{ "id": 2978821, "name": "DAVID BENDER, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. THE BOARD OF FIRE AND POLICE COMMISSIONERS OF DOLTON, Defendant-Appellee", "name_abbreviation": "Bender v. Board of Fire & Police Commissioners", "decision_date": "1993-09-14", "docket_number": "No. 1\u201492\u20142768", "first_page": "488", "last_page": "492", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "254 Ill. App. 3d 488" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "764 F.2d 458", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.2d", "case_ids": [ 378257 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "461" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f2d/764/0458-01" ] }, { "cite": "557 N.E.2d 939", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "199 Ill. App. 3d 927", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2468107 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "930" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/199/0927-01" ] }, { "cite": "454 N.E.2d 370", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1983, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "117 Ill. App. 3d 1065", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3482460 ], "year": 1983, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1068" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/117/1065-01" ] }, { "cite": "468 N.E.2d 1247", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "127 Ill. App. 3d 210", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3562616 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "213-14" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/127/0210-01" ] }, { "cite": "173 N.E. 165", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.", "year": 1984, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "340 Ill. 579", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 5246003 ], "year": 1984, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "581" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/340/0579-01" ] }, { "cite": "391 N.E.2d 168", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1930, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "72 Ill. App. 3d 910", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5581983 ], "year": 1930, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "914" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/72/0910-01" ] }, { "cite": "288 N.E.2d 49", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "7 Ill. App. 3d 478", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2678748 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "484" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/7/0478-01" ] }, { "cite": "140 N.E.2d 825", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "10 Ill. 2d 357", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2724827 ], "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "384-85" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/10/0357-01" ] }, { "cite": "413 N.E.2d 205", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "90 Ill. App. 3d 582", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3159708 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "587" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/90/0582-01" ] }, { "cite": "511 N.E.2d 982", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "158 Ill. App. 3d 842", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3578959 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "846" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/158/0842-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 490, "char_count": 7067, "ocr_confidence": 0.787, "pagerank": { "raw": 6.184765865984079e-08, "percentile": 0.38370808491151415 }, "sha256": "35a5ae452ef9742034559b977b8e63c450bdf403d2431015c1a6464237b3b2e6", "simhash": "1:4aaa71e67e77e310", "word_count": 1153 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T16:17:01.484927+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "DAVID BENDER, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. THE BOARD OF FIRE AND POLICE COMMISSIONERS OF DOLTON, Defendant-Appellee." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "PRESIDING JUSTICE McCORMICK\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nThe Board of Fire and Police Commissioners of Dolton, Illinois (the Board), discharged David Bender, and he sued for administrative review. The trial court affirmed the Board and Bender appeals. We remand for rehearing because the Board improperly failed to disqualify one of its members from hearing the case.\nOn December 19, 1990, Dolton Chief of Police George Pfo-tenhauer began disciplinary proceedings against Bender, charging him with six counts of misconduct. Prior to the hearing on the charges before the Board, Bender moved to disqualify Commissioner Donald Clayton. Bender swore, in an affidavit in support of the motion, that Clayton was a part-time reserve police officer for Dolton, and as such he was subordinate to Pfotenhauer, who had the power to evaluate Clayton\u2019s performance and thereby affect his employment status.\nAt the hearing Chief Pfotenhauer, represented by an attorney, acted as plaintiff, and the Board had the advice of its own attorney. Bender\u2019s attorney requested a ruling on his disqualification motion. The Board\u2019s attorney read a statement prepared in response to the motion, saying that \u201cthere\u2019s no provision in law that I\u2019m aware of *** for the recusal of members of this type of board.\u201d Clayton did not dispute the accuracy of Bender\u2019s affidavit. The Board denied the motion.\nAs a preliminary matter, defendants Pfotenhauer, the Village of Dolton and the individual members of the Board suggest that this court may not have jurisdiction over them in this appeal because they are not named in the notice of appeal. Where a party not named in the notice of appeal actually receives timely notice, the error may be considered de minimis. (Skees v. Growmark, Inc. (1987), 158 Ill. App. 3d 842, 846, 511 N.E.2d 982.) The omission is not grounds for finding that this court lacks jurisdiction over the party not named, especially where that party is represented by an attorney who represents another party properly named in the notice of appeal. (In re Estate of Bonjean (1980), 90 Ill. App. 3d 582, 587, 413 N.E.2d 205.) Here all defendants were represented in the trial court by the Board\u2019s attorney, and the attorney received the timely notice of appeal which properly named the Board as appellee. Thus, this court has jurisdiction to consider this appeal as it applies to all defendants.\nBender argues that this case must be reversed and remanded to the Board because the Board improperly allowed Commissioner Clayton to participate in deciding this case. In In re Heirich (1956), 10 Ill. 2d 357, 140 N.E.2d 825, committees on grievances of the Illinois State Bar Association and the Chicago Bar Association heard charges against an attorney. One committee member was a partner in a law firm that represented an organization which brought charges against the attorney. Our supreme court held:\n\u201c[Respondent was entitled to be tried before a tribunal that was completely disinterested in the subject matter and *** it would have been appropriate for the commissioner to have disqualified himself.\n*** [W]e need not in law, nor do we in fact, hold or intimate that this particular commissioner was infected, consciously or unconsciously, with prejudice or affected by other motivation against respondent.\nIt is a classic principle of jurisprudence that no man who has a personal interest in the subject matter of decision in a case may sit in judgment on that case.\nThe principle is as applicable to administrative agents, commissioners, referees, masters in chancery, or other arbiters of questions of law or fact not holding judicial office as it is to those who are technically judges in the full sense of the word. * * *\n* * *\nWe need not cite authority holding that if a venireman were to be retained upon a jury in a case in which he or the company that employed him had a financial interest over appropriate challenge, the verdict would be set aside. A similar principle is applicable here.\u201d (Heirich, 10 Ill. 2d at 384-85.)\nThese principles apply to administrative review of charges of employee misconduct heard before a city\u2019s board of fire and police commissioners. Mank v. Board of Fire & Police Commissioners (1972), 7 Ill. App. 3d 478, 484, 288 N.E.2d 49.\nA commissioner may have a personal interest requiring disqualification even though he does not have a direct pecuniary interest in the outcome of the case.\n\u201c[A] \u2018personal interest\u2019 need not be pecuniary; \u2018[i]t need only be an interest which can be viewed as having a potentially debilitating effect on the impartiality of the decision maker.\u2019 (International Harvester Co. v. Bowling (1979), 72 Ill. App. 3d 910, 914, 391 N.E.2d 168; [citation].) And if one member of an administrative body is not disinterested, his or her \u2018participation infects the action of the whole body and makes it voidable.\u2019 City of Naperville v. Wehrle (1930), 340 Ill. 579, 581[, 173 N.E. 165].\u201d Board of Education of Niles Township High School District No. 219 v. Regional Board of School Trustees (1984), 127 Ill. App. 3d 210, 213-14, 468 N.E.2d 1247.\nHere, Commissioner Clayton was employed in a position subordinate to Chief Pfotenhauer, who was both a party and a witness in the case against Bender. That employment relationship would be sufficient grounds to exclude Clayton from serving as a juror in this case:\n\u201c \u2018The trend of authority is to exclude from juries all persons who by reason of their business or social relations, past or present, with either of those parties, could be suspected of possible bias ***.\u2019 \u201d (Marcin v. Kipfer (1983), 117 Ill. App. 3d 1065, 1068, 454 N.E.2d 370, quoting R. Hunter, Trial Handbook for Illinois Lawyers \u00a715.14 (5th ed. 1983).)\nIn People v. Green (1990), 199 Ill. App. 3d 927, 930, 557 N.E.2d 939, the appellate court found that the trial court should have excused a juror for cause because she was a secretary in the State\u2019s Attorney\u2019s office, even though she said that her employment would not affect her ability to be fair. Similarly, for judges, \u201crecusal is required when, at the very time *** [of] trial before a judge, he is in negotiation *** with a lawyer or law firm or party in the case over his future employment.\u201d (Pepsico, Inc. v. McMillen (7th Cir. 1985), 764 F.2d 458, 461.) The actual employment relationship with a party, not merely his attorney, is yet stronger grounds for finding a person disqualified for possible bias. Therefore, Clayton\u2019s participation in this case in a quasi-judicial capacity requires reversal for rehearing by the Board.\nBecause of our resolution of this issue, we need not address the other issues raised in this appeal.\nReversed and remanded.\nHARTMAN and SCARIANO, JJ., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "PRESIDING JUSTICE McCORMICK" } ], "attorneys": [ "Wayne M. Klocke, of Springfield, for appellant.", "Kusper & Raucci, Chartered, of Chicago (Stanley T. Kusper, Jr., and John P. Connell, of counsel), for appellees." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "DAVID BENDER, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. THE BOARD OF FIRE AND POLICE COMMISSIONERS OF DOLTON, Defendant-Appellee.\nFirst District (2nd Division)\nNo. 1\u201492\u20142768\nOpinion filed September 14, 1993.\nWayne M. Klocke, of Springfield, for appellant.\nKusper & Raucci, Chartered, of Chicago (Stanley T. Kusper, Jr., and John P. Connell, of counsel), for appellees." }, "file_name": "0488-01", "first_page_order": 506, "last_page_order": 510 }