{ "id": 2882571, "name": "BLAIR LEWIS, a Minor, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. JASPER COUNTY COMMUNITY UNIT SCHOOL DISTRICT No. 1 et al., Defendants-Appellees", "name_abbreviation": "Lewis v. Jasper County Community Unit School District No. 1", "decision_date": "1994-03-04", "docket_number": "No. 5-93-0027", "first_page": "419", "last_page": "424", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "258 Ill. App. 3d 419" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "548 N.E.2d 601", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "192 Ill. App. 3d 150", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2506532 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/192/0150-01" ] }, { "cite": "584 N.E.2d 1383", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "192 Ill. App. 3d 711", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2504962 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/192/0711-01" ] }, { "cite": "576 N.E.2d 168", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "215 Ill. App. 3d 1013", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5294866 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/215/1013-01" ] }, { "cite": "555 N.E.2d 343", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "136 Ill. 2d 296", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3254770 ], "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/136/0296-01" ] }, { "cite": "441 N.E.2d 120", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "121" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "109 Ill. App. 3d 716", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5452709 ], "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "718" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/109/0716-01" ] }, { "cite": "544 N.E.2d 1302", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "188 Ill. App. 3d 1031", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2693482 ], "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/188/1031-01" ] }, { "cite": "385 N.E.2d 785", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 3, "year": 1989, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "787" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "68 Ill. App. 3d 7", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3307732 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1989, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "10" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/68/0007-01" ] }, { "cite": "347 N.E.2d 705", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1978, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "63 Ill. 2d 165", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5427298 ], "year": 1978, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/63/0165-01" ] }, { "cite": "510 N.E.2d 595", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "157 Ill. App. 3d 569", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3544565 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/157/0569-01" ] }, { "cite": "549 N.E.2d 9", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1987, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "192 Ill. App. 3d 599", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2506783 ], "year": 1987, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/192/0599-01" ] }, { "cite": "539 N.E.2d 246", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1989, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "183 Ill. App. 3d 367", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2628584 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1989, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/183/0367-01" ] }, { "cite": "373 N.E.2d 1323", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "71 Ill. 2d 47", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5449385 ], "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/71/0047-01" ] }, { "cite": "588 N.E.2d 1185", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 4, "year": 1978, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1189" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "146 Ill. 2d 467", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5597568 ], "weight": 4, "year": 1978, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "474-75" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/146/0467-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 505, "char_count": 10804, "ocr_confidence": 0.794, "pagerank": { "raw": 1.4469546894755198e-07, "percentile": 0.6542912347399404 }, "sha256": "bc538651e6dd25ed89504692e2cd9225c749d0f493069a0811423e14096e35e0", "simhash": "1:13644c57a2c68504", "word_count": 1777 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T22:48:59.357066+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "BLAIR LEWIS, a Minor, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. JASPER COUNTY COMMUNITY UNIT SCHOOL DISTRICT No. 1 et al., Defendants-Appellees." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE CHAPMAN\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nPlaintiff, Blair Lewis, filed a complaint against defendants, Jasper County Community Unit School District No. 1 (the School District) and the Regional Board of School Trustees of Clay, Richland, and Jasper Counties, for injuries she sustained after falling against a pumphouse on the school playground, during school hours. Plaintiff alleged both negligence and willful and wanton conduct. This court granted plaintiff leave to appeal from an order which dismissed the negligence counts of the complaint under the immunity provisions of section 3 \u2014 106 of the Local Governmental and Governmental Employees Tort Immunity Act (the Tort Immunity Act) (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1991, ch. 85, par. 3 \u2014 106). We affirm.\nPlaintiff\u2019s principal argument is that the school district is not immune from liability for ordinary negligence under section 3 \u2014 106 of the Tort Immunity Act because of the case law construing section 24 \u2014 24 of the School Code (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1991, ch. 122, par. 24 \u2014 24). Section 24 \u2014 24 of the School Code provides parental immunity to certain school personnel and school districts from negligence when the cause of action is premised on negligent supervision. Plaintiff relies on Sidwell v. Griggsville Community Unit School District No. 4 (1992), 146 Ill. 2d 467, 588 N.E.2d 1185, and Gerrity v. Beatty (1978), 71 Ill. 2d 47, 373 N.E.2d 1323, which held that the school districts did not have immunity under section 24 \u2014 24 of the School Code for the alleged negligent failure to provide safe equipment on school premises. Plaintiff contends that these cases and their construction of section 24 \u2014 24 have established a public policy against relaxing a school district\u2019s obligation to supply safe equipment, buildings, and playgrounds. (See Sidwell v. Griggsville Community Unit School District No. 4 (1992), 146 Ill. 2d 467, 588 N.E.2d 1185.) Plaintiff argues that the same policy should apply to cases construing section 3 \u2014 106 of the Tort Immunity Act and that to hold otherwise would nullify the holdings in Sidwell, Gerrity, and appellate court opinions which have held school districts liable for ordinary negligence for failure to provide safe equipment on school premises. See Bowers v. Du Page County Regional Board of School Trustees District No. 4 (1989), 183 Ill. App. 3d 367, 539 N.E.2d 246; Jastram v. Lake Villa School District 41 (1989), 192 Ill. App. 3d 599, 549 N.E.2d 9; Prest v. Sparta Community Unit School District No. 140 (1987), 157 Ill. App. 3d 569, 510 N.E.2d 595.\nPlaintiff\u2019s reliance on the Illinois courts\u2019 application of section 24 \u2014 24 of the School Code is misplaced. The supreme court cases that the plaintiff relies upon address only the application of section 24\u2014 24. (See Sidwell v. Griggsville Community Unit School District No. 4 (1992), 146 Ill. 2d 467, 588 N.E.2d 1185; see also Gerrity v. Beatty (1978), 71 Ill. 2d 47, 373 N.E.2d 1323.) Sidwell explicitly rejected the contention that its holding on section 24 \u2014 24 governed section 3 \u2014 106:\n\"Whether section 3 \u2014 106 itself would provide immunity to the school district *** is another matter. Because that statute was not pleaded as a defense in the trial court, the appellate court or here, we need not determine whether section 3 \u2014 106 would apply in this case.\u201d Sidwell, 146 Ill. 2d at 474-75, 588 N.E.2d at 1189.\nIn Kobylanski v. Chicago Board of Education, the court noted that immunity under the School Code did not derive from immunity in the Tort Immunity Act (Kobylanski v. Chicago Board of Education (1976), 63 Ill. 2d 165, 347 N.E.2d 705), thus indicating that the two statutes should be interpreted independently of one another. That the two statutes should be interpreted separately was also recognized by this court in Keller v. Board of Education of Jonesboro School District 43 (1978), 68 Ill. App. 3d 7, 385 N.E.2d 785. Finally, Bowers v. Du Page County Regional Board of School Trustees District No. 4 (1989), 183 Ill. App. 3d 367, 539 N.E.2d 246, explicitly held that the School Code and the Tort Immunity Act are to be interpreted independently of one another. We agree.\nTo apply the Sidwell court\u2019s reasoning and interpretation of section 24 \u2014 24 of the School Code to section 3 \u2014 106 of the Tort Immunity Act would be to ignore the clear language of section 3 \u2014 106, which provides:\n\"Neither a local public entity nor a public employee is liable for an injury where the liability is based on the existence of a condition of any public property intended or permitted to be used for recreational purposes, including but not limited to parks, playgrounds, open areas, buildings, or other enclosed recreational facilities, unless such local entity or public employee is guilty of willful or wanton conduct proximately causing such injury.\u201d Ill. Rev. Stat. 1989, ch. 85, par. 3 \u2014 106.\nSection 1 \u2014 206 of the Tort Immunity Act defines \"local public entity\u201d to include school districts; and section 3 \u2014 101 defines \"public property\u201d as \"real or personal property owned or leased by a local public entity\u201d (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1989, ch. 85, pars. 1 \u2014 206, 3 \u2014 101). Clearly, in light of the definitions provided by the legislature, section 3 \u2014 106 immunizes the School District from injuries occurring on school property used for recreational purposes, absent willful or wanton conduct by the school district. See Ramos v. Waukegan Community Unit School District No. 60 (1989), 188 Ill. App. 3d 1031, 544 N.E.2d 1302.\nThis interpretation of section 3 \u2014 106 is in harmony with its purpose, which is to encourage the development and maintenance of public parks, playgrounds, and similar recreation areas. (Jackson v. Board of Education (1982), 109 Ill. App. 3d 716, 441 N.E.2d 120.) In Jackson, the plaintiff was injured while playing on swings located on a school playground. Not unlike this plaintiff, the plaintiff in Jackson relied upon the case of Gerrity v. Beatty and claimed that section 3 \u2014 106 was inapplicable in that a public entity should be liable for ordinary negligence where the liability is based on the condition of property used as a playground. The court disagreed:\n\"Plaintiff\u2019s argument that a public entity should be liable for ordinary negligence where the liability is based on the condition of property used as a playground was resolved against the plaintiffs by the legislature when it enacted section 3 \u2014 106.\u201d Jackson, 109 Ill. App. 3d at 718, 441 N.E.2d at 121.\nKeller v. Board of Education of Jonesboro School District 43 (1978), 68 Ill. App. 3d 7, 385 N.E.2d 785, reached a similar conclusion. In Keller, the plaintiff sued the Board of Education for negligently failing to maintain a baseball field and for failing to supervise students using the baseball field. The trial court found Gerrity inapplicable and ruled that absent an allegation of willful and wanton conduct the defendant was immune from liability under sections 3 \u2014 106 and 3 \u2014 108 of the Tort Immunity Act. The court stated:\n\"While plaintiffs appear to argue that liability for ordinary negligence in situations covered by these provisions would not in fact be unduly burdensome on a school board, this question of policy has already been settled against plaintiffs by the legislature when it enacted these provisions granting immunity.\u201d Keller, 68 Ill. App. 3d at 10, 385 N.E.2d at 787.\nBased upon these earlier decisions and the clear meaning of the words of section 3 \u2014 106, we conclude that the circuit court was correct in finding that section 3 \u2014 106 of the Tort Immunity Act was applicable.\nThe next issue raised by the plaintiff is whether section 3 \u2014 106 applies to an injury to a student on a school playground occurring during school hours and during a school activity. The plaintiff claims that the immunity provisions should only apply when the cause of action involves an injury occurring on a playground open to the public. We agree with the trial court that section 3 \u2014 106 immunizes the School District from liability for negligence in the case- at bar. The fact that the injury occurred on a school playground during school hours is not controlling. As noted by the supreme court, the General Assembly, in defining \"public property\u201d for purposes of the Act, did not include a requirement that the property must be open for public use. (Davis v. Chicago Housing Authority (1990), 136 Ill. 2d 296, 555 N.E.2d 343.) Davis held that section 3 \u2014 106 applied to a playground owned by the housing authority, notwithstanding the fact that the playground was not open to the public but was provided for the sole use of public housing tenants and guests. (Davis v. Chicago Housing Authority (1990), 136 Ill. 2d 296, 555 N.E.2d 343.) The same rationale applies in the case of a school playground whose use during school hours is restricted to the children of that school.\nPlaintiff further argues that section 3 \u2014 106 is limited to public property intended or permitted to be used for recreational purposes, and that the pumphouse on which plaintiff was injured had no recreational function. We disagree. The immunity provisions of section 3 \u2014 106 have been held to apply to nonrecreational equipment and structures located on premises used for recreational activities. (See Kirnbauer v. Cook County Forest Preserve District (1991), 215 Ill. App. 3d 1013, 576 N.E.2d 168 (cable barrier between posts on a footpath); Annen v. Village of McNabb (1990), 192 Ill. App. 3d 711, 584 N.E.2d 1383 (sink in a restroom facility in a park); Spencer v. City of Chicago (1989), 192 Ill. App. 3d 150, 548 N.E.2d 601 (lagoon prohibited from public use in a city park); Ramos v. Waukegan Community Unit School District No. 60 (1989), 188 Ill. App. 3d 1031, 544 N.E.2d 1302 (sidewalk adjacent to school playground).) In the case at bar, the playground was the property being used for recreational purposes, and the pumphouse was a part of the property in question. Therefore, the immunity provisions of section 3 \u2014 106 apply.\nFor the foregoing reasons, we conclude that the trial court was correct in granting defendant\u2019s motion to dismiss based on its finding that defendants were immune from liability for ordinary negligence under section 3 \u2014 106 of the Local Governmental and Governmental Employees Tort Immunity Act.\nAffirmed.\nWELCH and RARICK, JJ\u201e concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE CHAPMAN" } ], "attorneys": [ "Barry Schaefer, of Newton, and Stephen L. Williams and Max E. Goodwin, both of Mann, Chaney, Johnson, Goodwin & Williams, of Terre Haute, Indiana, for appellant.", "John P. Ewart and Jonathan L. Kazense, both of Craig & Craig, of Mattoon, for appellee Jasper County Community Unit School District No. 1," ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "BLAIR LEWIS, a Minor, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. JASPER COUNTY COMMUNITY UNIT SCHOOL DISTRICT No. 1 et al., Defendants-Appellees.\nFifth District\nNo. 5 \u2014 93\u20140027\nOpinion filed March 4, 1994.\nBarry Schaefer, of Newton, and Stephen L. Williams and Max E. Goodwin, both of Mann, Chaney, Johnson, Goodwin & Williams, of Terre Haute, Indiana, for appellant.\nJohn P. Ewart and Jonathan L. Kazense, both of Craig & Craig, of Mattoon, for appellee Jasper County Community Unit School District No. 1," }, "file_name": "0419-01", "first_page_order": 439, "last_page_order": 444 }