{ "id": 2989955, "name": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. CHAD MICHAEL MOTE, Defendant-Appellant", "name_abbreviation": "People v. Mote", "decision_date": "1994-01-27", "docket_number": "No. 4\u201493\u20140033", "first_page": "757", "last_page": "762", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "255 Ill. App. 3d 757" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "354 N.E.2d 18", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 4, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "23" }, { "page": "24" }, { "page": "23" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "40 Ill. App. 3d 832", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2964754 ], "weight": 4, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "838" }, { "page": "839" }, { "page": "838" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/40/0832-01" ] }, { "cite": "410 Ill. 410", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 5311612 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/410/0410-01" ] }, { "cite": "107 N.E.2d 843", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "844" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "412 Ill. 565", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 2664575 ], "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "567" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/412/0565-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 628, "char_count": 11341, "ocr_confidence": 0.749, "pagerank": { "raw": 6.873996117795413e-08, "percentile": 0.4184089497109677 }, "sha256": "7bea43f0fb6843535bd11e126a9aa5512a3aa7d143cda5627529e32c31984492", "simhash": "1:b96a1554f45f8ef6", "word_count": 1820 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T21:02:11.364828+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. CHAD MICHAEL MOTE, Defendant-Appellant." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE STEIGMANN\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nIn August 1992, defendant, Chad Michael Mote, pleaded guilty to one count of aggravated battery in violation of section 12 \u2014 4(a) of the Criminal Code of 1961 (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1991, ch. 38, par. 12\u2014 4(a)). In November 1992, the trial court sentenced him to four years in prison and ordered him to pay restitution. Defendant appeals, contending that the court committed reversible error by conducting a private interview with the victim and his wife during the sentencing hearing. We agree and reverse and remand for a new sentencing hearing.\nI. Background\nAt the hearing at which defendant pleaded guilty, defense counsel stated that both he and the prosecutor agreed to recommend four years in prison as an appropriate sentence; neither would request a higher or lower sentence. As part of the plea agreement, the State dismissed an additional count of aggravated battery. However, when defendant spoke during allocution at the sentencing hearing, he requested probation. The trial court then stated that it was considering two sentences. The first consisted of four years in prison and restitution to the victim in the amount of $18,000 for unreimbursed medical expenses and $16,800 for lost wages. The second included 30 months of probation, six months of periodic imprisonment, and the same amount of restitution.\nThe court then stated the following:\n\u201c[I]f the defendant wishes to select the [sentence] which does not include [a] sentence to the Department of Corrections^] he will need to say that on the record.\nIf he so indicates[,] I will consider that sentence only if I have the agreement of counsel, and that is both counsel, to meet privately with the victim, the victim\u2019s wife, and any of their children they wish to be present with the Court Reporter only present to determine whether they are willing to accept that disposition. Contents of the transcript of that proceeding will be sealed in the court file for purposes of any appeal.\u201d\nAfter conferring with counsel, defendant selected the sentencing option that did not include a prison sentence. The court cautioned, however, that it would \u201cconsider that [option] only if [defendant] waives any objection to my discussing it privately with the victims.\u201d Defense counsel consented to this procedure.\nThe court then conducted a private discussion with the victim and his wife. The transcript was sealed and not made available to defendant prior to this appeal. Following that meeting, and without disclosing what occurred there, the court sentenced defendant to four years in prison and ordered him to pay restitution.\nII. Analysis\nIn People v. Thunberg (1952), 412 Ill. 565, 107 N.E.2d 843, the supreme court overturned a rape conviction in part because the trial court, before arriving at a verdict in a bench trial, interviewed the victim and her parents outside the presence of defendant and his counsel. The supreme court concluded that these circumstances required a new trial, explaining as follows:\n\u201cIt has been repeatedly held that the deliberations of the trial judge are strictly limited to the record made before him in open court. [Citations.] Quite recently, in the case of People v. Rivers, 410 Ill. 410, at page 416, this court said: \u2018The defendant in any criminal proceeding has an inherent and constitutional right that all proceedings against him shall be open and notorious, and in his presence, and any inquiry or any acquisition of information or evidence outside of open court and outside of the presence of the defendant is prejudicial error. The defendant cannot be expected to know the scope and extent of any private inquiry made by the court outside of open court and he is not required to inquire into such matters and to resort to extraneous proof to show that he has been prejudiced. He has a right to rely upon his constitutional guarantee that nothing shall be considered against him except the competent evidence introduced in open court, in his presence, by the witnesses who confront him.\u2019 \u201d Thunberg, 412 Ill. at 567, 107 N.E.2d at 844.\nIn a similar vein, this court in People v. Sumner (1976), 40 Ill. App. 3d 832, 354 N.E.2d 18, held that the trial court commits reversible error when it holds private conversations with members of the public in order to assist the court in determining the sentence it will impose. After observing that \u201c[pjrivate communications by a judge concerning a case are generally improper\u201d (Sumner, 40 Ill. App. 3d at 838, 354 N.E.2d at 23), this court wrote the following:\n\u201cThe private conversations of the trial judge with members of the public in the instant case were apparently for the purpose of determining whether a sentence of probation or conditional discharge would \u2018deprecate [the] seriousness\u2019 of the offense. An argument can be made that the best way to do this is to talk to others to sample public opinion. Such a procedure, however, affords the defendant no opportunity to challenge the bias of the information obtained. We deem the practice to be improper.\u201d Sumner, 40 Ill. App. 3d at 839, 354 N.E.2d at 24.\nAlthough we reaffirm this court\u2019s holding in Sumner that the sentencing court's private consultations with members of the public concerning sentencing constitute error, we note that Sumner also mentions that the sentencing court consulted privately with other judges, as well as members of the public. (Sumner, 40 Ill. App. 3d at 838, 354 N.E.2d at 23.) We take this opportunity to clarify Sumner by explaining that it did not prohibit such consultations with fellow judges.\nThe court in Sumner could have addressed the propriety of a judge\u2019s conversations with other judges, but declined to do so. Interestingly, however, the court cited section 7.1 of the A.B.A. Standards Relating to Sentencing Alternatives and Procedures (1968). Section 7.1 recommends that groups of trial judges from the same court meet together periodically in sentencing councils to discuss the sentences to be later imposed in pending cases. While sentencing is a uniquely personal responsibility for a trial judge, such discussions might well assist the judge and help avoid disparate sentences. Obviously, the choice of sentence must remain the sole responsibility of the judge who will actually impose it.\nCanon 3 of the Code of Judicial Conduct specifically authorizes a judge to \u201cconsult with court personnel whose function is to aid the judge in carrying out the judge\u2019s adjudicative responsibilities or with other judges.\u201d (Official Reports Advance Sheet No. 18 (September 1, 1993), R. 63(A)(b) (eff. August 6, 1993).) This authorization (which remains open to interpretation), when taken together with the policy behind section 7.1, suggests that conversations among trial judges about sentencing in pending cases is not forbidden.\nIn reaching our conclusion that the trial court\u2019s private interview constitutes reversible error, we have also considered section 5 \u2014 4\u20141 of the Unified Code of Corrections (Unified Code) (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1991, ch. 38, par. 1005 \u2014 4\u20141), which sets forth the actions the court shall take at the sentencing hearing. Needless to say, that section contains no authority for the court to conduct private interviews during the sentencing hearing. Because we view the court\u2019s action of conducting private interviews at the sentencing hearing as so fundamentally contrary to our legal traditions, we choose to view the absence of such authority as no legislative oversight. Thus, the court\u2019s actions violated the statutory scheme for sentencing hearings, as provided in section 5 \u2014 4\u20141 of the Unified Code, and constitute reversible error for that reason alone. Accordingly, we need not address defendant\u2019s constitutional challenges to the court\u2019s actions.\nThe State argues that the trial court\u2019s actions were not improper. Alternatively, the State contends that if they were improper, because they were done with defendant\u2019s \u201cpermission,\u201d he suffered no prejudice. We find the State\u2019s arguments without merit.\nThe fact that the trial court disclosed its intentions prior to the interview, rather than after the fact, makes no difference regarding whether the ex parte communication was proper in the first instance. It was not. Further, we reject the State\u2019s characterization of defendant\u2019s role as that of a willing participant who, without reservation, gave the court \u201cpermission\u201d to engage in this improper conduct. The court expressly indicated that it would not even consider the possibility of probation if defendant refused to agree to the private interview. Under these circumstances, no \u201cpermission\u201d was given. We add that a defendant\u2019s consent, even if freely given, does not (and cannot) authorize a trial court to engage in this improper conduct.\nWe note the transcript of the interview shows that the trial court initially told the victim and his wife that sentencing was a judicial function which the court was not trying to \u201cpass on\u201d to them. Yet, by the close of the interview, when the victims questioned the propriety of probation, the court seems clearly to have indicated that unless the victim and his wife consented, the court would not sentence defendant to probation. Defendant argues that these statements also constitute reversible error because despite the court\u2019s protestations to the contrary, it did in fact delegate its sentencing function to the victim and his wife. Although we believe defendant\u2019s criticism has merit, we need not decide whether the court\u2019s remarks constitute reversible error because we have already found reversible error, requiring a new sentencing hearing.\nLast, the State argues that defendant has failed to show prejudice because he originally agreed when he pleaded guilty to a four-year sentence. However, the issue of the appropriate sentence in this case is not before us. Had defendant been sentenced to a lesser punishment, the error the trial court committed would still require reversal. The only issue before us is whether the trial court\u2019s private interview of the victim and his wife constitutes reversible error, not whether defendant got what he deserved.\nIn his arguments on appeal, defendant specifically disclaims that the trial court harbored any improper motive. We agree. The record reveals the court's deep concern about the substantial amount of monetary loss suffered by the victims of this brutal crime and defendant\u2019s ability to satisfy a restitution award. Nonetheless, however well motivated the court may have been, the procedure it employed was improper.\nIII. Conclusion\nFor the reasons stated, we affirm defendant\u2019s conviction but vacate his sentence and remand the case to the circuit court of Logan County for resentencing before a different judge.\nAffirmed in part; vacated in part and remanded with directions.\nKNECHT and LUND, JJ., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE STEIGMANN" } ], "attorneys": [ "Daniel D. Yuhas and Judith L. Libby, both of State Appellate Defender\u2019s Office, of Springfield, for appellant.", "John Turner, State's Attorney, of Lincoln (Norbert J. Goetten, Robert J. Biderman, and Linda Susan McClain, all of State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor\u2019s Office, of counsel), for the People." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. CHAD MICHAEL MOTE, Defendant-Appellant.\nFourth District\nNo. 4\u201493\u20140033\nArgued October 13, 1993.\nOpinion filed January 27, 1994.\nDaniel D. Yuhas and Judith L. Libby, both of State Appellate Defender\u2019s Office, of Springfield, for appellant.\nJohn Turner, State's Attorney, of Lincoln (Norbert J. Goetten, Robert J. Biderman, and Linda Susan McClain, all of State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor\u2019s Office, of counsel), for the People." }, "file_name": "0757-01", "first_page_order": 777, "last_page_order": 782 }