{ "id": 2889219, "name": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. CURTIS MITCHELL, Defendant-Appellee", "name_abbreviation": "People v. Mitchell", "decision_date": "1993-12-17", "docket_number": "No. 1\u201493\u20140013", "first_page": "157", "last_page": "162", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "257 Ill. App. 3d 157" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "256 Ill. App. 3d 989", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5381841 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/256/0989-01" ] }, { "cite": "469 N.E.2d 147", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "103 Ill. 2d 226", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3151982 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/103/0226-01" ] }, { "cite": "462 U.S. 213", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6187462 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1984, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/462/0213-01" ] }, { "cite": "402 N.E.2d 228", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "79 Ill. 2d 96", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3070521 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "101" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/79/0096-01" ] }, { "cite": "489 N.E.2d 845", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1980, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "111 Ill. 2d 180", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3166556 ], "year": 1980, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "193" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/111/0180-01" ] }, { "cite": "604 N.E.2d 1138", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "237 Ill. App. 3d 705", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5161629 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/237/0705-01" ] }, { "cite": "535 N.E.2d 837", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "127 Ill. 2d 153", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5564623 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "162" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/127/0153-01" ] }, { "cite": "581 N.E.2d 730", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "221 Ill. App. 3d 13", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5796653 ], "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/221/0013-01" ] }, { "cite": "822 F.2d 1174", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.2d", "case_ids": [ 1723400, 4331177 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f2d/822/1174-01", "/us-app-dc/262/0112-01" ] }, { "cite": "463 U.S. 1032", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6203160 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1987, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/463/1032-01" ] }, { "cite": "508 U.S. 366", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 12205 ], "weight": 9, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "375-76" }, { "page": "346" }, { "page": "2137" }, { "page": "376" }, { "page": "346" }, { "page": "2137" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/508/0366-01" ] }, { "cite": "578 N.E.2d 569", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "218 Ill. App. 3d 132", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 8498411 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/218/0132-01" ] }, { "cite": "392 U.S. 1", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6167798 ], "weight": 6, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/392/0001-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 674, "char_count": 12948, "ocr_confidence": 0.784, "pagerank": { "raw": 6.470291726553117e-08, "percentile": 0.3986166761073715 }, "sha256": "b24c897dce8226ce0331c7d3d0dc98cc18512b89399b48cbfca7eaca19bc6689", "simhash": "1:e32df9ff6751abc5", "word_count": 2169 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T22:49:13.043500+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. CURTIS MITCHELL, Defendant-Appellee." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE MURRAY\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nDefendant Curtis Mitchell (Mitchell) was arrested on July 5, 1992, and charged with possession of crack cocaine, a controlled substance. He subsequently filed a motion to quash his arrest and suppress evidence seized at the time of his arrest, as well as statements, identifications and other evidence obtained subsequent to the arrest. After a hearing held November 9, 1992, the circuit court sustained defendant\u2019s pretrial motion to suppress evidence against him and the People of the State of Illinois brought this appeal. We now reverse the trial court\u2019s ruling.\nThe facts of this case are as follows.\nAt approximately 12:40 a.m. on July 5, 1992, Mitchell was observed by Chicago police officer Edward King driving an automobile down an alleyway in the vicinity of 330 West Locust in Chicago. Officer King\u2019s suspicions were aroused by the fact that the car had no license plates and was being driven without any lights on. After traveling a couple of blocks, the car came to a stop and Mitchell exited the car. Due to the suspicious circumstances and the fact that the area was known to the officer to be a high crime area for thefts from autos and auto thefts, Officer King approached Mitchell to question him. When he did so he was able to look inside the car. He noticed that the steering wheel had been \"peeled\u201d and he observed \"crack pipes\u201d (glass pipes used for smoking crack cocaine) and pieces of copper scouring pads (known to the officer to be used as a filter in the glass pipe when smoking crack cocaine) lying on the front seat.\nAt this point Officer King decided to conduct a protective pat-down for weapons. When he did, he felt a plastic baggie in Mitchell\u2019s front shirt pocket. He could feel that there were some small hard objects inside the baggie. Based upon his prior observations and his 17 years of experience on the police force, Officer King believed that Mitchell was in possession of a controlled substance, namely rock cocaine. Consequently, the officer removed the baggie from Mitchell\u2019s shirt, placed him under arrest for possession of a controlled substance and informed him of his rights pursuant to the Miranda decision.\nAfter hearing the evidence recited above, the trial court granted Mitchell\u2019s motion to suppress the narcotics that were seized from him. The trial court held that, pursuant to Terry v. Ohio (1968), 392 U.S. 1, 20 L. Ed. 2d 889, 88 S. Ct. 1868, there was sufficient cause for the officer to have stopped Mitchell to make inquiry into his conduct. (See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20 L. Ed. 2d 889, 88 S. Ct. 1868 (police officer may make an investigatory stop of an individual if he can articulate facts which would cause a reasonable person to believe that criminal activity may be afoot and may conduct a pat-down search if there is reason to believe that the person may be armed).) Further, the trial court found that the officer was justified in having conducted a pat-down search for weapons. Nonetheless, the court held that the officer exceeded his authority by removing the plastic baggie from Mitchell\u2019s pocket since the officer could not have legitimately believed that the item he felt was a weapon. The court held that Mitchell\u2019s constitutional rights were violated and that the contraband was subject to suppression.\nThe State filed a motion to reconsider, which the trial court denied, and the State then brought this timely appeal. The State sets forth two separate rationales for upholding the search and seizure that took place in this case. First, the State contends that the facts known by Officer King prior to the time he conducted the pat-down search on Mitchell constituted probable cause to have arrested Mitchell for a crime other than possession of narcotics. Based upon the fact that probable cause to arrest Mitchell for some crime existed prior to any search, the officer had the right to conduct a full search, not merely a pat-down search. The fact that Mitchell was not arrested for the other crime is irrelevant, the State argues. The State cites to People v. Kolichman (1991), 218 Ill. App. 3d 132, 578 N.E.2d 569, a case which fully supports its position.\nIn the alternative, the State asks this court to adopt the \"plain feel\u201d doctrine, a corollary to the \"plain view\u201d doctrine, which was recently recognized by the United States Supreme Court in Minnesota v. Dickerson (1993), 508 U.S. 366, 124 L. Ed. 2d 334, 113 S. Ct. 2130. The State argues that this court should find that Officer King\u2019s sensorial perceptions made at the time of a legitimate Terry stop and frisk, along with his observations of the \"crack\u201d paraphernalia in the car, gave Officer King probable cause to arrest Mitchell for possession of narcotics prior to the seizure of the baggie from Mitchell\u2019s pocket.\nWe\u2019ve taken this opportunity to review the decision in Minnesota v. Dickerson. Having done so, we find that the present case falls squarely within the parameters of the plain-feel exception to the fourth amendment restriction against unreasonable searches and seizures, as enunciated in that United States Supreme Court case. Consequently, we reverse the trial court\u2019s ruling on the motion to suppress.\nIn Minnesota v. Dickerson the Supreme Court analyzed the constitutional guarantees granted to all citizens under the fourth amendment to the United States Constitution (U.S. Const., amend IV) and made applicable to the States by the fourteenth amendment. It noted that warrantless searches and seizures have been deemed per se unreasonable, subject to only a handful of exceptions.\nOne such exception, recognized in Terry v. Ohio, allows a police officer to briefly detain a person, without probable cause to arrest, when the officer observes conduct that reasonably arouses his suspicion that a crime is being, or is about to be, committed. The Terry court also recognized that, to allow the officer to pursue his investigation without fear of violence, a protective pat-down search may be conducted whenever the circumstances justify the officer\u2019s belief that the person may be armed.\nAfter reviewing these long-settled principles, the Dickerson court went on to consider whether an officer may seize nonthreatening contraband detected during a pat-down search. The Court answered this question in the affirmative, holding that \"[i]f a police officer lawfully pats down a suspect\u2019s outer clothing and feels an object whose contour or mass make its identity immediately apparent, there has been no invasion of the suspect\u2019s privacy beyond that already authorized by the officer\u2019s search for weapons; if the object is contraband, its warrantless seizure would be justified by the same practical considerations that inhere in the plain view context.\u201d (Minnesota v. Dickerson, 508 U.S. at 375-76, 124 L. Ed. 2d at 346, 113 S. Ct. at 2137.) The Court went on to state that \"[rjegardless of whether the officer detects the contraband by sight or by touch, however, the Fourth Amendment\u2019s requirement that the officer have probable cause to believe that the item is contraband before seizing it ensures against excessively speculative seizures.\u201d Minnesota v. Dickerson, 508 U.S. at 376, 124 L. Ed. 2d at 346, 113 S. Ct. at 2137.\nIn the present case the State argued, both at trial and in the motion to reconsider, that an extension of the plain view exception, i.e., a \"plain touch\u201d exception, should apply to the facts of this case. They cited Federal case law (Michigan v. Long (1983), 463 U.S. 1032, 77 L. Ed. 2d 1201, 103 S. Ct. 3469; United States v. Williams (D.C. Cir. 1987), 822 F.2d 1174) as well as State case law (People v. Morales (1991), 221 Ill. App. 3d 13, 581 N.E.2d 730) in support of this proposition. The State argued that the police officer\u2019s tactile perceptions, in conjunction with his observation of drug paraphernalia, provided him with probable cause to arrest Mitchell.\nThe defendant, on the other hand, advocated adherence to the long line of cases that hold that a valid Terry stop and frisk is strictly limited to a search for weapons and that any soft item, which cannot legitimately be deemed a weapon, may not be seized.\nAfter hearing both arguments, the trial court found that the officer was justified in making both the stop and the frisk. He then went on to state:\n\"Now, it gets to what I would say is the guts of this case, is that it gets to be whether in making the stop of the car, the officer stated that he had seen crack pipes and the column peeled, although I believe he\u2019s still in a Terry situation, the crack pipes certainly would alert him that narcotics could be involved in this case in making a pat down and finding the one packet.\nAt this point, although I believe it was good police work, and the officer feeling that it would \u2014 certainly should be taken off\u2014 gotten off the street, I believe it\u2019s beyond what the constitution is now allowing. So I\u2019ll grant the motion to suppress at this point.\u201d\nAgain at the motion to reconsider, the trial court reiterated its belief that \"you cannot remove a soft package when you are making a search for weapons.\u201d\nA trial court\u2019s decision to suppress evidence will not be overturned on review unless that decision is manifestly erroneous. (People v. Galvin (1989), 127 Ill. 2d 153, 162, 535 N.E.2d 837.) Given the fact, however, that in this case the trial court did not have the benefit of the recent Supreme Court case to guide it when ruling on this matter, we find that the trial court\u2019s ruling was manifestly erroneous.\nBased upon the trial court\u2019s statements at trial and again at the motion to reconsider, it seems clear that the trial court believed that the police officer, in the course of the valid Terry stop and frisk, was readily able to discern the presence of what he reasonably believed to be narcotics, based upon his past experience and knowledge, but that he could not act upon those beliefs. We find, however, that pursuant to the Dickerson case and the plain touch extension of the plain view doctrine, Officer King was acting within the lawful bounds of Terry at the time that he obtained probable cause to believe that Mitchell was in possession of contraband. Furthermore, as the trial court noted, the officer\u2019s observation of drug paraphernalia in the car alerted him to the fact that drugs could be involved. Thus, when the officer felt the plastic baggie containing a small, hard, rock-like substance, the officer had probable cause to believe that the item was contraband and he was justified in seizing it. See People v. Spann (1992), 237 Ill. App. 3d 705, 604 N.E.2d 1138; People v. Morales, 221 Ill. App. 3d 13, 581 N.E.2d 730.\nProbable cause to arrest exists when the facts and circumstances within the arresting officer\u2019s knowledge are sufficient to warrant a person of reasonable caution in believing that an offense has been committed and that it was committed by defendant. (People v. Neal (1985), 111 Ill. 2d 180, 193, 489 N.E.2d 845; People v. Creach (1980), 79 Ill. 2d 96, 101, 402 N.E.2d 228.) Whether probable cause exists is determined not by technical legal rules, but by commonsense, practical examination of the totality of the circumstances. (Illinois v. Gates (1983), 462 U.S. 213, 76 L. Ed. 2d 527, 103 S. Ct. 2317; People v. Tisler (1984), 103 Ill. 2d 226, 469 N.E.2d 147.) In this case, the officer\u2019s tactile perceptions, made during the valid Terry stop and frisk, provided him with information which, taken together with his previous observations and experience, gave him probable cause to arrest. Hence, we find that the seizure of the baggie from Mitchell\u2019s pocket was valid.\nAlthough we adopt and apply here the United State Supreme Court\u2019s analysis of constitutional guarantees provided under the fourth amendment of the United States Constitution, we reject defendant\u2019s claim that a different analysis should be applied under our State Constitution. As recently noted in People v. Stoddard (1993), 256 Ill. App. 3d 989, our Illinois Supreme Court has already held that it would interpret section 6 of the Illinois Bill of Rights (Ill. Const. 1970, art. 1, \u00a7 6) in the same way that the United States Supreme Court had interpreted the fourth amendment. Therefore, our State Constitution affords no greater rights in search and seizure cases than the United States Constitution.\nFor the reasons stated above, we reverse the circuit court\u2019s order of suppression in this case.\nReversed.\nMcNULTY and COUSINS, JJ\u201e concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE MURRAY" } ], "attorneys": [ "Jack O\u2019Malley, State\u2019s Attorney, of Chicago (Renee Goldfarb, Annette Collins, Leslie German, and Elaine Wisnosky, Assistant State\u2019s Attorneys, of counsel), for the People.", "Rita A. Fry, Public Defender, of Chicago (Evelyn G. Baniewicz, Assistant Public Defender, of counsel), for appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. CURTIS MITCHELL, Defendant-Appellee.\nFirst District (5th Division)\nNo. 1\u201493\u20140013\nOpinion filed December 17, 1993.\nJack O\u2019Malley, State\u2019s Attorney, of Chicago (Renee Goldfarb, Annette Collins, Leslie German, and Elaine Wisnosky, Assistant State\u2019s Attorneys, of counsel), for the People.\nRita A. Fry, Public Defender, of Chicago (Evelyn G. Baniewicz, Assistant Public Defender, of counsel), for appellee." }, "file_name": "0157-01", "first_page_order": 175, "last_page_order": 180 }