{ "id": 2870396, "name": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. GEORGE KOKKENEIS, Defendant-Appellant", "name_abbreviation": "People v. Kokkeneis", "decision_date": "1994-03-25", "docket_number": "No. 1-91-0474", "first_page": "404", "last_page": "409", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "259 Ill. App. 3d 404" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "466 N.E.2d 1252", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "126 Ill. App. 3d 267", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3597327 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "269-70" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/126/0267-01" ] }, { "cite": "459 N.E.2d 985", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "121 Ill. App. 3d 273", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3559491 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "278" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/121/0273-01" ] }, { "cite": "454 N.E.2d 322", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "97 Ill. 2d 311", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5515543 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "316-17" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/97/0311-01" ] }, { "cite": "495 N.E.2d 616", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1986, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "144 Ill. App. 3d 1071", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3499731 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1075" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/144/1071-01" ] }, { "cite": "410 N.E.2d 511", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "88 Ill. App. 3d 352", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3172709 ], "weight": 4, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "354" }, { "page": "354-55" }, { "page": "357" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/88/0352-01" ] }, { "cite": "438 N.E.2d 1267", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1980, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "108 Ill. App. 3d 161", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3012546 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1980, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "164" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/108/0161-01" ] }, { "cite": "457 N.E.2d 390", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1982, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "99 Ill. 2d 19", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3163930 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1982, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "23" }, { "page": "23-24" }, { "page": "23-24" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/99/0019-01" ] }, { "cite": "397 N.E.2d 825", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "77 Ill. 2d 513", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5490609 ], "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "516" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/77/0513-01" ] }, { "cite": "403 N.E.2d 647", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "82 Ill. App. 3d 956", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3225516 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "962" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/82/0956-01" ] }, { "cite": "538 N.E.2d 461", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "128 Ill. 2d 1", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3228708 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "46" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/128/0001-01" ] }, { "cite": "488 N.E.2d 649", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "140 Ill. App. 3d 216", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3532300 ], "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "223" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/140/0216-01" ] }, { "cite": "599 N.E.2d 104", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "233 Ill. App. 3d 449", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5194078 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "455-56" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/233/0449-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 603, "char_count": 12489, "ocr_confidence": 0.8, "pagerank": { "raw": 5.527646540942415e-08, "percentile": 0.3466045703822887 }, "sha256": "7a9437c69d098432a521d100ea053986b9050bf5cb873747494a6f3b21acb9e2", "simhash": "1:ab7de7446ffcd4d2", "word_count": 2058 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T17:15:39.062040+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. GEORGE KOKKENEIS, Defendant-Appellant." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE GIANNIS\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nFollowing a bench trial, defendant, George Kokkeneis, was found not guilty by reason of insanity on a charge of aggravated arson. Based upon the determination that defendant was in need of inpatient mental health services and subject to involuntary admission, the trial court ordered that defendant be committed to the Illinois Department of Mental Health and Developmental Disabilities for a maximum term not to exceed 15 years. The trial court\u2019s final computation of defendant\u2019s maximum term of commitment excluded an additional 180-day period of good-time credit. Defendant appeals, contending that he was entitled to receive credit for the additional 180-day period provided for in the statute.\nThe record reveals that defendant was charged by indictment with aggravated arson. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1989, ch. 38, par. 20 \u2014 1.1(a)(1) (now 720 ILCS 5/20 \u2014 1.1(a)(1) (West 1992)).) The evidence adduced at trial established that on April 25, 1989, defendant intentionally started a fire in a dumpster located behind the Hellenic Enterprises grocery store, located at 6058 West Diversey, and the fire spread to the building which housed the grocery store and a second-floor apartment. The evidence further established that when defendant started the fire, the grocery store was open for business, and there were people in the store as well as in the upstairs apartment. Defendant was arrested on May 4, 1989, was advised of his constitutional rights through a Greek interpreter, and indicated that he understood those rights. In a statement to the police after his arrest, defendant admitted starting the fire and said he did so because the owners of the grocery had a poster in the window supporting Mayor Daley. Defendant admitted that he knew there were people in the building because shortly before starting the fire he had purchased a sandwich from one of the store owners.\nThe parties stipulated that if called as witnesses, Gerson H. Kap-lan, M.D., and Matthew S. Markos, M.D., would testify that, based upon their independent examinations of defendant on October 6, 1989, they believed that defendant was legally insane at the time of the alleged offense and was unable to conform his behavior to the requirements of the law due to schizophrenia.\nThe trial court found defendant not guilty by reason of insanity and ordered that he submit to the Department of Mental Health and Developmental Disabilities for inpatient evaluation.\nFollowing a hearing, the trial court entered an order on December 12,1990, involuntarily remanding defendant to the custody of the Department of Mental Health and Developmental Disabilities for an indefinite time, but not beyond November 3, 2003 (141/2 years from the date of defendant\u2019s arrest). The court calculated defendant\u2019s commitment term by deducting statutory day-for-day good-conduct credit as well as an additional 180 days of good-conduct credit from the 30-year maximum sentence possible if defendant had been convicted of aggravated arson. See Ill. Rev. Stat. 1989, ch. 38, par. 1005 \u2014 8\u20141(a)(3) (now 730 ILCS 5/5 \u2014 8\u20141(a)(3) (West 1992)).\nOn January 31,1991, an amended commitment order was entered on the court\u2019s own motion and over defendant\u2019s objection. This amended commitment order revoked the additional 180-day good-conduct credit from defendant\u2019s maximum period of commitment and thereby changed the maximum commitment term from 14x/2 years to 15 years from the date of defendant\u2019s arrest. Based upon this amended commitment order, defendant would be eligible for release on or before May 3, 2004. Defendant has appealed, contending that he was entitled to receive the 180 days of good-time credit which was revoked by the trial judge in her amended commitment order.\nThe State asserts that by failing to object at the hearing and failing to file a motion to reduce his commitment term, defendant has waived his right to challenge the amended commitment order which revoked the additional 180 days of good-conduct credit. It has been held, however, that there is no duty to file a post-sentencing motion to preserve alleged errors in sentencing. (People v. Turner (1992), 233 Ill. App. 3d 449, 455-56, 599 N.E.2d 104.) Because the involuntary commitment of a defendant found not guilty by reason of insanity affects the defendant\u2019s fundamental liberty interest (People v. Williams (1986), 140 Ill. App. 3d 216, 223, 488 N.E.2d 649), alleged error in the determination of the maximum term of commitment may be considered on review even where that alleged error was not brought to the attention of the trial court (People v. Young (1989), 128 Ill. 2d 1, 46, 538 N.E.2d 461). We note that defense counsel did voice an objection at the time the amended commitment order was entered by the trial court. Consequently, we reject the State\u2019s assertion that defendant waived his right to appeal the trial court\u2019s amended commitment order.\nOn appeal, defendant contends that the trial court erred in computing his maximum term of commitment by excluding the additional 180-day period of good-time credit.\nAggravated arson, a Class X felony, is punishable by a sentence of 6 to 30 years\u2019 imprisonment. See Ill. Rev. Stat. 1989, ch. 38, pars. 20 \u2014 1.1, 1005 \u2014 8\u20141(a)(3) (now 720 ILCS 5/20 \u2014 1.1; 730 ILCS 5/5\u2014 8 \u2014 1(a)(3) (West 1992)).\nSection 5 \u2014 2\u20144(b) of the Unified Code of Corrections (Code) states that the term of commitment for a defendant found not guilty by reason of insanity shall not exceed the maximum length of time that the defendant would have been required to serve, less credit for good behavior, if he had been convicted of and received the maximum sentence for the most serious crime for which he was acquitted by reason of insanity. Ill. Rev. Stat. 1989, ch. 38, par. 1005 \u2014 2\u20144(b) (now 730 ILCS 5/5 \u2014 2\u20144(b) (West 1992)).\nSection 3 \u2014 6\u20143(a)(2) of the Code provides that each prisoner of the Illinois Department of Corrections shall receive one day of good-conduct credit for each day of service (\"statutory good time credits\u201d), and each day of good-conduct credit shall reduce by one day the inmate\u2019s period of incarceration set by the court. See Ill. Rev. Stat. 1989, ch. 38, par. 1003 \u2014 6\u20143(a)(2) (now 730 ILCS 5/3 \u2014 6\u20143(a)(2) (West 1992)).\nPursuant to the guidelines in People v. Thiem (1980), 82 Ill. App. 3d 956, 962, 403 N.E.2d 647, the amended commitment order entered by the trial court set defendant\u2019s maximum term of commitment at 15 years, considering the 30-year maximum sentence for aggravated arson and deducting the day-for-day good-conduct credit mandated in section 3 \u2014 6\u20143(a)(2).\nDefendant argues, however, that the trial court erred in refusing to grant him the 180-day good-time credit provided in section 3 \u2014 6\u2014 3(a)(3), which states that the Director (of the Department of Corrections) may award up to 180 days\u2019 additional good-conduct credit for meritorious service in specific instances as the Director deems proper. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1989, ch. 38, par. 1003 \u2014 6\u20143(a)(3) (now 730 ILCS 5/3 \u2014 6\u20143(a)(3) (West 1992)).) Defendant characterizes the section 3 \u2014 6\u20143(a)(3) good-conduct credit as \"compensatory\u201d and argues that he is entitled to receive the additional 180 days of good-conduct credit authorized by this section.\nThe distinction between \"statutory good time credits\u201d and \"compensatory good time credits\u201d was fully explained in Johnson v. Franzen (1979), 77 Ill. 2d 513, 397 N.E.2d 825. In describing the application of good-conduct credits to sentence terms, the Illinois Supreme Court noted that the day-for-day schedule of good-conduct credits for good behavior provided in section 3 \u2014 6\u20143(a)(2) were known as \"statutory good time credits.\u201d Good-conduct credits awarded to prisoners who performed work assignments or participated in other Department programs were authorized by section 3 \u2014 12\u20145 and were known as \"compensatory good time credits.\u201d See Johnson, 77 Ill. 2d at 516; Ill. Rev. Stat. 1977, ch. 38, par. 1003\u2014 12 \u2014 5.\nBecause there were not enough jobs or programs to accommodate those who sought \"compensatory good time credits,\u201d the requirement that the prisoner perform work assignments or participate in other programs was eliminated. Consequently, eligibility for \"compensatory good time credits\u201d was no longer dependent upon the performance of work assignments or other meritorious activity by the inmate, and \"compensatory good time\u201d was made available to all inmates within the Department of Corrections. (See People v. Tanzy (1983), 99 Ill. 2d 19, 23, 457 N.E.2d 390, citing In re Commitment of Coppersmith (1982), 108 Ill. App. 3d 161, 438 N.E.2d 1267; Hampton v. Rowe (1980), 88 Ill. App. 3d 352, 354, 410 N.E.2d 511.) Section 3 \u2014 12\u20145 was amended as of February 1, 1978, and the amended version of this section provided that prisoners who performed work assignments or participated in other programs could earn wages. The accrual of \"compensatory good time credits\u201d was deleted from this statutory section. Also on February 1, 1978, section 3 \u2014 6\u20143(a) was amended to include subparagraph (3), which had not previously existed. This section originally provided 90 days of good-time credit, but was amended July 13, 1990, to provide 180 days of credit in certain circumstances.\nNoting this change in the law, the Rowe opinion stated that the only difference between \"statutory good time\u201d and \"compensatory good time\u201d was the amount and method of computation. (Rowe, 88 Ill. App. 3d at 354-55.) Significantly, although section 3 \u2014 12\u201415 did not provide for \"compensatory good time credits\u201d after February 1, 1978, the cases continued to refer to these credits as separate and distinct from \"statutory good time credits.\u201d\nThe Illinois Supreme Court has unequivocally held that a defendant found not guilty by reason of insanity is entitled to \"compensatory good time credits.\u201d (Tanzy, 99 Ill. 2d at 23-24, citing In re Commitment of Coppersmith, 108 Ill. App. 3d 161, and Rowe, 88 Ill. App. 3d 352.) The cases cited by the State, People v. Spudic (1986), 144 Ill. App. 3d 1071, 495 N.E.2d 616, and People v. Williams (1986), 140 Ill. App. 3d 216, 488 N.E.2d 649, involved other issues and did not specifically address or discuss the applicability of section 3 \u2014 6\u2014 3(a)(3) good-time credit in determining the maximum term of commitment for a defendant found not guilty by reason of insanity.\nThe legislative history recounted above reflects that the \"compensatory good time credit\u201d formerly provided in section 3 \u2014 12\u20145, requiring work performance or program participation, was supplanted by the good-time credit provided in section 3 \u2014 6\u20143(a)(3), which did not require work performance or program participation. See generally Lane v. Sklodowski (1983), 97 Ill. 2d 311, 316-17, 454 N.E.2d 322.\nWe hold that defendant should have received the \"compensatory good time credit\u201d of 180 days provided in section 3 \u2014 6\u20143(a)(3). (See Tanzy, 99 Ill. 2d at 23-24; People v. Hampton (1983), 121 Ill. App. 3d 273, 278, 459 N.E.2d 985; In re Commitment of Coppersmith, 108 Ill. App. 3d at 164; Rowe, 88 Ill. App. 3d at 357.) Defendant would be entitled to receive the \"compensatory good time credit\u201d specified in section 3 \u2014 6\u20143(a)(3) despite the fact that the grant of such credit is within the discretion of the Director of the Department of Corrections and is based upon meritorious service by the defendant. See People v. Spudic (1986), 144 Ill. App. 3d 1071, 1075, 495 N.E.2d 616; In re Commitment of Guy (1984), 126 Ill. App. 3d 267, 269-70, 466 N.E.2d 1252 (good-time credits cannot be revoked on the basis of subsequent bad conduct and are not earned by an insanity acquittee during the course of his commitment, but are included in computing the maximum period of commitment).\nAccordingly, the amended commitment order is vacated, and the cause is remanded for entry of a new commitment order upon recalculation of the defendant\u2019s maximum term of commitment after the 180 days of compensatory good-time credit are applied.\nVacated and remanded.\nEGAN, P.J., and McNAMARA, J., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE GIANNIS" } ], "attorneys": [ "Rita A. Fry, Public Defender, of Chicago (Kim L. Sorrells, Assistant Public Defender, of counsel), for appellant.", "Jack O\u2019Malley, State\u2019s Attorney, of Chicago (Renee Goldfarb, Christine Cook, and Ann Kidd, Assistant State\u2019s Attorneys, of counsel), for the People." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. GEORGE KOKKENEIS, Defendant-Appellant.\nFirst District (6th Division)\nNo. 1 \u2014 91\u20140474\nOpinion filed March 25, 1994.\nRita A. Fry, Public Defender, of Chicago (Kim L. Sorrells, Assistant Public Defender, of counsel), for appellant.\nJack O\u2019Malley, State\u2019s Attorney, of Chicago (Renee Goldfarb, Christine Cook, and Ann Kidd, Assistant State\u2019s Attorneys, of counsel), for the People." }, "file_name": "0404-01", "first_page_order": 422, "last_page_order": 427 }