{ "id": 2851197, "name": "LUCIOUS LEE, Appellant, v. THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION et al. (Tootsie Roll Industries, Inc., Appellee)", "name_abbreviation": "Lee v. Industrial Commission", "decision_date": "1994-05-13", "docket_number": "No. 1\u201493\u20140803WC", "first_page": "1108", "last_page": "1114", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "262 Ill. App. 3d 1108" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "191 Kan. 130", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Kan.", "case_ids": [ 504963 ], "weight": 4, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "132" }, { "page": "218-19" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/kan/191/0130-01" ] }, { "cite": "79 N.E. 501", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "400 Ill. 322", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 5307023 ], "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "327" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/400/0322-01" ] }, { "cite": "178 N.E.2d 646", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "23 Ill. 2d 106", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2795753 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "108" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/23/0106-01" ] }, { "cite": "324 N.E.2d 425", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1961, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "60 Ill. 2d 92", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5414647 ], "year": 1961, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "97" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/60/0092-01" ] }, { "cite": "375 N.E.2d 553", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1975, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "59 Ill. App. 3d 494", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3358589 ], "year": 1975, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "499" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/59/0494-01" ] }, { "cite": "426 N.E.2d 1276", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1978, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "100 Ill. App. 3d 48", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5501167 ], "year": 1978, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "54" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/100/0048-01" ] }, { "cite": "591 N.E.2d 108", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "227 Ill. App. 3d 217", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5792598 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "219" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/227/0217-01" ] }, { "cite": "403 N.E.2d 221", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "79 Ill. 2d 249", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3071050 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "253" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/79/0249-01" ] }, { "cite": "559 N.E.2d 1034", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "202 Ill. App. 3d 437", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2588043 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "442-43" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/202/0437-01" ] }, { "cite": "576 N.E.2d 539", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "216 Ill. App. 3d 653", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5289926 ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/216/0653-01" ] }, { "cite": "392 N.E.2d 21", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "pin_cites": [ { "page": "22-23" } ], "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "76 Ill. 2d 333", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2984090 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "336" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/76/0333-01" ] }, { "cite": "601 N.E.2d 1339", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1344" } ], "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "235 Ill. App. 3d 779", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5785276 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "786-87" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/235/0779-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 654, "char_count": 13833, "ocr_confidence": 0.788, "pagerank": { "raw": 4.719567370958748e-08, "percentile": 0.29549599223738526 }, "sha256": "9d75d055c0dfe4fa9eca600f8df454509aeb8dbbacd80a0bc0725537aaa416cb", "simhash": "1:e631e180bbff26fa", "word_count": 2287 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T21:36:39.333622+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "LUCIOUS LEE, Appellant, v. THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION et al. (Tootsie Roll Industries, Inc., Appellee)." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE RAKOWSKI\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nLucious Lee (claimant) filed an application for adjustment of claim pursuant to the Workers\u2019 Compensation Act (Act) (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 48, par. 138.1 et seq.) alleging that he sustained accidental injuries on December 10, 1984, which arose out of and in the course of his employment with Tootsie Roll Industries, Inc. (employer). The arbitrator\u2019s finding that claimant\u2019s accident was not work related was affirmed by the Industrial Commission (Commission), and on administrative review, the circuit court confirmed the Commission\u2019s determination. The issue on appeal is whether the Commission erred in concluding that the claimant\u2019s injuries, which were sustained when he was coming from a doctor\u2019s appointment for treatment of a prior work-related injury, were not compensable. We affirm.\nThe claimant testified that at the time of the accident he worked for the employer doing general labor. On December 10, 1984, the claimant had an appointment at the clinic to have a cast removed from his thumb which he had injured while at work the previous month. Although the claimant testified that he left work around 1 p.m. for a 2 p.m. appointment and that he intended to return to work, a copy of his time card from the day in question indicated that he punched out at 3:32 p.m., which was the time he usually ended his shift. The clinic records also indicated that the claimant arrived at 4:14 p.m. and left at 4:39 p.m. After the claimant left the clinic, he started to cross the street but was hit by an oncoming vehicle and thrown to the ground. According to the police report, the time of the accident was 4:45 p.m.\nThe employer presented the deposition testimony of the claimant\u2019s supervisor, Edward Stephens, that he had not given the claimant a pass to leave work early for a doctor\u2019s appointment on the day of the accident.\nThe claimant contends that the accident which occurred on December 10, 1984, was compensable because he was engaged in an activity which was incident to his employment where he was receiving treatment for a prior work-related injury at a time and place that were determined by the employer. The Commission, however, reached the contrary conclusion that the claimant was not engaged in a work-related activity when he was injured because he completed a full shift prior to leaving work for his clinic appointment. Therefore, the claimant\u2019s injuries, which occurred after he left work, were not compensable.\nThe claimant first argues that the determination of the Commission that the claimant left work at the end of his shift was against the manifest weight of the evidence. The claimant maintains that he left work at 1 p.m. for a 2 p.m. appointment and that he was in the process of returning to work when he was injured. However, the Commission found that the claimant left work at 3:30 p.m., which was when his shift ended, and that he did not intend to return to work when he left the clinic.\nIn Dexheimer v. Industrial Comm\u2019n (1990), 202 Ill. App. 3d 437, 442-43, 559 N.E.2d 1034, the court stated:\n\"It is the province of the Commission to weigh and resolve conflicts in testimony, including medical testimony, and to choose among conflicting inferences therefrom. [Citations.] It is only when the decision of the Commission is without substantive foundation in the evidence or its finding is manifestly against the weight of the evidence that the findings of the Commission should be set aside.\u201d\n(See also O\u2019Dette v. Industrial Comm\u2019n (1980), 79 Ill. 2d 249, 253, 403 N.E.2d 221.)\n\"A reviewing court cannot reject, or disregard permissible inferences drawn by the Commission because different or conflicting inferences may also be drawn from the same facts nor can it substitute its judgment for that of the Commission unless the Commission\u2019s findings are against the manifest weight of the evidence.\u201d (Martin v. Industrial Comm\u2019n (1992), 227 Ill. App. 3d 217, 219, 591 N.E.2d 108.)\nIt has been observed that \" '[t]he manifest weight of the evidence is that which is \"the clearly evident, plain and indisputable weight of the evidence.\u201d In order for a finding to be contrary to the manifest weight of the evidence, an opposite conclusion must be clearly apparent. [Citation.]\u2019 \u201d (Drogos v. Village of Bensenville (1981), 100 Ill. App. 3d 48, 54, 426 N.E.2d 1276, quoting In re Application of County Collector (1978), 59 Ill. App. 3d 494, 499, 375 N.E.2d 553.) Finally, \" '[i]f the undisputed facts permit an inference either way *** then the Commission alone is empowered to draw the inference and its decision as to the weight of the evidence will not be disturbed on review.\u2019 \u201d Morgan Cab Co. v. Industrial Comm\u2019n (1975), 60 Ill. 2d 92, 97, 324 N.E.2d 425, quoting Greenberg v. Industrial Comm\u2019n (1961), 23 Ill. 2d 106, 108, 178 N.E.2d 646.\nIn the case sub judice, the evidence relied on by the Commission was the claimant\u2019s time card, which was punched out at 3:32 p.m., the clinic records which indicated that the claimant arrived there at 4:14 p.m. and left at 4:39 p.m., and the police report which had the time of the accident at 4:45 p.m. The Commission also considered the deposition testimony of the claimant\u2019s supervisor that he did not give the claimant a pass to leave work early on the day in question. Although the claimant testified that he left work at 1 p.m. for a 2 p.m. appointment, he offered no corroborating evidence in support of his position. The Commission accepted the employer\u2019s testimony as to the time sequence of events on the day of the accident and also concluded that the claimant\u2019s testimony to the contrary was not credible. Given that the documentary evidence supported the employer\u2019s position, the Commission\u2019s decision was clearly not against the manifest weight of the evidence.\nThe claimant also argues, in the alternative, that even if his clinic appointment was at the conclusion of his shift, the injuries he sustained when he left the clinic were compensable because they resulted from an activity that was incidental to the claimant\u2019s employment. The claimant reasons that his going to and from the clinic was incidental to his employment because he was referred to that facility by the employer, it was used regularly for the treatment of other employees\u2019 work injuries, and the cost of the treatment at the clinic was assumed by the employer. Because the clinic and physician were not of his own choosing, he would not have been at the clinic on the day of the accident but for the employer\u2019s demands.\nWhether an injury sustained by an employee going to or from a doctor\u2019s office for treatment of a previous work-related injury is compensable seems to be one of first impression in Illinois. Although Skelgas Co. v. Industrial Comm\u2019n (1948), 400 Ill. 322, 79 N.E. 501 (employee killed in an automobile accident while returning from an employer-scheduled doctor\u2019s appointment), is similar, there the employee had been terminated from employment three days prior to the accident. Relying upon this fact, the Skelgas court held:\n\"Undisputed facts impel the conclusion that Weymouth\u2019s employment terminated as of January 31, 1939, and, in consequence, on February 3, 1939, he was not an employee of the Skelgas Company. This being so, it follows necessarily that the accident resulting in his death was not compensable under the Workmen\u2019s Compensation Act.\u201d Skelgas Co., 400 Ill. at 327.\nOther States have addressed this issue with varying results. For a discussion and list of citations, see 1A. Larson, Workmen\u2019s Compensation \u00a7 13.13, at 3 \u2014 573 (1992). According to Professor Larson:\n\"In the simple case, however, of a trip to the doctor\u2019s office necessitated by a compensable injury, the arguments put forward by the Kansas court in the Taylor case (Taylor v. Centex Construction Co. (1963), 191 Kan. 130, 379 P.2d 217) are difficult to answer. The court noted that the employer is under a statutory duty to furnish medical care, and that the employee is similarly under a duty to submit to reasonable medical treatment under the act. The provisions of the act, in turn, become by implication part of the employment contract. This being so, the better view appears to be that accidental injuries during a trip made pursuant to this statutory and contractual obligation are work connected.\u201d 1A. Larson, Workmen\u2019s Compensation \u00a7 13.13, at 3 \u2014 573 (1992).\nAlthough we agree in part with Professor Larson, we decline to adopt his reasoning in toto. Initially, we note that in the Taylor case, from which Larson draws support, the majority held that the employee was in the course of his employment when injured. He had suffered an eye injury the previous day and at 10 a.m. he received permission to go to the doctor. The accident occurred at 1 p.m. about one mile from the jobsite while the employee was en route back to work. Under these circumstances, we have no quarrel with the result in Taylor.\nThe Taylor court went on to address a district court finding that \"although the claimant had been permitted to go to the doctor\u2019s office the same was not a part of his employment.\u201d (Taylor v. Center Construction Co. (1963), 191 Kan. 130, 132, 379 P.2d 217, 218-19.) It was in this context that the court employed the reasoning to which Professor Larson refers. In Taylor, despite the fact that the injury occurred during working hours, the district court used the fact that the employee was at the doctor\u2019s office to deny recovery. In reversing, the Kansas Supreme Court held that an on-duty employee is not barred from recovery because he is returning from a doctor\u2019s appointment. This is not the same as saying that an off-duty employee can recover because he is returning from the doctor. Accordingly, we find Taylor distinguishable from the instant case.\nMoreover, to adopt Professor Larson\u2019s reasoning in toto would open up a completely new area of employer responsibility. In some cases injured employees may receive medical treatment for months or even years after an injury.\nIn sum, we agree that an employee injured en route to medical treatment immediately after an injury is entitled to compensation. This result is not altered by the fact that the injury occurred after regular working hours. Beyond that point, however, each case must be decided on an individual basis.\nAccordingly, the judgment of the circuit court confirming the decision of the Commission is affirmed.\nAffirmed.\nMcCULLOUGH, P.J., and WOODWARD and SLATER, JJ., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE RAKOWSKI" }, { "text": "JUSTICE RARICK,\ndissenting:\nI respectfully dissent.\nWhile I agree with the majority with respect to when the accident occurred, I believe that the better view, as espoused by Professor Larson, is that injuries sustained while traveling to and from medical treatment for a compensable injury arise out of and in the course of employment and are compensable. As Professor Larson points out, when referring to Taylor, an employer is under a statutory duty to furnish medical care, and an employee is under a statutory duty to submit to reasonable medical treatment. Such duties become, by implication, part of the employment contract. Professor Larson concludes that \"the better view appears to be that accidental injuries during a trip made pursuant to this statutory and contractual obligation are work connected.\u201d (1A. Larson, Workmen\u2019s Compensation, \u00a7 13.13, at 3 \u2014 573 (1992).)\nWe have held:\n\"If the injury occurs when the employee was performing acts he was instructed to perform by his employer, acts he had a common-law or statutory duty to perform, or acts he might reasonably be expected to perform incident to his assigned duties, then the injury arose out of his employment. [Citations.]\u201d (Komatsu Dresser Co. v. Industrial Comm\u2019n (1992), 235 Ill. App. 3d 779, 786-87, 601 N.E.2d 1339, 1344.)\nOur supreme court has held that in cases of traveling employees, the determination of whether an injury arises out of and in the course of employment depends upon the reasonableness of the specific conduct and whether it might normally be anticipated or foreseen by the employer. (Humphrey v. Industrial Comm\u2019n (1979), 76 Ill. 2d 333, 336, 392 N.E.2d 21, 22-23.) I believe that an employer can clearly foresee that an employee could be injured while seeking medical treatment for a prior work-related injury.\nThe majority distinguishes Taylor on the basis that the claimant in Taylor sought medical treatment during his normal work shift. While I agree that the present case is factually dissimilar in that the employee here sought treatment after work, I see no meaningful relevance to this temporal distinction. It is contrary to the spirit and purpose of the Workers\u2019 Compensation Act to penalize an employee who waits until the end of his shift to seek medical treatment. The Workers\u2019 Compensation Act is remedial in nature and should be liberally construed to reflect its purpose. (Mattern v. Industrial Comm\u2019n (1991), 216 Ill. App. 3d 653, 576 N.E.2d 539.) The more logical and better reasoned view is to relate compensability to whether the employee\u2019s course of conduct in seeking medical treatment for a work-related injury is reasonable under the circumstances. In such cases, the injury should be considered to arise out of and in the course of employment regardless of when the employee sought treatment.\nI concede that this will open a new area of employer responsibility, but I believe it is a responsibility which is properly the employer\u2019s.", "type": "dissent", "author": "JUSTICE RARICK," } ], "attorneys": [ "James E. Riley, of Chicago, for appellant.", "Kane, Doy & Harrington, Ltd., of Chicago (Gregory E. Ahern, of counsel), for appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "LUCIOUS LEE, Appellant, v. THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION et al. (Tootsie Roll Industries, Inc., Appellee).\nFirst District (Industrial Commission Division)\nNo. 1\u201493\u20140803WC\nOpinion filed May 13, 1994.\n\u2014 Rehearing denied June 8, 1994.\nRARICK, J., dissenting.\nJames E. Riley, of Chicago, for appellant.\nKane, Doy & Harrington, Ltd., of Chicago (Gregory E. Ahern, of counsel), for appellee." }, "file_name": "1108-01", "first_page_order": 1126, "last_page_order": 1132 }