{ "id": 2979928, "name": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. EARL T. STORMS, Defendant-Appellant", "name_abbreviation": "People v. Storms", "decision_date": "1993-12-29", "docket_number": "No. 2\u201490\u20140100", "first_page": "139", "last_page": "144", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "254 Ill. App. 3d 139" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "233 Ill. App. 3d 471", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5196318 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "473-74" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/233/0471-01" ] }, { "cite": "245 Ill. App. 3d 658", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5384746 ], "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "669" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/245/0658-01" ] }, { "cite": "68 Ill. 2d 149", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5809665 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "154" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/68/0149-01" ] }, { "cite": "227 Ill. App. 3d 92", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5794673 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "100" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/227/0092-01" ] }, { "cite": "147 Ill. 2d 326", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3278519 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "345" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/147/0326-01" ] }, { "cite": "135 Ill. App. 3d 486", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3600978 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "492" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/135/0486-01" ] }, { "cite": "215 Ill. App. 3d 393", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5294482 ], "year": 1985, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "395" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/215/0393-01" ] }, { "cite": "164 Ill. App. 3d 245", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3582060 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "251" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/164/0245-01" ] }, { "cite": "155 Ill. 2d 498", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 4809899 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "502" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/155/0498-01" ] }, { "cite": "225 Ill. App. 3d 558", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5245611 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1993, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/225/0558-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 601, "char_count": 12383, "ocr_confidence": 0.789, "pagerank": { "raw": 1.2200040529516247e-07, "percentile": 0.5979537803169219 }, "sha256": "b20588bfa01eaea986a59c1a51a413b722e38303b10d3aaa67b5cf75056b5f52", "simhash": "1:bb3bb5394242b8b4", "word_count": 2066 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T16:17:01.484927+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. EARL T. STORMS, Defendant-Appellant." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE McLAREN\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nThe defendant, Earl T. Storms, was sentenced as a Class X offender (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1989, ch. 38, par. 1005\u20145\u20143(c)(8) (now 730 ILCS 5/5\u20145\u20143(c)(8) (West 1992))) to a term of 19 years\u2019 imprisonment and 3 years of mandatory supervised released on his conviction of residential burglary (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1989, ch. 38, par. 19\u20143 (now 720 ILCS 5/19\u20143 (West 1992))). The defendant filed an appeal contesting both his conviction and sentence. In People v. Storms (1992), 225 Ill. App. 3d 558, we affirmed the defendant\u2019s conviction, but remanded the cause to the trial court for a new sentencing hearing before a different judge. Our supreme court granted the State\u2019s petition for leave to appeal. In People v. Storms (1993), 155 Ill. 2d 498, 502, our decision to remand the cause for a new sentencing hearing before a different judge was reversed, and the cause was remanded to our court to consider the issues raised by the defendant concerning his sentence in his initial appeal. In this appeal after remand, we consider whether (1) the trial court abused its discretion in sentencing defendant as a Class X offender; (2) the trial court failed to consider factors in mitigation; and (3) the defendant\u2019s sentence was excessive. For the following reasons, we affirm the sentence imposed by the trial court.\nThe defendant in this case was convicted by a jury of the crime of residential burglary, which is a Class 1 felony. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1989, ch. 38, par. 19\u20143(b) (now 720 ILCS 5/19\u20143(b) (West 1992)).) The facts surrounding the defendant\u2019s conviction and our affirmance of that conviction are reported in People v. Storms (1992), 225 Ill. App. 3d 558. The Unified Code of Corrections specifies that residential burglary carries a mandatory sentence ranging from 4 to 15 years\u2019 imprisonment. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1989, ch. 38, par. 1005\u20148\u20141(a)(4) (now 730 ILCS 5/5-9-1(a)(4)).) However, the defendant was sentenced to a term of 19 years\u2019 imprisonment with 3 years of mandatory supervised release under the Class X enhancement provision of the Unified Code of Corrections. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1989, ch. 38, par. 1005-5-3(c)(8) (now 730 ILCS 5/5\u20145\u20143(c)(8) (West 1992)).) On appeal, the defendant contends that the trial court abused its discretion in sentencing him as a Class X offender.\nThe Unified Code of Corrections allows a court to enhance a defendant\u2019s sentence by treating the offense as a Class X felony in the following situation:\n\u201cWhen a defendant, over the age of 21 years, is convicted of a Class 1 or Class 2 felony, after having twice been convicted of any Class 2 or greater Class felonies in Illinois, and such charges are separately brought and tried and arise out of different series of acts, such defendant shall be sentenced as a Class X offender. This paragraph shall not apply unless (1) the first felony was committed after the effective date of this amendatory Act of 1977; and (2) the second felony was committed after conviction on the first; and (3) the third felony was committed after conviction on the second.\u201d (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1989, ch. 38, par. 1005\u20145\u20143(c)(8) (now 730 ILCS 5/5\u20145\u20143(c)(8) (West 1992)).)\nThe defendant does not dispute his prior convictions or the dates the offenses were committed. Under the defendant\u2019s reading of the statute, the enhancement provisions only apply when a defendant was over the age of 21 at the time he committed the prior felonies. Since the defendant was under the age of 21 when he was convicted of one of the prior felonies, he contends that he cannot be sentenced as a Class X offender.\nThe defendant finds support for his proposition in the doctrine of ejusdem generis. The doctrine provides that where a clause specifically describes classes of persons or things and then uses general language, the general language is limited to the classes similar to those specifically described. (Douglas Transit, Inc. v. Illinois Commerce Comm\u2019n (1987), 164 Ill. App. 3d 245, 251.) Since the phrase \u201cover the age of 21 years\u201d defines and qualifies \u201cdefendant,\u201d the defendant suggests that a consistent reading of the statute requires a defendant to be over the age of 21 at the time the prior felonies were committed.\nWe agree with the defendant\u2019s suggestion that the application of the statute to \u201ca defendant\u201d is qualified by the phrase \u201cover the age of 21 years.\u201d Further, the \u201clast antecedent rule\u201d of statutory construction requires that relative or qualifying words, phrases, or clauses are to be applied to the words immediately preceding, and do not modify words, phrases, or clauses which are more remote. (People v. Pettigrew (1991), 215 Ill. App. 3d 393, 395; Board of Education of Rockford School District No. 205 v. Regional Board of School Trustees (1985), 135 Ill. App. 3d 486, 492.) Applying this rule to the language of the enhancement provisions, the phrase \u201cover the age of 21 years\u201d modifies \u201cdefendant.\u201d Thus, the \u201cdefendant\u201d in the instant case must be over the age of 21 years. The age limitation does not apply to more remote terms concerning prior convictions. Thus, the age of the defendant at the time the prior felonies were committed is irrelevant.\nFurther, when interpreting a statute, the court may consider the reason and necessity for the law, the evils sought to be remedied, and the purposes to be achieved. (People v. Frieberg (1992), 147 Ill. 2d 326, 345.) The enhancement provision presumes that persons under the age of 21 have great rehabilitative potential since a sentence will not be increased until after a defendant reaches age 21. Our interpretation is consistent with the goal of prescribing a sentence that is proportionate to the seriousness of the offense with regard to the presumption that minors should be rehabilitated. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1989, ch. 38, par. 1001\u20141\u20142 (now 730 ILCS 5/1\u20141\u20142 (West 1992)).) For these reasons, we determine that the sentencing judge did not abuse his discretion in sentencing the defendant as a Class X offender.\nThe defendant next contends that his sentence should be vacated or reduced because the court failed to consider all of the mitigating factors. In sentencing the defendant, the court stated as follows:\n\u201cI\u2019ve considered the evidence at the trial, the presentence investigation, the evidence, which there hasn\u2019t been any evidence, but the arguments in aggravation and mitigation and the defendant\u2019s statement that he wrote to me, also his alcohol influence report, the victim impact statement, and the statutory factors in aggravation and mitigation.\nI agree as far as mitigation goes, that the mitigating factors are that no one was injured, no one was home at the time and no one has been injured by his criminal history; however, it\u2019s a very significant criminal history. He\u2019s been on probation twice. He\u2019s been to the Department of Corrections twice. I think the last offense was committed after he was out only three months and was obviously still on parole.\nAttempts to help him through probation and incarceration have not seemed to deter his behavior any. I realize that he feels his problems are alcohol and drug related and that is probably a serious factor to what he\u2019s been doing, but he\u2019s had so many contacts with the system before and none of these contacts have seemed to help him any. As soon as he gets out of the penitentiary he\u2019s back in somebody\u2019s house.\nBased on everything that I\u2019ve considered in this case, I think [the State] is correct that it\u2019s a Class X, given his prior background, and I sentence the defendant to 19 years in the Department of Corrections. You\u2019ll also have three years mandatory supervised release after you\u2019re released from the penitentiary.\u201d\nThe defendant contends that the court deprecated the mitigating factors by suggesting that nobody was harmed by his criminal conduct solely because nobody was home at the time the defendant broke into the residence. The defendant further asserts that the sentencing judge failed to consider factors in mitigation such as his disadvantaged background, remorse for the crime, and his rehabilitative potential.\nIn setting a sentence, the court must consider information offered in mitigation (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1989, ch. 38, par. 1005 \u2014 4\u20141(a)(4) (now codified, as amended, at 730 ILCS 5/5 \u2014 4\u20141(a)(4) (West 1992))), which includes the fact that \u201cthe defendant\u2019s criminal conduct neither caused nor threatened serious physical harm to another.\u201d (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1989, ch. 38, par. 1005-5-3.1(a)(l) (now 730 ILCS 5/5 \u2014 5\u20143.1(a)(1) (West 1992)).) Absent any contrary indication, it is presumed that the trial court considered evidence presented in mitigation. People v. McDonald (1992), 227 Ill. App. 3d 92, 100.\nThe sentencing judge stated that he considered the defendant\u2019s personal statement, his alcohol influence report, the victim impact statement, and the statutory factors in aggravation and mitigation. The court specifically noted the fact that no person was harmed by his criminal conduct as a factor in mitigation. However, the court balanced the mitigating factors against the factors in aggravation. Emphasis was placed on the defendant\u2019s criminal history, which revealed three prior convictions of burglary, one conviction of theft, two convictions of possession of alcohol by a minor, and one conviction of unlawful possession of cannabis. The defendant was sentenced to the Department of Corrections on two occasions and was later arrested and convicted while on probation and parole. Thus, the court believed that the defendant lacked a serious commitment toward rehabilitation. We find no evidence in the record indicating that the trial court failed to consider the factors in mitigation.\nFinally, the defendant contends that a sentence of 19 years\u2019 imprisonment for this crime is excessive, given the nonviolent nature of the offense, his past history of nonviolent crime, his chemical dependency, minimal education, and dysfunctional upbringing. The sentence rendered by the trial court is entitled to great weight and deference (People v. Perruquet (1977), 68 Ill. 2d 149, 154), since the judge had the opportunity to consider the defendant\u2019s credibility, demeanor, and general moral character firsthand. (People v. Lintz (1993), 245 Ill. App. 3d 658, 669.) Thus, the length of a sentence is a matter of judicial discretion and will not be altered or reduced on review absent an abuse of that discretion. People v. Sims (1992), 233 Ill. App. 3d 471, 473-74.\nSince the defendant was sentenced as a Class X offender, his possible sentence ranged from 6 to 30 years\u2019 imprisonment. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1989, ch. 38, par. 1005-8-1(a)(3) (now 730 ILCS 5/5\u2014 8 \u2014 1(a)(3) (West 1992)).) The sentence of 19 years\u2019 imprisonment was within the statutorily prescribed guidelines. We note that the nature of the crime was nonviolent. When the defendant was questioned by employees of a restaurant across the street from the home, he stated that he believed the home belonged to his Aunt Margaret. The defendant did not attempt to flee, was not violent, and sat on the front porch until the police arrived. No items were stolen and the defendant did not possess burglary tools or a weapon. Although the defendant\u2019s prior criminal background was nonviolent, the sentencing judge specifically stated that an extended period of incarceration was necessary to deter the defendant\u2019s conduct. He was sentenced to serve two terms of imprisonment and was on parole when he was arrested and convicted again. While we may have balanced the factors in aggravation and mitigation differently, which may have resulted in a lesser sentence, the record does not reflect that the length of the sentence was an abuse of discretion.\nFor the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment of the circuit court of Lake County.\nAffirmed.\nGEIGER and QUETSCH, JJ., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE McLAREN" } ], "attorneys": [ "G. Joseph Weller and Kim M. DeWitt, both of State Appellate Defender\u2019s Office, of Elgin, Daniel D. Yuhas, of State Appellate Defender\u2019s Office, of Springfield, and Joseph Michael Williams, of St. Charles, for appellant.", "Michael J. Waller, State\u2019s Attorney, of Waukegan (William L. Browers and Mary Beth Burns, both of State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor\u2019s Office, of counsel), for the People." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. EARL T. STORMS, Defendant-Appellant.\nSecond District\nNo. 2\u201490\u20140100\nOpinion filed December 29, 1993.\nG. Joseph Weller and Kim M. DeWitt, both of State Appellate Defender\u2019s Office, of Elgin, Daniel D. Yuhas, of State Appellate Defender\u2019s Office, of Springfield, and Joseph Michael Williams, of St. Charles, for appellant.\nMichael J. Waller, State\u2019s Attorney, of Waukegan (William L. Browers and Mary Beth Burns, both of State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor\u2019s Office, of counsel), for the People." }, "file_name": "0139-01", "first_page_order": 157, "last_page_order": 162 }