{ "id": 2980434, "name": "ALLEN W. KNASEL, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. INSURANCE COMPANY OF ILLINOIS, Defendant-Appellee", "name_abbreviation": "Knasel v. Insurance Co. of Illinois", "decision_date": "1993-09-24", "docket_number": "No. 1\u201492\u20140574", "first_page": "638", "last_page": "644", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "254 Ill. App. 3d 638" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "149 Ill. App. 3d 932", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3462536 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "940" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/149/0932-01" ] }, { "cite": "175 Ill. App. 3d 26", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3555296 ], "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "30-31" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/175/0026-01" ] }, { "cite": "105 Ill. 2d 486", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3141899 ], "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "495" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/105/0486-01" ] }, { "cite": "156 Ill. App. 3d 1098", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3504925 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1100" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/156/1098-01" ] }, { "cite": "157 Ill. App. 3d 785", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3544053 ], "year": 1987, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "790" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/157/0785-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 639, "char_count": 14015, "ocr_confidence": 0.79, "pagerank": { "raw": 4.03580807328026e-08, "percentile": 0.08643669959136614 }, "sha256": "a534b1b42d49a19ffe409b4588bb0cd38c2115cb24e390f52683913c0a89c6b3", "simhash": "1:afb118f2746565fe", "word_count": 2312 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T16:17:01.484927+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "ALLEN W. KNASEL, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. INSURANCE COMPANY OF ILLINOIS, Defendant-Appellee." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE COUSINS\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nPlaintiff, Allen Knasel (Knasel), appeals from the judgment entered against him in an insurance coverage dispute. Knasel brought an action against defendant, Insurance Company of Illinois (ICI), to recover damages for items of personal property belonging to his live-in girl friend which were destroyed in a fire that occurred in his residence. Knasel also claimed that the insurance company\u2019s handling of his claim constituted unreasonable and vexatious conduct. Following a trial on stipulated facts, the trial court held that no coverage was available and entered judgment for defendant on both claims.\nOn appeal, Knasel raises two issues: (1) whether the trial court correctly held that the language in the ICI homeowner\u2019s insurance policy required him to request coverage for the personal property of a guest prior to a loss; and (2) whether the trial court properly entered judgment in favor of ICI on Knasel\u2019s claim that ICI engaged in unreasonable and vexatious conduct.\nWe affirm.\nBackground\nOn May 27, 1989, a fire destroyed the interior of Knasel\u2019s home including items of personal property belonging to his live-in girl friend, Cynthia Garza (Garza). At the time, Knasel\u2019s residence was covered under a homeowner\u2019s insurance policy (the policy) issued by ICI.\nThe personal property coverage contained in the policy provides:\n\u201cWe cover personal property owned or used by an insured while it is anywhere in the world. At your request, we will cover personal property owned by:\n1. Others while the property is on the part of the residence premises occupied by an insured;\n2. A guest or a residence employee, while the property is in any residence occupied by an insured.\u201d\nThe policy contains the following exclusion:\n\u201cWe do not cover:\n* * *\n5. property of roomers, boarders and other tenants, except property of roomers and boarders related to an insured.\u201d\nAt the time the fire occurred, Garza had been living with Kna-sel for approximately five months. At no time during the five months preceding the fire did Knasel notify ICI that personal property belonging to Garza was on his premises. After the fire, Knasel filed a claim with ICI which included personal property belonging to Garza. ICI denied coverage for Garza\u2019s property, stating that she was a \u201ctenant\u201d in Knasel\u2019s home and that her property was therefore excluded under the policy.\nOn March 7, 1990, Knasel filed a two-count complaint for declaratory relief. Count I alleged that ICI\u2019s denial of coverage for Garza\u2019s personal property, on the basis that she was a \u201ctenant,\u201d was erroneous. Count II alleged that ICI\u2019s treatment of Knasel\u2019s claim, including its failure to pay for property it had earlier agreed to cover, constituted unreasonable and vexatious conduct. Knasel requested that the court declare coverage and award costs and penalties to the plaintiff to the extent permitted under section 155 of the Illinois Insurance Code. Ill. Rev. Stat. 1991, ch. 73, par. 767.\nSubsequently, Knasel filed a motion for summary judgment arguing that Garza was not a \u201ctenant\u201d in his home. In response, ICI abandoned its argument that Garza was a \u201ctenant\u201d and instead argued that she was a \u201cguest\u201d in Knasel\u2019s home. ICI asserted that property belonging to \u201cguests\u201d was not covered unless ICI received notice prior to a loss; since Knasel did not notify ICI of Garza\u2019s presence before the fire, no coverage was available.\nOn January 21, 1992, trial took place based upon the following stipulated facts:\n\u201cThis action is filed by Allen Knasel against Insurance Company of Illinois (TCI\u2019) by reason of ICI\u2019s failure to cover the personal property of Cynthia Garza in the Knasel residence. The Garza personal property was destroyed and/or damaged in a fire that occurred on May 27, 1989 at the Kna-sel residence.\nAllen Knasel has been a long time policy holder of ICI. ICI issued the original policy on the 903 Glendale Road property in Glenview, Illinois in 1977 or 1978 and the ICI policy was renewed every year thereafter. Prior to November 9, 1988, Allen Knasel renewed the ICI policy for a one year period through and including November 9, 1989. After paying his premium, Allen Knasel was sent and received the ICI policy sometime immediately after November, 1988. He did not read the policy, however, he did \u2018browse\u2019 through the policy when it was received.\nIn October of 1988 Allen Knasel met Cynthia Garza. After dating Allen Knasel for a short period of time, Cynthia Garza moved into the Knasel residence in either late December of 1988 or early January of 1989. When Cynthia Garza moved into the residence, she and Allen Knasel were not married and were not married at the time of the fire.\nWhen Cynthia Garza moved in, Allen Knasel did not intend that Cynthia Garza was going to live there permanently. It was his thought that she could live there as long as they were seeing each other. Allen Knasel did not require or ask Cynthia Garza to pay any rent or make any monetary contribution to utilities. Cynthia Garza shared in various grocery expenditures and shared keeping the house clean.\nAllen Knasel did not notify anyone at ICI or anyone at his insurance agency that Cynthia Garza was a resident in the house and brought with her certain items of personal property. At no time after Cynthia Garza moved in did Allen Kna-sel request that any of Cynthia Garza\u2019s personal possessions be listed or covered under his ICI policy.\u201d\nFollowing argument, the trial court made the following findings:\n(1) Cynthia Garza was not a tenant of Allen Knasel\u2019s;\n(2) Cynthia Garza was a guest on the property of Allen Knasel on May 27, 1989;\n(3) notice to ICI for property of guests was required prior to a loss; and\n(4) Knasel did not provide notice to ICI that Cynthia Garza\u2019s property was on the premises.\nThe trial court entered judgment in favor of ICI on both counts of Knasel\u2019s claim.\nOpinion\nI\nKnasel does not dispute the trial court\u2019s determination that his live-in girl friend, Garza, was a guest. Instead, Knasel contends that the trial court erred in holding that the language in the ICI policy required him to request coverage for the personal property of his guest prior to a loss. Knasel asserts that the obvious interpretation of the policy\u2019s language is that if a guest suffers a property loss, ICI will cover it if the insured requests so after the loss. Alternatively, Knasel argues that the language is ambiguous and must be interpreted under Illinois law to provide coverage.\nResearch has revealed no case law in Illinois or elsewhere which has interpreted the language of the policy provisions at issue here. Thus, this case presents an issue of first impression.\nAlthough ambiguities in an insurance policy will be construed against the insurer, courts will not distort the language of a policy to create an ambiguity where none exists. (Allstate Insurance Co. v. Boston Whaler, Inc. (1987), 157 Ill. App. 3d 785, 790; State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v. Byrne (1987), 156 Ill. App. 3d 1098, 1100.) Words in an insurance policy must be given their plain and ordinary meaning. (Western Casualty & Surety Co. v. Brochu (1985), 105 Ill. 2d 486.) \u201cIf the words of a policy can reasonably be given their plain, ordinary, and popular meaning, the provisions should be applied as written and the parties should be bound to the agreement they made.\u201d Western Casualty, 105 Ill. 2d at 495.\nThe language at issue reads, \u201c[w]e cover personal property owned or used by an insured while it is anywhere in the world. At your request, we will cover personal property owned by *** a guest.\u201d (Emphasis added.) As ICI points out, the clause pertaining to the insured\u2019s property is written in the present tense, \u201cwe cover.\u201d The clause concerning a guest\u2019s property is written in the future tense, \u201cwe will cover,\u201d and makes such additional coverage subject to \u201cyour request.\u201d The only reasonable interpretation of this language is that no coverage exists until the insured notifies the insurance company of the existence of guest property on the premises and requests additional coverage. Such notice would provide the insurance company with the opportunity to adjust the premiums accordingly. Because Knasel failed to notify ICI of the presence of Garza\u2019s property on his premises before the fire, no coverage for Garza\u2019s property existed at the time the property was destroyed. Accordingly, we hold that the trial court correctly entered judgment for ICI on Knasel\u2019s claim for coverage of Garza\u2019s property.\nII\nKnasel next contends that the court erred in failing to find that ICI engaged in unreasonable and vexatious conduct pursuant to section 155 of the Illinois Insurance Code (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1991, ch. 73, par. 767). Knasel claims that the following actions taken by ICI constitute unreasonable and vexatious conduct: (1) ICI initially denied coverage for Garza\u2019s property because it claimed she was a tenant, and then in response to a motion for summary judgment asserted for the first time that Garza was a guest; (2) ICI has not paid for the bedroom set which was jointly used by Knasel and Garza; and (3) ICI repeatedly attempted to take the deposition of Garza despite the existence of a protective order. We disagree.\nSection 155 of the Illinois Insurance Code provides in pertinent part:\n\u201c\u00a7155 Attorney fees. (1) In any action by or against a company wherein there is in issue the liability of a company on a policy or policies of insurance or the amount of the loss payable thereunder, or for an unreasonable delay in settling a claim, and it appears to the court that such action or delay is vexatious and unreasonable, the court may allow as part of the taxable costs in the action reasonable attorney fees, [and] other costs ***.\u201d Ill. Rev. Stat. 1991, ch. 73, par. 767.\nThe granting of fees and penalties pursuant to section 155 is entrusted to the sound discretion of the trial court, and absent an abuse of discretion, the ruling of the trial court will not be disturbed. Dark v. United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co. (1988), 175 Ill. App. 3d 26, 30-31; Meier v. Aetna Life & Casualty Standard Fire Insurance Co. (1986), 149 Ill. App. 3d 932, 940.\nWith respect to the first instance of allegedly vexatious conduct, ICI argues that Knasel has waived this argument. ICI asserts that Knasel\u2019s claim of vexatious conduct which appears in count II of Knasel\u2019s complaint does not make reference to ICI\u2019s actions relating to Garza\u2019s personal property, but instead relates solely to ICI\u2019s alleged failure to pay for the joint furniture of Knasel and Garza. The record does not support ICI\u2019s assertion; count II of Knasel\u2019s complaint does in fact refer to ICI\u2019s actions relating to both Garza\u2019s personal property and property which was jointly used. However, the record does not demonstrate and Knasel does not explain why ICI\u2019s delay in asserting that Garza was a \u201cguest\u201d rather than a \u201ctenant\u201d amounts to unreasonable and vexatious conduct.\nNext, Knasel argues that ICI\u2019s continuing refusal to pay for the property which was jointly used by Knasel and Garza constitutes unreasonable and vexatious conduct. Knasel asserted at trial that ICI still had not paid for furniture which was jointly used even though ICI had previously agreed to do so. However, the record indicates that ICI paid out the sum of $65,560 to Knasel, and ICI asserts that the cost of the jointly used furniture was included within this amount. Plaintiff does not point to any evidence in the record which refutes ICI\u2019s assertion, and this court has found none.\nFinally, Knasel argues that ICI repeatedly and unreasonably subpoenaed for the deposition of Garza, despite the existence of a protective order. However, Knasel did not pursue this claim in the trial court and is therefore barred from doing so here.\nAfter careful review of the record, we perceive no abuse of discretion in the trial court\u2019s refusal to award relief under section 155 of the Illinois Insurance Code.\nFor the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the circuit court is affirmed.\nAffirmed.\nGORDON, P.J., concurs.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE COUSINS" }, { "text": "JUSTICE MURRAY,\nspecially concurring:\nI concur with the majority, but believe the entire litigation could have been avoided if the involved insurance company kept its policy language up with modern America\u2019s concepts.\nAs the majority opinion indicates, the subject property belonged to Knazel\u2019s \u201clive-in girl friend.\u201d A \u201cguest\u201d is \u201ca person entertained in one\u2019s house or at one\u2019s table.\u201d (Webster\u2019s Third New International Dictionary 1008 (1986).) The same dictionary defines \u201clive in\u201d as a verb meaning \u201cto lodge in one\u2019s place of employment.\u201d (Webster\u2019s Third New International Dictionary 1324 (1986).) A \u201clive in\u201d in modern American culture means something more than a mere guest; it is closer to a \u201clodger.\u201d Lodger is an archaic word meaning (according to the cited dictionary), \u201cone that lives or dwells in a place: Inhabitant, Occupant.\u201d (Webster\u2019s Third New International Dictionary 1329 (1986).) \u201cGirl friend,\u201d according to the cited dictionary, means among other things, \u201cthe female partner in an intimate *** relationship.\u201d (Webster\u2019s Third New International Dictionary 959 (1986).)\nFollowing these well-defined meanings in modern American English, a \u201clive-in girl friend\u201d is in a category other than a \u201cguest.\u201d She is a \u201cdwelling partner in an intimate relationship with the occupant of a house.\u201d\nIf the parties had not stipulated that Knazel\u2019s \u201clive-in girl friend\u201d and now his wife was his \u201cguest,\u201d in view of the policy not mentioning \u201clive ins,\u201d I would reverse and remand to determine what the insurer did mean by the term \u201cguest\u201d used in the policy when it applies to \u201clive ins.\u201d", "type": "concurrence", "author": "JUSTICE MURRAY," } ], "attorneys": [ "Rigsby & McAuley, of Chicago (John G. McAuley, of counsel), for appellant.", "James M. Dupree, of Chicago, for appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "ALLEN W. KNASEL, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. INSURANCE COMPANY OF ILLINOIS, Defendant-Appellee.\nFirst District (5th Division)\nNo. 1\u201492\u20140574\nOpinion filed September 24, 1993.\nMURRAY, J., specially concurring.\nRigsby & McAuley, of Chicago (John G. McAuley, of counsel), for appellant.\nJames M. Dupree, of Chicago, for appellee." }, "file_name": "0638-01", "first_page_order": 656, "last_page_order": 662 }