{ "id": 5384296, "name": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. BARRY LEE LACEY, Defendant-Appellant", "name_abbreviation": "People v. Lacey", "decision_date": "1993-12-21", "docket_number": "No. 1-90-3050", "first_page": "20", "last_page": "27", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "256 Ill. App. 3d 20" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "319 N.E.2d 764", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "59 Ill. 2d 276", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2958767 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "282" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/59/0276-01" ] }, { "cite": "514 N.E.2d 817", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "161 Ill. App. 3d 967", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3466668 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "978" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/161/0967-01" ] }, { "cite": "368 N.E.2d 882", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "68 Ill. 2d 149", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5809665 ], "weight": 3, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "154" }, { "page": "154" }, { "page": "154" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/68/0149-01" ] }, { "cite": "609 N.E.2d 371", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "241 Ill. App. 3d 276", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2436532 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "283" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/241/0276-01" ] }, { "cite": "599 N.E.2d 137", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "233 Ill. App. 3d 471", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5196318 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "473" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/233/0471-01" ] }, { "cite": "599 N.E.2d 104", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "233 Ill. App. 3d 449", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5194078 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "456" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/233/0449-01" ] }, { "cite": "617 N.E.2d 320", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "247 Ill. App. 3d 68", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2926715 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "71" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/247/0068-01" ] }, { "cite": "545 N.E.2d 399", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "189 Ill. App. 3d 473", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2681099 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "476" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/189/0473-01" ] }, { "cite": "587 N.E.2d 1113", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1989, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "224 Ill. App. 3d 815", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5253635 ], "year": 1989, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "816" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/224/0815-01" ] }, { "cite": "618 N.E.2d 279", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "pin_cites": [ { "page": "284" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "247 Ill. App. 3d 951", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2931463 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "959" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/247/0951-01" ] }, { "cite": "546 N.E.2d 561", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1992, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "131 Ill. 2d 387", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5569807 ], "weight": 4, "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "398" }, { "page": "398" }, { "page": "398" }, { "page": "398" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/131/0387-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 750, "char_count": 15296, "ocr_confidence": 0.775, "pagerank": { "raw": 5.527646540942415e-08, "percentile": 0.3471476522376401 }, "sha256": "d37805fe509a9f97420866ef801053136e6d423c18cf8566b075edec695b6932", "simhash": "1:63fa756e7760f577", "word_count": 2523 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T16:39:51.292435+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. BARRY LEE LACEY, Defendant-Appellant." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "PRESIDING JUSTICE McCORMICK\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nDefendant, Barry Lee Lacey, was charged with first degree murder and robbery. After a jury trial, he was found guilty of both charges and sentenced to natural life in prison for the murder and to seven years\u2019 imprisonment for the robbery, the sentences to run concurrently. Defendant appeals the convictions and sentences.\nOn appeal, defendant argues (1) that the police did not have probable cause to arrest him on February 2, 1989, and (2) that the trial court failed to take into account his rehabilitative potential in sentencing. Thus, defendant contends that he was improperly sentenced to life imprisonment. For the reasons set forth below, we affirm the convictions and sentences.\nOn February 1, 1989, the victim, Renee Butler, resided at 7416 South Phillips, Chicago, in apartment 209. She had lived there for approximately two weeks. Defendant resided in apartment 208. The two apartments were located directly across from each other on the second floor.\nOn the evening of February 1, 1989, the victim was in the home of her friend, Martrice Dow, who lived upstairs in the same apartment building, to borrow some clothes she planned to wear later that evening. The victim\u2019s niece, Davina Davis, was also present in Dow\u2019s apartment. Davis lived in the same apartment building in apartment 401.\nAt about 9:45 p.m., the victim left Dow\u2019s apartment to go back to her own apartment. However, Dow expected the victim to return shortly. When the victim left Dow\u2019s apartment, she was wearing a royal blue Dodgers\u2019 baseball cap, an orange T-shirt, dark jeans, a gold chain and a gold watch.\nDow went to look for the victim when she failed to return. The victim did not respond when Dow knocked on her door. As Dow turned to go back to her own apartment, she spotted the victim\u2019s blue Dodgers\u2019 cap in the doorway of defendant\u2019s apartment across the hall. She picked up the cap and went back to her own apartment.\nDavis left Dow\u2019s apartment at about 10 p.m. on February 1,1989. Upon returning to Dow\u2019s apartment, Davis discovered the victim\u2019s cap on a chair. After talking with Dow, the two decided to go to apartment 208 to talk to defendant.\nDefendant first told Davis and Dow that he had seen the victim with a \"tall and fat\u201d man and that the man was wearing a red jacket. This description did not match anyone the women knew. A short while later, Davis and Dow returned to defendant\u2019s apartment to question him about the victim\u2019s whereabouts. During this second conversation, defendant gave a different description of the man he claimed was with the victim. This time defendant stated that he saw the victim accompanied by a \"short\u201d man with a \"red and green\u201d Chicago Bulls\u2019 jacket. Davis pointed out to the defendant that no Chicago Bulls\u2019 jacket existed in the colors \"red and green.\u201d\nThe janitor of the building discovered the victim\u2019s body the following morning, February 2, 1989, while he was looking out of the window of the second-floor landing. Defendant was arrested a short time later near the intersection of 75th and Phillips on February 2, 1989.\nDefendant filed a motion to quash arrest and suppress evidence. At the hearing on the motions, Officer Clifford Evans testified that on February 2, 1989, he was assigned to the 7 a.m. to 3 p.m. shift when he got a call at 9:15 a.m. that a woman had been thrown from a window. When he arrived at the scene, he found the body of a black female lying face down on the ground. He noticed that the body was lying directly below an open window on the second floor of the apartment building at 7416 South Phillips. He subsequently learned that defendant lived in the apartment with the open window. Officer Evans then spoke to Davis, who related the events surrounding the victim\u2019s disappearance the previous evening and her conversations with defendant, during which defendant gave her inconsistent descriptions of the man defendant said had accompanied the victim. Davis also told him that defendant lived in 208, directly across from the victim\u2019s apartment.\nOfficer Evans testified that he toured defendant\u2019s apartment. He found the apartment door \"busted\u201d and the apartment in \"disarray.\u201d Evans stated that it appeared to him that \"foul play\u201d had occurred in the apartment. Upon looking out of the open window located in defendant\u2019s bedroom, he saw the victim\u2019s body lying directly underneath on the ground below. Evans also testified that he spoke to a man and woman who lived in apartment 210. The couple told him that they had heard screaming the night before coming from defendant\u2019s apartment.\nEvans was at the scene for approximately one hour before a woman approached him with information regarding defendant\u2019s whereabouts. He placed her in his car to search for defendant. The woman spotted defendant walking down the street and pointed out defendant to Officer Evans. Evans asked the woman to exit the vehicle and proceeded to arrest defendant.\nThe trial court denied the motions to quash the arrest and suppress evidence. Finding that the two motions rested on the validity of the arrest, the trial court determined that under the totality of the circumstances, \"a reasonable officer acting on the information that [Officer Evans] had would have done what this officer did.\u201d The trial court held, therefore, that the arrest of defendant was valid.\nAt trial, defendant\u2019s confession and the items seized from his apartment were offered into evidence. Detective Michael Pochordo testified that defendant told him defendant murdered the victim by strangling her with a belt in an attempt to rob her of her gold watch and chain. Defendant stated that, on the evening of February 1, 1989, he just had smoked the last of his cocaine and was thinking of how he could get more. He heard the victim entering her apartment and invited her into his apartment to smoke a marijuana cigarette; he was after the victim\u2019s jewelry in order to sell it to buy more cocaine. Defendant told Pochordo that the victim resisted when defendant attempted to steal her jewelry. To counter this resistance, defendant grabbed a cloth black belt and began to choke the victim until the victim stopped breathing. As he let the victim\u2019s body drop to the floor, he heard a knock at the door. In a panic, he threw the victim\u2019s body out of his bedroom window.\nPochordo testified that defendant gave the police oral consent to search his apartment. The police discovered the belt in the bathroom and the victim\u2019s gold watch lodged behind a radiator in defendant\u2019s living room. The chain was not found.\nAssistant State\u2019s Attorney David Kelley testified that defendant\u2019s confession was later taken down by a court reporter. During the court-reported confession, defendant stated that he strangled the victim with a belt for 5 or 10 minutes until she \"was limp like.\u201d Defendant also identified the items retrieved from his apartment as those involved in the murder and robbery. Defendant stated the belt found in his apartment belonged to his fiancee and identified it as the one he used to strangle the victim. He also identified the watch found behind his radiator as the one he took from the victim. The jury found defendant guilty of first degree murder and robbery of the victim.\nDefendant argues that the trial court erred in denying the motion to quash the arrest and suppress evidence. A reviewing court will not disturb a trial court\u2019s determination on a motion to suppress unless that determination is manifestly erroneous. (People v. Adams (1989), 131 Ill. 2d 387, 398, 546 N.E.2d 561.) This court has stated that \"[pjrobable cause *** exists when the police have knowledge of facts which would lead a reasonable person to believe that the suspect committed a crime.\u201d People v. Hopkins (1992), 247 Ill. App. 3d 951, 959, 618 N.E.2d 279, 284.\nOur supreme court has stated that the arresting officer must make a determination based on an evaluation of all the information available, including the source of that information, that there is probable cause to believe that the individual in question was involved in criminal activity. (People v. Adams (1989), 131 Ill. 2d 387, 398, 546 N.E.2d 561.) In Adams, the court held that a review as to whether probable cause existed at the time of arrest is not based on hindsight which may be supported by the \"fruit of some criminality; rather, the review must center on the information available to the officers preceding the search or arrest.\u201d (Adams, 131 Ill. 2d at 398.) Thus, the relevant inquiry as to probable cause is whether \"a reasonable person in that officer\u2019s position believed that a crime was being or had been committed\u201d by the individual in question. Adams, 131 Ill. 2d at 398.\nIn the instant case, Officer Evans had probable cause to arrest defendant. He received a call, minutes after the victim\u2019s body was discovered, that a woman was possibly thrown out of a window. At the crime scene, he found the victim\u2019s body lying face down directly under defendant\u2019s open bedroom window. Arriving at defendant\u2019s apartment, Evans found defendant\u2019s apartment door busted and the apartment itself in \"disarray.\u201d From the open window in defendant\u2019s apartment, Evans had a clear view of the victim\u2019s body lying directly underneath the window on the ground below.\nUpon interviewing the people on the scene, Officer Evans discovered that defendant had been evasive when answering questions about the victim\u2019s whereabouts and had given inconsistent descriptions of the man he supposedly saw accompanying the victim on the night she disappeared. In addition, defendant\u2019s neighbors told Officer Evans that they heard screams coming from defendant\u2019s apartment the previous evening. Based on this evidence, we find that the trial court correctly held that from the \"totality of the circumstances,\u201d Officer Evans had probable cause to arrest defendant.\nDefendant next argues that his sentence of natural life imprisonment for first degree murder was excessive in light of the facts presented in mitigation relative to his rehabilitative potential. Defendant contends that the trial court did not consider his rehabilitative potential in imposing the sentence.\nAs a preliminary matter, it should be noted that defendant has waived this issue for our review. Section 5 \u2014 8\u20141(c) of the Unified Code of Corrections provides:\n\"If a motion to reduce a sentence is timely filed within 30 days after the sentence is imposed, the proponent of the motion shall exercise due diligence in seeking a determination on the motion and the court shall thereafter decide such motion within a reasonable time.\nIf a motion to reduce a sentence is timely filed within 30 days after the sentence is imposed, then for the purposes of perfecting an appeal, a final judgment shall not be considered to have been entered until the motion to reduce a sentence has been decided by order entered by the trial court.\u201d Ill. Rev. Stat. 1989, ch. 38, par. 1005 \u2014 8\u20141(c).\nFailure to file a post-trial motion to reduce a sentence \"denies the trial court the opportunity to correct any error that might have occurred\u201d and waives subsequent review of that issue in the appellate court. People v. Macke (1992), 224 Ill. App. 3d 815, 816, 587 N.E.2d 1113; People v. Diaz (1989), 189 Ill. App. 3d 473, 476, 545 N.E.2d 399.\nWe address the merits of defendant\u2019s contention based on the reasons expressed in People v. Gomez (1993), 247 Ill. App. 3d 68, 71, 617 N.E.2d 320:\n\"Mindful, however, of the division within the appellate court on this issue (see People v. Turner (1992), 233 Ill. App. 3d 449, 456, 599 N.E.2d 104 (expressly rejecting Macke and holding that a motion to reduce sentence is not a necessary precondition to appellate review of that sentence); People v. Sims (1992), 233 Ill. App. 3d 471, 473, 599 N.E.2d 137 (same); see also People v. Hess (1993), 241 Ill. App. 3d 276, 283[, 609 N.E.2d 371] (recognizing the disagreement among the appellate districts but reaching the merits of the case on the basis of plain error)).\u201d\nThe trial court held the sentencing hearing on October 18, 1990. In aggravation, the State presented two witnesses who testified that, on separate occasions, defendant had sexually assaulted them. One of the State\u2019s witnesses was defendant\u2019s second cousin. Defendant was never convicted of any of these offenses.\nDefendant presented several facts in mitigation during the sentencing hearing. Defendant, the father of two children, Barry Lacey, Jr., and Elena Lacey, formerly worked for the Illinois Department of Rehabilitation helping senior citizens. Lillisteen Johnson, defendant\u2019s girl friend and the mother of Barry Lacey, Jr., characterized defendant as a good father. She also stated that he briefly attended Kennedy-King College.\nThe trial court found that the facts revealed that defendant had a \"Jekyll and Hyde\u201d personality. However, it determined that the facts in mitigation, especially the fact that defendant had no prior criminal convictions, precluded imposition of the death penalty. After reviewing the evidence, the trial court determined that the defendant would be a danger to society should he be released after being confined for a term of years in prison. The court sentenced defendant to natural life imprisonment.\nA trial judge\u2019s sentencing is afforded great weight and deference. (People v. Perruquet (1977), 68 Ill. 2d 149, 154, 368 N.E.2d 882.) A sentence is within the sound discretion of the trial court and will not be disturbed absent an abuse of discretion. Perruquet, 68 Ill. 2d at 154.\nDefendant\u2019s sentence of natural life imprisonment was not excessive. In determining an appropriate sentence, a defendant\u2019s potential for rehabilitation is not entitled to more weight than the seriousness of the offense. (People v. Wright (1987), 161 Ill. App. 3d 967, 978, 514 N.E.2d 817.) The trial court here considered all the factors in mitigation and aggravation before imposing the sentence of natural life imprisonment. After considering the evidence and arguments, the trial court found that defendant was eligible for the death penalty since defendant committed first degree murder during the course of committing another felony, in this case, robbery. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1989, ch. 38, par. 1005 \u2014 8\u20141(a)(1).) The court, however, declined to impose this penalty finding that the factors in mitigation, especially the fact that defendant had no prior criminal convictions, were sufficient to avoid imposition of the death penalty.\nAccordingly, we find that the trial court, whose opportunity to review all factors \" 'is superior to that afforded by the cold record in this court\u2019 \u201d (Perruquet, 68 Ill. 2d at 154, quoting People v. Morgan (1974), 59 Ill. 2d 276, 282, 319 N.E.2d 764), did not abuse its discretion in sentencing defendant.\nAffirmed.\nSCARIANO and DiVITO, JJ., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "PRESIDING JUSTICE McCORMICK" } ], "attorneys": [ "Rita A. Fry, Public Defender, of Chicago (Ira Sheffey, Assistant Public Defender, of counsel), for appellant.", "Jack O\u2019Malley, State\u2019s Attorney, of Chicago (Renee Goldfarb, James Fitzgerald, and Margaret M. Regan, Assistant State\u2019s Attorneys, of counsel), for the People." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. BARRY LEE LACEY, Defendant-Appellant.\nFirst District (2nd Division)\nNo. 1 \u2014 90\u20143050\nOpinion filed December 21, 1993.\nRita A. Fry, Public Defender, of Chicago (Ira Sheffey, Assistant Public Defender, of counsel), for appellant.\nJack O\u2019Malley, State\u2019s Attorney, of Chicago (Renee Goldfarb, James Fitzgerald, and Margaret M. Regan, Assistant State\u2019s Attorneys, of counsel), for the People." }, "file_name": "0020-01", "first_page_order": 40, "last_page_order": 47 }