{ "id": 5368735, "name": "FRANK LEE SCOTT et al., Indiv. and as Parents of Kevin Frank Scott, a Minor, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. ROCKFORD PARK DISTRICT et al., Defendants-Appellees", "name_abbreviation": "Scott v. Rockford Park District", "decision_date": "1994-06-23", "docket_number": "No. 2\u201492\u20141454", "first_page": "853", "last_page": "858", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "263 Ill. App. 3d 853" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "149 Ill. App. 3d 235", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3460896 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "240" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/149/0235-01" ] }, { "cite": "158 Ill. 2d 360", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 780285 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "364-65" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/158/0360-01" ] }, { "cite": "61 Nw. U.L. Rev. 265", "category": "journals:journal", "reporter": "Nw. U. L. Rev.", "year": 1966, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "144 Ill. App. 3d 953", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3501035 ], "weight": 3, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "955" }, { "page": "955" }, { "page": "955" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/144/0953-01" ] }, { "cite": "146 Ill. 2d 477", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5597177 ], "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "484" }, { "page": "484" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/146/0477-01" ] }, { "cite": "234 Ill. App. 3d 508", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5187687 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "512" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/234/0508-01" ] }, { "cite": "215 Ill. App. 3d 1013", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5294866 ], "weight": 4, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1016-17" }, { "page": "1017" }, { "page": "1017" }, { "page": "1017" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/215/1013-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 614, "char_count": 12291, "ocr_confidence": 0.785, "pagerank": { "raw": 1.710537864890621e-07, "percentile": 0.7023361207545304 }, "sha256": "b79a423ac1be56e3ec5a8d7cdf8a4b2f412649a39a55b542b9028acaaf04ffa7", "simhash": "1:a7a8cb158f24447d", "word_count": 2024 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T21:36:39.761555+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "FRANK LEE SCOTT et al., Indiv. and as Parents of Kevin Frank Scott, a Minor, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. ROCKFORD PARK DISTRICT et al., Defendants-Appellees." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE GEIGER\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nThe plaintiffs Frank Lee Scott and Gladys Scott (the parents), individually and on behalf of the remaining plaintiff, their minor son Kevin Frank Scott (the son), brought this personal injury action against the defendants, Rockford Park District (the District) and the City of Rockford (the City). The plaintiffs appeal from the court\u2019s order of summary judgment in favor of the defendants. We affirm.\nThis action arose as a result of injuries suffered by the nine-year-old son when the bicycle he was riding allegedly struck a crack in the Kent Creek Bridge. According to an uncontroverted affidavit, Kent Creek runs in a generally north-south direction along the east boundary of Talcott Page Park, a Rockford public park used for recreational purposes. The bridge crosses the creek, and its west end connects to a paved north-south pathway in the park. The boy and his bicycle were thrown over the side of the bridge, which had side rails less than one foot high. The defendants have not denied the allegation that the bridge was a bike path bridge owned and maintained by both the District and the City.\nAccording to the affidavit of the District\u2019s supervisor of support operations, on the date of the accident, the paved path and the Kent Creek Bridge were open to the public for recreational use, including hiking and bicycling. The supervisor also stated that the path and the bridge are neither a city, town, or village street nor a city, town, county, State, Federal, or other road district highway. According to the affidavit, the bridge provided access from the park\u2019s corner for persons using the recreational path and the recreational facilities in the park.\nThe plaintiffs filed their amended complaint, bringing both negligent tort and intentional tort claims against both defendants individually. The parents claimed damages specifically for the son\u2019s injury and also for their own related damages. With reference to section 3 \u2014 106 of the Local Governmental and Governmental Employees Tort Immunity Act (the Tort Immunity Act or the Act) (745 ILCS 10/3 \u2014 106 (West 1992)), the court granted the District\u2019s motion to dismiss negligence counts I and II against it. The court\u2019s grant of that motion is not on appeal.\nAfter the court dismissed counts I and II, each defendant brought a motion for summary judgment (735 ILCS 5/2\u20141005 (West 1992)) on the remaining counts. Both defendants relied on tort immunity under section 3 \u2014 107 of the Act (745 ILCS 10/3\u2014107 (West 1992)). Following hearings, the court granted the defendants summary judgment. This appeal followed.\nIn this appeal, the plaintiffs argue that the trial court erroneously found that the defendants were entitled to section 3 \u2014 107 tort immunity. They argue that section 3 \u2014 107 applies only to wilderness areas, and not to areas such as Kent Creek Bridge or the nearby Talcott Page Park, with their extensive improvements. They also argue that Kent Creek Bridge is neither \"a road that provides access to fishing, hunting or primitive camping areas, recreational or scenic areas\u201d nor \"a hiking, riding, fishing or hunting trail.\u201d\nDirectly at issue are the provisions of sections 3 \u2014 106 and 3 \u2014 107 of the Act. Section 3 \u2014 106 provides that absent willful and wanton conduct proximately causing the injury, a local public entity is not liable for injury \"where the liability is based on the existence of a condition of any public property intended or permitted to be used for recreational purposes, including but not limited to parks, playgrounds, open areas, buildings or other enclosed recreational facilities.\u201d (745 ILCS 10/3\u2014106 (West 1992).) Section 3 \u2014 107 provides local governmental immunity for \"an injury caused by a condition of: (a) Any road which provides access to fishing, hunting, or primitive camping, recreational, or scenic areas and which is not a (1) city, town or village street, (2) county, state or federal highway or (3) a township or other road district highway, (b) Any hiking, riding, fishing or hunting trail.\u201d 745 ILCS 10/3\u2014107 (West 1992).\nIn reviewing a trial court\u2019s grant of summary judgment, we consider all grounds urged and facts revealed in the pleadings, together with all depositions, admissions on file, and any affidavits, to determine if there is a genuine issue of material fact and, if not, whether the movant was entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law. (735 ILCS 5/2\u20141005 (West 1992); Kirnbauer v. Cook County Forest Preserve District (1991), 215 Ill. App. 3d 1013, 1016-17.) We will affirm if the decision to grant summary judgment is justified by a reason appearing in the record. Kirnbauer, 215 Ill. App. 3d at 1017.\nOur review of the court\u2019s order initially requires statutory interpretation of whether section 3 \u2014 107 provides the defendants immunity in this case. It is a primary rule of statutory interpretation that the intent of the legislature should be ascertained and given effect. (Maske v. Kane County Officers Electoral Board (1992), 234 Ill. App. 3d 508, 512.) To do so, a court will first look to the language of the statute as a whole, considering its various parts. (Antunes v. Sookhakitch (1992), 146 Ill. 2d 477, 484.) The best source of the legislative intent usually appears from a consideration of the statute\u2019s language. (Village of Woodridge v. County of Du Page (1986), 144 Ill. App. 3d 953, 955.) The words in the statute are to be given their ordinary meaning, and if the legislative intent can be ascertained therefrom, the language prevails. Woodridge, 144 Ill. App. 3d at 955.\nIn the initial portion of their first argument on appeal, the plaintiffs refer solely to a law review article. According to the article\u2019s author, although tort immunity statutes for park districts are generally to be criticized, section 3 \u2014 107 has a supportable legislative purpose of preserving such property in its natural state. (See Comment, Illinois Tort Claims Act: A New Approach to Municipal Tort Immunity in Illinois, 61 Nw. U.L. Rev. 265 (1966).) The plaintiffs then emphasize the chain link fences, the asphalt and concrete paths, and the park operations buildings in the area of the son\u2019s injury and conclude that section 3 \u2014 107 did not apply here because the view of the park was already cluttered and because additional fences, for example chain link fencing to protect the sides of the bridge, would not further detract from the view.\nIn the second section of their first argument, the plaintiffs refer to the requirement that any statute be interpreted as a whole. (See Antunes, 146 Ill. 2d at 484.) They then consider the language of section 3 \u2014 106 together with that of section 3 \u2014 107. In doing so, they emphasize that section 3 \u2014 106 addresses all property used for recreational purposes but does not provide immunity for willful and wanton conduct. They also emphasize the difference in the language that the two sections use to describe covered areas.\nThe plaintiffs assert that to reach a construction where sections 3 \u2014 106 and 3 \u2014 107 have meanings that are consistent and harmonious with each other, one must conclude that Talcott Page Park and Kent Creek Bridge, because they are clearly covered by section 3 \u2014 106, are not contemplated to be covered by section 3 \u2014 107. Their conclusion includes the observation that those sites contain \"virtually all the items listed in \u00a7 3 \u2014 106 (parks, playgrounds, open areas for softball and hardball and picnic areas), and none of the items listed in \u00a7 3 \u2014 107 (no lake, fishing or horseback riding).\u201d In another assertion as to how this property in question does not allow for section 3 \u2014 107 immunity for the defendants, the plaintiffs emphasize the son\u2019s use of the property leading to his injury: the record is clear that he was not on any particular \"wilderness mission\u201d but, rather, riding his bicycle to buy snacks at a store not associated with the park, crossing the bridge to do so.\nWe agree with the defendants that the bulk of the plaintiffs\u2019 argument is either irrelevant or not compelling. Considering the plain language of sections 3 \u2014 106 and 3 \u2014 107, we find it clear, without resorting to methods of statutory construction, that the primary distinction that the legislature intended to draw in drafting the respective sections of the Act was between, on the one hand, recreation areas (745 ILCS 10/3\u2014106 (West 1992)) and, on the other hand, (a) roads, other than streets and highways, used to access recreation areas; and (b) trails (745 ILCS 10/3\u2014107 (West 1992)). We find no conflict in the legislature\u2019s determination that local entities should be immune from liability only for negligent actions connected with the broader category of properties covered in section 3 \u2014 106 while they would receive full immunity covering the trail and access-road properties covered in section 3 \u2014 107. We also are aware of no clear indication or persuasive authority that the \"access roads\u201d to be covered in subsection (a) would be limited to those providing access to wilderness areas.\nBy its own language, section 3 \u2014 107 covers \"[a]ny hiking, riding, fishing or hunting trail\u201d (745 ILCS 10/3\u2014107(b) (West 1992)) or, alternatively, nonexcluded roads providing \"access to fishing, hunting, or primitive camping, recreational, or scenic areas\u201d (745 ILCS 10/3\u2014107(a) (West 1992)). We examine the plain language of section 3 \u2014 107(a) and find that it unambiguously grants full immunity for access roads to fishing, hunting, primitive camping areas, recreational areas, and scenic areas. (See Woodridge, 144 Ill. App. 3d at 955.) Given the absence of any statutory ambiguity, our analysis stops there; we need not resort to any rules of construction. (See People v. Fitzpatrick (1994), 158 Ill. 2d 360, 364-65.) Thus, we do not implement the rule of construction by which the Tort Immunity Act, because it is in derogation of the common law, is strictly construed against the public entity. Cf. Kirnbauer, 215 Ill. App. 3d at 1017.\nIn the conclusion of their argument, the plaintiffs assert, without any citation to authority, that at the least, there remained a factual question to defeat summary judgment. We find none.\nInitially, we note that the record includes no issue on whether the bridge here is among the types of \"street\u201d or \"highway\u201d excluded from the access roads to be granted coverage under subsection (a). We also find there is no question of fact as to the \"rustic\u201d nature in the bridge or its uses; the subsection\u2019s requirement of \"primitiveness\u201d clearly does not apply to the nature of access roads but, rather, to any camping areas thereby provided access. Furthermore, the relevant access in this case is that which the bridge unquestionably provides to Talcott Page Park; no question of fact has been raised as to whether that park, with its playground and picnic facilities, is a \"recreational area.\u201d Lastly, we note that the bridge uncontrovertedly connects directly to a municipal street and to park maintenance facilities and that it is used for motorized travel. Further, for failure to raise the argument in the trial court, the plaintiffs have waived the question of whether the bridge is covered by section 3 \u2014 107\u2019s term \"road which provides access.\u201d (See Harbor Insurance Co. v. Arthur Andersen & Co. (1986), 149 Ill. App. 3d 235, 240.) We find no question of material fact.\nGiven the full immunity provided by the legislature in the unambiguous language of section 3 \u2014 107(a), and since we find no genuine issue of material fact (see Kirnbauer, 215 Ill. App. 3d at 1017), we affirm the judgment of the circuit court of Winnebago County. Having determined to affirm on that basis, we need not address the defendants\u2019 alternative arguments for affirmance.\nAffirmed.\nINGLIS, P.J., and McLAREN, J\u201e concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE GEIGER" } ], "attorneys": [ "David W. Earnest, of Sachs, Earnest & Associates, Ltd., and Gregory R. Sun, both of Chicago, for appellants.", "Brassfield, Cowan & Howard, of Rockford, for appellee Rockford Park District.", "Daniel J. McGrail, Corporation Counsel, of Rockford, for appellee City of Rockford." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "FRANK LEE SCOTT et al., Indiv. and as Parents of Kevin Frank Scott, a Minor, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. ROCKFORD PARK DISTRICT et al., Defendants-Appellees.\nSecond District\nNo. 2\u201492\u20141454\nOpinion filed June 23, 1994.\nDavid W. Earnest, of Sachs, Earnest & Associates, Ltd., and Gregory R. Sun, both of Chicago, for appellants.\nBrassfield, Cowan & Howard, of Rockford, for appellee Rockford Park District.\nDaniel J. McGrail, Corporation Counsel, of Rockford, for appellee City of Rockford." }, "file_name": "0853-01", "first_page_order": 871, "last_page_order": 876 }