{ "id": 5372916, "name": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. TOMMIE C. DANIELS, JR., Defendant-Appellant", "name_abbreviation": "People v. Daniels", "decision_date": "1994-05-02", "docket_number": "No. 2\u201493\u20140001", "first_page": "695", "last_page": "700", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "261 Ill. App. 3d 695" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "155 Ill. App. 3d 332", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3465389 ], "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "339" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/155/0332-01" ] }, { "cite": "106 Ill. App. 3d 838", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3031578 ], "weight": 3, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "847" }, { "page": "847" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/106/0838-01" ] }, { "cite": "138 Ill. App. 3d 899", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 8499746 ], "weight": 3, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "901" }, { "page": "905" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/138/0899-01" ] }, { "cite": "142 Ill. App. 3d 240", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3448494 ], "weight": 4, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "243" }, { "page": "243" }, { "page": "243" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/142/0240-01" ] }, { "cite": "116 Ill. 2d 474", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5543502 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "493-94" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/116/0474-01" ] }, { "cite": "252 Ill. App. 3d 801", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 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App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5211088 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "734" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/230/0730-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 613, "char_count": 11699, "ocr_confidence": 0.801, "pagerank": { "raw": 4.03580807328026e-08, "percentile": 0.1585376213053348 }, "sha256": "9996ed93a7e836b67d5941ca27c68ab336aae29a8e917f6cf0cf00ab809223dc", "simhash": "1:fa7b752e724b9df4", "word_count": 1979 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T17:03:20.371410+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. TOMMIE C. DANIELS, JR., Defendant-Appellant." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE COLWELL\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nOn April 1, 1990, the State charged defendant, Tommie Daniels, and his codefendant, Kwami Giles, each with one count of armed robbery (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1989, ch. 38, par. 18\u20142(a) (now 720 ILCS 5/18\u20142(a) (West 1992))), one count of aggravated battery (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1989, ch. 38, par. 12\u20144(b)(1) (now 720 ILCS 5/12\u20144(b)(1) West 1992))) and one count of theft (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1989, ch. 38, par. 16\u20141(a)(1) (now 720 ILCS 5/16\u20141(a)(1) West 1992))). On June 4, 1990, both defendant and Giles pleaded guilty to armed robbery, and, in exchange, the State dropped the other two charges for both defendants. The trial court sentenced defendant to 15 years\u2019 imprisonment and Giles to SUs' years. On appeal, defendant contends that the sentence that the trial court imposed was excessive. Defendant asks this court to reduce his sentence from 15 years to 12 years. We affirm.\nAt the guilty plea hearing, the trial court admonished defendant pursuant to Supreme Court' Rule 402(a) (134 I1L 2d R. 402(a)) and informed defendant that armed robbery carries a sentence of 6 to 30 years\u2019 imprisonment. The trial court also referred to an earlier Rule 402(d) conference (134 Ill. 2d R. 402(d)) and stated:\n\"I made some preliminary indications concerning ranges, and that dealt with who did what, more than any other thing, but do you understand that what I\u2019m trying to do in those situations is to give people an idea of what I\u2019ve done in the past, or what\u2019s likely to happen. But *** that\u2019s not a promise. I\u2019m not legally bound to it.\u201d\nDefendant stated that he understood the trial court\u2019s comments. The factual basis for defendant\u2019s plea was that he and Giles stole a Chevy Blazer from Jerry Corcoran by threatening him with a BB gun and that defendant hit Corcoran with the gun. The trial court accepted defendant\u2019s plea.\nDefendant\u2019s presentence report stated that he was 19 years old at the time of the offense. He had no prior criminal convictions, although he was out on bond at the time of the offense. Defendant had completed high school and was enrolled at Olive Harvey College. Defendant was also employed as a data processor at H&R Block, and he had worked for McDonald\u2019s for one year during high school. Defendant reported to his probation officer that he smoked marijuana occasionally and that he drank beer approximately three times per week.\nCorcoran\u2019s testimony, along with the presentence report, revealed the following about the nature of the offense. In March 1990 Corcoran had advertised to sell his Chevy Blazer. On March 31, 1990, defendant and Giles went to Corcoran\u2019s Libertyville home to inquire about the vehicle. Corcoran agreed to take them on a test drive. Giles sat in the driver\u2019s seat, Corcoran sat in the passenger seat, and defendant sat in the back seat. Giles drove the vehicle to Route 45, ostensibly to check the overdrive on the transmission. When the vehicle was under a viaduct, defendant began to beat Corcoran repeatedly with a gun. Defendant hit Corcoran with the gun 25 to 30 times on the head, face, and back. Corcoran could not get out of the vehicle because it was moving too fast. Corcoran was eventually able to take the gun from defendant and hit Giles a couple of times. When the Blazer slowed down, Corcoran jumped out. Corcoran received a cut above his eye which required four to five stitches, a cut on his ear which required 12 stitches, and multiple bruises. Corcoran\u2019s ear was still sore at the time of the hearing.\nThe trial judge stated that he had considered the factual basis for defendant\u2019s and Giles\u2019 pleas along with the evidence before it in light of the statutory aggravating and mitigating factors. (See Ill. Rev. Stat. 1989, ch. 38, pars. 1005\u20145\u20143.1, 1005\u20145\u20143.2 (now codified, as amended, at 730 ILCS 5/5\u20145\u20143.1, 5\u20145\u20143.2 (West 1992)).) The trial court found in mitigation that defendant used a pellet gun rather than a real gun and that defendant had no criminal history. It found in aggravation that defendant injured the victim during the armed robbery. Balancing defendant\u2019s rehabilitative potential with the seriousness of the crime, the trial court sentenced defendant to 15 years\u2019 imprisonment. It recognized that Giles\u2019 participation in the crime was less serious and it sentenced Giles to 8\u00bd years\u2019 imprisonment.\nOn July 11, 1990, defendant, through his attorney, filed a motion to reconsider his sentence. On July 17, 1990, defendant filed a pro se notice of appeal. The trial court refused to consider defendant\u2019s motion to reconsider his sentence on the ground that defendant\u2019s notice of appeal deprived it of jurisdiction. On appeal, we held that the trial court erred in determining that defendant\u2019s notice of appeal deprived it of jurisdiction. We remanded the cause to the trial court to review defendant\u2019s motion. People v. Giles (1992), 230 Ill. App. 3d 730, 734.\nOn October 29, 1992, defendant filed an amended motion to reconsider his sentence or in the alternative to withdraw his guilty plea. In this motion he alleged that the trial court failed to consider defendant\u2019s rehabilitative potential and failed to consider various mitigating factors. Defendant also alleged that the trial court had stated in a Rule 402(d) conference that it would impose a sentence in the \"low double digits.\u201d\nAt the December 11, 1992, hearing on this motion, defendant stated that he did not want to withdraw his guilty plea but solely wanted the trial court to reconsider his sentence. The trial court refused to modify defendant\u2019s sentence. The trial court reasoned that, despite factors in mitigation, defendant had engaged in \"pretty egregious and meaningless violence\u201d during the course of an armed robbery.\nOn appeal defendant concedes that the offense was serious and that it merited a sentence in excess of the six-year statutory minimum. He contends, however, that his lack of a criminal history, his educational achievements, his employment history, and his remorse for the crime constitute mitigating factors which indicate that he has a strong rehabilitative potential. According to defendant, the trial court\u2019s imposition of a 15-year sentence reflects that the trial court did not consider defendant\u2019s rehabilitative potential. Defendant asks, therefore, that we reduce his sentence from 15 years to 12 years pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 615(b) (134 Ill. 2d R. 615(b)(4)).\nSupreme Court Rule 615(b)(4) empowers a reviewing court to reduce the sentence imposed by the trial court. (134 Ill. 2d R. 615(b)(4).) However because the trial court has \"the opportunity to consider the defendant\u2019s credibility, demeanor, and general moral character firsthand\u201d (People v. Storms (1993), 254 Ill. App. 3d 139, 143), we exercise this power with \"caution and care.\u201d (People v. Streit (1991), 142 Ill. 2d 13, 19.) \"[W]e will not substitute our judgment for that of the trial court merely because we feel that we would have imposed a different sentence had that function been delegated to us.\u201d (People v. Perruquet (1977), 68 Ill. 2d 149, 156.) We will therefore only reduce a defendant\u2019s sentence in cases where the trial court has abused its discretion. (People v. Keating (1993), 252 Ill. App. 3d 801, 803.) A sentence is an abuse of discretion by reason of its excessiveness only if it is contrary to the purpose and spirit of the law or if it is manifestly disproportionate to the nature of the offense. People v. Cabrera (1987), 116 Ill. 2d 474, 493-94.\nIn arriving at a sentence, \"the court must consider not only the defendant\u2019s history and his rehabilitative potential, but the court must also consider the seriousness of the offense, the need to protect society, and the need for deterrence.\u201d (Keating, 252 Ill. App. 3d at 803.) The trial court in this case recognized that defendant had no criminal history and that he did not use a real gun in the robbery. According to the trial court, these mitigating factors precluded the imposition of the 20-year sentence that the State requested. However, the trial court found that the senseless, brutal beating that defendant inflicted on the victim justified a sentence of 15 years\u2019 imprisonment. Armed robbery is a Class X felony. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1989, ch. 38, par. 18\u20142(b) (now 720 ILCS 5/18\u20142(b) (West 1992)).) As such it carries a sentence of from 6 to 30 years. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1989, ch. 38, par. 1005\u20148\u20141(a)(3) (now 730 ILCS 5/5\u20148\u20141(a)(3) (West 1992)).) The sentence in this case, which fell well within the statutory range, was not an abuse of discretion.\nThe cases that defendant cites do not dictate a contrary result. In People v. Anderson (1985), 142 Ill. App. 3d 240, the trial court sentenced defendants to extended 17-year prison terms for residential burglary against an elderly, disabled victim. Both defendants were 17 years old at the time of the offense and neither had a significant criminal history. (Anderson, 142 Ill. App. 3d at 243.) On review, the court reduced defendants\u2019 sentences from 15 to 6 years. (Anderson, 142 Ill. App. 3d at 243.) However, defendants in Anderson did not actually harm the victim and may not have even known that she was at home when they committed the burglary. (Anderson, 142 Ill. App. 3d at 243). On the other hand, defendant in this case beat the victim severely. Furthermore, the trial court in Anderson had sentenced defendants to an extended term (see Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 38, par. 1005\u20148\u20142 (now codified, as amended, at 730 ILCS 5/5\u20148\u20142 (West 1992))), while the trial court in this case imposed a sentence that was well within the normal range for the offense.\nIn People v. Treadway (1985), 138 Ill. App. 3d 899, the trial court sentenced defendant to concurrent, extended 60-year terms for armed violence and attempted murder. (Treadway, 138 Ill. App. 3d at 901.) In light of defendant\u2019s rehabilitative potential, we reduced defendant\u2019s sentences to 30 years. (Treadway, 138 Ill. App. 3d at 905.) In this case, unlike Treadway, the trial court considered defendant\u2019s rehabilitative potential and sentenced defendant to significantly less than the maximum term.\nIn People v. Nelson (1982), 106 Ill. App. 3d 838, the trial court sentenced defendants to 20 years\u2019 imprisonment, for, armed robbery. In light of defendants\u2019 ages, work histories, scholastic histories, and lack of significant criminal histories, the reviewing court reduced defendants\u2019 sentences to 10 years\u2019 imprisonment. (Nelson, 106 Ill. App. 3d at 847.) In so doing, the court expressly considered that defendants had not actually physically harmed the victims: (Nelson, 106 Ill. App. 3d at 847.) In contrast, the trial court\u2019s primary reason for sentencing defendant as harshly as it did in this case was that defendant inflicted serious harm on the victim.\nFinally, in People v. Williams (1987), 155 Ill. App. 3d 332, we upheld the trial court\u2019s imposition of a 12-year prison sentence for a defendant who was convicted of armed violence for attacking a woman and stabbing her with a screwdriver. (Williams, 155 Ill. App. 3d at 339.) We believe that Williams reaffirms that sentencing decisions are within the sound discretion of the trial court.\nThe judgment of the circuit court of Lake County is affirmed.\nAffirmed.\nQUETSCH and PECCARELLI, JJ., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE COLWELL" } ], "attorneys": [ "G. Joseph Weller and Thomas A. Lilien, both of State Appellate Defender\u2019s Office, of Elgin, for appellant.", "Michael J. Waller, State\u2019s Attorney, of Waukegan (William L. Browers and David A. Bernhard, both of State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor\u2019s Office, of counsel), for the People." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. TOMMIE C. DANIELS, JR., Defendant-Appellant.\nSecond District\nNo. 2\u201493\u20140001\nOpinion filed May 2, 1994.\nG. Joseph Weller and Thomas A. Lilien, both of State Appellate Defender\u2019s Office, of Elgin, for appellant.\nMichael J. Waller, State\u2019s Attorney, of Waukegan (William L. Browers and David A. Bernhard, both of State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor\u2019s Office, of counsel), for the People." }, "file_name": "0695-01", "first_page_order": 713, "last_page_order": 718 }