{ "id": 5367989, "name": "PHILOMENA M. GLYNN, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. THE RETIREMENT BOARD OF THE POLICEMEN'S ANNUITY AND BENEFIT FUND OF THE CITY OF CHICAGO, Defendant-Appellant", "name_abbreviation": "Glynn v. Retirement Board of the Policemen's Annuity & Benefit Fund", "decision_date": "1994-05-17", "docket_number": "No. 1\u201493\u20142337", "first_page": "590", "last_page": "595", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "263 Ill. App. 3d 590" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "557 N.E.2d 869", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "136 Ill. 2d 441", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3254594 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "447" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/136/0441-01" ] }, { "cite": "606 N.E.2d 566", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "238 Ill. App. 3d 721", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5153934 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "726-27" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/238/0721-01" ] }, { "cite": "449 N.E.2d 843", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "96 Ill. 2d 245", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3114045 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "249" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/96/0245-01" ] }, { "cite": "447 N.E.2d 394", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "95 Ill. 2d 211", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3111336 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "217" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/95/0211-01" ] }, { "cite": "591 N.E.2d 31", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "144 Ill. 2d 643", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "584 N.E.2d 865", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1992, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "222 Ill. App. 3d 1071", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5263990 ], "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1075" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/222/1071-01" ] }, { "cite": "527 N.E.2d 1264", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "123 Ill. 2d 303", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5550589 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "312-13" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/123/0303-01" ] }, { "cite": "588 N.E.2d 1111", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1988, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "146 Ill. 2d 477", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5597177 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "484" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/146/0477-01" ] }, { "cite": "612 N.E.2d 513", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "149 Ill. 2d 649", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "608 N.E.2d 327", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1993, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "240 Ill. App. 3d 419", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5137949 ], "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "424" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/240/0419-01" ] }, { "cite": "593 N.E.2d 522", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1992, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "148 Ill. 2d 429", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3283006 ], "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "441" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/148/0429-01" ] }, { "cite": "545 N.E.2d 695", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "131 Ill. 2d 196", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5570158 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "202-03" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/131/0196-01" ] }, { "cite": "550 N.E.2d 553", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1989, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "129 Ill. 2d 561", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "year": 1989, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "546 N.E.2d 651", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1990, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "190 Ill. App. 3d 338", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2521469 ], "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "348" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/190/0338-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 669, "char_count": 13730, "ocr_confidence": 0.787, "pagerank": { "raw": 6.599905439574588e-08, "percentile": 0.40346193928680785 }, "sha256": "3819960169f21f7897f8d9fc20fc2bb1f247ddc54367f3e4eca581a29d07e64b", "simhash": "1:034670967ddfcfcf", "word_count": 2289 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T21:36:39.761555+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "PHILOMENA M. GLYNN, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. THE RETIREMENT BOARD OF THE POLICEMEN\u2019S ANNUITY AND BENEFIT FUND OF THE CITY OF CHICAGO, Defendant-Appellant." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "PRESIDING JUSTICE DiVITO\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nPlaintiff Philomena Glynn brought this action in the circuit court for administrative review of the decision by the Retirement Board of the Policemen\u2019s Annuity and Benefit Fund of the City of Chicago (Retirement Board), rejecting her petition for additional compensation annuity benefits. The circuit court found that the Retirement Board erroneously refused to consider evidence regarding the correct birth date of her deceased husband. The court then granted her motion for summary judgment and remanded the matter to the Retirement Board so that it could grant her the additional benefits. On appeal, the Retirement Board contends that the circuit court erred in reversing its decision because under the Illinois Pension Code, the date of birth stated in the employment application is \"conclusive.\u201d (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1991, ch. 40, par. 5\u2014223 (now 40 ILCS 5/5\u2014223 (West 1992)).) For the reasons that follow, we reverse the judgment of the circuit court.\nOn March 2, 1953, Thomas J. Glynn was appointed to the Chicago police department. In his application for employment with the Civil Service Commission, he stated that he was born on January 3, 1928. Similarly, on his enrollment form with the Retirement Board, he stated that his date of birth was January 3, 1928. Glynn died as a result of an injury sustained in the line of duty on September 20, 1974, and plaintiff began receiving widow\u2019s compensation annuity benefits.\nOn January 17, 1991, the Retirement Board sent plaintiff a letter informing her that because their records indicated that her husband would have turned 63 years old on January 3, 1991, she would no longer receive the compensation annuity, and instead would receive the lesser supplemental annuity benefit. Plaintiff filed a petition with the Retirement Board asserting that because Glynn was actually born on February 4, 1929, he would not have attained the age of 63 until February 4, 1992, and therefore she was entitled to the greater benefit until that time.\nAt the hearing on the petition, plaintiff offered into evidence certified copies of Glynn\u2019s birth certificate and baptismal records, both of which established that Glynn was born on February 4, 1929, rather than January 3, 1928. She also testified that throughout their marriage, their family had always recognized Glynn\u2019s birthday as February 4. On cross-examination, she identified her husband\u2019s signature on the Civil Service Commission application.\nThe Retirement Board first noted that Glynn\u2019s enrollment form indicated that the date of birth of January 3, 1928, had been verified with the Civil Service Commission on July 21, 1953, and then unanimously voted to deny plaintiff\u2019s petition because section 5 \u2014 223 of the Pension Code provides that the age stated in the employment application is conclusive evidence for purposes of the statute.\nOne of the board members then told plaintiff:\n\"Mrs. Glynn, you understand how we feel? We\u2019re faced with the statute, what\u2019s written in the statute.\nI have talked with you on the phone before and I want to tell you that I have requested the [Fraternal Order of Police] to look into statutory changes as far as what a surviving spouse might be entitled to. I have reminded them about that. I don\u2019t want you to feel as though we have forgotten you. We haven\u2019t. We\u2019re sort of tied with this particular decision.\nI hope you\u2019ll understand that.\u201d\nPlaintiff then filed a complaint for administrative review in the circuit court, alleging that the Retirement Board\u2019s decision was not in accordance with the law. Plaintiff subsequently filed a motion for summary judgment.\nAfter a hearing, the circuit court granted plaintiff\u2019s motion, finding that section 5 \u2014 144 of the Pension Code mandates that a surviving spouse be entitled to receive the compensation benefit until the police officer would have actually reached 63, rather than when his application indicates he would have turned 63. The court also stated that it believed that section 5 \u2014 223 applies only to policemen themselves, and not to others who may receive benefits under the Pension Code. The court then entered an order reversing the decision of the Retirement Board and directing it to grant plaintiffs petition on remand. The order also included language pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 304(a) (134 Ill. 2d R. 304(a)) so that the Retirement Board could immediately appeal the ruling.\nOn appeal, the Retirement Board contends that the circuit court erred when it reversed the decision to deny plaintiffs petition because the plain language of section 5 \u2014 223 precludes the Retirement Board from looking beyond the employment application to determine the officer\u2019s date of birth by mandating that the age stated in the application be treated as conclusive evidence. In response, plaintiff maintains that because the restriction of section 5 \u2014 223 is expressly limited to police officers themselves, rather than including their spouses or dependents, she is entitled to receive the greater benefit under section 5 \u2014 144 until her husband would have reached age 63 on February 4, 1992.\nBecause the construction of a statute is a question of law (Berrios v. Rybacki (1989), 190 Ill. App. 3d 338, 348, 546 N.E.2d 651, appeal denied (1990), 129 Ill. 2d 561, 550 N.E.2d 553), we need not give any deference to the interpretation of the circuit court or the Retirement Board. See Van\u2019s Material Co. v. Department of Revenue (1989), 131 Ill. 2d 196, 202-03, 545 N.E.2d 695 (noting that statutory interpretations made by the agency charged with their enforcement are \"clearly not binding on the courts\u201d even though they may receive some respect and deference).\nThe Illinois Pension Code is divided into several articles, each one involving a different group of Illinois pensioners. Article 5, the controlling article in this case, is entitled \"Policemen\u2019s Annuity and Benefit Fund \u2014 Cities over 500,000.\u201d\nSection 5 \u2014 144 provides in pertinent part:\n\"Beginning January 1, 1986, and without regard to whether or not the annuity in question began before that date, if the annuity for a widow of a policeman whose death, on or after January 1, 1940, results from injury incurred in the performance of an act or acts of duty, is not equal to the sum hereinafter stated, 'Compensation Annuity\u2019 equal to the difference between the annuity and an amount equal to 75% of the policeman\u2019s salary *** that would ordinarily have been paid to him as though he were in active discharge of his duties shall be payable to the widow until the policeman, had he lived, would have attained age 63. ***\nThereafter, 'Supplemental Annuity\u2019, equal to the difference between the annuity for the widow and the annuity she would have received if the policeman had continued in service at the salary in effect at his death until he attained age 63, shall be payable to her.\u201d Ill. Rev. Stat. 1991, ch. 108\u00bd, par. 5\u2014144 (now 40 ILCS 5/5\u2014144 (West 1992)).\nSection 5 \u2014 223 provides:\n\"For any policeman, as defined in this Article, who has filed an application for appointment as a member of the police department of the city, the age therein stated shall be conclusive evidence of his age for purposes of this Article.\u201d Ill. Rev. Stat. 1991, ch. 108\u00bd, par. 5\u2014223 (now 40 ILCS 5/5\u2014223 (West 1992)).\nIllinois law is well established that the primary role of a court when construing a statute is to ascertain and to give effect to the intent of the legislature. (Burke v. 12 Rothschild\u2019s Liquor Mart, Inc. (1992), 148 Ill. 2d 429, 441, 593 N.E.2d 522; In re Marriage of Hawking (1992), 240 Ill. App. 3d 419, 424, 608 N.E.2d 327, appeal denied (1993), 149 Ill. 2d 649, 612 N.E.2d 513.) In order to ascertain legislative intent, the court must look to the language of the statute, considering each section in connection with every other section. (Antunes v. Sookhakitch (1992), 146 Ill. 2d 477, 484, 588 N.E.2d 1111.) However, when the language of a statute lends itself to two possible constructions, one of which renders it absurd or illogical while the other appears reasonable and sensible, the construction which leads to an absurd result must be avoided. Mulligan v. Joliet Regional Port District (1988), 123 Ill. 2d 303, 312-13, 527 N.E.2d 1264.\nIn the instant case, the language of section 5 \u2014 144 clearly states that a surviving spouse of a police officer who dies as a result of injuries sustained in the line of duty is entitled to receive the \"Compensation Annuity\u201d until the policeman would have turned 63 years old. That section does not indicate, however, how to calculate when such an event would occur. Accordingly, if we were to construe section 5 \u2014 144 in a vacuum, we would have to agree with the circuit court that plaintiff was entitled to receive the greater benefit until her husband would have actually turned 63 on February 4, 1992, rather than on the earlier date based on the Retirement Board\u2019s records. See Roser v. Anderson (1991), 222 Ill. App. 3d 1071, 1075, 584 N.E.2d 865, appeal denied (1992), 144 Ill. 2d 643, 591 N.E.2d 31 (stating that the plain language of a statute must be given \"its ordinary and popularly understood meaning\u201d).\nBecause we are not construing section 5 \u2014 144 in a vacuum, however, we reach the contrary conclusion. Section 5 \u2014 223 explicitly states that the age stated by a police officer in his application for appointment to the police department \"shall be conclusive evidence of his age for purposes of this Article.\u201d While it is true that section 5 \u2014 223 begins with the introductory clause \"[f]or any policeman,\u201d such language does not necessarily limit its application (as plaintiff argues and the circuit court found) to only those instances where the policeman himself is still involved. To the contrary, the concluding phrase \"for purposes of this Article\u201d implies that the restriction of section 5 \u2014 223 applies to every section found in article 5 of the Pension Code. Thus, because section 5 \u2014 144 must be read in conjunction with section 5 \u2014 223, the only logical conclusion is that the Retirement Board was obligated to calculate Glynn\u2019s age from the date of birth stated in his Civil Service Commission application rather than from his actual birth date as established by plaintiff. Although it is true that pension laws are to be construed liberally in favor of those to be benefitted (Kozak v. Retirement Board of the Firemen\u2019s Annuity & Benefit Fund (1983), 95 Ill. 2d 211, 217, 447 N.E.2d 394), to find otherwise would lead to the absurd conclusion that the Retirement Board must use one method of calculating a policeman\u2019s age in cases where the policeman is still alive, and another method in cases where he is not.\nAccordingly, we hold.that the circuit court erred when it reversed the Retirement Board\u2019s decision and remanded the matter so that plaintiffs petition could be granted.\nFor the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the circuit court of Cook County is reversed.\nReversed.\nHARTMAN and McCORMICK, JJ\u201e concur.\nWe note that such language was unnecessary in this case because rather than conducting an entirely new hearing on remand, the Retirement Board was merely required to grant plaintiff\u2019s petition. See Wilkey v. Illinois Racing Board (1983), 96 Ill. 2d 245, 249, 449 N.E.2d 843 (holding that when a court remands a cause for entry of judgment according to the court\u2019s instructions, the order is considered final and may be reviewed by an appellate court); see also Martin v. Cajda (1992), 238 Ill. App. 3d 721, 726-27, 606 N.E.2d 566 (holding that a remand to an administrative hearing officer to enter a discharge order resolved the dispute between the parties, and was therefore \"substantively final\u201d).\nThis conclusion is also supported by language of prior versions of section 5 \u2014 223.\nThe original' version, enacted in 1921, provided:\n\"In the case of any policeman who shall have filed an application for appointment as a member of the police department of such city, the age stated in such application shall be conclusive evidence of the age of such policeman for the purposes of this Act.\u201d Ill. Rev. Stat. 1921, ch. 24, par. 1004.\nIn 1933, the section was amended. That version provided:\n\"In the case of any policeman who shall have filed an application for appointment as a member of the police department of such city, the age stated in such application shall be conclusive evidence of the age of such policeman for the purposes of this Act, in the absence of fraud, or of a certificate of birth, or of other evidence as to age satisfactory to the retirement board.\u201d (Emphasis added.) Ill. Rev. Stat. 1933, ch. 24, par. 1004.\nIn 1947, the section was amended again to return it to its original language, and remained that way until 1963 when the Pension Code was recodified. At that time, minor changes were made to the section to make it more consistent with the overall Pension Code. That version is the one that remains in effect at this time. See Ill. Rev. Stat. 1963, ch. 108\u00bd, par. 5\u2014223.\nBecause we must presume that the legislature intended to alter the effect of the statute when it amended the language {In re Marriage of Sutton (1990), 136 Ill. 2d 441, 447, 557 N.E.2d 869), we find that by omitting the language of the 1933 version, the legislature intended to remove any ability of the Retirement Board to consider evidence of a policeman\u2019s age other than what appears in his application.", "type": "majority", "author": "PRESIDING JUSTICE DiVITO" } ], "attorneys": [ "David R. Kugler, of Chicago, for appellant.", "Marshall E. Lesueur, of Deerfield, for appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "PHILOMENA M. GLYNN, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. THE RETIREMENT BOARD OF THE POLICEMEN\u2019S ANNUITY AND BENEFIT FUND OF THE CITY OF CHICAGO, Defendant-Appellant.\nFirst District (2nd Division)\nNo. 1\u201493\u20142337\nOpinion filed May 17, 1994.\nDavid R. Kugler, of Chicago, for appellant.\nMarshall E. Lesueur, of Deerfield, for appellee." }, "file_name": "0590-01", "first_page_order": 608, "last_page_order": 613 }