{ "id": 2872738, "name": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. NELSON BELL, Defendant-Appellant", "name_abbreviation": "People v. Bell", "decision_date": "1994-03-23", "docket_number": "No. 3-92-0963", "first_page": "572", "last_page": "574", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "259 Ill. App. 3d 572" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "372 N.E.2d 666", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "69 Ill. 2d 520", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5454879 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/69/0520-01" ] }, { "cite": "613 N.E.2d 740", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "pin_cites": [ { "page": "743" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "155 Ill. 2d 188", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 4810501 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "194" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/155/0188-01" ] }, { "cite": "619 N.E.2d 246", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "249 Ill. App. 3d 750", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5410783 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/249/0750-01" ] }, { "cite": "600 N.E.2d 902", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "234 Ill. App. 3d 631", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5187652 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/234/0631-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 300, "char_count": 4884, "ocr_confidence": 0.779, "pagerank": { "raw": 4.446063651887353e-08, "percentile": 0.278430325474574 }, "sha256": "0474ad663e6ccaa991515443e0323dd4cebf8d533c809bcbd767db403df820a6", "simhash": "1:b10cb459aac6af76", "word_count": 810 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T17:15:39.062040+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. NELSON BELL, Defendant-Appellant." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "PRESIDING JUSTICE SLATER\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nThe defendant, Nelson Bell, was convicted of one count of aggravated criminal sexual assault and one count of aggravated criminal sexual abuse (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1991, ch. 38, pars. 12 \u2014 14, 12 \u2014 16). He received a six-year sentence on the former count and a consecutive three-year sentence on the latter count. On appeal, the defendant contends that the trial court mistakenly believed that it had to impose consecutive sentences. We agree and remand for resentencing.\nAt trial, 10-year-old D.W. testified that during spring break in 1991, she and her sister, E.W., visited their uncle and aunt, the defendant and Shirley Bell. D.W. stated that they arrived at the defendant\u2019s house on a Monday. Later that day, the defendant asked her to go into the first-floor bathroom with him. In the bathroom, the defendant told her to pull down her pants. He then touched D.W.\u2019s vagina and asked if anyone had been \"messing\u201d with her.\nTwelve-year-old E.W. testified that she and D.W. went to the defendant\u2019s house on a Sunday. E.W. thought that on the following day the defendant asked her to go into the basement with him. In the basement, the defendant told E.W. to pull down her pants. He then rubbed her \"privates.\u201d\nThe defendant was found guilty of two counts of aggravated criminal sexual assault and was sentenced to two consecutive six-year terms of imprisonment. In an earlier appeal, this court modified one of the convictions to aggravated criminal sexual abuse and remanded for resentencing on that count. (People v. Bell (1992), 234 Ill. App. 3d 631, 600 N.E.2d 902.) Upon remand, the trial court found that consecutive sentences were mandatory under section 5 \u2014 8\u20144(a) of the Unified Code of Corrections (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1991, ch. 38, par. 1005\u2014 8 \u2014 4(a)). It then imposed a consecutive three-year term of imprisonment.\nIn this appeal, the defendant argues that his offenses did not constitute a single course of conduct during which there was no substantial change in the nature of the criminal objective. Consequently, he contends that the trial court erred in finding that consecutive sentences were mandatory.\nSection 5 \u2014 8\u20144(a) of the Unified Code of Corrections states in relevant part as follows:\n\"The court shall not impose consecutive sentences for offenses which were committed as part of a single course of conduct during which there was no substantial change in the nature of the criminal objective, unless *** the defendant was convicted of a violation of Section 12 \u2014 13 or 12 \u2014 14 of the Criminal Code of 1961, in which event the court shall enter sentences to run consecutively.\u201d Ill. Rev. Stat. 1991, ch. 38, par. 1005 \u2014 8\u20144(a).\nWe find that the instant offenses did not constitute a single course of conduct during which there was no substantial change in the nature of the criminal objective. In support of our finding, we note that the offenses were committed against different victims at different times and in different places. We acknowledge that in People v. Embry (1993), 249 Ill. App. 3d 750, 619 N.E.2d 246, the court found that two aggravated criminal sexual assaults committed against two different victims were part of the same course of conduct with no substantial change in the nature of the criminal objective. However, in that case the evidence showed that all of the sexual contact had occurred in the same room within a short period of time. In the instant case, by contrast, the offenses occurred in different rooms, and there was no testimony as to how far apart in time they were. Moreover, given the conflict in the victims\u2019 testimony regarding the day they had arrived and the time lapse between the offenses and that day, it is possible that the offenses occurred on different days. Thus, we find Embry to be distinguishable. Cf. People v. Bole (1993), 155 Ill. 2d 188, 194, 613 N.E.2d 740, 743 (finding that three sexual assaults committed against the same victim did not constitute a single course of conduct because there were \"substantial interruptions\u201d in time between each offense).\nBased on the foregoing, we conclude that the trial court erred in finding that consecutive sentences were mandatory under section 5 \u2014 8\u20144(a). Consequently, we vacate the sentence for aggravated criminal sexual abuse and remand for resentencing on that count. See People v. Moore (1978), 69 Ill. 2d 520, 372 N.E.2d 666.\nVacated in part and remanded.\nLYTTON and McCUSKEY, JJ., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "PRESIDING JUSTICE SLATER" } ], "attorneys": [ "Stephen Omolecki, of State Appellate Defender\u2019s Office, of Ottawa, for appellant.", "Kevin W. Lyons, State\u2019s Attorney, of Peoria (John X. Breslin and Robert M. Hansen, both of State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor\u2019s Office, of counsel), for the People." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. NELSON BELL, Defendant-Appellant.\nThird District\nNo. 3 \u2014 92\u20140963\nOpinion filed March 23, 1994.\nStephen Omolecki, of State Appellate Defender\u2019s Office, of Ottawa, for appellant.\nKevin W. Lyons, State\u2019s Attorney, of Peoria (John X. Breslin and Robert M. Hansen, both of State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor\u2019s Office, of counsel), for the People." }, "file_name": "0572-01", "first_page_order": 590, "last_page_order": 592 }