{ "id": 2869836, "name": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. LATONJA B. HEMPHILL, Defendant-Appellant", "name_abbreviation": "People v. Hemphill", "decision_date": "1994-03-31", "docket_number": "No. 4-93-0141", "first_page": "474", "last_page": "479", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "259 Ill. App. 3d 474" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "403 N.E.2d 297", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "298" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "82 Ill. App. 3d 853", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 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LATONJA B. HEMPHILL, Defendant-Appellant." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE KNECHT\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nDefendant, Latonja Hemphill, appeals from three consecutive sentences entered with respect to her convictions of two counts of retail theft (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1991, ch. 38, par. 16A \u2014 3(a)) and one count of theft (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1991, ch. 38, par. 16 \u2014 1(a)(4)). Hemphill alleges her sentences are excessive. We disagree and affirm.\nIn July 1992, Hemphill, carrying her infant child in a car seat and accompanied by Jack Trumbo, Jr., went to Country Fair, a store in Jacksonville. A store employee observed Trumbo placing three cartons of cigarettes in a shopping cart. However, when Trumbo and Hemphill went through the checkout lane, their purchase consisted of only two bananas. The store employee confronted Trumbo and Hemphill before they exited the store. A police officer arrived and asked Hemphill if he could look in the baby\u2019s car seat. Hemphill swung the car seat from side to side, with the baby in it. The police officer was ultimately permitted to examine the car seat and discovered, the three cartons of cigarettes hidden under a blanket. Trumbo and Hemphill were arrested for retail theft.\nLate in July 1992, Hemphill, carrying her infant in a baby basket and accompanied by Victor Branch, went shopping at Jack\u2019s Discount, another store in Jacksonville. This time Hemphill placed an answering machine and a stereo cassette player under a blanket in the baby basket. While Hemphill went to the service counter to return some merchandise, Branch, carrying the baby and baby basket, left the store. Branch was apprehended by a store employee. Branch and Hemphill were ultimately arrested for retail theft.\nAgain in July 1992, Hemphill approached Janis Williams, who was sitting on the front porch of a residence, and asked her for a glass of water. Williams went inside to get the water, leaving her purse on the porch. Hemphill took the purse and fled. The purse contained $50 cash. The purse was recovered; the cash was not. Hemphill was arrested for theft.\nIn September 1992, Hemphill pleaded guilty to the two counts of retail theft and one count of theft. The sentencing hearing was held in October 1992. The presentence investigation report submitted to the court reflected Hemphill was 22 years old at the time of the offenses. Hemphill\u2019s juvenile record included a finding of delinquency in 1985 as the result of her theft of an automobile. She was placed on six months\u2019 supervision, which was successfully completed.\nHemphill also has an adult record. In 1987, Hemphill was convicted of two counts of burglary and sentenced to 120 days\u2019 incarceration and 18 months\u2019 probation. While on probation, Hemp-hill committed the offense of retail theft. She was sentenced to 30 days\u2019 incarceration. Shortly thereafter, Hemphill was convicted of escape from a penal institution and sentenced to four years\u2019 incarceration. In 1991, after her release from prison, Hemphill was convicted of three counts of forgery and sentenced to 21lz years\u2019 probation. While on probation, Hemphill was convicted of passing bad checks in excess of $150 and sentenced to two years\u2019 probation. The three offenses in the present case were committed while Hemp-hill was on probation with respect to both the forgery and bad checks convictions.\nA condition of Hemphill\u2019s probation with respect to the bad checks conviction was that she cooperate with the Treatment Alternatives to Street Crimes (TASC) program to obtain treatment for her crack cocaine addiction. TASC located a drug treatment facility in which Hemphill, who was then pregnant, could be placed. In this facility, Hemphill would be able to keep the infant with her after its birth. Hemphill failed to cooperate in completing the paperwork necessary to her admission. As the result, Hemphill did not enter the treatment facility. Hemphill was expelled from the TASC program. Hemphill\u2019s probation officer submitted a letter indicating Hemphill had been very uncooperative.\nAt the sentencing hearing Hemphill testified she committed her crimes in order to obtain money or goods which could be exchanged for drugs. Hemphill acknowledged her addiction to crack cocaine. She testified she wanted to enter treatment for her drug addiction and had telephoned and left several messages for her TASC representative; however, he did not wish to help her get treatment. Hemp-hill\u2019s mother testified she had supplied all of the information and paperwork necessary for Hemphill to enter the drug treatment program.\nIn rendering sentence, the trial court noted Hemphill had committed felony after felony. The court noted when Hemphill had been before the court for sentencing with respect to the bad checks conviction, the State requested a sentence of imprisonment; however, the court gave her the opportunity to be placed on probation and get treatment for her drug addiction.\nThe sentence imposed upon a defendant is a matter of judicial discretion. The circuit court is in the best position to view defendant\u2019s credibility, demeanor, general moral character, social environment, habits, and age. (See People v. Duckett (1974), 56 Ill. 2d 432, 452, 308 N.E.2d 590, 601.) The trial court is, therefore, better able to fashion a sentence tailored to the particular circumstances and acts of the defendant. (See generally People v. Steppen (1985), 105 Ill. 2d 310, 323, 473 N.E.2d 1300, 1307; People v. Perruquet (1977), 68 Ill. 2d 149, 154, 368 N.E.2d 882, 884.) The circuit court\u2019s decision with respect to sentencing is entitled to great weight and will not be disturbed absent an abuse of discretion.\nThe sentence for retail theft of property having a value of less than $150, as well as for theft of property having a value of $300 or less, is the sentence for a Class A misdemeanor, i.e., a term of imprisonment of less than one year. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1991, ch. 38, pars. 16A \u2014 10(1), 16 \u2014 1(b)(1), 1005 \u2014 8\u20143(a)(1).) However, where, as in the present case, the defendant has previously been convicted of burglary, the theft or retail theft may be elevated from a Class A misdemeanor to a Class 4 felony. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1991, ch. 38, pars. 16\u2014 1(b)(2), 16A \u2014 10(2).) The sentence for a Class 4 felony is a term of imprisonment of not less than one nor more than three years. Ill. Rev. Stat. 1991, ch. 38, par. 1005 \u2014 8\u20141(a)(7).\nMoreover, the trial court, in the exercise of its discretion, could have sentenced Hemphill to an extended term. A defendant who has previously been convicted of the same or a greater class felony may be sentenced to an extended term. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1991, ch. 38, par. 1005 \u2014 5\u20143.2(b)(1).) Since Hemphill had previously been convicted of forgery, a Class 3 felony (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1991, ch. 38, par. 17 \u2014 3(d)), she was eligible for an extended-term sentence. The extended-term sentence for a Class 4 felony is a term of imprisonment of not less than three nor more than six years. Ill. Rev. Stat. 1991, ch. 38, par. 1005 \u2014 8\u20142(a)(6).\nThus, Hemphill could have been sentenced to a term of imprisonment of one to three years with respect to each of the convictions of retail theft as well as the theft conviction. Had the court, in its discretion, determined extended-term sentences to be appropriate, Hemphill could have been sentenced to a term of imprisonment of three to six years in each instance.\nIn the present case, given the factors in aggravation, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in sentencing Hemphill to 21h years\u2019 imprisonment with respect to each of the convictions. Most notably, Hemphill has an extensive prior criminal record and committed the instant offenses while on probation. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1991, ch. 38, pars. 1005 \u2014 5\u20143.2(a)(3), (a)(12).) Moreover, the trial court found the sentences were necessary to deter others. Ill. Rev. Stat. 1991, ch. 38, par. 1005 \u2014 5\u20143.2(a)(7).\nNor did the trial court err in ordering the sentences to be served consecutively. The court may order sentences to be served consecutively, where, having regard to the nature and circumstances of the offense and the history and character of the defendant, such a term is required to protect the public from future criminal conduct by the defendant. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1991, ch. 38, par. 1005 \u2014 8\u20144(b); Steppen, 105 Ill. 2d at 322-23, 473 N.E.2d at 1306-07.) The determination of whether a consecutive term is warranted lies within the discretion of the trial court and such determination will not be disturbed absent an abuse of discretion. (People v. Harris (1991), 220 Ill. App. 3d 31, 32, 580 N.E.2d 903, 904.) A reviewing court should not substitute its judgment or preference as to punishment for that of the sentencing court. The trial court is ordinarily best situated to tailor a sentence to the needs of the case. It balances the appropriate factors in imposing sentence, and the exercise of this discretion should not be altered upon review absent abuse of that discretion. People v. Anderson (1991), 211 Ill. App. 3d 140, 144, 569 N.E.2d 1178, 1182.\nHemphill argues the consecutive sentences, 71h years in the aggregate, are excessive because the property taken totalled less than $300. Hemphill directs our attention to People v. Odom (1980), 82 Ill. App. 3d 853, 403 N.E.2d 297. In Odom, this court vacated the sentence of a defendant sentenced to 364 days\u2019 imprisonment with respect to a conviction of criminal damage to property, where the offense consisted of the splattering of paint on a neighbor\u2019s fence. This court found the sentence to be so out of proportion to the offense committed that it would bring the system of the administration of criminal justice into question if not disrepute. This court additionally concluded the prison term was unnecessary to protect the public from a man convicted of splattering paint on a neighbor\u2019s fence and probation would not deprecate the seriousness of the defendant\u2019s offense. Odom, 82 Ill. App. 3d at 854-55, 403 N.E.2d at 298.\nWe cannot apply the reasoning used in Odom to the present case. Hemphill was convicted of three theft-related offenses. Her previous history presents a pattern of stealing from others, whether by theft or deception. The trial court could have reasonably determined consecutive sentences were necessary to protect the public from further criminal conduct by Hemphill. Moreover, the sentencing of Hemp-hill, a repeat offender, to a total of 71/2 years\u2019 imprisonment will not bring the criminal justice system into question or beget public indignation.\nWe find the present case bears closer resemblance to Anderson than to Odom. Anderson, a cocaine addict, was 33 years old at the time of sentencing on a retail theft conviction. Her prior record consisted of one juvenile adjudication, one traffic violation, a burglary conviction, a misdemeanor theft conviction, and five retail theft convictions. Five of her prior offenses were felonies. At the time of sentencing, Anderson was serving consecutive terms of four years\u2019 and two years\u2019 imprisonment for retail theft. (Anderson, 211 Ill. App. 3d at 141, 569 N.E.2d at 1180.) The trial court sentenced Anderson to a six-year extended-term sentence, to be served consecutively to her other consecutive sentences. (Anderson, 211 Ill. App. 3d at 142, 569 N.E.2d at 1180.) On appeal, we affirmed, noting Anderson\u2019s extensive prior record and the lack of meaningful attention to overcoming her drug addiction. Anderson, 211 Ill. App. 3d at 144, 569 N.E.2d at 1182.\nHemphill had numerous prior convictions and committed offenses while on probation for other offenses. The trial court found Hemp-hill was incorrigible and could not be trusted. When given the opportunity to obtain treatment for her drug addiction, Hemphill did not.\nThe consecutive sentences imposed by the circuit court of Morgan County are affirmed.\nAffirmed.\nCOOK and STEIGMANN, JJ., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE KNECHT" } ], "attorneys": [ "Daniel D. Yuhas (argued), of State Appellate Defender\u2019s Office, of Springfield, for appellant.", "Charles Colburn, State\u2019s Attorney, of Jacksonville (Norbert J. Goetten, Robert J. Biderman (argued), and Linda Susan McClain, all of State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor\u2019s Office, of counsel), for the People." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. LATONJA B. HEMPHILL, Defendant-Appellant.\nFourth District\nNo. 4 \u2014 93\u20140141\nArgued January 19, 1994.\nOpinion filed March 31, 1994.\nDaniel D. Yuhas (argued), of State Appellate Defender\u2019s Office, of Springfield, for appellant.\nCharles Colburn, State\u2019s Attorney, of Jacksonville (Norbert J. Goetten, Robert J. Biderman (argued), and Linda Susan McClain, all of State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor\u2019s Office, of counsel), for the People." }, "file_name": "0474-01", "first_page_order": 492, "last_page_order": 497 }