{ "id": 2882222, "name": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. DONALD F. CULBERTSON, Defendant-Appellee", "name_abbreviation": "People v. Culbertson", "decision_date": "1994-03-08", "docket_number": "No. 2-92-0565", "first_page": "294", "last_page": "297", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "258 Ill. App. 3d 294" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "37 Ill. App. 3d 1010", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2718084 ], "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1013" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/37/1010-01" ] }, { "cite": "243 Ill. App. 3d 871", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5108916 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/243/0871-01" ] }, { "cite": "150 Ill. App. 3d 283", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3501497 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/150/0283-01" ] }, { "cite": "152 Ill. App. 3d 518", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3576115 ], "year": 1986, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/152/0518-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 471, "char_count": 8970, "ocr_confidence": 0.793, "pagerank": { "raw": 1.346300687217805e-07, "percentile": 0.6323013426651515 }, "sha256": "fd56d4b14a73cdd25dda72de25d7d8a8b678c9a77bf98e9d12e082d05e6295a1", "simhash": "1:162f17ab2d4fcca1", "word_count": 1492 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T22:48:59.357066+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. DONALD F. CULBERTSON, Defendant-Appellee." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE McLAREN\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nThe State appeals from an order granting a petition filed by the defendant, Donald F. Culbertson, to rescind the statutory summary suspension of his driver\u2019s license. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1991, ch. 95\u00bd, par. 11 \u2014 501.1(a) (now 625 ILCS 5/11 \u2014 501.1(a) (West 1992)).) The sole issue on appeal is whether the court erred by holding that the parking lot in question was not a public highway. For the following reasons, we reverse and remand.\nOn February 27, 1992, the defendant drove his automobile to the Metra train station in Wood Dale, Illinois, and parked in the Metra commuter parking lot. In the evening, the defendant departed the train, returned to his automobile, and started the car. He testified that he did not put the automobile in gear and did not move from the parking stall.\nOn that evening, Officer Ronald Lamorte of the Wood Dale police was patrolling the area around the Metra commuter parking lot. He observed the defendant\u2019s automobile parked in a parking stall with the motor running. The keys were in the ignition. The defendant was slumped backwards in the driver\u2019s seat. After the defendant performed field sobriety tests, he was placed under arrest for driving under the influence. At the Wood Dale police station, the defendant received the warning to motorists, which informed him that his driving privileges would be suspended for six months if he refused to submit to a breathalyzer test. The warning also indicated that the defendant\u2019s driving privileges would be suspended for a minimum of three months, if the test disclosed an alcohol concentration of .10 or greater. The defendant\u2019s result of the breath test indicated an alcohol concentration greater than .10.\nOn April 8, 1992, a hearing was held to rescind the statutory summary suspension of the defendant\u2019s driver\u2019s license. On cross-examination, Officer Lamorte testified that the City of Wood Dale owns the parking lot and maintains it by paving, cleaning, and plowing. On redirect examination, Officer Lamorte stated that the police consider the parking lot to be a public highway because it has a main access to the public highway adjacent to the lot. The State argued, without citation to authority, that the defendant was in actual physical control of the automobile. The State further argued that the parking lot was owned and maintained by the City of Wood Dale and met the definition of a highway as provided by section 1 \u2014 126 of the Illinois Vehicle Code (Vehicle Code (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1991, ch. 95^2, par. 1 \u2014 126 (now 625 ILCS 5/1 \u2014 126 (West 1992))).\nThe court found that the parking lot in which the defendant\u2019s vehicle was parked was not a public highway. The court expressly stated, \"I\u2019m not finding this to be private property; I\u2019m just finding it not to be a highway.\u201d The petition to rescind the statutory summary suspension of the defendant\u2019s driving privileges was granted.\nThe State filed a motion to reconsider the prior ruling. At the hearing on the motion to reconsider, the defendant introduced a certilled copy of the land lease for the parking lot in question. The lease indicated that the Chicago, Milwaukee, St. Paul & Pacific Railroad Company owns the parking lot and that the City of Wood Dale leased it for a period of 20 years commencing on November 15, 1977. Again, the court found the parking lot was not a public highway and denied the State\u2019s motion to reconsider. The State appealed.\nUnder section 11 \u2014 501.1 of the Vehicle Code, a person driving, or in actual physical control of a motor vehicle on a public highway, impliedly consents to take a complete test or chemical analysis of breath, blood, or urine for purposes of determining the concentration of alcohol or drugs in that person\u2019s blood. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1991, ch. 95\u00bd, par. 11 \u2014 501.1(a) (now 625 ILCS 5/11 \u2014 501.1(a) (West 1992)).) The State argues that the trial court erred in finding that the parking lot where the defendant was found sleeping in the driver\u2019s seat of his automobile with the motor running was not a public highway.\nThe provisions of the implied-consent statute are applicable when a person is in control of a vehicle on a \"public highway.\u201d Section 1 \u2014 126 of the Vehicle Code defines \"[h]ighway\u201d as \"[t]he entire width between the boundary lines of every way publicly maintained when any part thereof is open to the use of the public for purposes of vehicular travel.\u201d (Emphasis added.) Ill. Rev. Stat. 1991, ch. 95\u00bd, par. 1 \u2014 126 (now 625 ILCS 5/1 \u2014 126 (West 1992)).\nIn this case, the lease presented by the defendant indicates that the Chicago, Milwaukee, St. Paul & Pacific Railroad Company owns the parking lot where the defendant was found. The lease also indicates that the City of Wood Dale (City) leases the parking lot from the owner for $675 annually. The terms of the lease require the lessee, the City, to utilize the premises as a site for a \"fee-commuter parking lot and landscaping\u201d and no other purpose. Through the lease, the lessee releases the owner and agrees to indemnify against all loss, damage, and injury caused by or resulting from any act or omission of the lessee to persons on the parking lot. Any claim of negligence arising from the joint or concurring negligence of both parties is to be shared equally. The lease obligates the City to pay all taxes and assessments on the property, erect facilities \"appropriate for the uses herein mentioned,\u201d and \"keep said premises and all improvements thereon in a neat and orderly condition.\u201d Officer Lamerte corroborated this evidence when he testified that the City maintains the parking lot by paving, plowing, and cleaning.\nThe defendant cites People v. Montelongo (1987), 152 Ill. App. 3d 518, and People v. Kissel (1986), 150 Ill. App. 3d 283, as support for the proposition that the implied-consent statute does not apply to persons operating vehicles in private parking lots. These cases are factually distinguishable from the instant case because the trial court did not find \"this to be private property.\u201d Assuming arguendo the property was privately owned, we do not believe such criterion controls. The terms of the implied-consent statute apply to drivers on public \"highways,\u201d which are defined by the Vehicle Code as \"[t]he entire width between the boundary lines of every way publicly maintained when any part thereof is open to the use of the public for purposes of vehicular travel.\u201d (Emphasis added.) (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1991, ch. 95\u00bd, par. 1 \u2014 126 (now 625 ILCS 5/1 \u2014 126 (West 1992)).) Contrary to Montelongo and Kissel, the issue in this case is not ownership, but maintenance.\nSupport for our analysis lies in People v. Bailey (1993), 243 Ill. App. 3d 871. In Bailey, the defendant hit another car while driving in a parking lot which was posted with municipal parking lot signs and was maintained by the municipality. In holding that a municipal parking lot was a public \"highway\u201d under the implied-consent statute, the court relied on People v. Jensen (1976), 37 Ill. App. 3d 1010. Jensen reasoned that the Vehicle Code\u2019s definition of a \"highway\u201d was \"broad enough to encompass publicly-maintained parking lots\u201d for purposes of prosecuting for driving with a suspended license. (Emphasis added.) (Jensen, 37 Ill. App. 3d at 1013.) Both Bailey and Jensen indicate that the focus of the inquiry is public maintenance, and not ownership.\nSimilar to Bailey, the undisputed evidence at the suspension hearing and on rehearing established that the parking lot in question was owned by a private entity, but was maintained by a municipality, a public entity. Through the 20-year lease, the City has assumed the responsibility of maintaining the parking lot in the instant case. As such, the lot has assumed the character of a public way. Consistent with the holding of People v. Bailey, the evidence in this case is manifest that the parking lot was publicly maintained. Thus, we determine that the parking lot in question fell within the definition of a \"public highway\u201d under the statutory summary suspension statute since it was publicly maintained and open to use by the public for vehicular travel. Therefore, the trial court erred by granting the defendant\u2019s petition to rescind the statutory summary suspension of his driver\u2019s license.\nFor the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the circuit court of Du Page County is reversed, and the cause is remanded for further proceedings consistent with the opinion of this court.\nReversed and remanded.\nINGLIS, P.J., and GEIGER, J. concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE McLAREN" } ], "attorneys": [ "James E. Ryan, State\u2019s Attorney, of Wheaton (Barbara A. Preiner, Assistant State\u2019s Attorney, and William L. Browers and David A. Bernhard, both of State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor\u2019s Office, of counsel), for the People.", "Gregory J. Ellis, of Oak Brook, for appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. DONALD F. CULBERTSON, Defendant-Appellee.\nSecond District\nNo. 2 \u2014 92\u20140565\nOpinion filed March 8, 1994.\nJames E. Ryan, State\u2019s Attorney, of Wheaton (Barbara A. Preiner, Assistant State\u2019s Attorney, and William L. Browers and David A. Bernhard, both of State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor\u2019s Office, of counsel), for the People.\nGregory J. Ellis, of Oak Brook, for appellee." }, "file_name": "0294-01", "first_page_order": 314, "last_page_order": 317 }