{
  "id": 2873595,
  "name": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. ERIC TYNES, Defendant-Appellant",
  "name_abbreviation": "People v. Tynes",
  "decision_date": "1994-03-21",
  "docket_number": "No. 3-92-0615",
  "first_page": "307",
  "last_page": "308",
  "citations": [
    {
      "type": "official",
      "cite": "259 Ill. App. 3d 307"
    }
  ],
  "court": {
    "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.",
    "id": 8837,
    "name": "Illinois Appellate Court"
  },
  "jurisdiction": {
    "id": 29,
    "name_long": "Illinois",
    "name": "Ill."
  },
  "cites_to": [
    {
      "cite": "158 Ill. 2d 260",
      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "Ill. 2d",
      "case_ids": [
        780297
      ],
      "weight": 3,
      "pin_cites": [
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          "page": "262-72"
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        {
          "page": "272"
        }
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  "last_updated": "2023-07-14T17:15:39.062040+00:00",
  "provenance": {
    "date_added": "2019-08-29",
    "source": "Harvard",
    "batch": "2018"
  },
  "casebody": {
    "judges": [],
    "parties": [
      "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. ERIC TYNES, Defendant-Appellant."
    ],
    "opinions": [
      {
        "text": "JUSTICE McCUSKEY\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nFollowing a jury trial, the defendant, Eric Tynes, was convicted of aggravated criminal sexual assault (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1991, ch. 38, par. 12 \u2014 14(a)(2)). The defendant was sentenced to an extended term of 50 years\u2019 imprisonment and was also ordered to pay $1,500 in restitution.\nOn appeal, the sole issue raised by the defendant is whether the trial court erred when it ordered the defendant to pay restitution but failed to set a payment schedule. The defendant contends that section 5 \u2014 5\u20146(f) of the Unified Code of Corrections (Code) (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1991, ch. 38, par. 1005 \u2014 5\u20146(f)) requires a trial court to set a concrete time and manner for the payment of the restitution amount within five years of the date of sentencing. Based upon our supreme court\u2019s decision in People v. Brooks (1994), 158 Ill. 2d 260, we disagree with the defendant and affirm the trial court\u2019s sentencing order.\nIn Brooks, the defendant was sentenced to a term of 10 years\u2019 imprisonment. He was also ordered to pay $2,767.93 in restitution within two years of his release from prison. The defendant in Brooks argued that the restitution order was improper because the five-year limitation period for paying restitution set out in section 5 \u2014 5\u20146(f) of the Code must begin at sentencing. He also contended that the trial court was required to specify the method and manner of payment in the restitution order.\nThe Brooks court carefully analyzed the language of section 5 \u2014 5\u20146(f) of the Code, including an amendment to the section' recently enacted by the legislature (see Pub. Act 88 \u2014 237, eff. January 1, 1994, amending 730 ILCS 5/5 \u2014 5\u20146(f) (West 1992)). Based upon this analysis, the Brooks court concluded that section 5 \u2014 5\u20146(f) allows the five-year time period for the payment of restitution to begin when a defendant is released from prison after serving a lengthy prison term. (Brooks, 158 Ill. 2d at 262-72.) The Brooks court also rejected the defendant\u2019s argument that the restitution order was inappropriate because it failed to specify the method and manner of payment. The court stated:\n\"The trial court\u2019s failure to define a specific payment schedule is understandable, given that defendant had yet to serve his term and the regularity and amount of his future income, if any, was unknown. [Citations.] Furthermore, it is appropriate to infer from the trial court\u2019s failure to specify a payment schedule that restitution is to be made in a single payment. [Citation.] Under such circumstances, the order\u2019s lack of specificity is not unreasonable.\u201d Brooks, 158 Ill. 2d at 272.\nWe conclude that the Brooks decision is dispositive of this appeal. Based upon Brooks, the trial court in this case was not required to order that the restitution amount be paid within five years of the date of sentencing. Also, because the defendant was sentenced to a lengthy prison term of 50 years, the trial court was not required to specify the method and manner of payment.\nFor the reasons indicated, the judgment of the circuit court of Kankakee County is affirmed.\nAffirmed.\nSLATER, P.J., and LYTTON, J., concur.",
        "type": "majority",
        "author": "JUSTICE McCUSKEY"
      }
    ],
    "attorneys": [
      "Joseph N. Ehmann, of State Appellate Defender\u2019s Office, of Ottawa, and Eric Tynes, of Pontiac, pro se, for appellant.",
      "Clarke Erickson, State\u2019s Attorney, of Kankakee (John X. Breslin and Robert M. Hansen, both of State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor\u2019s Office, of counsel), for the People."
    ],
    "corrections": "",
    "head_matter": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. ERIC TYNES, Defendant-Appellant.\nThird District\nNo. 3 \u2014 92\u20140615\nOpinion filed March 21, 1994.\nJoseph N. Ehmann, of State Appellate Defender\u2019s Office, of Ottawa, and Eric Tynes, of Pontiac, pro se, for appellant.\nClarke Erickson, State\u2019s Attorney, of Kankakee (John X. Breslin and Robert M. Hansen, both of State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor\u2019s Office, of counsel), for the People."
  },
  "file_name": "0307-01",
  "first_page_order": 325,
  "last_page_order": 326
}