{ "id": 5367871, "name": "KENNETH WILFERT, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. RETIREMENT BOARD OF THE FIREMEN'S ANNUITY AND BENEFIT FUND OF CHICAGO, Defendant-Appellee", "name_abbreviation": "Wilfert v. Retirement Board of the Firemen's Annuity & Benefit Fund", "decision_date": "1994-04-25", "docket_number": "No. 1\u201492\u20141432", "first_page": "539", "last_page": "547", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "263 Ill. App. 3d 539" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "226 N.E.2d 867", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "37 Ill. 2d 335", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2863778 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/37/0335-01" ] }, { "cite": "210 N.E.2d 209", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "pin_cites": [ { "page": "211" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "33 Ill. 2d 40", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2882943 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "43-44" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/33/0040-01" ] }, { "cite": "481 N.E.2d 684", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 9, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "686" }, { "page": "687" }, { "page": "688" }, { "page": "688-89" }, { "page": "687" }, { "page": "687" }, { "page": "689" }, { "page": "689" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "107 Ill. 2d 79", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3134628 ], "weight": 9, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "82" }, { "page": "86" }, { "page": "87" }, { "page": "88" }, { "page": "84" }, { "page": "85" }, { "page": "88" }, { "page": "88" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/107/0079-01" ] }, { "cite": "595 N.E.2d 51", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "pin_cites": [ { "page": "54" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "230 Ill. App. 3d 349", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5212169 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "353" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/230/0349-01" ] }, { "cite": "603 N.E.2d 777", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "781" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "236 Ill. App. 3d 499", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5782103 ], "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "507" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/236/0499-01" ] }, { "cite": "551 N.E.2d 264", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "pin_cites": [ { "page": "271" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "194 Ill. App. 3d 573", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 8499008 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "584-85" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/194/0573-01" ] }, { "cite": "536 N.E.2d 143", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "146" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "180 Ill. App. 3d 656", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2613138 ], "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "661" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/180/0656-01" ] }, { "cite": "505 N.E.2d 1387", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1389" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "153 Ill. App. 3d 595", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3607394 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "598" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/153/0595-01" ] }, { "cite": "447 N.E.2d 394", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1987, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "397" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "95 Ill. 2d 211", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3111336 ], "year": 1987, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "217" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/95/0211-01" ] }, { "cite": "532 N.E.2d 830", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1983, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "831-32" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "125 Ill. 2d 489", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5555300 ], "year": 1983, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "493-94" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/125/0489-01" ] }, { "cite": "42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1983", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "U.S.C.", "weight": 2, "year": 1988, "opinion_index": 0 } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 877, "char_count": 20147, "ocr_confidence": 0.773, "pagerank": { "raw": 1.9011980998237071e-07, "percentile": 0.7303099524335203 }, "sha256": "7baa116f9a98b00d134c093caa256eba8b5d743b8ca192dcce93b59782621a57", "simhash": "1:9ad7605a2f240636", "word_count": 3278 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T21:36:39.761555+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "KENNETH WILFERT, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. RETIREMENT BOARD OF THE FIREMEN\u2019S ANNUITY AND BENEFIT FUND OF CHICAGO, Defendant-Appellee." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "PRESIDING JUSTICE CAMPBELL\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nPlaintiff Kenneth Wilfert appeals an order of the circuit court of Cook County denying his petition for administrative review of the decision of defendant Retirement Board of Firemen\u2019s Annuity & Benefit Fund of Chicago (Board) that plaintiff was not entitled to duty disability benefits. Plaintiff also appeals the trial court\u2019s decision denying him leave to amend his complaint to include a civil rights claim against the Board pursuant to 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1983 (1988).\nThe record of the Board\u2019s proceedings with respect to plaintiff\u2019s claim for duty disability benefits indicates the following facts. Plaintiff, who appeared before the board pro se, indicated that he had attained the rank of fire paramedic with the Chicago fire department. Plaintiff testified that he had been a paramedic for five years and had been employed by the Chicago fire department for 31/2 years. On December 22, 1989, after dealing with a combative patient on a stretcher, plaintiff started having cramping in his hand, which he reported to his superior officer. The record indicates that plaintiff suffered pain in his left thumb and wrist. At 4:30 a.m. on December 23, 1989, plaintiff advised his superior officer that his hand was bothering him much more than before. Plaintiff went to Holy Cross Hospital, where he was told to make an appointment to see Dr. Mel-house, who was an orthopedic doctor. According to plaintiff, in early January 1990, Dr. Melhouse ran an EMG test on plaintiff that showed \"slowing in C-5/C-6 and C-7.\u201d Plaintiff stated that Dr. Melhouse diagnosed him with a brachial plexus contusion and told him to rest for six weeks before a reexamination.\nPlaintiff testified that he was also seen by Dr. Jablon, who plaintiff indicated was well known for hand surgery, and Dr. Zak, who was a neurologist. According to plaintiff, these doctors concurred that plaintiff suffered from a brachial plexus injury. Plaintiff testified that Dr. Zak prescribed Naprosyn and Flexeril and thrice-weekly physical therapy sessions at Sports Performance. Plaintiff indicated that Dr. Hugh H. Russell, who the record indicates was the medical director for the Chicago fire department, ordered him over to Baxter Medical Group for \"work hardening\u201d training without conferring with plaintiff\u2019s treating physician. Plaintiff indicated that while he showed some improvement from the initial physical therapy sessions, he did work hardening training and \"[a]fter Baxter, my whole complaints flared up even more worse.\u201d\nPlaintiff saw his treating physician, who performed a MRI test and ordered plaintiff to continue with physical therapy. Plaintiff testified that he was still in therapy and had a lot of pain in his neck, underneath his arm, in the elbow, ribs and back shoulder muscles.\nPursuant to questioning, plaintiff indicated that prior to December 22, 1989, his left arm would become tired and he would have difficulty holding a book for a long period of time. Plaintiff also indicated that in March 1989, the ambulance he had been driving in response to a report of a drug overdose was struck by an automobile. Plaintiff testified that he had been proceeding through the intersection of 76th and Loomis on a green light at the time. Plaintiff indicated that he was smashed into the left side of the ambulance door, his arm went through the window and his head hit the top of the ambulance. Plaintiff testified that he was taken to the hospital, where he was diagnosed with a severe blunt trauma to the whole left side of his body. Plaintiff indicated that he returned to work and performed all of his duties a few days after the accident, though he had told Dr. Russell that his left side was still sore. Plaintiff further indicated that he had not worked since December 23, 1989.\nUpon further examination by the Board\u2019s attorney, plaintiff indicated that he had seen Dr. Zak, who was recommended by the Chicago fire department, Dr. Jablon, Dr. Russell, and Dr. George Motto, who, the record shows, was the Board\u2019s physician.\nDr. Motto testified regarding his credentials, including his position as the Board\u2019s physician since 1974. Dr. Motto testified that he examined plaintiff on January 9, 1991, and had reviewed plaintiff\u2019s medical records. The record shows that plaintiff\u2019s medical records were admitted into evidence at the outset of the hearing without objection. These records, and duplicates thereof, consume dozens of pages of the record on appeal and will be referred to below as necessary. Dr. Motto testified that at that time, plaintiff was disabled and should not perform paramedic duties due to persistent difficulties with his left shoulder, arm and hand. Dr. Motto testified that these difficulties took the form of numbness, tingling, cramping and pain. Dr. Motto added, however, that the disability may not be permanent and that plaintiff should be seen in follow-up examinations.\nPursuant to questioning by the Board\u2019s attorney, Dr. Motto testified that plaintiff\u2019s complaints were \"subjective with minimal objective findings.\u201d Dr. Motto referred to a February 1991 letter from Dr. Zak that indicated plaintiff had \u2014 in Dr. Motto\u2019s words \u2014 \"some minimal functional decline in his left arm.\u201d The Board\u2019s attorney then asked the following question:\n\"Q *** Doctor, with your experience and having examined the applicant and hearing the testimony today, could you say within a reasonable degree of medical certainty that the accident of March 25, [19]89 and the incident of December 23, 1989, is not the cause of Mr. Wilfert\u2019s present medical disability?\u201d\nDr. Motto answered \"Yes.\u201d The Board then proceeded to vote on plaintiff\u2019s application for duty disability benefits. The Board voted to deny plaintiff\u2019s application, then voted to grant ordinary disability benefits. Plaintiff then obtained counsel, who sought reconsideration of the Board\u2019s decision. The Board denied the motion on March 20, 1991.\nOn April 2, 1991, plaintiff filed a petition for administrative review in the circuit court of Cook County. The transcript of the hearing on plaintiff\u2019s petition shows that the trial judge indicated that the record contained \"a lot of medical statements that strongly suggest to the layperson that there must be a connection\u201d between the duty-related incidents and plaintiff\u2019s injuries. The trial court indicated, however, that there was \"no opinion expressing\u201d the connection and that \"it requires medical testimony.\u201d The trial judge believed the Board \"relied on a summary that was just plain wrong,\u201d but acknowledged that the Board is the finder of fact. The trial court asked plaintiff\u2019s counsel whether there was any place in the record that expressed an opinion about causation. Plaintiff\u2019s counsel responded that anyone looking at the medical reports (including any group of laymen and any reasonable medical expert reviewing this record) would conclude that the injury was duty-related.\nThe trial court denied plaintiff\u2019s petition; the trial court later denied his motion for reconsideration and his motion to amend the complaint to include a civil rights claim against the Board pursuant to 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1983 (1988). Plaintiff filed a timely notice of appeal to this court.\nOn appeal, plaintiff contends that: (1) the Board\u2019s decision to deny him duty disability benefits was against the manifest weight of the evidence; (2) the Board erred in failing to consider the reinjury he suffered in \"work hardening\u201d in reaching its decision; and (3) the circuit court erred in denying his motion for leave to amend his complaint. As the second issue is dispositive of the entire appeal, we turn to address that issue first.\nArticle 6 of the Illinois Pension Code provides that an active firefighter (including a paramedic) who becomes disabled \"as the result of a specific injury, or of cumulative injuries *** incurred in or resulting from an act or acts of duty, shall have the right to receive duty disability benefit.\u201d (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1989, ch. 108\u00bd, par. 6\u2014151.) This statute serves an equivalent purpose to the objectives of workers\u2019 compensation. (See Mitsuuchi v. City of Chicago (1988), 125 Ill. 2d 489, 493-94, 532 N.E.2d 830, 831-32.) The terms of the statute should be liberally construed in favor of the applicant to achieve its beneficent purpose. Kozak v. Retirement Board of the Firemen\u2019s Annuity & Benefit Fund (1983), 95 Ill. 2d 211, 217, 447 N.E.2d 394, 397; Olson v. City of Wheaton Police Pension Board (1987), 153 Ill. App. 3d 595, 598, 505 N.E.2d 1387, 1389.\nPlaintiff has the burden of proving his disability resulted from an act or acts of duty. (Evert v. Board of Trustees of the Fire Fighters\u2019 Pension Fund (1989), 180 Ill. App. 3d 656, 661, 536 N.E.2d 143, 146.) However, plaintiff need not prove that an injury received on duty was the sole cause of his disability; the injury need only have contributed to the disability. (Kellan v. Board of Trustees of the Firemen\u2019s Pension Fund (1990), 194 Ill. App. 3d 573, 584-85, 551 N.E.2d 264, 271.) Generally, the Board\u2019s factual determinations are entitled to deference upon review and should be reversed only where they are against the manifest weight of the evidence. (See Zien v. Retirement Board of the Firemen\u2019s Annuity & Benefit Fund (1992), 236 Ill. App. 3d 499, 507, 603 N.E.2d 777, 781.) In contrast, a reviewing court is not bound to give the same deference to an administrative agency on questions of law and statutory construction. Worth v. Board of Trustees of Police Pension Fund (1992), 230 Ill. App. 3d 349, 353, 595 N.E.2d 51, 54.\nIt should be noted at the outset that the issue on appeal here is limited. The Board has granted plaintiff ordinary disability benefits. Thus, the administrative review is concerned solely with the issue of causation.\nIn this case, the record contains the Board\u2019s letter of February 21, 1991, that formally informed plaintiff of the Board\u2019s decision to deny plaintiff duty disability benefits \"for the reason that the injury did not result from an act or acts of duty.\u201d This conclusion appears to be based solely on Dr. Motto\u2019s one-word response to the question on causation quoted above. Indeed, the Board notes that Dr. Motto was the only witness to testify as to causation. Moreover, the transcript of proceedings on administrative review indicates that the circuit court believed that Dr. Motto\u2019s testimony was the basis for the Board\u2019s decision.\nPlaintiff contends that the Board erred in failing to consider the injury plaintiff sustained during \"work hardening\u201d when it denied his application for duty disability benefits. Plaintiff primarily relies upon Unger v. Continental Assurance Co. (1985), 107 Ill. 2d 79, 481 N.E.2d 684, a worker\u2019s compensation case. In Unger, the plaintiff allegedly suffered injuries due to the failure of a company doctor to diagnose his cancerous condition. (Unger, 107 Ill. 2d at 82, 481 N.E.2d at 686.) Our supreme court characterized the injury as the aggravation of a non-work-related disease. (Unger, 107 Ill. 2d at 86, 481 N.E.2d at 687.) The court concluded that the alleged injury was sustained \"in the course of\u201d plaintiff\u2019s employment and \"arose out of\u201d the employment relationship, as those terms are used in the Workers\u2019 Compensation Act. (Unger, 107 Ill. 2d at 87, 481 N.E.2d at 688.) The court reasoned that plaintiff\u2019s examination was \" \u2019determined by the demands of his employment rather than personal factors.\u2019 \u201d Unger, 107 Ill. 2d at 88, 481 N.E.2d at 688-89, quoting Sjostrom v. Sproule (1965), 33 Ill. 2d 40, 43-44, 210 N.E.2d 209, 211.\nThe Board contends on appeal that Unger is not applicable to the \"work hardening\u201d in this case because the Unger court interpreted a section of the Workers\u2019 Compensation Act barring a common law action by an employee against an employer or co-employee \" 'for injury or death sustained *** while engaged in the line of *** duty as such employee.\u2019 \u201d (See Unger, 107 Ill. 2d at 84, 481 N.E.2d at 687, quoting Ill. Rev. Stat. 1979, ch. 48, par. 138.5(a).) However, the Board\u2019s argument ignores the rules cited above that article 6 of the Illinois Pension Code is supposed to serve the same objective as the Workers\u2019 Compensation Act and is to be liberally construed in favor of the applicant to serve that beneficent purpose. Moreover, the Unger court noted that the \"line of duty\u201d test is the same as the general test of \"arising out of and in the course of the employment\u201d applied in worker\u2019s compensation cases. (See Unger, 107 Ill. 2d at 85, 481 N.E.2d at 687.) Thus, while the term \"act of duty\u201d by itself has a specific statutory definition (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1989, ch. 108\u00bd, par. 6\u2014110), we conclude that the broader phrase \"incurred in or resulting from an act or acts of duty\u201d that appears in section 6 \u2014 151 (emphasis added) (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1989, ch. 108\u00bd, par. 6\u2014151) should be interpreted similarly to the phrases quoted from the Workers\u2019 Compensation Act in Unger.\nThe Board also contends that Unger is distinguishable as a \"co-employee\u201d case. The Unger court, in concluding that the examination arose out of the plaintiff\u2019s employment, found \"the reasoning in Field Enterprises v. Industrial Com. (1967), 37 Ill. 2d 335, [226 N.E.2d 867,] compelling when applied to the facts of the case under consideration.\u201d (Unger, 107 Ill. 2d at 88, 481 N.E.2d at 689.) A reading of Field Enterprises indicates that it is not a \"co-employee\u201d case; the worker suffered a heart attack while performing his normal job. (See Unger, 107 Ill. 2d at 88, 481 N.E.2d at 689.) Thus, we are not persuaded by the Board\u2019s argument that the rationale behind Unger should not apply to this appeal.\nThe Board also contends that, assuming arguendo that Unger is applicable, plaintiff failed to establish that his rehabilitation caused his disability. The Board again misapprehends the law of causation; plaintiff need only establish that the injury sustained in rehabilitation was a cause of his disability. We note in passing that the Board apparently made the same error at the hearing by asking only whether the March and December 1989 incidents were the cause of the disability.\nPlaintiff has demonstrated from the record in this case that he presented a prima facie case that the \"work hardening\u201d injury was a cause of his disability. Indeed, plaintiffs argument is supported by the January 9, 1991, report of Dr. Motto \u2014 the Board\u2019s physician since 1974 and the physician on whose opinion the Board apparently relied in this case. Dr. Motto\u2019s report states as follows:\n\"The applicant was applying to return to work in December of last year, but while performing a rehabilitative test, he reinjured his left shoulder during the weight lifting procedure. Since that time, he has had more pain and more difficulties with his left hand, arm and shoulder.\u201d\nIn the report, Dr. Motto concludes that \"[a]t the present time, it appears that Mr. Wilfert is disabled and cannot and should not perform paramedic duties.\u201d The report identifies no other possible cause of plaintiffs inability to return to duty. Unlike Evert v. Board of Trustees of the Fire Fighters\u2019 Pension Fund (1989), 180 Ill. App. 3d 656, 536 N.E.2d 143, no physicians expressly attributed plaintiffs disability to a non-duty-related cause.\nThe Board claims that the rehabilitation caused only numbness and that a December 7, 1990, letter from Dr. Zak states that plaintiff no longer complained of said numbness. However, the Board does not cite to the record for the proposition that plaintiff suffered only numbness. Dr. Motto\u2019s report, quoted above, contradicts the Board\u2019s argument.\nFurthermore, the Board points to nothing in the record that would contradict plaintiffs testimony that he was ordered to participate in the \"work hardening\u201d by Dr. Russell, the medical director for the Chicago fire department. Dr. Russell\u2019s January 8, 1991, letter to Dr. Motto confirms that \"[t]he Department then sought an independent functional capacity evaluation on August 2, 1990, at Baxter.\u201d Indeed, the sessions are referred to as \"work hardening\u201d and the record shows they were undertaken in addition to physical therapy. Given this record, plaintiff made a prima facie case that his participation in \"work hardening\u201d was determined by the demands of his employment rather than personal factors.\nIn sum, we conclude that plaintiff made a prima facie case that he aggravated a preexisting injury as the result of an act or acts of duty \u2014 i.e., participating in the \"work hardening\u201d and functional evaluation \u2014 and that \"but for\u201d the reinjury, he would have returned to duty.\nThe transcript of the hearing before the Board shows that the Board did not ask Dr. Motto whether the injury suffered in \"work hardening\u201d was a cause of plaintiff\u2019s disability. Indeed, the Board does not suggest on appeal that it considered the \"work hardening\u201d injury. Instead, the Board contends that it was not required to consider the reinjury because: (1) Unger does not apply to this case; and (2) plaintiff did not identify it in his application for benefits. As we have already rejected the first argument, we turn to consider the second.\nThe Board notes that plaintiff\u2019s application for duty-related benefits refers only to the December 1989 injury. Though not expressly stated by the Board, we infer that the Board is suggesting that plaintiff has waived his right to raise other incidents of injury. However, the record shows that the Board specifically asked plaintiff about other (albeit prior) incidents of injury to his left thumb, hand and shoulder. Moreover, the transcript of proceedings in administrative review show that plaintiff raised the \"work hardening\u201d injury before the circuit court. The Board could have argued waiver at that time, as the record shows that plaintiff first raised the \"work hardening\u201d injury before the circuit court in his reply memorandum on summary judgment. However, the Board failed to object. Thus, it is the Board\u2019s objection, rather than plaintiff\u2019s argument, that is waived on appeal.\nFurthermore, the Board cites no authority on appeal for the proposition that the Board can ignore the \"work hardening\u201d and functional evaluation injury. Section 6 \u2014 151 of the Illinois Pension Code states in relevant part as follows:\n\"Any injury or sickness not reported to the board in time to permit the board\u2019s physician to examine the fireman before his recovery, and any injury or sickness for which a physician\u2019s report or copy of the hospital record is not on file with the board shall not be considered for the payment of duty disability benefit.\u201d (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1989, ch. 108\u00bd, par. 6\u2014151.)\nHad the legislature intended to exclude consideration of any injury or sickness not specified in the firefighter\u2019s application, it could have expressly stated such a limitation. Absent that express limitation, the statute shall be construed liberally in favor of the applicant to achieve the statute\u2019s beneficent purpose. In this case, Dr. Motto examined plaintiff before his recovery and the reinjury is documented both in his report and in other physicians\u2019 reports that were admitted into evidence before the Board. Thus, the reinjury should have been considered by the Board.\nIn sum, the Board erred as a matter of law in failing to consider whether the \"work hardening\u201d reinjury was a cause of plaintiffs disability, given the facts and circumstances of this case. In light of this disposition, we deem it unnecessary to address additional arguments raised by the parties at this time.\nFor all of the aforementioned reasons, the decision of the Board is reversed and the cause is remanded to the Board for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.\nReversed and remanded.\nBUCKLEY and O\u2019CONNOR, JJ., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "PRESIDING JUSTICE CAMPBELL" } ], "attorneys": [ "Dowd & Bloch, of Chicago (J. Peter Dowd, of counsel), for appellant.", "Fagel & Haber, of Chicago (Steven J. Teplinsky, Sara L. Thomas, and Sheryl L. Cohen, of counsel), for appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "KENNETH WILFERT, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. RETIREMENT BOARD OF THE FIREMEN\u2019S ANNUITY AND BENEFIT FUND OF CHICAGO, Defendant-Appellee.\nFirst District (1st Division)\nNo. 1\u201492\u20141432\nOpinion filed April 25, 1994.\nDowd & Bloch, of Chicago (J. Peter Dowd, of counsel), for appellant.\nFagel & Haber, of Chicago (Steven J. Teplinsky, Sara L. Thomas, and Sheryl L. Cohen, of counsel), for appellee." }, "file_name": "0539-01", "first_page_order": 557, "last_page_order": 565 }