{ "id": 2865685, "name": "THE PEOPLE ex rel. GUADALUPE MENDEZ, on Behalf of Raquel Mendez, a Minor, Plaintiffs-Appellees, v. RAFAEL VILLA, Defendant-Appellant", "name_abbreviation": "People ex rel. Mendez v. Villa", "decision_date": "1994-04-05", "docket_number": "No. 1\u201492\u20142809", "first_page": "866", "last_page": "872", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "260 Ill. App. 3d 866" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "618 N.E.2d 709", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "248 Ill. App. 3d 253", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2942589 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/248/0253-01" ] }, { "cite": "508 U.S. 275", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 12227 ], "weight": 3, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/508/0275-01" ] }, { "cite": "467 N.E.2d 386", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "pin_cites": [ { "page": "388" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "126 Ill. App. 3d 438", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3596795 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "441" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/126/0438-01" ] }, { "cite": "507 N.E.2d 962", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "155 Ill. App. 3d 116", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3465924 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/155/0116-01" ] }, { "cite": "605 N.E.2d 1373", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "238 Ill. App. 3d 410", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5154699 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/238/0410-01" ] }, { "cite": "468 N.E.2d 1228", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1992, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "102 Ill. 2d 505", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3156104 ], "year": 1992, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/102/0505-01" ] }, { "cite": "529 N.E.2d 525", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "124 Ill. 2d 226", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3217866 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/124/0226-01" ] }, { "cite": "314 N.E.2d 313", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "20 Ill. App. 3d 915", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5345461 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/20/0915-01" ] }, { "cite": "504 N.E.2d 781", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1974, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "152 Ill. App. 3d 716", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3575012 ], "year": 1974, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/152/0716-01" ] }, { "cite": "585 N.E.2d 243", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "223 Ill. App. 3d 564", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5256602 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/223/0564-01" ] }, { "cite": "606 N.E.2d 160", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1992, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "238 Ill. App. 3d 154", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5155781 ], "year": 1992, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/238/0154-01" ] }, { "cite": "595 N.E.2d 1077", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "231 Ill. App. 3d 956", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5204259 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/231/0956-01" ] }, { "cite": "606 N.E.2d 818", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1991, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "239 Ill. App. 3d 601", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5149412 ], "year": 1991, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/239/0601-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 761, "char_count": 13071, "ocr_confidence": 0.784, "pagerank": { "raw": 1.0400805524630624e-07, "percentile": 0.5504956080451022 }, "sha256": "6832c87a6c4e274df3554a19d92a5410a334b7c02df301002d4bb26f77488617", "simhash": "1:205722f36789cdb7", "word_count": 2208 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T14:46:56.444129+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "THE PEOPLE ex rel. GUADALUPE MENDEZ, on Behalf of Raquel Mendez, a Minor, Plaintiffs-Appellees, v. RAFAEL VILLA, Defendant-Appellant." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE SCARIANO\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nOn February 20, 1991, relator Guadalupe Mendez, on behalf of her daughter Raquel, filed a complaint to determine the existence of a father and child relationship between Raquel and defendant Rafael Villa. Relator alleged that she and defendant had engaged in sexual intercourse on a few occasions during the months of December 1979 and January 1980, as a result of which she became pregnant with Raquel, who was born approximately nine months later on September 7, 1980. She sought a declaration that defendant was Raquel\u2019s natural father and, inter alia, that he be ordered to pay child support for her, retroactive to the date of her birth.\nPursuant to section 11 of the Illinois Parentage Act of 1984 (750 ILCS 45/11 (West 1992) (formerly Ill. Rev. Stat. 1991, ch. 40, par. 2511)), the parties submitted blood samples in order that appropriate blood and genetic comparison paternity tests be conducted by Genetic Design, Inc., of Greensboro, North Carolina. The test results disclosed that defendant could not be excluded as the father of Raquel, and that he was, in fact, 99.99% likely to be her father. The results also showed that defendant\u2019s combined paternity index (CPI), which, as described by relator\u2019s expert, Dr. Christine Durkie, is a statistical compilation of the results of three different types of genetic tests, was 6,789 to 1. According to Durkie, that figure predicted that defendant was 6,789 times more likely to be the father of Raquel than any randomly chosen male who would qualify as a member of the population group defined as Hispanic. Because the CPI was in excess of the statutory minimum of 500 to 1, defendant\u2019s paternity of Raquel was to be presumed and could be rebutted only by clear and convincing evidence demonstrating that he was not her father.\nDefendant, called as an adverse witness, admitted to having sexual relations with Guadalupe Mendez, sometime around January or February 1980. He also affirmed that he had previously met Raquel, the first time being when she was very young. Some years later, he saw Raquel at his father\u2019s funeral, at which time he gave her a chain which had been either his father\u2019s or his ex-wife\u2019s, and a charm in the shape of a bull, which represented Taurus, the sign of the zodiac under which she was born.\nAfter the funeral, Raquel accompanied him to his home, where his relatives had gathered. He denied introducing Raquel as his daughter to the group assembled, but instead recalled introducing her simply as Raquel. Before the paternity action was filed, he had last seen her when she spent a few nights at his home during her Christmas vacation, at which time he again gave her presents. He denied telling Raquel that he was her father and further denied that he had ever heard Raquel refer to his sisters as \"aunt\u201d or his mother as \"grandma.\u201d Finally, he had no recollection of his ever having spoken to Raquel concerning the changing of her surname from Mendez to Villa.\nIn cross-examination and during his testimony after relator had rested, he explained that he met Guadalupe through his sister, Linda Tanaschuk, with whom Lupe had a close relationship. It was Linda who informed him that Raquel had been born. In the year before the filing of the paternity suit, he and his sister were at odds over his decision to take their mother out of a nursing home, and also because Linda blamed him for impregnating her friend Guadalupe. He explained that this friction caused him to give the child presents, in the hope that it would appease his sister.\nGuadalupe testified that she had four children, three of whom were fathered by her estranged husband, Abel Mendez. She and Abel were divorced in May 1979, the year before Raquel was born. She stated that she met defendant through her cousin and that their relationship was very brief, during which they twice engaged in sexual intercourse. When she skipped her next menses, she called defendant, predicting that she was pregnant, and told him she was contemplating abortion, to which he was unresponsive. She later decided to carry the baby to term.\nWhen Raquel was born, Guadalupe listed Abel as her father on the birth certificate because, according to her, she was informed that in order to name defendant as the father, she had to have him sign the form, and at that time she was unaware of his whereabouts. Abel later testified that he could not have been the biological father of Raquel, and that he did not give Guadalupe permission to name him as the father on Raquel\u2019s birth certificate.\nRaquel also testified, to which defendant objected on the ground of prejudice, and she related a conversation she had with defendant at his father\u2019s funeral, during which he took her aside and confessed that he was her father. When she was at his home during her Christmas vacation, he gave her presents, and at one point, the two discussed her desire to change her last name to Villa.\nThe jury found defendant to be the father of Raquel and judgment was entered thereon, from which defendant filed his timely notice of . appeal.\nI\nDefendant first argues that the court erred in allowing relator to offer the testimony of Raquel. Defendant had moved in limine to exclude her testimony, urging that it would be overly prejudicial with little probative value. The court agreed in principle, but expressly reserved reconsideration of the issue in the event defendant denied that he told her he was her father. When, during his testimony as an adverse witness, he did deny making that purported admission to Raquel, the court, pursuant to its reservation of ruling, allowed her to take the stand, and, as previously noted, Raquel testified that defendant admitted to her on the day of his father\u2019s funeral that he was her father. Defendant maintains that this was inadmissible in rebuttal and the court therefore erred in allowing it.\nEvidence offered in rebuttal is admissible if it tends to explain, repel, contradict or disprove the testimony of a witness. (Hoem v. Zia (1992), 239 Ill. App. 3d 601, 606 N.E.2d 818; Flanagan v. Redondo (1991), 231 Ill. App. 3d 956, 595 N.E.2d 1077.) Its admission, as with the admission of all evidence, is addressed to the discretion of the trial court, which will not be disturbed unless it is manifestly erroneous. (Lee v. Ingalls Memorial Hospital (1992), 238 Ill. App. 3d 154, 606 N.E.2d 160; Knight v. Haydary (1992), 223 Ill. App. 3d 564, 585 N.E.2d 243.) An example of an abuse of the court\u2019s discretion pertinent to the instant appeal would be the court\u2019s allowing rebuttal testimony which has value only to contradict the defendant\u2019s testimony on an issue which is collateral to the action. (See Hall v. Northwestern University Medical Clinics (1987), 152 Ill. App. 3d 716, 504 N.E.2d 781; People v. McGhee (1974), 20 Ill. App. 3d 915, 314 N.E.2d 313.) Defendant argues, without explanation, that that is the case here.\nAn issue is considered collateral to an action if it has no relevance to a matter of consequence in the action as defined by the pleadings. (See Tzystuck v. Chicago Transit Authority (1988), 124 Ill. 2d 226, 529 N.E.2d 525 (reports concerning the repair of bus\u2019 dents from previous accidents is collateral to the issue of the defendant\u2019s liability for a later accident).) A fact is considered relevant if it has any tendency to make a material fact more probable than not. Bullard v. Barnes (1984), 102 Ill. 2d 505, 468 N.E.2d 1228; Lundquist v. Nickels (1992), 238 Ill. App. 3d 410, 605 N.E.2d 1373.\nIn light of these definitions, it cannot be gainsaid that the testimony of Raquel was relevant to the case and that it therefore was not collateral. The gist of her testimony was that defendant had confessed to her in private that he was her father. If believed, this evidence alone would resolve the matter at hand, i.e., whether defendant was her biological father. Accordingly, the circuit court did not err in allowing Raquel\u2019s testimony.\nII\nDefendant\u2019s final assignment of error concerns the definition instruction the court gave the jury explaining the quantum of proof required of defendant in order to establish that he was not Raquel\u2019s father before the presumption of his paternity, created by the greater than 500 to 1 CPI, would be rebutted. In the non-Illinois Pattern Jury Instruction tendered by relator, the court admonished that \"clear and convincing evidence,\u201d the standard imposed by the Act, \"means that no reasonable doubt exists.\u201d\nIn In re Estate of Casey (1987), 155 Ill. App. 3d 116, 507 N.E.2d 962, this court held it to be error to charge a jury with that definition of clear and convincing evidence. The court reasoned that because it was likely that many jurors would be familiar with that standard from prior service in criminal trials, such a definition in a civil context could mislead a jury into tying it to the higher standard of proof obtaining in a criminal setting and would substantially disadvantage a party in a civil trial who was required to prove his case by clear and convincing evidence by systemically yet unintentionally increasing his burden of proof. As in Casey, the instruction given here certainly could have confused or misinformed the jury; thus, under Supreme Court Rule 239 (134 Ill. 2d R. 239), it was error for the court to give it. Therefore, due to the nature of the error, we must reverse the judgment and remand the action for a new trial.\nIn so doing, we are not unmindful that although the Casey court found the instruction defining \"clear and convincing evidence\u201d to be erroneous, it nevertheless affirmed the judgment because it found the giving of the instruction to be harmless. We reverse and remand in the instant case, however, because we part company with Casey on the issue of the amenability of the instruction at issue to harmless error analysis. (See Rikard v. Dover Elevator Co. (1984), 126 Ill. App. 3d 438, 441, 467 N.E.2d 386, 388 (\"[I]t is essential that jurors receive a definition or description of the applicable burden of proof\u2019).) A trial judge\u2019s misdescription of the proper burden of proof is resistant to mending on appeal because the verdict it produces presents to the reviewing court not correctable findings of facts, but rather, because they were made through an improper optic, what must be deemed to be no findings at all.\nConsequently, in this context for us to engage in a de novo review of the record to determine whether it contains sufficient evidence to rebut the statutory presumption of paternity would constitute an original assessment of the evidence by this court. Such a review would depriv\u00e9 defendant of his right to have a jury determine whether he is the father of Raquel, and would instead leave him only with our speculation and conjecture of his paternity.\nIn Sullivan v. Louisiana (1993), 508 U.S. 275, 124 L. Ed. 2d 182, 113 S. Ct. 2078, the Court reached this precise conclusion with respect to the mistaken definition of the burden of proof in a criminal trial. It held that a faulty explanation of the \"proof beyond a reasonable doubt\u201d standard constituted per se reversible error. (But cf. People v. King (1993), 248 Ill. App. 3d 253, 618 N.E.2d 709 (holding that where no instruction on the State\u2019s burden of proof in a criminal trial is given, reversal is not required so long as the jury learned of the proper burden from, inter alia, the closing argument of the State).) We view Sullivan, although discussing a different burden of proof, as being fully analogous to the case at bar. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the circuit court and remand for a new trial to determine defendant\u2019s paternity of Raquel.\nReversed and remanded for a new trial.\nDiVITO, P.J., and McCORMICK, J\u201e concur.\nhe section in question provides in pertinent part:\n\"\u00a7 11 Blood Tests, (a) As soon as practicable, the court *** may, and upon request of a party shall, order *** the mother, child and alleged father to submit to appropriate tests to determine inherited characteristics, including, but not limited to, blood types and genetic markers such as those found by Human Leucocyte Antigen (HLA) tests. ***\n* ** **\n(f) Tests taken pursuant to this Section shall have the following effect:\n* * *\n(4) If the blood or tissue tests show that the alleged father is not excluded and the combined paternity index is at least 500 to 1, the alleged father is presumed to be the father, and this evidence shall be admitted. This presumption may be rebutted by clear and convincing evidence.\u201d 750 ILCS 45/11 (West 1992) (formerly Ill. Rev. Stat. 1991, ch. 40, par. 2511).", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE SCARIANO" } ], "attorneys": [ "Rita A. Fry, Public Defender, of Chicago (Vicki Rogers, Assistant Public Defender, of counsel), for appellant.", "Jack O\u2019Malley, State\u2019s Attorney, of Chicago (Robert F. Lyons and Leonard N. Foster, Assistant State\u2019s Attorneys, of counsel), for appellees." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "THE PEOPLE ex rel. GUADALUPE MENDEZ, on Behalf of Raquel Mendez, a Minor, Plaintiffs-Appellees, v. RAFAEL VILLA, Defendant-Appellant.\nFirst District (2nd Division)\nNo. 1\u201492\u20142809\nOpinion filed April 5, 1994.\nRita A. Fry, Public Defender, of Chicago (Vicki Rogers, Assistant Public Defender, of counsel), for appellant.\nJack O\u2019Malley, State\u2019s Attorney, of Chicago (Robert F. Lyons and Leonard N. Foster, Assistant State\u2019s Attorneys, of counsel), for appellees." }, "file_name": "0866-01", "first_page_order": 884, "last_page_order": 890 }