{
  "id": 2883604,
  "name": "BOYCE LAVELL MURPHY, Appellant, v. THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION et al. (Cook County, Juvenile Detention, et al., Appellees)",
  "name_abbreviation": "Murphy v. Industrial Commission",
  "decision_date": "1994-02-18",
  "docket_number": "No. 1-93-0544WC",
  "first_page": "764",
  "last_page": "767",
  "citations": [
    {
      "type": "official",
      "cite": "258 Ill. App. 3d 764"
    }
  ],
  "court": {
    "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.",
    "id": 8837,
    "name": "Illinois Appellate Court"
  },
  "jurisdiction": {
    "id": 29,
    "name_long": "Illinois",
    "name": "Ill."
  },
  "cites_to": [
    {
      "cite": "549 N.E.2d 353",
      "category": "reporters:state_regional",
      "reporter": "N.E.2d",
      "opinion_index": 0
    },
    {
      "cite": "187 Ill. App. 3d 409",
      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d",
      "case_ids": [
        2665341
      ],
      "pin_cites": [
        {
          "page": "411"
        }
      ],
      "opinion_index": 0,
      "case_paths": [
        "/ill-app-3d/187/0409-01"
      ]
    },
    {
      "cite": "457 N.E.2d 381",
      "category": "reporters:state_regional",
      "reporter": "N.E.2d",
      "opinion_index": 0
    },
    {
      "cite": "99 Ill. 2d 1",
      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "Ill. 2d",
      "case_ids": [
        3164164
      ],
      "opinion_index": 0,
      "case_paths": [
        "/ill-2d/99/0001-01"
      ]
    },
    {
      "cite": "613 N.E.2d 271",
      "category": "reporters:state_regional",
      "reporter": "N.E.2d",
      "opinion_index": 0
    },
    {
      "cite": "243 Ill. App. 3d 711",
      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d",
      "case_ids": [
        5109726
      ],
      "pin_cites": [
        {
          "page": "714"
        }
      ],
      "opinion_index": 0,
      "case_paths": [
        "/ill-app-3d/243/0711-01"
      ]
    },
    {
      "cite": "223 Ill. App. 462",
      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "Ill. App.",
      "case_ids": [
        3041965
      ],
      "opinion_index": 0,
      "case_paths": [
        "/ill-app/223/0462-01"
      ]
    },
    {
      "cite": "578 N.E.2d 985",
      "category": "reporters:state_regional",
      "reporter": "N.E.2d",
      "year": 1921,
      "opinion_index": 0
    },
    {
      "cite": "144 Ill. 2d 32",
      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "Ill. 2d",
      "case_ids": [
        5592433
      ],
      "weight": 2,
      "year": 1921,
      "pin_cites": [
        {
          "page": "43"
        }
      ],
      "opinion_index": 0,
      "case_paths": [
        "/ill-2d/144/0032-01"
      ]
    },
    {
      "cite": "510 N.E.2d 105",
      "category": "reporters:state_regional",
      "reporter": "N.E.2d",
      "opinion_index": 0
    },
    {
      "cite": "156 Ill. App. 3d 786",
      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d",
      "case_ids": [
        3504641
      ],
      "weight": 2,
      "pin_cites": [
        {
          "page": "789"
        },
        {
          "page": "789"
        }
      ],
      "opinion_index": 0,
      "case_paths": [
        "/ill-app-3d/156/0786-01"
      ]
    },
    {
      "cite": "265 N.E.2d 161",
      "category": "reporters:state_regional",
      "reporter": "N.E.2d",
      "year": 1987,
      "opinion_index": 0
    },
    {
      "cite": "47 Ill. 2d 273",
      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "Ill. 2d",
      "case_ids": [
        2905111
      ],
      "year": 1987,
      "pin_cites": [
        {
          "page": "276"
        }
      ],
      "opinion_index": 0,
      "case_paths": [
        "/ill-2d/47/0273-01"
      ]
    },
    {
      "cite": "579 N.E.2d 370",
      "category": "reporters:state_regional",
      "reporter": "N.E.2d",
      "opinion_index": 0
    },
    {
      "cite": "219 Ill. App. 3d 203",
      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d",
      "case_ids": [
        5800487
      ],
      "pin_cites": [
        {
          "page": "205"
        }
      ],
      "opinion_index": 0,
      "case_paths": [
        "/ill-app-3d/219/0203-01"
      ]
    }
  ],
  "analysis": {
    "cardinality": 424,
    "char_count": 7600,
    "ocr_confidence": 0.806,
    "pagerank": {
      "raw": 1.2240919645422112e-07,
      "percentile": 0.6015126750632952
    },
    "sha256": "205cbd9c708dc18104e403ca43eac67313da4f5d0660fb842aa7f96b39ece9c4",
    "simhash": "1:0d28ea5788dd0502",
    "word_count": 1259
  },
  "last_updated": "2023-07-14T22:48:59.357066+00:00",
  "provenance": {
    "date_added": "2019-08-29",
    "source": "Harvard",
    "batch": "2018"
  },
  "casebody": {
    "judges": [],
    "parties": [
      "BOYCE LAVELL MURPHY, Appellant, v. THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION et al. (Cook County, Juvenile Detention, et al., Appellees)."
    ],
    "opinions": [
      {
        "text": "JUSTICE RAKOWSKI\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nThe employee, Boyce Lavell Murphy (claimant), filed an application for adjustment of claim pursuant to the Workers\u2019 Compensation Act (Act) (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1981, ch. 48, par. 138.1 et seq.) for injuries to his back allegedly sustained in the course of his employment with Cook County, Juvenile Detention (employer). The arbitrator found that claimant was permanently and totally disabled under section 8(f) of the Act. The Industrial Commission (Commission) affirmed.\nClaimant then filed a motion to dismiss his attorney, Tyrrell. Contrary to the claimant\u2019s assertions, the Commission found that the claimant was well represented by Tyrrell but granted the claimant\u2019s motion to discharge Tyrrell. The Commission allowed fees and costs as requested by Tyrrell.\nClaimant refused to pay the costs and fees as ordered. Tyrrell petitioned for further relief before the Commission. On June 17, 1992, the Commission ordered the employer to disburse the costs incurred by Tyrrell and to disburse 20% of each compensation check due claimant for 364 weeks to Tyrrell pursuant to section 16a of the Act.\nOn August 12, 1992, claimant filed a \"Petition for Relief from Judgment\u201d in the circuit court. The employer and Tyrrell moved for dismissal pursuant to section 19(f)(1) of the Act because the claimant\u2019s request for judicial review was sought in excess of 20 days. On February 3, 1993, the circuit court dismissed claimant\u2019s \"Petition for Relief from Judgment,\u201d finding a lack of subject matter jurisdiction.\nOn appeal, the claimant contends that the June 17, 1992, order was void because the Commission lacked the authority to enter an order that allowed attorney fees to be disbursed from the claimant\u2019s compensation benefits. According to claimant, because this order was void, it was subject to attack at any time and, therefore, the circuit court was incorrect as a matter of law to dismiss claimant\u2019s \"Petition for Relief from Judgment\u201d for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.\nWe agree with claimant\u2019s contention that a void judgment may be attacked at any time (Notman v. Industrial Comm\u2019n (1991), 219 Ill. App. 3d 203, 205, 579 N.E.2d 370) and that if the June 17, 1992, order was void, the circuit court would have jurisdiction. We disagree, however, the June 17, 1992, order was void.\nSection 16a(B) of the Act states that attorney fees shall not \"exceed 20% of the amount of compensation recovered and paid\u201d to the injured employee. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1981, ch. 48, par. 138.16a(B).) Section 16a(I) provides that \"[a]ll attorneys\u2019 fees for representation of an employee or his dependents shall be only recoverable from compensation actually paid to such employee or dependents.\u201d (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1981, ch. 48, par. 138.16a(I).) When the Act is read as a whole, and adopting the practical interpretation which was intended by the legislature (Moreland v. Industrial Comm\u2019n (1970), 47 Ill. 2d 273, 276, 265 N.E.2d 161), there is no reason why attorney fees should not come from the same source from which the injured employee receives his benefits. Field v. Rollins (1987), 156 Ill. App. 3d 786, 789, 510 N.E.2d 105.\nWe find Field v. Rollins persuasive. In that case, the employee whom the plaintiff-attorney represented was declared totally and permanently disabled and entitled to receive $296 per week for life. The employer was ordered to make the first 150 weeks of payments with the remaining payments to be made by the custodian of the \"Second Injury Fund.\u201d The plaintiff was awarded attorney fees of 20% of the amount due to the injured employee for 364 weeks of total permanent disability. Plaintiff was unable to collect the balance when his client moved out of the jurisdiction. The appellate court recognized this as a case of first impression and held that the attorney fees for representing an injured employee, awarded pursuant to the Act, may be recovered from the \"Second Injury Fund.\u201d The court stated that workers\u2019 compensation payments are protected from the reach of judgment creditors; however, \"attorney fees approved by the Industrial Commission rise to the same level as the award granted to the injured employee.\u201d Field, 156 Ill. App. 3d at 789.\nIn the case sub judice, the claimant relies on In re Estate of Callahan (1991), 144 Ill. 2d 32, 578 N.E.2d 985, and Lasley v. Tazewell Coal Co. (1921), 223 Ill. App. 462, for the proposition that the compensation awarded to him is not subject to lien. However, attorney fees in workers\u2019 compensation cases are not liens under section 21 of the Act. (Muller v. Jones (1993), 243 Ill. App. 3d 711, 714, 613 N.E.2d 271.) Further, the Lasley case involved an attorney seeking fees from a former client under the Attorney\u2019s Lien Act of 1909. The court held that fees earned in a workers\u2019 compensation proceeding are not recoverable under the lien statute.\nIn Callahan, the discharged attorney was awarded a quantum meruit fee of $36,000 for work conducted on behalf of the former client\u2019s third-party claim, not a workers\u2019 compensation claim. The fee was ordered to be paid from the assets of the guardianship estate. The supreme court stated that the workers\u2019 compensation payments were assets of the estate. However, because the fee did not arise from a workers\u2019 compensation claim, it was a \"debt.\u201d Therefore, it could not be taken out of weekly workers\u2019 compensation benefits because section 21 of the Act provides that workers\u2019 compensation benefits paid under the Act shall not be liable for any \"debt.\u201d Callahan, 144 Ill. 2d at 43.\nIn the case sub judice, the claimant has not presented any support for his proposition that the June 17, 1992, order was void. On the contrary, to the extent that the cases cited were applicable, they favor Tyrrell. As such, we conclude that the order entered on June 17, 1992, was valid and enforceable.\nSection 19(f)(1) of the Act states in part that a proceeding for review \"shall be commenced within 20 days of the receipt of notice of the decision of the Commission.\u201d (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1981, ch. 48, par. 138.19(f)(1).) The Illinois Supreme Court stated that a request for summons must be in writing. (Daugherty v. Industrial Comm\u2019n (1983), 99 Ill. 2d 1, 457 N.E.2d 381.) More recently, this court has determined that \"the failure to file any written request to be substantive, since to hold otherwise would completely emasculate a clear requirement of section 19(f)(1).\u201d Whitmer v. Industrial Comm\u2019n (1989), 187 Ill. App. 3d 409, 411, 549 N.E.2d 353.\nIn the case sub judice, the claimant stated in his \"Petition for Relief from Judgment\u201d that he received a copy of the June 17, 1992, decision on June 22, 1992. Claimant\u2019s request for summons was filed on August 12, 1992. As such, the request for summons was not filed within 20 days. In light of the clear language of the statute and current case law, we conclude that the trial court properly determined that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction because of claimant\u2019s failure to comply with the statute.\nFor the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the circuit court of Cook County is affirmed.\nAffirmed.\nMcCULLOUGH, P.J., and WOODWARD, SLATER, and RAR-ICK, JJ., concur.",
        "type": "majority",
        "author": "JUSTICE RAKOWSKI"
      }
    ],
    "attorneys": [
      "Boyce Lavell Murphy, of Chicago, appellant pro se.",
      "Jack O\u2019Malley, State\u2019s Attorney, of Chicago (Karen A. Covy and Douglas S. Stefenson, Assistant State\u2019s Attorneys, of counsel), for appellees."
    ],
    "corrections": "",
    "head_matter": "BOYCE LAVELL MURPHY, Appellant, v. THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION et al. (Cook County, Juvenile Detention, et al., Appellees).\nFirst District (Industrial Commission Division)\nNo. 1 \u2014 93\u20140544WC\nOpinion filed February 18, 1994.\nBoyce Lavell Murphy, of Chicago, appellant pro se.\nJack O\u2019Malley, State\u2019s Attorney, of Chicago (Karen A. Covy and Douglas S. Stefenson, Assistant State\u2019s Attorneys, of counsel), for appellees."
  },
  "file_name": "0764-01",
  "first_page_order": 784,
  "last_page_order": 787
}