{ "id": 2987219, "name": "In re DIANE WINTERS, Alleged to be a Person Subject to Involuntary Admission (The People of the State of Illinois, Petitioner-Appellee, v. Diane Winters, Respondent-Appellant)", "name_abbreviation": "People v. Winters", "decision_date": "1994-01-14", "docket_number": "No. 2\u201492\u20141006", "first_page": "605", "last_page": "613", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "255 Ill. App. 3d 605" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "242 Ill. App. 3d 735", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5121659 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "740" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/242/0735-01" ] }, { "cite": "62 Ill. App. 3d 408", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5620671 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "411" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/62/0408-01" ] }, { "cite": "108 Ill. App. 3d 169", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3011449 ], "year": 1978, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "174" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/108/0169-01" ] }, { "cite": "219 Ill. App. 3d 361", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5798444 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "363" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/219/0361-01" ] }, { "cite": "216 Ill. App. 3d 410", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5289510 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "414" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/216/0410-01" ] }, { "cite": "209 Ill. App. 3d 999", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2542081 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1003" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/209/0999-01" ] }, { "cite": "114 Ill. 2d 232", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5542808 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "244" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/114/0232-01" ] }, { "cite": "422 U.S. 563", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 9560 ], "weight": 6, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "575" }, { "page": "407" }, { "page": "2493" }, { "page": "575" }, { "page": "407" }, { "page": "2493-94" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/422/0563-01" ] }, { "cite": "237 Ill. App. 3d 105", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5163414 ], "weight": 4, "year": 1975, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "109-10" }, { "page": "110" }, { "page": "110" }, { "page": "110" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/237/0105-01" ] }, { "cite": "151 Ill. 2d 126", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3292113 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "130-31" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/151/0126-01" ] }, { "cite": "151 Ill. App. 3d 911", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3540187 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/151/0911-01" ] }, { "cite": "193 Ill. App. 3d 119", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2499081 ], "year": 1987, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/193/0119-01" ] }, { "cite": "233 Ill. App. 3d 334", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5195234 ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/233/0334-01" ] }, { "cite": "151 Ill. App. 3d 911", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3540187 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "920" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/151/0911-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 770, "char_count": 18143, "ocr_confidence": 0.788, "pagerank": { "raw": 2.3248873416031565e-07, "percentile": 0.7904213720568265 }, "sha256": "be0c88223718b000c9c0b613563c4bb5955130abc39029a5bae93d4c20a8283d", "simhash": "1:10ef1826e3149e60", "word_count": 2972 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T21:02:11.364828+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "In re DIANE WINTERS, Alleged to be a Person Subject to Involuntary Admission (The People of the State of Illinois, Petitioner-Appellee, v. Diane Winters, Respondent-Appellant)." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE QUETSCH\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nRespondent, Diane Winters, was found to be a person subject to involuntary admission and was ordered to be hospitalized with the Department of Mental Health. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1991, ch. 911/2, pars. 3-700, 3-811, 3-812 (now 405 ILCS 5/3-700, 3-811, 3-812 (West 1992)).) Respondent raises two issues for review: (1) whether the trial court\u2019s order for involuntary admission must be reversed because the State failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence that respondent was unable to provide for her basic physical needs so as to guard herself from serious harm; and (2) whether the trial court ordered the least restrictive treatment alternative.\nOn June 15, 1992, respondent voluntarily admitted herself to the H. Douglas Singer Mental Health Center (Singer). On July 23, respondent requested that she be released from Singer, and the State responded with a petition for involuntary admission. At the hearing on the petition on August 3, John LaRue, a registered nurse, testified that respondent was on his unit at Singer. According to LaRue, respondent was \u201cconfused\u201d and \u201cdelusional.\u201d She insisted that she was pregnant, even after receiving negative pregnancy test results, and she refused medication. Respondent also was hostile when prevented from leaving the unit. On one occasion, respondent attempted to hit LaRue, but he blocked the blow. About two weeks before the hearing, respondent began saying that she was diabetic and she demanded insulin injections, although this behavior had subsided a few days before the hearing.\nDaniel Figiel, a clinical social worker, testified that he examined respondent on July 31 and again on the day of the hearing. During the first interview, respondent paced the room, and she had severe hand tremors. Respondent told Figiel that she \u201chad racing thoughts real bad,\u201d that \u201cshe slept too much but then said she didn\u2019t sleep at all,\u201d and \u201cshe was exhausted from thinking too much.\u201d She also told him that \u201cHail Mary has been with her\u201d and \u201ca lot of women\u201d had been in her thoughts. Respondent then said her mouth was dry and she did not want to answer any more questions. During the interview on the day of the hearing, respondent said \u201cshe was on camera with eyes at Singer\u201d; she \u201csaid she was being the Hail Mary,\u201d and her \u201cbrains were being picked at by the staff at Singer.\u201d Respondent told Figiel that she was not ready to leave Singer because she had no place to live. Respondent did not know the day or date, but she knew she was in Singer. Figiel diagnosed respondent as suffering from schizophrenia, paranoid type, with marked delusions and confusion. Figiel did not examine respondent\u2019s medical charts.\nFigiel opined that respondent was mentally ill and that she was reasonably expected to inflict serious physical harm on another in the near future. Figiel based this opinion on respondent\u2019s physical aggression when she attempted to leave the unit. Figiel further opined that respondent was unable to provide for her basic needs so as to guard herself from serious harm because of her mental illness. This opinion was based on respondent having no place to stay. Figiel also stated:\n\u201cShe is not able to care for herself, I don\u2019t believe, based on her illness, that she would have a great difficulty in taking care of her eating habits or eating. I don\u2019t think she would be able to sleep properly. She would get very confused and would not be able to function on a daily basis.\u201d\nRespondent objected to this opinion as not having a sufficient basis. The court reserved ruling on the objection, subject to cross-examination.\nOn cross-examination, Figiel stated that he interviewed respondent on July 31 for 10 to 15 minutes and for 10 minutes before the hearing. During the interviews respondent was not threatening, she made no statements about eating, she was dressed appropriately, and her hygiene appeared adequate. Figiel had no evidence that respondent was not eating or sleeping properly.\nRespondent renewed her motion to strike Figiel\u2019s testimony, which the court denied. Respondent presented no evidence. Several times during the hearing, respondent expressed that she was thirsty, and she was permitted to get a drink of water.\nThe court found that respondent was not likely to inflict serious harm on another. However, the court determined that respondent was unable to provide for her basic physical needs and was likely to cause serious harm to herself. The court noted respondent\u2019s belief that she was pregnant and diabetic. The court expressed concern that if respondent injected herself with insulin, she would cause serious harm to herself. Based on LaRue\u2019s testimony that the medical records did not indicate that respondent was diabetic, the court found that respondent\u2019s belief that she had diabetes resulted from her mental illness. The court further stated that the evidence was sufficient for an expert to conclude that respondent\u2019s delusions made it impracticable for her to determine what she should eat and what she should take for medication. The court conceded that there was no evidence about respondent not eating, but there was evidence she had no plans for living arrangements. Based on the dis-positional evaluation, the court found that the least restrictive alternative was hospitalization. Respondent timely appealed.\nRespondent first contends that the order of involuntary commitment must be reversed for lack of clear and convincing evidence that she was unable to provide for her basic physical needs so as to guard herself from serious harm.\nThe State cites In re Grimes (1990), 193 Ill. App. 3d 119, and In re Williams (1987), 151 Ill. App. 3d 911, to assert that the State does not need to prove that respondent is a definite danger to herself, and that a reviewing court should uphold a commitment order where there is a reasonable expectation that the respondent may engage in dangerous conduct. The State\u2019s reliance on these cases is misplaced because the trial court here did not find that respondent was a danger to herself or others. The court\u2019s decision was premised on its conclusion that respondent was unable to provide for her basic physical needs.\nThe involuntary commitment procedures implicate substantial liberty interests of the person, but these liberty interests must be balanced against the need to provide care for persons unable to care for themselves and to protect society from the dangerously mentally ill. (In re Robinson (1992), 151 Ill. 2d 126, 130-31.) This latter concern is not relevant here because the court found that respondent was not a danger to others. Respondent does not contest the finding that she is mentally ill, only the finding that her mental illness renders her unable to provide for her care and protection. (See Ill. Rev. Stat. 1991, ch. 911/2, par. 1 \u2014 119(2) (now 405 ILCS 5/ 1 \u2014 119(2) (West 1992)).) The State had the burden to make this showing by clear and convincing evidence, and we may not disturb the trial court\u2019s decision unless it is against the manifest weight of the evidence. (In re Long (1992), 237 Ill. App. 3d 105, 109-10.) A person may not be confined against her will merely because she is mentally ill if she is \u201cdangerous to no one and can live safely in freedom.\u201d O\u2019Connor v. Donaldson (1975), 422 U.S. 563, 575, 45 L. Ed. 2d 396, 407, 95 S. Ct. 2486, 2493.\nTo determine whether a person can provide for her basic physical needs, the court should consider whether: \u201cthe respondent can obtain her own food, shelter, or necessary medical care [citation]; the respondent has a place to live, or a family to assist the respondent [citation]; the respondent is able to function in society [citation]; and the respondent has an understanding of money or a concern for it as a means of sustenance [citation].\u201d Long, 237 Ill. App. 3d at 110.\nRespondent argues that the State failed to prove that she was unable to provide for her basic physical needs. Respondent points out that there was no evidence to support Figiel\u2019s opinion that respondent would not eat properly or would not sleep sufficiently. Although the trial court may determine the weight to accord an expert\u2019s opinion, that opinion must be more than conjecture or guess (Dyback v. Weber (1986), 114 Ill. 2d 232, 244). The weight to be assigned an expert\u2019s opinion depends on the factual basis for that opinion (Treadwell v. Downey (1991), 209 Ill. App. 3d 999, 1003), as an expert\u2019s opinion is only as valid as the reasons for it (In re B.W. (1991), 216 Ill. App. 3d 410, 414). We agree with respondent that Figiel\u2019s opinion should have been given little weight on this question because he never ascertained whether respondent was eating properly or whether she was sleeping an appropriate amount. In addition, the court cannot presume that a person suffering from schizophrenia will fail to eat or sleep or may engage in physical activity to the point of exhaustion. See Long, 237 Ill. App. 3d at 110; see also In re Biggs (1991), 219 Ill. App. 3d 361, 363.\nThe State emphasizes that the nurse, LaRue, testified that respondent believed that she was pregnant, that she was diabetic, she demanded insulin and she refused \u201canti-psychotic\u201d medication. Figiel testified that respondent suffered from delusions and was confused; she was not oriented to day or date, and she told Figiel that she was not ready to leave Singer because she had no place to live.\nRespondent first argues that she could not be committed merely because she refused to take psychotropic medication. The right to refuse such medication is guaranteed statutorily (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1991, ch. 911/2, par. 2-107 (now 405 ILCS 5/2-107 (West 1992))), and it is not grounds for involuntary admission (People v. Nunn (1982), 108 Ill. App. 3d 169, 174; In re Phillips (1978), 62 Ill. App. 3d 408, 411). Thus, this fact will not support the trial court\u2019s finding.\nRespondent also argues that she could not be committed involuntarily merely because she had no place to live. Figiel never discussed with respondent any living arrangements if she were to be released. There was no evidence that respondent did not have a place to stay temporarily. In addition, \u201c[a] person may not be held against her will merely to improve her standard of living or because society may find it uncomfortable to see such people on the street.\u201d (Long, 237 Ill. App. 3d at 110, citing O\u2019Connor v. Donaldson (1975), 422 U.S. 563, 575, 45 L. Ed. 2d 396, 407, 95 S. Ct. 2486, 2493-94.) Thus, this factor also fails to support the court\u2019s ruling.\nThe court based its finding on its concern that respondent would seek medical treatment for her imaginary pregnancy and diabetes. The court emphasized its concern that respondent might get insulin and cause herself serious harm. Respondent asserts that there was no evidence that her belief that she had diabetes was a delusion. Respondent correctly notes that no test was performed on her to determine whether she had developed diabetes, and the nurse merely stated that respondent did not have a history of diabetes. Respondent suggests that her frequent requests for water indicate a symptom of diabetes and that her belief that she was pregnant may have resulted from side effects of her medication which mimic symptoms of pregnancy. However, respondent did not raise these arguments in the trial court; therefore, they are waived. (Saladino v. Team Chevrolet, Inc. (1993), 242 Ill. App. 3d 735, 740.) Respondent further argues that, even if she were delusional in thinking that she was diabetic, there is no evidence that this delusion, or the delusion about pregnancy, would put her safety at risk. We agree.\nFigiel did not testify that respondent might harm herself if she persisted in believing that she was pregnant or diabetic. These delusions were not part of Figiel\u2019s report, and it is unclear whether Figiel was aware of these delusions, as he did not examine her charts. Thus, the trial court\u2019s findings were not based on the evidence.\nMoreover, the trial court assumed that respondent would be able to get insulin. This assumption presupposes that a physician would prescribe insulin for respondent without determining whether respondent is in need of it. According to the trial court\u2019s reasoning, all hypochondriacs would have to be committed to the Department of Mental Health. Clearly, such is not the case. It is unreasonable to assume that any physician would prescribe insulin for respondent if she does not have diabetes. We conclude that the trial court\u2019s finding is against the manifest weight of the evidence and the order of involuntary commitment must be reversed. Consequently, we need not address respondent\u2019s second issue pertaining to treatment alternatives.\nThe judgment of the circuit court is reversed.\nReversed.\nGEIGER, J., concurs.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE QUETSCH" }, { "text": "JUSTICE WOODWARD\ndissenting.\nI respectfully dissent. In order to subject the respondent to involuntarily admission, the State must prove by clear and convincing evidence that the respondent is a person who is mentally ill and who, because of her illness, is unable to provide for her basic physical needs, so as to guard herself from serious harm. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1991, ch. 91V2, pars. 3-808, 1-119 (now 405 ILCS 5/3-808, 1-119 (West 1992)).) The reviewing court will normally uphold a commitment order where there is a reasonable expectation that respondent may engage in dangerous conduct. (In re Williams (1987), 151 Ill. App. 3d 911, 920.) The trial court\u2019s decision that the respondent is subject to involuntary admission will not be disturbed unless it is manifestly erroneous. In re Long (1992), 233 Ill. App. 3d 334.\nThe majority\u2019s attempt to rationalize the respondent\u2019s behavior is simply not convincing. John LaRue, a registered nurse who worked on the respondent\u2019s ward, opined that she could not guard herself against harm. He recounted some of respondent\u2019s persistent delusions, namely, that she was diabetic, though medical records showed otherwise, and that she was pregnant with three fetuses, despite negative pregnancy tests. The respondent had attempted to leave the hospital on numerous occasions, becoming angry and sometimes violent when restrained.\nDaniel Figiel, a clinical social worker, examined respondent on July 31, 1992, and August 3, 1992, and filed a detailed report of his findings. Mr. Figiel testified that respondent suffers from paranoid schizophrenia, which manifests itself in marked delusions and confused thinking. His examination revealed a complex system of delusional thought processes. During one examination, the respondent said that she believed a being referred to as \u201cHail Mary\u201d has been with her on several occasions. She claimed to have been Hail Mary on one occasion. Additionally, the respondent believed that she was under continual observation by \u201ca camera with eyes.\u201d She stated to Mr. Figiel that her brain is \u201cpicked at\u201d by the Singer hospital staff.\nImportantly, Mr. Figiel observed that the respondent was disoriented as to time and place. Further, she told him that she was not ready to leave Singer and had no place to live. Mr. Figiel found that the respondent had no ability to make realistic plans for herself. In his opinion, if she were allowed to leave the hospital, respondent\u2019s delusions would render her confused to the point where \u201cshe would not be able to function on a daily basis.\u201d\nThe trial court, upon observing the respondent at the hearing, stated:\n\u201cIt is clear that she is suffering from a very active mental illness. The microphone couldn\u2019t even be pointed towards her because she felt that the electricity from it was going to affect her mentally. The speakers in the quiet room add static, according to her, which affected her mentally and other patients.\u201d\nThe testimony of Mr. LaRue and Mr. Figiel and the trial court\u2019s observations of the respondent\u2019s behavior provide ample support for the ruling that her behavior was so delusional that she could not take care of herself outside of the hospital setting.\nThe majority emphasizes the trial court\u2019s view that, if the respondent acted upon her delusions regarding diabetes and pregnancy, then she would put her safety at risk. Admittedly, acting on these delusions would probably not pose much risk to the respondent. Nevertheless, this distorted thinking does demonstrate her significant disorientation and serves to support the trial court\u2019s decision that she is unable to care for herself.\nAlso, the majority stresses that the evidence did not show respondent had no place to temporarily stay upon release. Yet the respondent stated to Mr. Figiel that she was not ready to leave Singer because she had no place to live. This is evidence of her lack of housing upon release. Given that testimony, it was incumbent upon the respondent to come forward with evidence that she did have a place to live.\nIn conclusion, the evidence clearly and convincingly demonstrates the following. At the time of the hearing, the respondent was floridly psychotic. She was delusional prior to the hearing and at the hearing. The testimony of a nurse, who worked on respondent\u2019s ward, and the clinical social worker, who evaluated her mental condition, left no doubt that the respondent\u2019s paranoid schizophrenia substantially interfered with her ability to address the problems of daily life. Having observed the respondent\u2019s delusional behavior at the hearing and having listened to the testimony, the trial court\u2019s decision that the respondent, due to her active psychosis, was a danger to herself is not against the manifest weight of the evidence.", "type": "dissent", "author": "JUSTICE WOODWARD" } ], "attorneys": [ "William E. Coffin, of Guardianship & Advocacy Commission, of Chicago, for appellant.", "Paul A. Logli, State\u2019s Attorney, of Rockford (William L. Browers, David A. Bernhard, and Norbert J. Goetten, all of State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor\u2019s Office, of counsel), for the People." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "In re DIANE WINTERS, Alleged to be a Person Subject to Involuntary Admission (The People of the State of Illinois, Petitioner-Appellee, v. Diane Winters, Respondent-Appellant).\nSecond District\nNo. 2\u201492\u20141006\nOpinion filed January 14, 1994.\nWOODWARD, J., dissenting.\nWilliam E. Coffin, of Guardianship & Advocacy Commission, of Chicago, for appellant.\nPaul A. Logli, State\u2019s Attorney, of Rockford (William L. Browers, David A. Bernhard, and Norbert J. Goetten, all of State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor\u2019s Office, of counsel), for the People." }, "file_name": "0605-01", "first_page_order": 625, "last_page_order": 633 }