nothing more than it heard.\u201d (Caley, 24 Ill. 2d at 394, 182 N.E.2d at 209.) We agree with the trial court\u2019s ruling in the present case that in effect the prosecutor\u2019s demonstration merely showed the jury what seven beers looked like when poured into a container, testimony the jury had already heard from defendant about how he had poured seven beers into a \u201cdifferent container\u201d \u2014 namely, himself.\nFor the reasons stated, we affirm the judgment of the circuit court.\nAffirmed.\nMcCULLOUGH, PM., and LUND, J., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE STEIGMANN" } ], "attorneys": [ "Daniel D. Yuhas and Judith L. Libby, both of State Appellate Defender\u2019s Office, of Springfield, for appellant.", "Richard L. Broch, State\u2019s Attorney, of Tuscola (Norbert J. Goetten, Robert J. Biderman, and Linda Susan McClain, all of State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor\u2019s Office, of counsel), for the People." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. DORSEY D. DOWDS, Defendant-Appellant.\nFourth District\nNo. 4\u201492\u20140805\nOpinion filed December 9, 1993.\nDaniel D. Yuhas and Judith L. Libby, both of State Appellate Defender\u2019s Office, of Springfield, for appellant.\nRichard L. Broch, State\u2019s Attorney, of Tuscola (Norbert J. Goetten, Robert J. Biderman, and Linda Susan McClain, all of State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor\u2019s Office, of counsel), for the People." }, "file_name": "0955-01", "first_page_order": 975, "last_page_order": 978 }